during the whole of the war, as for many years before the germans began their great campaign of aggression, every country with which the fatherland might in any way be concerned was permeated with german agents and german spies. great britain was one of the nations specially favoured in this respect. the ramifications of their systematic interpenetration of the social, political, financial, commercial and even journalistic departments of our public life have never yet been fully exposed; nor, certainly, have the very important personages who conducted this sinister propaganda been dealt with. even when the defence of the realm act is ended and the censorship is abrogated, it is doubtful if the full truth will ever be generally known, so powerful are the influences directly interested in its suppression.
in the united states of america, where similar work was done upon an enormous scale and at vast expense, under circumstances still more favourable to success than in this island, the american government acted with a decision and a vigour that are not yet understood. even so, the amount of mischief done was very great, and, for the first two years of the war at least, the german efforts were largely successful. that a duly accredited ambassador to a friendly power should have been at the head of this vast conspiracy in america, as count bernstorff unquestionably was, introduces a new and most dangerous precedent into the comity of international relations. italy, in like manner, suffered very seriously from german intrigues. the history of the carefully organised disaster upon the isonzo has yet to be written. that it was[258] the result of well-arranged collaboration between clerical organisers of treachery, inspired by austria, german agents, with unlimited financial backing, who had sympathisers in high place, and honest and dishonest fanatics of the pacifist persuasion, does not admit of question. certain it is that in this one case alone german underground machinations were responsible for the crushing defeat of an army of 500,000 men, holding a position where 50,000 good troops could have held a million at bay.[c]
but if great britain, the united states, and italy were thus honeycombed with secret service agents from germany, the nation which the kaiser, his chief of staff and the junkers were most anxious to crush down beyond the possibility of recovery was still more imperilled by astute german infiltration. up to the crisis of agadir in 1911, french finance was, to an ever increasing extent, manipulated by german jews, who made it their special business to become more parisian than the parisians themselves. they were consequently regarded with favour by people whose patriotism was beyond question. scarcely a great french finance institution but had close relations in some form with germans, whose continuous attention to business and excellent general information rendered them valuable coadjutors for the french, who, as a rule, are not very exactly informed on foreign matters. very few saw any danger in this. it seemed, indeed, a natural result of the great growth of german trade, as well as of the position which germans had acquired as capable managers of the growing french factory industry in the north-eastern provinces.
this latter point is of importance. so long as any industry remains in the old form, where individual skill, meticulous attention to detail, and close observance of quality are the rule, the french are second to none in their methods. but when the next stage is reached, and machine production[259] reigns on a very large scale, with its concomitant standardisation of output, then the french seem to fail for lack of the thorough organising faculty of the german or the american. hence in many directions the highly educated, methodical, progressive foreigner from across the frontier had begun to take the place of the more conservative frenchman. this process could be observed in the department of motor-cars, where the french, who were undoubtedly the pioneers, had begun to fall behind upon the world market in the time just anterior to the war. not only the americans, but the germans, and even italy, showed more capacity to gauge the necessities of the coming period than france in their output of cars.
but, in addition to this, frenchmen, the most thrifty people in the world, are disinclined to use their savings in the development of their own country. in literature, in science, in art, they display great faculties of initiative. in the matter of investment they prefer to rely upon others. even the underground railways of their metropolis were started by a foreigner: the french investors only coming in to buy the debentures of companies which they might just as well have started themselves. they complained that the germans were making vast profits out of “their own” iron mines of lorraine which had been taken from france in an undeveloped state in 1871; yet they failed to exploit the still richer deposits in briey, of which the germans were so envious that the desire to possess them was one of the minor causes of the war. similar instances of neglected opportunities could be pointed out in many districts.
this indifference of the thrifty french investors to the possibility of enriching their own country by the use at home of the money capital obtained from their own savings, and the profits derived from visitors, astonished lookers-on. clemenceau denounced the folly of financial wars of conquest in semi-civilised countries when france needed her own resources for the improvement of her own soil and what underlay it, as well[260] as to make adequate preparation for war. but the loans to foreign nations and foreign banks were economically as prejudicial to her real interests as the injurious colonial policy. that was proved only too clearly, even in the field of military preparation when, in august and september, 1914, tens of thousands of men, unsupplied with clothing and equipment, were to be seen in and around paris. england had to provide them with what they required.
