clemenceau flung himself out of office in an unreasonable fit of temper. a man of his time of life, at sixty-eight years of age, with his record behind him, had no right to have any personal temper at all, when the destinies of his country had been placed in his hands. probably he would admit this himself to-day. but, during his exceptionally strenuous period of office, he had, as we have seen, more than once shown an impulsiveness and even an irritability that were not consonant with his general disposition. throughout, there appeared to be an inclination on his part to take opposition and criticism too much to heart. as if, in fact, the great radical overthrower of opportunism was annoyed at being compelled, as all administrations must be, to adopt to some extent a policy of opportunism himself. his outburst against all compromise with the church was one instance of this. his uncalled-for resignation on account of m. delcassé’s attack was another. this might well have been the end of his official experiences. certainly no one would have ventured to predict that eight years later would come the crowning achievement of his remarkable career. his own remark on leaving office was not calculated to encourage his personal adherents or to give his country confidence in his leadership. “i came in with an umbrella, i go out with a stick,” was all very well as the epigram of a journalist: it was too flippant a remark for a serious statesman such as clemenceau had shown himself to be. but the time was not far off when all his main policy, as man of affairs, politician, and as publicist would be overwhelmingly justified. as we have seen, clemenceau was[234] all his life strongly opposed to colonial expansion. his action with regard to morocco, apparently so contrary to this, arose from an even stronger motive, his desire to build up french defence against germany on every side.
but his general distrust of colonisation by conquest in egypt, china, madagascar, and elsewhere had been based upon france’s need for using all her strength and all her resources to build up the power of the french republic within the limits of france. this is true of all nations at a period when the power of man over nature is increasing so rapidly in every department: perhaps, properly understood, in agriculture most of all, when science is capably applied to production on the land. that is to say, that even in countries such as england, where the cry of over-population is so frequently raised, and where the cult of colonisation and emigration has been exalted to the position of a fetish, it would be far better to devote attention to the creation of wealth at home than to the development of waste lands, however fertile, abroad. concentration of population, given adequate regulation of employment in the interests of the whole people, and attention to the requirements of space, air and health, is not only devoid of danger but is an element in national prosperity—“nothing being more plain than that men in proper labour and employment are capable of earning more than a living,” as john bellers wrote more than two hundred years ago; and “a nation wherein are eight millions of people is more than twice as rich as the same scope of land wherein are but four,” as petty wisely stated, about the same date.
if this was so obviously true at the end of the seventeenth century, it is tenfold, not to say a hundredfold, more certain in the twentieth, having regard to the marvellous discoveries and inventions since made and still but partially applied in every direction. but france is the land where such considerations are most decisive in dealing with the basis of national polity. france has enormous advantages in regard to soil, climate, the industrious habits and skill of her people,[235] and the consequent monopoly on the world market of whole branches of commerce, where taste and luxury have to be gratified. moreover, she possesses a source of income unparalleled in europe and scarcely worth noting elsewhere, except in the case of italy. i calculate that france receives, one year with another, from visitors who come thither, merely to see and to spend, an amount, by way of profit, of not less than seventy millions sterling. this large sum alone, if used for enhancing the productiveness of the french soil and french industry generally, would immensely benefit the people in every respect. french thrift, again, had piled up out of the products of industry immense pecuniary accumulations. there could have been no better investment of these funds possible than the improvement of the defences of france against invasion, the completion of her railway and canal system, the development of her mines, so greatly coveted by her aggressive neighbour, the concentration of her military and naval forces at home, instead of scattering any portion of them abroad, the expenditure upon thorough education and scientific agricultural and industrial experiments. all this even imperialist frenchmen can see now.
so with regard to russia. the alliance of the french republic with the empire of russia gave france, apparently, a better position in europe, the pusillanimous and short-sighted english statesmen having rejected an alliance which was afterwards forced upon great britain when wholly unprepared for war. here also clemenceau’s views were justified by the event. the close connection between a democratic republic and an autocratic empire put france in an unenviable moral position before the world. more materially serious than this ill-fated combination, ethically, was the necessity imposed upon the french of lending continually to russia, until the total amount of the russian loans held in france amounted to many hundreds of millions sterling.
such huge sums, again, would have been far more advan[236]tageously spent at home than in building strategical and other railways, and financing gold and other mines, in the vast muscovite empire. financiers gained largely by these loans. but the peasants and small bourgeoisie of france were unknowingly dependent for their interest upon a poverty-stricken agricultural population, which could not possibly continue to pay the large sum due yearly on this amount to their western creditors without utter ruin. thus unsound finance followed hard on the heels of more than doubtful policy, and france was the weaker and the poorer for both.
