in the endeavour to give a connected statement of the very dangerous german offensive, conducted by their spies and agents in paris, at the most critical period of the whole war, i have been obliged to some extent to anticipate events in order to show clemenceau’s share in the exposure of this organised treachery. by 1917, as already recorded, anti-patriotic and pro-german intrigues in paris and france had become more and more harmful to that “sacred unity” which had been constituted to present an unbroken front to the enemy. after the miserable breakdown of russia, largely due to the bolshevik outbreak fostered by german intrigue and subsidised by german money, the position was exceedingly dangerous. german troops withdrawn from the eastern front were poured into france and flanders by hundreds of thousands, and the allied armies were hard put to it to hold their own. at this time, when it was all-important to maintain the spirit of the french army, the enemy offensive in paris and throughout france became more and more active. what made the situation exceptionally critical was the fact that the rank and file of the french soldiery began to feel that, however desperately they might fight at the front, they were being systematically betrayed in the rear. while, therefore, clemenceau, in his capacity as senator and president of the inter-allied parliamentary committee, voiced the great and growing discontent of the country with the lack of real statesmanship displayed in the conduct of the war, he also fulminated against the weakness of the wobbling ministers who, knowing that defeatism and[282] treachery were fermenting all round them, took no effective steps to counteract this pernicious propaganda.
the notorious bonnet rouge group, however, with m. joseph caillaux, bolo pasha, almereyda and others in close touch with m. jean longuet and his pacifist friends of the socialist party, were allowed to carry on their virulent anti-french campaign in the press and in other directions practically unchecked. it might even have been thought that these persons had the sympathy and support of members of the government.
thus, when m. painlevé took office on m. ribot’s resignation in august, 1917, the outlook was dark all round. the position of the allied armies was by no means satisfactory: the state of affairs in paris itself was not such as to engender confidence: mr. lloyd george’s headlong speech of depreciation on his return from italy had undone all the good of the unanimous resolution passed by the inter-allied parliamentary committee of which clemenceau was president, declaring that no peace could be accepted which did not secure the realisation of national claims and the complete triumph of justice all along the line. in short, a fit of despondency, almost deepening into despair, had come over allied statesmen. notwithstanding distrust, however, war-weariness was not spreading among the soldiers and sailors. but among the politicians it was, and german “peace offensives” were being welcomed in quarters which were supposed to be resolute for “la victoire intégrale.” m. painlevé’s administration was scarcely hoisted into the saddle before it was ignominiously thrown out again. the instability of successive french ministries was becoming a danger which extended far beyond the limits of france. the unification of the allied command and the concentration of effort on the western front had become imperative. the arrest of all those against whom there was serious suspicion of treason, no matter how highly they might be placed, was a necessity of the moment. vigorous support for the generals and armies engaged in resisting the reinforced enemy was called for from every quarter. so the president, m. poincaré,[283] found himself in a dilemma. but none of the leading politicians who had been prominent since the war began was prepared to take the responsibility of forming an administration and then acting upon the lines which the situation demanded.
it was at this crisis, perhaps the most dangerous that france has had to face in all her long history, that the president asked clemenceau to become the prime minister. he was then seventy-six years of age and had withdrawn from all those conferences and discussions behind the scenes which, under ordinary circumstances, invariably precede the acceptance of office. the socialists declared that, no matter what clemenceau’s policy might be, they could not serve under him as president of council. clemenceau could not rely upon support from m. poincaré, and on every ground he was much disinclined to come to the front under existing conditions. but his duty to france and its republic outweighed all other considerations, and this old statesman shouldered the burden which far younger men declined to take up.
the socialists went quite wild against him—to the lasting injury, as i hold, of their party and their cause—the radicals and republicans themselves were more than doubtful of the possibility of his success. many politicians and journalists of the right doubted whether they could make common cause with the man who above all other things stood for the permanence of republicanism and was the bitter enemy of clericalism in every shape. shrewd judges of public opinion stated that his ministry could not last three months.