in such a state of affairs, where neglect of consideration as to the purposes of loans was the rule, so long as the interest seemed quite secure, german banks could and did act with great advantage. they borrowed french savings at a low rate and employed them for profitable objects, or for their own more complete war preparations on economical terms. after the shock of agadir, when war at one period seemed certain, the french called in most of their loans and thenceforward were rather more cautious. but, in the meantime, and even afterwards, france’s savings had been used to strengthen her bitterest enemy. and this was the end the germans kept constantly in view when they borrowed. france, in fact, built up german credit against herself, at the same time that germany was able to estimate exactly the economic power of her destined victim, and to investigate, without appearing to do so, the weak points in french preparation for defence. the german banks and their french friends played together the same game, in a different way, that the deutsche bank and the dresdner bank did in london and the banca commerciale in italy. the whole formed part of the vast economic octopus scheme, in finance and in industry, which went hand in hand with the co-ordination of military effort destined for attack.
it is easy to discern how all this peaceful financial manipulation played into the hands of the german government and fostered german influence in paris and in france. there was nothing which could be reasonably objected to, under the conditions of to-day, if holland, or belgium, had been the[261] nation concerned. but with germany it was quite different.
not only was french money being used on german account, but, under cover of quite legitimate finance and apparently genuine newspaper enterprise, most nefarious schemes were hatched in peace whose full utility to the enemy would only be disclosed in war. taking no account even of the actual operations of bribery, which we now know were carried on upon a very large scale, everybody who was directly or indirectly interested in the various forms of parasitical franco-german finance had personally excellent reasons for pooh-poohing distrust of the friendly nation on the other side of the frontier. thus the most pressing warnings addressed to the french government might be rendered almost useless—as, in fact, they were—by influence brought to bear from quarters that were pecuniarily above suspicion. an atmosphere favourable to german propaganda was created which covered up and favoured the sinister plans of men and women who were actually in german pay. this went on long before the war, and was continued in still more dangerous shape after the war had begun.
then there were the honest pacifists, who regarded all war, even defensive war, as disastrous to the workers. whether germany won or france won in any conflict, the capitalists and the capitalists alone were the real enemy. two such different men as edouard vaillant and gustave hervé held this opinion; and both at great international socialist congresses declared that every effort should be made to prevent france from coming to an actual struggle with germany, no matter what the provocation might be. when, however, they saw what the policy of the kaiser and his junker militarists really meant they changed their minds. so, in the early days of the war, did the majority of french socialists; and several of their principal men, including jules guesde, the leader of the marxists, and albert thomas, joined m. briand’s cabinet.
[262]
but there was always an active section left which in all good faith stood to their views that under the capitalist system nothing could justify the workers of one country in killing the workers of another. they had no interest in their own nation which was worth defending in the field. the past of france was for them a record of class oppression, the present of france the continuance of chattel slavery in disguise, the future of france no better than the permanence of penal servitude for life as wage-slaves to the bourgeoisie. german domination could be no worse for them than the economic tyranny of their own capitalist countrymen.
this form of social fanaticism now exists in every european nation. it is as bitter and, given the opportunity, as unscrupulous and cruel as any form of religious intolerance that ever exercised control. economic theory entirely obscures history and facts with such men. not even the awful horrors of the german invasion, horrors quite unprecedented in modern warfare and systematically practised in order to engender terror, and destroy the means of creating wealth, could convert socialists of this school. as a socialist i understand their fanaticism, though i despise their judgment. capitalism under the control of home employers and financiers is bad, but it can be controlled by educated workers. capitalism in victorious alliance with foreign junkerdom would have made france uninhabitable for frenchmen, and would have thrown back democratic socialism for at least two generations throughout europe.
nevertheless, this furious minority, in conjunction with socialists of political intrigue, among whom jean longuet (son of charles longuet the member of the commune and grandson of karl marx) was the leader, became eventually the majority, owing to the weakness of the heads of the patriotic section. this success laid the french socialist party open to the charge of being not only anti-patriotic but definitely pro-german. it led to the retirement of forty-one deputies from the “unified” combination. the violent animosity[263] of the main body to clemenceau at the time when he was forced into office, and the refusal of socialists to accept portfolios in his cabinet, when the cause of the allies was at its lowest point, from november, 1917, to july, 1918, looked to outsiders a miserable policy for the party, not to be explained by the devotion of its members to mm. malvy and caillaux.[d] personal malevolence and political pusillanimity together were the imputations made against those who thus declined to serve france in her utmost need. happily for europe, their strength was not equal to their ill-will, and clemenceau, after his first month of power, was able to treat them as a negligible quantity. so they remain to-day. a very great opportunity of serving the workers of their country has been missed: that the bitterest enemy of france and of freedom has not been greatly helped in her war for universal domination is no fault of theirs.