this was all the more fatal to real french interests, inasmuch that, at the same time, the home population of the republic was slowly decreasing, while the population of her threatening rival, germany, was steadily growing, and the wealth of the german empire, both agricultural and mineral, was likewise rapidly expanding with every decade. consequently, the position of france was becoming more and more precarious, and the relative strength on the two sides of the frontier less and less favourable to the republic. it must be admitted, under such circumstances, that those who favoured a russian alliance, in spite of all its manifest drawbacks, had a great deal to say for themselves. but that great britain should have failed to see that the declension of french power was a peril to herself, long before the entente was brought about by edward vii, and that a pacific understanding alone was not sufficient to ensure the maintenance of peace, is a truly marvellous instance of the blindness of british statesmanship! only the phenomenal good luck that has so far attended the united kingdom hindered our governing classes from landing this country, as well as the french, in overwhelming disaster. how narrow the escape was is not yet fully understood.
clemenceau was at all times in favour of an anglo-french offensive and defensive alliance, and he clung to this policy in the face of the most serious discouragement from abroad and, as has been seen, at the cost of vitriolic misrepresentation and hatred at home. it was in vain, however, that for many years[237] he preached this political doctrine. even when the relations between the two countries were greatly improved, the very proper liberal and radical and labour dislike in england of the entanglement with czarist russia rendered the close combination which seemed so essential to all who, like clemenceau himself, knew what was really going on in germany, exceedingly difficult to bring about.
the terrific war has thrown into high relief facts always discernible except by those who would not see. here clemenceau’s own bitter experience of the war of 1870-71, and his yearly visits to austria, enabled him to form a clearer conception of the real policy of germany and the ruthless brutality which underlies modern teutonic culture than any of his contemporaries. it is no longer doubted that the franco-german war was welcomed by prince bismarck, and made inevitable by him, in order to crush france and ensure german military supremacy in europe. bismarck himself made no secret of the manner in which he had deceived benedetti at ems by a forged telegram; and the refusal of the germans to make a reasonable peace with france immediately after sedan was conclusive evidence of what was really intended. during the campaign, also, the germans resorted to the same hideous methods of warfare on land, on a smaller scale, which have horrified the entire civilised world, on land and on sea, during the great war which commenced forty-four years later.
all this clemenceau himself saw. while, therefore, in his speeches and writings, he never shut out the possibility that the people of germany, rising superior to their militarist rulers, might come to terms for permanent peace with the people of france, he at the same time cherished no illusions whatever as to the policy of those military rulers, and the small probability that german social-democracy would be able to thwart the designs of the german aggressionists. unfortunately, in france, as in great britain, a considerable section of all classes, but especially of the working class, represented by labour unions and socialists, would not believe that at the end of the nineteenth and begin[238]ning of the twentieth century any great civilised power could be harbouring such designs as those attributed to germany. vaillant, for example, who, like clemenceau, had seen the horrors inflicted upon france in the war of 1870, was vehement on that side. so enamoured was he of peace that he never lost a chance of assuring germany that under no circumstances would the french republic go to war. he advocated a general strike, in all countries affected, should a rupture of peace be threatened; entirely regardless of the fact that the social-democrats themselves had declared that such a strike was absolutely impossible in germany itself.
the same with jaurès. not only did this great socialist believe that peace might be maintained by concessions to germany; but, although in favour of “the armed nation” for france herself, for the purpose of defending her against a german invasion, he actually came over to london and addressed a great meeting, called by anarchist-pacifists who were all strongly in favour of the reduction of the british fleet. that fleet which, as bebel himself put it, was the only counterbalance in europe for germany herself against prussian militarism and junkerdom, jaurès spoke of with regret as a provocation to war! germany could, in fact, always rely in all countries upon a large number of perfectly honest pro-germans, and a lesser proportion who had purely financial considerations in view, to oppose any policy which was directed against the spread of german domination. this was the mania of anarchist-pacifism and anti-patriotism which clemenceau, both in and out of office, did his utmost to expose and resist. honesty of purpose could be no excuse whatever for fatuity of action.
clemenceau, therefore, from the moment when he gave up the premiership, lost no chance of inculcating the need for vigorous preparation. france must be ready to meet a german assault by land and by sea. when the time came she was not ready on either element, and without the help in finance, in munitions, in clothing, and by arms, on land and on the ocean, at once given by england—whom clemenceau always upheld[239] as the friend of the republic—france would have been overrun and crushed, before she could possibly have obtained aid from elsewhere. in spite of the franco-german agreement of 1909, the danger of such an attack in 1911 was very great: so much so that war was then commonly expected, and was only averted because germany thought she would be in a more commanding position to carry out her predetermined policy three or four years later. the franco-german convention relating to morocco, of november 4th, 1911, after the agadir difficulty, was no better than a pretence. it was not intended, in good faith, to ensure a permanent peace, so far as germany was concerned. this clemenceau felt sure of, though the treaty was by no means unfavourable to france. he was ready to make all sacrifices, however mortifying, provided only a genuine treaty of peace and understanding between the two peoples could be secured. but this must not be done blindly. it must be an integral part of a serious national policy.
