the events of the great war, from 1914 onwards, are too recent and too deeply graven on all our minds to call for lengthy recital or criticism. what many, if not most, people believed to be outside the limits of calculation occurred. the german armies commenced their campaign by outraging the neutrality of belgium, which, in 1870, even bismarck had respected. in a few days they crashed down the great belgian fortresses, which capable experts had calculated would check the teutonic advance for at least a month, with howitzers specially constructed and tested for that purpose; soon they exhausted the resources of barbarism in torturing, butchering and shooting down unarmed men, women and children whose country they had solemnly sworn to safeguard; and they devastated and destroyed homes, beautiful buildings, and great libraries, which even a turcoman horde might have spared, and extorted tremendous ransom and blood-money from the defenceless inhabitants.
that accomplished, this torrent of ruffianism and infamy poured in upon france with almost irresistible fury. the horrors of 1870-71 were far outdone. the defeats of mons, charleroi and metz, the impossibility that their opponents should resist such overwhelming odds, made the germans believe that for the second time in half a century they would force paris to surrender. then they were prepared to wreak upon the great city, the social capital of europe, the full vengeance of destruction.
it is not easy, even for those who remember what occurred in the terrible year of the downfall of the second empire, and the prostration of the french republic before the german[248] invaders, to imagine what were the feelings of all frenchmen who went through that period of martyrdom for their country when they saw a still worse storm of brutality and hatred breaking out upon them—when, too, more rapidly than before, amiens was in danger and paris seriously threatened. clemenceau, with his devotion to france and almost worship of the city where he had spent his whole manhood, was more hardly hit than perhaps any of his countrymen. he had experienced the horrors of the former invasion; and though, when france was at its lowest, he never despaired of the republic, no ordinary man of seventy-three could possess the resource and resilience of a man of thirty.
yet clemenceau showed little loss of vigour compared with his former self. no englishman has ever undergone what he underwent at that period. undoubtedly, when the news came to us of the great retreat of august, 1914, our heartfelt sympathy went out to our own men. we were all likewise full of admiration for our french comrades who still held the franco-british line unbroken. but at least our hearths and homes were kept in safety for us—the raids of aircraft excepted—by the magnificent courage of our sailors in the north sea and of our soldiers who freely gave their lives to protect us from the enemy. if we would fully appreciate what was happening to france and belgium, in spite of all their efforts, we must imagine the county of durham completely occupied by the german hordes, yorkshire overrun and the chance of saving london from the enemy dependent upon the result of a battle to be fought in the neighbourhood of cambridge. it would be well if we could display at such a crisis in england the same cool courage that the parisians did; if we had generals at our disposal such as joffre and foch and gallieni; and statesmen in reserve such as clemenceau. that was how things looked prior to the first battle of the marne, which checked the early flood of german invasion and removed for the time being the necessity for retiring from amiens and epernay and moving the seat of government from paris.
[249]
during the whole of this trying period clemenceau never lost heart for a moment, nor his head either; and day after day in his journal he surveyed the whole situation without fear, devoid of illusion, yet confident always that france and her allies could not be beaten to their knees. when things looked worst and paris was being drained of her population by order, in preparation for a siege, and when the government was about to be removed to bordeaux, this is how clemenceau wrote, recalling the past to cheer his countrymen in the present:
“the seat of government at bordeaux is a new phase of the war which must follow its course: a renewal of the war in the provinces, as in the days of the gambettas, of the freycinets. the same struggle against the same german invasion, with the capital of france reduced to the simple condition of a fortress, with france herself—provincial france, as we say—taking in hand her own defence outside the traditional lines of political and administrative concentration in which she has lived.