during the first three years and more of the war, however, a conspiracy was being conducted which, aided unfortunately by much of apathy and ineptitude on the part of successive french governments, and supported unintentionally or intentionally by one of the leading statesmen of france, went near to wrecking the fortunes of the republic. that this fateful plot failed to achieve the full success which the germans anticipated from it is due to clemenceau. sordid monetary sympathy with the enemy is difficult to forgive: socialist[264] fanaticism and socialist intrigues which must tell to the disadvantage of the nation are hard to reconcile with common honesty; but downright infamous treachery, bribery, corruption, and wholesale attempts to organise defeat put all who are guilty of them outside the law. yet matters had come to such a pass that all these various forms of treason to france, to the allies, and to soldiers at the front could be carried on with impunity.
though the guilty persons were well known and their german plots were scarcely concealed, none of the ministers responsible for the public safety dared arrest them. journals that were obviously published in the interest of the enemy were allowed to spread false information as they pleased, and to attack all statesmen and politicians who were honestly trying to serve france with vitriolic misrepresentation. day after day this went on. day after day, as the situation without grew more precarious, the chiefs of this criminal endeavour to bring france to ruin grew bolder in their well-paid treachery. the people of paris and the soldiery in the trenches, whose minds also german agents strove to debauch with plausible lies, were becoming hopeless of justice being done. ministry succeeded ministry and still the traitors were treated with consideration by the minister of the interior, m. malvy, and other men in high place.
beyond question the man officially responsible for all this shameful laxity, at one of the most trying crises of the whole war, was m. malvy, who enjoyed the whole-souled support of the socialist party, on account of creditable behaviour towards the workers, altogether outside of questions arising from the war. but his conduct in regard to traitors and pro-germans had become so weak as to be capable of the worst interpretation.
on july 24th, 1917, clemenceau declared that he utterly distrusted m. malvy. it was known even thus early that this minister had shown deplorable incapacity in his dealings with men who are known to have been actual traitors.[265] he had, in fact, decided not to arrest persons enumerated in what was called “list b,” that is to say, men and women more than suspected of criminal intrigue against france. had not almereyda himself assured m. malvy, as minister of the interior, that he and all other anarchists and anti-patriotic agitators would really desist from their sinister proceedings? this was enough. without taking any steps against them, or even obtaining any security for the fulfilment of this promise in the air, m. malvy left these miscreants alone to do what they pleased. so things went on as before; though, as has since been proved, several of these active agitators for peace, disaffection and surrender were paid agents of the german government.
when, therefore, a resolution of confidence in m. ribot’s administration was proposed in the senate, clemenceau voted for the resolution, but made special exception in the case of m. malvy, in whom he declared he had no confidence whatever. later, clemenceau boldly accused m. ribot and his whole administration of being themselves all responsible for the existence of the treacherous german bonnet rouge and bolo conspiracy. most unfortunately, notwithstanding the universal distrust thus awakened and spreading from paris throughout france, republican ministers, who ought to have been the first to move to safeguard the interests of france and her republic, against the dangerous plots of men known to be immersed in abominable dealings with the enemy, failed altogether in their duty. they left it to avowed royalists and reactionaries to lead the attack upon persons guilty of these crimes. what, consequently, ought to have been done at once, legally and thoroughly, by men who had received political power by vote of the french people, and were trustees for the defence of the country, against the foreign enemy from without and the domestic enemy within, was left largely to be accomplished by m. léon daudet and m. barrès.
these men made no secret of the fact that they were actuated by motives entirely antagonistic to the democratic policy of the allies and hostile to the only form of government[266] possible in france. this did not render their indictment less crushing when the facts were fully disclosed, but it certainly weakened the force of the attack. what is more, it gave a large and, later, apparently the largest section of the socialist party the excuse, which they were eager to grasp, for supporting m. malvy, and more particularly their friend m. joseph caillaux, against what they were pleased to denounce as abominable detraction.