but courage, frankness and good faith, backed by relentless determination, and the genius that blazes up in the day of difficulty, go far. the whole french people suddenly called to mind that this old radical of the bocage of la vendée, this parisian of parisians for nearly sixty years, whatever mistakes he may have made in opposition or in office, had invariably stood up for the greatness, the glory, the dignity of france; that he had voted at bordeaux for the continuance of the war when france lay at the feet of the ruthless conqueror[284] and gambotta was striving to organise his countrymen for resistance to the death; that from those dark days of 1871 onwards he had always vehemently adjured his countrymen to make ready to resist coming invasion; that from august 1914 he had never failed to keep a stout heart himself and to do his utmost to encourage his countrymen even when the outlook was blackest for the allies; that he had ever been the relentless denouncer of weakness and vacillation, as he had also been the unceasing opponent of pacifism, pro-germanism and treachery of every kind; that now, therefore, when la patrie was in desperate danger, when paris might yet be at the mercy of the enemy, of whose hideous ruffianism they had had such bitter experience, georges clemenceau was the one man to take control of democratic and republican france in the interest of every section of the population. these stirring memories of the past rose up behind clemenceau in the present.[e]
thus it was that the new prime minister, coming down from the senate to read his declaration to the national assembly, as the french custom is, was certain beforehand of a cordial reception from the great majority of the deputies. what might happen afterwards depended upon himself and his ministry: what should occur on this his first appearance in the tribune after nearly eight years of absence depended on themselves. they took good care that, at the start at least, he should have no doubt as to their goodwill. only the socialist minority abstained.
the declaration itself was worthy of the occasion, and it[285] was a stirring scene when the veteran of the radical party, the tiger of the old days, rose to deliver it to the house, which was crowded on the floor and in the galleries with deputies and strangers eager to hear what he had to say:—
“gentlemen, we have taken up the duty of government in order to carry on the war with renewed energy and to obtain a better result from our concentrated efforts. we are here with but one idea in our minds, the war and nothing but the war. the confidence we ask you to give us should be the expression of confidence in yourselves. . . . never has france felt more keenly the need for living and growing in the ideal of power used on behalf of human rectitude, the resolve to see justice done between citizens and peoples able to emancipate themselves. the watchword of all our governments since the war began has been victory for the sake of justice. that frank policy we shall uphold. we have great soldiers with a great history led by men who have been tested and have been inspired to deeds of the highest devotion worthy of their ancestral renown. the immortal fatherland of our common humanity, overmastering the exultation of victory, will follow, on the lines of its destiny, the noble aspiration for peace, through them and through us all. frenchmen impelled by us into the conflict have special claims upon us. we owe them everything without reserve. everything for france: everything for the triumph of right. one simple duty is imposed upon us, to stand by the soldier, to live, suffer and fight with him, and to throw aside everything that is not for our country. the rights on our front, the duties in our rear must be merged in one. every zone must be the army zone. if men there are who must cherish the hatreds of bygone days, sweep them away.
“all civilised nations are now arrayed in the like battle against modern forms of ancient barbarisms. our allies and ourselves together constitute a solid barrier which shall not be surmounted. throughout the allied front, at all times and in all places, there is nothing but solid brotherhood, the surest[286] basis for the coming world. . . . the silent soldiers of the factory, the old peasants working, bent over their soil, the vigorous women who toil, the children who help in their weakness—these likewise are our poilus who in times to come, recalling the great things done, will be able to say with the men in the trenches, ‘i, too, was there.’ . . . mistakes have been made. think no more about them save only to remedy them.
“but, alas! there have also been crimes, crimes against france which demand prompt punishment. we solemnly pledge ourselves, before you and before the country, that justice shall be done with the full rigour of the law. personal considerations or political passion shall neither divert us from fulfilling this duty nor induce us to go beyond it. too many such crimes have cost us the blood of our soldiers. weakness would mean complicity. there shall be no weakness as there shall be no violence. accused persons shall all be brought before courts-martial. the soldier of justice shall make common cause with the soldier in the field. no more pacifist plots: no more german intrigues. neither treason nor semi-treason. war, nothing but war. our country shall not be placed between two fires. our country shall learn that she is really defended.