“how men and times have changed! . . . and now after full four-and-forty years i find myself again at bordeaux, before the theatre i had not seen since 1871, looking for men who had undergone the misery of survival and failing to find them. who now remembers that jules simon on his arrival had in his pocket an order for the arrest of gambetta? in the provinces, as in paris, foreign war and civil war were being carried on. i only recall these terrible memories of past dissensions to enhance the value of the magnificent consolation that uplifts our hearts at the spectacle of the truly fraternal union of all the frenchmen of to-day. gambetta maintained the war against invasion in the midst of the most cruel attacks of a merciless opposition. compare this with the present attitude of all parties in the presence of a government from which all only demand that every means should be used with the maximum of efficiency.” nor does the writer hesitate even at this moment of trial to criticise the shortcomings of his countrymen. as opposed to the persistent preparations of[250] germany, frenchmen, he says, have been too careless, too light-hearted, too apt to rely upon the inspiration and enthusiasm of the moment to repair their neglect, “while an implacable enemy was sharpening his sword against us with unwearying zeal.” and this had been proved to be the truth years before; while so lately as november 22nd, 1913, the french ambassador in berlin, m. jules cambon, had solemnly warned m. pichon, then as now french minister for foreign affairs, “for some time past hostility against us is more marked, and the emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace.”
the man who used his pen to tell frenchmen disagreeable truths in this wise and followed them up by giving chapter and verse from the french yellow book, with the text of the threatening conversations of the emperor and general von moltke with the king of the belgians, may be granted the credit of entirely disregarding his own political interests, at least.
so also when the anglo-french forces had won the great seven days’ battle on the marne, clemenceau at once uttered a note of warning against undue confidence and excessive elation. “let us be very careful not to believe that we can reckon upon an uninterrupted series of successes up to the final destruction of the aggressor. the curtain falls on the horrible scenes of foreign invasion in belgium and france. a mortal blow has been inflicted upon the invincible kaiser who had never fought a battle. . . . but it would be sheer madness to imagine that we have nearly finished with an enemy who will shortly obtain fresh forces, vast forces even, from his uninvaded territory. a great part of his military resources are still untouched. automatic discipline will soon reassert itself. the struggle will last very long yet and be full of unforeseen dangers. the stake is too heavy for the german empire to decide suddenly to give up the game. remember your mistakes of the past, rejoice soberly in your victory of the present, make ready now for still heavier trials in the future.” such was the counsel of clemenceau to frenchmen on september 15th, 1914. above all, “leave nothing you can[251] help to chance. our military leaders have just victoriously undergone racking anxieties. it is for us to show our confidence in them by giving them credit for the patience and firmness which they will desperately need.”
similarly in regard to the magnificent series of defensive victories at verdun, of which clemenceau gives a fine picturesque account. after justly glorifying the prowess of the heroic french soldiery, whose chances of victory at the commencement of those long weeks of unceasing battle seemed small indeed; after bitter sarcasms on the miserable crown prince with his premature jubilations over his supreme carefully stage-managed “triumph”; after a terrible picture of masses of the german troops marching through a hurricane to what they were assured was certain victory and then their dead bodies literally kept erect by the pressure of their dead comrades as a mass of corpses—after all this, and his legitimate pride in the hardly won victory, clemenceau goes on to remind his countrymen again that this is not the end. “verdun is the greatest drama of resistance. but all, all must at once set to work to make ready for a thorough offensive: a complete offensive that needs no interpretation. for this we must have preparation. for this we must have science. for this we must have method. for this we must have man?uvres. keep those words well in mind, for nothing can be worse than to forget them. never too soon: never too late. what would be the cost to us, in our turn, of a coup manqué?”