newspapers to-day are credited, perhaps, with more political influence than they really possess. but it is clear that if nearly the whole of the important press of a country can be captured by a particular faction, and only such news is allowed to be published as suits the convenience of the government in power, the people at large have no means of correcting the false impressions of events thus thrust upon them. that is an extreme case, which has, so far, been realised, in practice, in only one country. but the german agents who were so active in paris were fully alive to the advantages of such a policy of purchase and manipulation of the press for their own ends. they made efforts to secure a control of the majority of the shares in some of the most influential journals of paris. how far this process was surreptitiously carried will never be known: not far enough, certainly, to affect the tone of the organs they were anxious to manipulate.
but enough was done to show the great danger which would have resulted to the community, had a newspaper trust been successfully created on the scale contemplated, but fortunately never carried out, by the infamous bolo pasha and his associates. their own journal, le bonnet rouge, even when increased during the war from a weekly to a daily issue, was not by any means sufficient for their needs, although that traitorous sheet alone was able to do a great deal of mischief. but their control was extended to the journal, a paper, prior to the war, of considerable circulation and influence. their attempts to expand further were in full swing when, thanks to the work of mm. léon daudet and barrès in the action[267] fran?aise, and still more to that of their bitter opponent clemenceau in l’homme encha?né and in the senate, the french government was forced to arrest the proprietors of the bonnet rouge and put them on their trial as traitors. it was known that m. caillaux and m. paix-séailles—the latter connected with m. painlevé’s cabinet and the repository of anti-french confidences—had contributed considerable sums to the support of the incriminated paper.
when m. almereyda, one of the most important persons connected with the bonnet rouge (to whose columns a leading socialist was a contributor) died suddenly in prison, the editor of that journal telegraphed to m. caillaux concerning the lamentable departure of “our friend.” as these facts were accompanied by other revelations still more compromising, public opinion became greatly excited. there could be no doubt that the conspiracy was more than a mere anti-patriotic newspaper intrigue of financial origin, or an attempt of discredited politicians to float themselves back into office on the wave of discouragement and defeatism: it was an endeavour, supported throughout by german funds, to destroy french confidence in order to ensure french destruction. a complete exposure of the whole plot, in which m. caillaux and bolo pasha were alleged to be the leading figures, was threatened in the course of the bonnet rouge trial. eleven members of the army committee of the senate were appointed to consider m. caillaux’s connection with m. almereyda and the bonnet rouge.
m. caillaux has been by far the most formidable advocate of a german peace from the first. that an ex-premier of france should take up such a position would seem almost incredible, but that signor giolitti in italy and lord lansdowne in england have pursued the same course in a less objectionable way. the political relations between clemenceau and m. caillaux in the years prior to the war had not been unfriendly. m. caillaux had been finance minister in clemenceau’s cabinet in 1907, and they had both worked together for m. pams[268] against m. poincaré in the contest for the presidency. but two more different personalities it would be difficult to find.
m. caillaux is a financier of financiers. his whole career has been associated with the dexterous manipulation and acquisition of money in all its forms. clemenceau never had anything to do with finance in his fife, and wealth is the last thing anybody could accuse him of possessing. clemenceau, though no sentimentalist, makes an exception in his view of life where frenchmen, france and paris are concerned. with caillaux audacious cynicism in everything is the key-note of his character all through. moreover, the one is very simple in his habits, and the other is devoted to ostentation and display. caillaux’s cynicism is as remarkable as that of henry labouchere, though more malignant. when he carried the income tax through the assembly and was upbraided for having made himself the champion of such a measure, he claimed that, though he had obtained for his measure a majority in the assembly, he had used such arguments as would destroy it in the country.
whatever may be the truth of that story, it is certain that the result has been as predicted. so in the course of the agadir affair. m. caillaux, as prime minister during the whole of the proceedings, was reluctant, and perhaps rightly so, to assert the claims of france with vigour. he was, in fact, quite lukewarm on behalf of his country, the representatives of other nations doing more for france, it is said, than she, or her premier, did for herself. no sooner, however, was the business settled than m. caillaux, the judicious but unavowed anti-expansionist, claimed that he had secured morocco for france! however this may be, m. caillaux has always favoured a close political and financial understanding with germany, as by far the more advantageous policy for france, in opposition to a similar entente with england: a view which, of course, he was quite entitled to take and act upon, though its success in practice must have reduced france to the position[269] of a mere satellite of the fatherland. before the war it was possibly a justifiable, though scarcely a far-seeing, policy.