“the day will come when from paris to the smallest village of france storms of cheers will welcome our victorious colours tattered by shell-fire and drenched with blood and tears—the glorious memorials of our great dead. it is for us to hasten the coming of that day, that glorious day, which will fitly take its place beside so many others in our history. these are our unshakable resolves, gentlemen: we ask you to give them the sanction of your approval.”
such is a free summary of a ministerial pronouncement that will ever be memorable in the annals of france and of mankind. it swept the chamber away as the recital marched on. but organised attacks upon the president of the council at once followed. now came the supreme test of the mental and[287] physical efficiency of this wonderful old man whose youth is so amazing. he could read a telling manifesto with vigour and effect. would he be able to reply with equal power to a series of interrogations in an atmosphere to which he had been a stranger for so many years? questions, by no means all of them friendly, poured in upon clemenceau from every part of the chamber. from his attitude towards caillaux and malvy to his view of the league of nations and his policy in regard to negotiations with the enemy, no point was missed that might embarrass or irritate the statesman who had undertaken to stand in the gap. he showed immediately that he was fully capable of taking his own part. the fervour of the new france was heard in every phrase of his crushing reply:
“you do not expect me to talk of personal matters. i am not here for that. still, i have heard enough to understand that the criticisms upon me should make me modest. i feel humble for the mistakes i have already made and for those which i am likely to make. i do not think i can be accused of having sought power. but i am in power. i hope it will not be a misfortune for my country. you tell me i have made mistakes. perhaps you do not know the worst of them. i am here because these are terrible times when those who through all the struggle have loved their country more than they knew see the hopes of the nation centred on them. i am here through the pressure of public opinion, and i am almost afraid of what it will demand of me, of what it expects of me.
“i have been asked to explain myself in regard to war aims, and as to the idea of a league of nations. i have replied in my declaration, ‘we must conquer for the sake of justice.’ that is clear. we live in a time when words have great power, but they have not the power to set free. the word ‘justice’ is as old as mankind. do you imagine that the formula of a league of nations is going to solve everything?
“there is a committee at the ministry of foreign affairs even now preparing a scheme for a league of nations. among its members are the most authoritative exponents of inter[288]national law. i undertake that immediately their labours are finished i will table the outcome of it in this chamber, if i am still prime minister—which does not seem likely.” (laughter and cheers.)
“i am not unfavourable to arbitration. it was i who sent m. léon bourgeois to the hague, where a series of conventions were agreed upon which germany is now engaged in violating. many believe that a miracle will bring about a league of nations. i do not myself think that a league of nations will be one of the results of this war. if to-morrow you proposed to me that germany should be included in a league of nations, i should not consent. what guarantees do you offer me? germany’s signature? go and ask the belgians what they think of that.
“you never weary of saying that the first thing is for germany herself to destroy german militarism, but she is far from destroying it; she still holds it fast.
“m. forgeot wants to make war, but while we are making war he wants us to talk about peace. personally, i believe that when you are doing things you should talk as little as possible. do m. forgeot’s ideas come within the range of practical politics? do people believe that the men in the trenches and the women in the factories do not think of peace? our thoughts are theirs. they are fighting to obtain some decent security of life; and when you ask me my war aims, i reply that my war aim is victory in full.” (loud cheers and socialist interruption.)
“i understand your aspirations, some of which i share, but do not let us make mistakes about war. all these men want peace. but if, while they are fighting, the rumour goes round that delegates of one or other belligerent country are discussing terms of peace—that yesterday we were on the eve of peace, that next day there was a break-off—then we are condemned to flounder about in mud and in blood for years still. that is the way to disarm and discourage us all. for these reasons, i am not in favour of conferences where citizens of different[289] belligerent countries discuss peace which the governments alone are able to decide. i want to make war. this means that for the moment we must silence all factious discussion. is there a man who has been more of a party man than i? i see to-day that i have been far too much of a party man. my programme is a military and economic programme. we have got allies, to whom we owe loyalty and fidelity, which must override every other consideration.