that is the tone throughout. but here and there in l’homme encha?né we find clemenceau the controversialist in a lighter, but not less telling, style. i give an extract from his scathing attack on the danish littérateur, m. brandès, in the original:—
“oui, retenez-le, lecteur, la crainte de m. brandès dans les circonstances actuelles est que l’allemagne puisse être humiliée! le danemark a été humilié par le peuple de seigneurs qu’est la race allemande. la france aussi, je crois, et la belgique même; peut-être brandès le reconnaitra-t-il. il n’a pas protesté. il refuse même de s’expliquer a cet égard, alléguant que son[252] silence (assez prolixe) est d’or—d’un or qui ne résisterait pas à la pierre de touche. mais sa crainte suprême est que les machinateurs du plus grand attentat contre la civilisation, contre l’indépendance des peuples, contre la dignité de l’espèce humaine, les auteurs des épouvantables forfaits dont saignent encore la belgique et la france n’éprouvent une humiliation.”[b] brandès among the neutrals is of the same type as romain rolland and bertrand russell among the belligerents. all their sympathies are reserved for the criminals. and there are others, who are actually eager to embrace the murderers as their “german friends”!
in quite another style is his tribute to garibaldi when his son ricciotti—two of whose own sons had fallen fighting for france against the germans—was himself visiting paris:—
“garibaldi was one of those magicians who give their commands to the peoples. these are the true performers of miracles. for they take no account of human powers when the spirit of superhumanity impels them to adventures of rash madness which for them prove to be evidence of supreme sanity.
“those who know, or think they know, talk. but words are not life. living humanity instinctively gives its devotion to men who rise up, in historic episodes whose law is to us unknown, to accomplish in their heroic simplicity precisely those very feats which ‘reason’ had never anticipated. to achieve this miracle calls for the man. it requires also the historic moment. the hour struck, and garibaldi was there. but of that hour he himself was to a marvellous degree the mild[253] yet imperious expression. obviously inspired with an idea, he refused to see obstacles or to recognise impossibilities. ‘i shall go through with it,’ and through he went. that seems simple enough to-day. how was it no one was found to do it before him? he went through with it, handing over the crown to royal supplicants, and then hid himself in his island to avoid the annoyance of his glory.
“he had given freedom. let freedom do its work.”
during the whole of the struggle, even when the military situation looked most desperate for the future of his country, clemenceau never lost confidence. his faith in france and her steadfast ally great britain never wavered. that was a great service he then rendered to france and civilisation. but he did more. at a time when on the other side of the channel, as in great britain, in italy, and in russia, the national spirit was clouded by deep suspicion of enemy influence, bribery and corruption in high places, with almost criminal weakness, when strength and determination were essential to success, clemenceau did not hesitate to denounce treachery where he believed it to exist. nothing like his courage in this respect has, unfortunately, been shown by statesmen in any other of the allied countries. the fact that fomenters of reaction were, for their own ends, engaged on the like task of exposing the men who were unworthy of the republic did not deter him, bitterly opposed as he was to the royalist clique of which m. léon daudet was the chief spokesman, from demanding thorough investigation and the punishment of traitors, if traitors there were, in their midst. the time has not yet come to estimate the full value of the work he thus did, or the dangers from which, by his frankness, he saved the republic.
but already we can form a judgment of the perils which surrounded france in 1917. the feeling of depression and distrust was growing. the organisation of the forces of the allies was inferior to that of the enemy. the effect of the collapse of russia was becoming more serious each day. great britain, which had rendered france quite invaluable aid in all depart[254]ments, had accepted mr. lloyd george’s personal strategy, which consisted in breaking through to the rhine frontier by way of jerusalem and jericho, owing to the apparent hopelessness of a favourable decision on the west front. the french government itself, alarmed at the enormous sacrifices france was making in every way, discouraged at the progress of the defeatist movement which weakened the position of socialists in the cabinet, and alarmed at the manner in which german agents and german spies, whom they were afraid to arrest, pervaded almost every department—the french government, itself shaken daily by attacks from the right and from the left, felt incapable of dealing with the situation as a whole. there was, for a moment, a sensation in paris not far removed from despair.