the war itself rather strengthened than weakened his tendency in this direction. having comfortably recovered from the unpleasing effect of the murder of m. calmette of the figaro, for which crime his wife was acquitted, he used all his influence, in and out of france, to bring about a peace with germany, which could with difficulty be distinguished from complete surrender, as soon as possible. this while the german armies were in actual occupation of more than a fifth of his devastated country, that fifth being the richest part of france. his interviews with signer giolitti, a vehement partisan of germany, and certain strange intrigues in rome and elsewhere, could only be regarded as the more suspicious from the fact that he travelled with a passport made out in a fictitious name. altogether m. caillaux’s proceedings at home and abroad, in europe and in south america, gave the impression that he was pursuing a policy of his own which was diametrically opposed to the welfare of his countrymen.
some who have watched closely m. caillaux’s career from his youth up are of opinion that the man is mad. but there is certainly method in his madness. whatever the defects to which the high priests of international financial brotherhood may plead guilty, they never admit lunatics into their teutono-hebraic holy of holies. access to the interior of that sanctuary is reserved for the very elect of the artists in pecuniary conveyance. but it is precisely within this innermost circle of glorified mammon that m. joseph caillaux is most at home and most influential. and these people, so ensconced in their golden temple, were the ones most anxious to bring the war to an end no matter what became of france. this, as has been well said, was a civil war for jews; but for the jews of the great international of mammon it was civil war and hari-kari at one and the same time. so there was weeping and wail in frankfurt-am-main, there was wringing of hands in berlin on[270] the spree, and the parisian devotees of the golden calf were not less profuse in their lamentations.
as a matter of fact, international finance was, and is, the most pacifist of all the internationals, and m. joseph caillaux as director of the société générale, a portion of the great banque de paris et pays bas, represented its view perfectly. but that he is not devoid of political as well as financial astuteness is apparent from the extraordinary success he has achieved in securing close intimacy and friendship with the french socialists. this has assured him the support not only of jean longuet and his friends, with whom he was specially bound up, but also of l’humanité, with renaudel, sembat, thomas and others connected with that useful journal. it has, indeed, been very difficult to understand the bitter hatred which the socialists of france have manifested towards the thoroughgoing patriot clemenceau, and their persistent championship of pro-germans such as caillaux and malvy. but the dry-rot of pro-germanic pacifism has infected a large proportion of the younger school of international socialists in every country. with socialism, as with commerce and finance, the german policy of unscrupulous penetration has been pursued with great success. honest fanatics as well as self-seeking intriguers have fallen victims to their wiles. caillaux was equally fortunate in capturing both sections. even the rougher type of german agents, such as bolo and duval, were not without their friends in the socialist camp.
the investigation of his conduct before the army committee of the senate was, in effect, an informal trial of m. caillaux, m. malvy’s case having already been remitted by the same body for definite adjudication by the high court. naturally, m. caillaux and his friends strained every nerve, first to prevent clemenceau from being forced into office by public opinion; and then, when his assumption of the premiership became inevitable, to upset his ministry while its members were scarcely warm in their seats. the french socialist party, unfortunately, aided m. caillaux and his friends in their attacks,[271] after having declined the premier’s offer of seats in his cabinet. shortly afterwards clemenceau himself was summoned to appear as a witness before the committee of the senate on this serious indictment. it is difficult for us to imagine the sensation which this produced. here was m. caillaux, who had been prime minister of france only a few short years before, who had previously been clemenceau’s intimate colleague, openly charged with the despicable crime of trading france away to the enemy.
no wonder a great many thoroughly patriotic frenchmen could not believe, even in the face of the evidence, that a statesman of m. caillaux’s ability, with a great future before him after the war, could be guilty of such actions as those which were imputed to him. but his old colleague who had just taken office was in possession of documents which threw an ugly shadow upon all m. caillaux’s recent proceedings. as usual clemenceau went straight to the point. the government had not furnished the members of the committee with mere surmises or doubts cast upon the general conduct of the incriminated person. there were printed statements already at their disposal of the gravest character. with three notorious persons m. caillaux had intimate connections. one of them, when arrested, had died suspiciously in prison: the two others were still under arrest upon most serious charges. if this were the case of a common citizen he would have been brought at once before a magistrate. the whole country was crying out for the truth in this caillaux case as well as in the malvy affair.
this happened soon after clemenceau had accepted office. a month later, m. caillaux being in the meantime protected against arrest by his position as deputy, clemenceau repeated that if all the probabilities accumulated against caillaux had been formulated against any private person his fate would have been practically decided already. “the government has undertaken responsibilities. the chamber must likewise shoulder responsibilities. if the chamber refuses to sanction[272] the prosecution of m. caillaux, the government will not remain in office.”