“we have not yet achieved victory. we have come to a cruel phase of the war. a time of privation is at hand, a time when our spirit must rise to greater heights yet. do not, then, speak of peace. we all want peace, we are making great sacrifices to obtain peace, but we must get rid of old animosities and turn solidly against the enemy. leave all other questions alone.
“there is one on which, however, i must touch. scandals have been spoken of. do you think we can have three years of war without germany trying to keep spies busy in our midst? i complained that our look-out was insufficient, and events have too clearly shown that i was right. i am told to tell you the truth. you shall have it. but we must distinguish between crimes and accusations. as the examination proceeds facts will be disclosed which will have their effect. how can you expect me to mention names or reveal fragments of truth? certain people have been guilty of indiscretion, want of reflection, or weakness. it is not i but the judge who has to decide. you shall have the truth. in what form? if there is any revelation of a political nature to make there is a political tribunal in this country to make it. it shall judge. just as civil justice must do its work during war time, so must political justice.” (a voice: “caillaux!”) “i mention no name. a journalist has freedom as to what he may say, it is his own responsibility; but the head of the government has a quite different task. i am here to put the law in motion if political acts have been committed which are subject to a jurisdiction beyond the ordinary tribunals.
[290]
“those facts will be brought before the tribunal, but i refuse here to accuse any man.
“justice is our weapon against treason, and where treason is concerned there can be no possibility of pardon. in any case, you have got a government which will try to govern in the strict, but high, idealistic sense of the word. where i differ from you, gentlemen of the extreme left, is when you want to bring abstract conceptions into the field of hard facts. that is impossible. we shall try to govern honestly and in a republican spirit. you are not obliged to think we shall succeed. but we shall do our best. if we make mistakes, others have done so before us, others will do so after us. if at last we see before us the long-awaited dawn of victory, i hope—if it is only to complete the beauty of the picture—that you will pass a vote of censure upon me, and i shall go happy away! i know you will not do that; but allow me to point out, as i have a right to tell you, that you have almost passed a vote of censure on me already before listening to my ministerial programme. i challenge you to say that we have made any attempt to deceive you. if we get painful news, our hearts will bleed, but we shall tell that news to you here. we have never given anybody the right to suppose that we constitute a peril to any class of citizen or a danger to the national defence. if you think the contrary, prove it, and i will leave the house. but if you believe that what we want above all is the welfare of france, give us your confidence, and we will endeavour to be worthy of it.”
his deeds have been on a level with his words. bolo and duval shot: caillaux in gaol: malvy exiled by decree of the senate: the bonnet rouge gang tried and condemned: the wretched intrigue in switzerland with the poor german tool, austria exposed and crushed: a new spirit breathed into all public affairs: the army reassured by his perpetual presence under fire and his unfailing resolve at the war office that the splendid capacity and intrepidity of all ranks at the front[291] shall not be sacrificed by treachery or cowardice at the rear: the higher command brimful of enthusiasm and confidence, due to the appointment of the military genius foch as generalissimo of the united allied armies and the reinstatement of general mangin at the head of his corps d’armée: the allies, like france herself, convinced that they have at last discovered a man. such was the stirring work that clemenceau had been doing since he took office.
so to-day clemenceau is still democratic dictator of the french republic as no man has been for more than a century. when the enemy was arrayed in overwhelming numbers close to amiens and within a few miles of calais, when the german war lords were decreeing the permanent subjugation of the territories they occupied in the west and in the east, when the long-range guns were bombarding the capital and the removal of the seat of government to the provinces was again being considered, the great french nation felt more confident of its future than at any moment since the victories won around verdun. to every question clemenceau’s answer invariably was, “je fais la guerre. je fais la guerre. je fais la guerre.”
those who doubted were convinced: those who were doubtful saw their aspirations realised: those who had never wavered cheered for victory right ahead.