at this juncture a cry arose for clemenceau. for many years he had predicted the german attack. for more than a full generation he had adjured his fellow-frenchmen to prepare vigorously for the defence of la patrie. that he feared nobody all were well aware. of his patriotism there was no doubt. then, as more than forty years before, he never despaired of the republic. old as he was, whatever his defects of temper, whatever his shortcomings in other respects, the one man for such a crisis was georges clemenceau. office was thus forced upon him, and, as he stated, he accepted power strongly against his will. at seventy-six, and approaching seventy-seven, not the most ambitious politician would be eager to take upon himself the responsibility of coping with such difficulties as clemenceau was called upon to face. it was hard enough to undertake as minister of war the onerous work of that exhausting department.
but still more trying was the necessity imposed upon him of dealing with the traitors of various degree who had been trading upon the lives and sacrifices of the men at the front. probably no other french statesman would have dared to enter upon this dangerous and difficult task. the suspected men were highly placed, both politically and financially. they were surrounded by influential cliques and[255] coteries, in parliament and in the press, to whom it was almost a matter of life and death to prevent disclosures which would inevitably be made, if the various cases were brought into court. it was even doubtful whether he would get the support of the assembly, the senate, or the presidents of council who preceded him, if he decided to push things to extremity, as, in view of his own criticisms and denunciations, he was bound to do. should such misfortune occur or should the malefactors be indicted and acquitted, all that clemenceau had been saying against them would turn to the advantage of the domestic enemy. it was a great risk to run.
there was also another obstacle in the way of clemenceau’s acceptance of the premiership. the relations between himself and m. poincaré, the president of the republic, had been anything but good. m. clemenceau had energetically championed the claim of m. pams for the presidency. m. pams had been, in fact, m. clemenceau’s candidate, as mm. sadi-carnot, loubet and fallières had been before him. this time he did not win. the fight was fierce, the personal animosity between the parties very keen, and m. poincaré’s victory was asserted to have been achieved by intrigue of a doubtful character. the war had called a truce to individual rancour, and the union sacrée was supposed to inspire all hearts. still it was by no means certain that trouble would not come from that quarter. a president of council with a hostile president of the republic over against him must find the difficulty of the post at such a time immensely increased.
then there were the socialists to consider. true, they had taken office in the cabinet of m. briand, whose policy towards strikers of anarchist methods had been even more stern than that of m. clemenceau. but they regarded clemenceau as an unforgivable enemy. the calling in of the military at courrières, at narbonne, montpellier and st. béziers had never been forgotten. clemenceau for them was the tiger crossed with the kalmuck. it was far more important, the french socialists apparently thought, to hamper clemenceau and prevent him[256] from forming an administration than it was to beat the german armies and clear france of the boches. such, at any rate, was the opinion of a minority, which afterwards became the majority, of the party. therefore, even socialists who thoroughly sympathised with clemenceau in his policy towards germany, and had previously taken part in a cabinet pledged to carry on the war “jusqu’au bout,” would have nothing to do with a clemenceau administration. the upshot of these fatuous, anti-patriotic and anti-socialist tactics on their part will be seen later. yet the knowledge that the socialists as a whole would give him at best a lukewarm support, and at worst would vigorously oppose him, was not an encouraging factor in the general calculation of what might occur.
neither could high finance be relied upon. the great bankers, great brokers, and great money institutions as a whole, were heartily sick of the war. they wanted peace with germany on almost any terms, if only they could get back to business and begin to recoup their losses during more than three years of war. nor, apart from downright treachery of which he held positive proof, could the proposed new premier close his eyes to the fact that german influence had so subtly and thoroughly pervaded the french money market that many frenchmen were still looking at the economic problems of france through spectacles made and tinted in germany.
there was consequently a combination possible which might drive clemenceau headlong out of office at any moment, if he entered upon his second attempt to control french affairs at such a desperately critical stage of the war.
but the formidable old radical leader did not hesitate. sceptic as he might be in all else, one entity he did believe in: the unshakable greatness of france: one frenchman he could rely upon—himself.