m. caillaux’s admitted conferences with well-known defeatists in italy were of such a nature that baron sonnino, the italian minister for foreign affairs, had himself informed the french government that he was inclined to expel caillaux forthwith. no doubt he would have done so, but for the fact that m. caillaux had been, and might possibly still be again, an important personage in french and european affairs. throughout, clemenceau promised that the public should have the full truth. he kept his word. the delays in bringing m. caillaux to a definite judgment have not been due to him. m. caillaux’s immunity as deputy was suspended. he was arrested and imprisoned on january 15th, 1918. four days later came the partial disclosure of the documents found in his private safe in florence.
that such papers should ever have been left by a man of m. caillaux’s intelligence where they might quite conceivably be attached, and that he should have carefully put in writing the names of men whom he hoped to use for the purpose of furthering a coup d’état, do unquestionably support the theory that he is subject to intermittent fits of madness. his extraordinary proceedings at buenos aires, where, according to the united states representative in the argentine capital, he entered into a series of most compromising negotiations with the german von luxburg, were no good evidence of the permanent sanity of this successful and experienced man of affairs. but “madness in great ones must not unwatched go.” his object was avowed in that remote city: to make peace with germany at any price, for the purpose of reviving international finance. all these statements coming in succession, and accompanied by the formulation of the cases against m. malvy, bolo pasha, with duval and others of the bonnet rouge clique, at length roused furious public indignation, which the actions of m. humbert, the senator and owner of the journal, the paper that bolo had in effect bought, further[273] inflamed. who could be regarded as entirely free from treacherous designs, when such a crushing indictment as that officially formulated against caillaux could be accepted as correct?—when a minister of the interior could be publicly charged with criminal weakness towards persons more than suspected of high treason of the most sordid type?—and when a man of bolo pasha’s career and associations evidently exercised great influence, not to say authority?
the revelations at the trials of the accused persons, and the ugly evidence submitted not only made matters look worse for m. caillaux, but roused general amazement that such deadly intrigues should have been allowed to go so far under the very eyes of the authorities. the career of bolo pasha, the direct agent-in-chief of the main conspiracy, was well known. the men with whom he was on terms of close intimacy were suspected persons, long before any action was taken. the secret service department was well aware that he had huge sums of money at his disposal that were very, very far in excess of any that he could command from his private resources. the origin of his title of dishonour from the khedive could not have escaped notice. yet he, a born frenchman, all whose begettings and belongings were a matter of record, pursued his shameless policy in the interest of germany with apparent certainty of immunity from interference.
it was this very same certainty of immunity that made all but a few afraid to speak out. bolo, in fact, was a privileged person, until there was a statesman at the head of affairs who not only did not fear to take the heavy responsibility of the arrest and imprisonment of m. caillaux, but was also determined that the proceedings in the other cases already commenced should be pushed to their inevitable conclusion. “the unseen hand” in france, therefore, was no longer unseen. yet so wide was the reach of the octopus tentacles, directed by underground agency, that even to this day not a few innocent, as well as guilty, people are in mortal fear lest disclosures may be made which will in some or other[274] way implicate them. for the trial of m. caillaux has yet to come.
the two really dramatic episodes in all this gradual exposure of infamy were the arrest and imprisonment of m. caillaux, upon the suspension of his privileges as deputy, and the public trial of bolo pasha. after what had happened since august, 1914, it seemed almost impossible that any minister, however powerful he might be, would venture to go to the full extent of what was indispensably necessary with m. caillaux. a man who had been prime minister of france, who in that capacity had gathered round him groups of politicians whose members looked to him to ensure their personal success in the future, was formidably entrenched both in the senate and in the assembly. to incur the personal enmity of such a capable statesman and such a master of intrigue as joseph caillaux was more than any of the previous ministries had dared to risk. there were too many political reasons against it. even the most honest of the socialist ministers themselves seem to have felt that. all the time, likewise, an influential portion of the press vigorously supported the ex-premier. they carried the war into the enemy’s camp by denouncing his critics either as unscrupulous and lying reactionaries, who were endeavouring to ruin a really progressive statesman, as men imbued with such lust for slaughter and eagerness for revenge that they had lost all grip of the actual situation, or as malignant intriguers behind the scenes whose one object was to blacken the character of an opponent who stood in the way of their schemes for personal aggrandisement.