on june 6th, 1918, the french socialist group in the chamber of deputies made another of those attacks upon the national administration which, sad to say, have done so much to discredit the whole socialist party, and even the socialist cause, throughout europe and the world. pacifism and bolshevism together—that is to say, an unholy combination between anti-nationalism and anarchism, have indeed shaken the influence of democratic socialism to its foundations, just at the time when a sound, sober and constructive socialist policy, in harmony with the aspirations of the mass of the people in every allied country, might have led mankind peacefully along the road to the new period of national and international co-operation. the socialist deputies in the[292] chamber held clemenceau’s ministry, which they had done their very utmost to discredit and weaken, directly responsible for the serious military reverses recently undergone by the french and allied armies. they insisted, therefore, upon clemenceau’s appearance in the tribune. but when they had got him in front of them their great object evidently was not to let him speak. there this old statesman stood, exposed to interruptions which were in the worst of bad taste. at last he thought the opportunity for which his enemies clamoured had come, and began to address the assembly. but no sooner had he opened his mouth than he was forced to give way to m. marcel cachin. only then was he enabled to get a hearing, and this is a summary of what he said:—
“i regret that, our country being in such great danger, a unanimous vote of confidence cannot be accorded to us. but, when all is said, the opposition of the socialists does not in the least enfeeble the government. for four long years our troops have held their own at the front with a line which was being steadily worn down. now a huge body of german soldiers fresh from russia and in good heart come forward to assail us. some retreat was inevitable. from the moment when russia thought that peace could be obtained by the simple expression of wishes to that end we all knew that, sooner or later, the enemy would be able to release a million of men to fall upon us. that meant that such a retirement as we have witnessed must of necessity follow. our men have kept their line unbroken against odds of five to one. they have often gone sleepless for three days and even four days in succession. but our great soldiers have had great leaders, and our army as a whole has proved itself to be greater than even we could expect.
“the duties we have to perform here are, in contrast to their heroism, tame and even petty. all we have to do is to keep cool and hold on. the germans are nothing like so clever as they believe themselves to be. they have but a single device. they throw their entire weight into one general[293] assault, and push their advantage to the utmost. true they have forced back our lines of defence. but final success is that alone which matters, and that success for us is certain. the government you see before you took office with the firm resolve never to surrender. so long as we stand here our country will be defended to the last. give way we never shall.
“germany has once more staked her all on one great blow, thinking to cow us into abandoning the conflict. her armies have tried this desperate game before. they tried it on the marne, they tried it on the yser, they tried it at verdun, they tried it elsewhere. but they never have succeeded, and they never shall. our allies to-day are the leading nations of the world. they have one and all pledged themselves to fight on till victory is within our grasp. the men who have already fallen have not fallen in vain. by their death they have once more made french history a great and noble record. it is now for the living to finish the glorious work done by the dead.”
this great speech raised the overwhelming majority of the assembly to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. nearly all present felt that the destinies of france hung in the balance, and that any vote given which might tend to discourage the men at the front at such a time was a direct service rendered to the enemy whose bombs were even then falling in the heart of paris. the vote of confidence in clemenceau and his ministry was carried by 377 votes to 110; and of these 110 more than a third were convinced shortly afterwards that the course they had then taken in order to preserve the unity of their forces as factionists was unworthy of their dignity as men.
then, too, when the tide turned and the german hordes, after fresh glorious battles of the marne and of the somme, were in headlong retreat, clemenceau, unelated by victory as he was undiscouraged by defeat, repeated again: “je fais la guerre. je fais la guerre. je fais la guerre.” not until the[294] german armies were finally vanquished would the republican statesman talk of making peace. on both sides of the atlantic, therefore, as on both sides of the channel, knowing great britain and the united states by personal experience and able to gauge the cold resolution of the one and the inexhaustible resources and determination of the other, speaking and writing english well, he is now, as he has been throughout this tremendous war, a tower of strength to the forces of democracy and a very present help to all who are resolved to break down german militarism for evermore.