furthermore, m. caillaux, holding the eminent position already referred to in the world of finance, had the whole-souled and entire-pocket backing of the french and german-jew international money-lords. these magnates of plutocracy, marvellous to relate, found themselves on this issue hand in glove with the most active international french socialists. nobody who was in the least afraid of political cliques, of journalistic coteries, of financial syndicates, or of socialist[275] rancour, could put caillaux under lock and key. and the military outlook lent itself to the encouragement of the leading advocate of surrender and his acolytes. the word was assiduously passed round that, now russia was out of the fray, a drawn battle was the very best that the entente could hope for.
france was bled white, great britain was war-weary and her workers were discontented, italy—think of caporetto—while, as to the united states, america was a long way off, president wilson was still “too proud to fight” in earnest, american troops could never be transported in sufficient numbers across the atlantic, and, to say nothing of dangers from submarines, there was not enough shipping afloat to do it. all pointed, therefore, to prompt “peace by negotiation,” and what better man could there be to negotiate such a peace than m. joseph caillaux? it was because he was the one political personage in france who could secure fair terms for his distressful country, at this terrible crisis, that he was so persistently attacked by the chauvinists as a pro-german and accused of the most sordid treachery by men who envied him his power at the international council table!
such was the situation. so long as m. caillaux was at large, and able to direct the whole of the forces of defeatism, no genuinely patriotic ministry could be successfully formed, or, if formed by some fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, could last for three months. treachery breeds treachery as loyalty engenders loyalty. when clemenceau took office, therefore, everything depended upon what he did with caillaux. paris and all france held their breath as they awaited the event. patriots were doubtful: defeatists were hopeful: soldiers were on the look-out for a man.
on january 15th, then, m. caillaux was arrested and put in prison by clemenceau and his ministry. all the predictions of upheaval and disaster, indulged in by m. caillaux’s friends, were falsified. the country breathed more freely. thenceforward, france knew whom to back. but, supposing that[276] m. caillaux had still been within the precincts of parliament and carrying on his political plots when the terrible news came of the disasters of cambrai and st. quentin, and when the german armies were within cannon-shot of paris—how then? those who knew best how things stood believe themselves that counsels of despair and pusillanimity might have prevailed, to the ruin of the country.
no such fateful issue as that involved in caillaux’s arrest hung upon the result of the trial of bolo pasha. but bolo’s whole career was a tragical farce, to which even alphonse daudet could scarcely have done full justice. bolo was a frenchman of the midi: a tartarin with the tendencies of a financial vautrin: a fine specimen of the flamboyant and unscrupulous international adventurer. his first experience in the domain of extraction was as a dentist in the country of his birth. a handsome, blond young man of fine appearance and manners and methods of address attractive to women, he soon found that the drawing of teeth and other less skilled professions led to the receipt of no emoluments worthy of his talents. to take in a well-to-do partner and decamp with his wife and the firm’s cash-box was more in the way of business.
so satisfactory was this first adventure that he extended his field of operations, and several ladies had the advantage of paying for his attentions in the shape of all the money of which they chanced to be possessed. somehow or other he found himself in the champagne country during the wine-growers’ riots, and continued to have a good time in the district while they were going on. but in 1905 the claret region proved more lucrative. for in bordeaux the charm of his disposition produced so great an effect upon the widow of a rich merchant of that city that she succumbed to his attractions and married him. this provided bolo with the means for setting on foot all sorts of financial enterprises in europe and america. he thus became a promoter of the open-hearted and sanguine type, found his way into “society” of the kind which opens its arms to such men, had sufficient[277] influence to become a chevalier of the legion of honour, and by 1914 had lost all his wife’s money and more into the bargain—was, in fact, in very serious financial straits from which he saw no way of extricating himself. certain egyptian friends he had made, who later obtained for him his title of pasha from the khedive, were not then in a position to help him.
but bolo without money meant a german agent in search of a job. it proved easy to get it. he notified the germans through the egyptians that he could do good service in france if only he were provided with plenty of funds. he was so furnished with hundreds of thousands of pounds. l’homme libre said of him that he revelled in the prestige of having money, to such an extent that he believed that money was everything. rather, perhaps, he had become so accustomed to indulge in pleasures and political and financial intrigues of every sort that he would run any risk rather than give up the game. so it was that he carried on the dangerous policy, if such it could be called, sketched above.
about his guilt there could be no doubt. that he had been closely connected with people in high places as well as in low, and possessed considerable personal magnetism, was clear. all this came out in court, where persons of every grade, from ministers and senators to levantine rogues and parisian courtesans, passed in and passed out like figures on a cinema film. bolo, of course, denied every charge, and posed as a financier of high degree, but he was condemned to death, and his appeal against the sentence was fruitless, though he pretended he could make harrowing disclosures. he met his death bravely on april 10th. his fate was a heavy blow to other spies and conspirators.
there was an interpellation on the bolo trial, a month before his execution that led to a powerful speech by clemenceau, in which he declared that he was first for liberty, next for war, and finally for the sacrifice of everything to secure victory. he then made a vigorous appeal to the socialists to join with the rest of the country in supporting his govern[278]ment in a supreme effort to free france from the invader. “it is a great misfortune that my administration should be denounced by renaudel”—then editor of l’humanité—“as a danger to the workers. my hands are to the full as hardened by toil as those of renaudel and albert thomas, good bourgeois citizens as they are, like myself. i have in my pocket a paper in which renaudel is stigmatised as clemenceau’s orderly; nay, adding insult to injury, he is held up to public obloquy as monsieur renaudel.” then, addressing the socialist group, he declared with vehemence: “we have done you no harm, but my methods are not yours. you will not defeat prussian junkerdom by baa-ing around about peace.” the appeal was quite bootless. on a division confidence in the clemenceau government was voted by 400 to 75. the socialists were the 75. the vote was a direct outcome of the sordid and gruesome bolo case.
summary of events relating to treachery in paris,
july, 1917, to july, 1918.
july, 1917.—clemenceau attacks m. malvy, then minister of the interior, for ruinous weakness towards traitors.
assails the ribot ministry as responsible for the propaganda of the pro-german journal le bonnet rouge.
it was shown later that this newspaper had received state support to the extent of ￡4,000 a year.
august, 1917.—m. almereyda (alias vigo), connected with bolo pasha, m. caillaux and the bonnet rouge, arrested and dies in prison.
m. malvy “explains” the almereyda affair.
september, 1917.—m. malvy resigns.
october, 1917.—debate in chamber upon m. léon daudet’s charge of treason against malvy.
captain bouchardon begins investigation.
proprietors of bonnet rouge arrested.279]
november, 1917.—revelations by clemenceau in l’homme enchainé, which had been going on for a twelvemonth, take effect on public.
bonnet rouge trial.
revelations concerning m. paix-séailles’s document about french troops at salonika to have been published in bonnet rouge. paix-séailles in m. painlevé’s entourage.
clemenceau exposes caillaux’s intrigues with almereyda, the bonnet rouge, the defeatists in italy, and comments on the large subsidies to the bonnet rouge which enabled it to become a daily instead of a weekly sheet.
clemenceau forms ministry.
december, 1917.—clemenceau examined before committee of senate on caillaux affair.
clemenceau declares if parliament would not sanction prosecution of caillaux his ministry would resign.
caillaux’s immunity as deputy suspended by vote.
january, 1918.—captain bouchardon’s report on bolo pasha published.
traces bolo’s career from 1914, his intrigues with germany through ex-khedive of egypt and other egyptians. receipt by bolo of ￡400,000 from deutsche bank.
bolo buys shares in journal, and tries to buy shares also in the figaro and the temps.
m. caillaux arrested.
his private safe brought from florence containing strange papers relating, among other things, to a suggested coup d’état.
united states agent at buenos aires reveals series of negotiations between m. caillaux and the german representative, count luxburg, having for object the conclusion of a german peace.
m. malvy arraigned before the high court of the senate.
february, 1918.—trial of bolo begun. caillaux, humbert and others incriminated.
[280]
u.s.a. secret service shows that large sums passed from count bernstorff, german ambassador in washington, to bolo for the purposes of german propaganda.
bolo found guilty and condemned to be shot on february 16th.
m. malvy’s case before the high court extended.
march, 1918.—bolo appeals.
bolo case discussed in chamber. socialists attack clemenceau. vote of confidence in clemenceau’s ministry 400 to 75.
terrible military disasters at cambrai and st. quentin due to heavy german attack on positions weakened by withdrawal of british troops.
april, 1918.—bolo shot.
caillaux in gaol.
malvy trial continued.
may, 1918.—caillaux “explains” his connection with le bonnet rouge.
june, 1918.—committee report on m. malvy’s case and fix date of trial.
july, 1918.—m. malvy found guilty of undue laxity towards traitors and condemned to exile from france.
french socialists infuriated at m. malvy’s expulsion.