therefore, speaking in the senate on the 12th february, 1912, in opposition to the treaty with germany about morocco, he went on: “we shall make every effort to give fresh proofs of our goodwill—we have given enough and to spare already during the past forty years—in order that the consequences of this treaty may fructify under conditions worthy of the dignity of the two peoples; but we must know what the other party to the treaty is about, what are his intentions, what he thinks, says, proposes to do, and what signs of goodwill he likewise has vouchsafed. that is the question we must have the courage to ask ourselves. this question i deal with at my own risk and peril, without being concerned as to what i have to say, because i have at heart no bad feeling, no hatred, to use the right word, towards the german people. i want no provocation; firmly resolved as i am to do nothing to sacrifice a vestige, however trifling, of our capacity to win if attacked, i am equally convinced that peace is not only desirable but necessary for the development of french ideas in the domain of civilisation. . . . the german people won two great victories which changed the[240] equilibrium of europe, in 1866 and in 1870. . . . we then knew, we had the actual proof in our hands, that, if the enemy had occupied paris, the capital of france would have been reduced to ashes. prince bismarck, in reply to the expostulations of jules favre, declared that the german troops must enter at one of the gates, ‘because i do not wish, when i get home, that a man who has lost a leg or an arm should be able to say to his comrades, pointing to me: that fellow you see there is the man who prevented me from entering paris.’ when jules favre said that the german army had glory enough without that, m. bismarck retorted, ‘glory! we don’t use that word.’ the german, so far as i can judge of him, is above all the worshipper of force, and rarely misses an opportunity of saying so; but where he differs from the latin is that his first thought is to make use of this force. as the vast economic development of the empire is a perpetual temptation in this respect, he wants the french to understand that behind every german trader there stands an army of five millions of men. that is at the bottom of the whole thing.” moreover, he continued, having pocketed a fine indemnity last time, germany is greedy for a much bigger one now. “even quite lately the german press has never wearied of proclaiming that france shall pay out of her milliards the cost of building the new german fleet. that is the frame of mind of germany, that is the truth which clearly appears in your treaty: germany thinks first and foremost of using to advantage her glory and her force.
“but this is not all. she has conquered her unity by force, by iron, by blood; she has so fervently yearned for this unity—nothing more natural—that now she wants to apply it; she wishes to spread her surplus population over the world. she finds herself compelled, therefore, by a fatality from which she cannot escape, to exercise pressure upon her neighbours which will compel them to give her the economic outlets she needs. . . . there is always land for an owner who wishes to round off his estate. there are always nations to be attacked by a warrior-nation which would conquer other peoples. i am not here for the[241] purpose of criticising the german people, i am trying to describe their state of mind towards us. . . .
“and now what of us, the french people? the people of france are a people of idealism, of criticism, of indiscipline, of wars, of revolutions. our character is ill adapted for continuous action; doubtless the french people have magnificent impulses, but, as the poet says, their height has ever been measured by the depth of their fall.”
after a survey of “the terrible year” and its results, the orator recounts what difficult work it was that frenchmen had to carry out after the collapse. it was not only that they had to change their government, but this government must be taught how to govern itself.
“that has created a hard situation for us. we are absorbed in this great task. we hope to bring it to a successful conclusion. the intervention of public opinion to-day in its own affairs, calmly, soberly, without a word of braggadocio, that is one of the best signs that france has yet given.
“the work we have done must be judged not by what we see but by the ideas, the spirit that we have breathed into the heart of all french citizens.”
after giving conclusive proof that in 1875, in the schn?bele affair, as well as at tangier, morocco and casablanca, germany’s policy had been to wound, weaken and irritate france, clemenceau wound up as follows:
“in all good faith we desire peace, we are eager for peace because we need it in order to build up our country. but if war is forced upon us we shall be there! the difficulty between germany and ourselves is this: germany believes the logical consequence of her victory is domination. we do not believe that the logical consequence of our defeat is vassalage. we are peaceful but we are not subjugated. we do not countersign the decree of abdication and downfall issued by our neighbours. we come of a great history and we mean to continue to be worthy of it. the dead have created the living: the living will remain faithful to the dead.”
[242]
this great speech was prophetic. clemenceau knew what were the real intentions of germany. it was this fact that made him so bitter against all who, honest, patriotic and self-sacrificing as they might be, were in favour of weakening france in the hour of her greatest danger. his warning against the financiers who were so solicitous that foreign policy should be guided by manipulators of loans, interest and discounts was also specially appropriate at a time when german influence was becoming dominant in many of the banks and pecuniary coteries of paris. such warnings were also timely in view of the strange hallucinations—or worse—which then dominated english politicians.
for it was in this same year that lord haldane, having reduced the english artillery, full of sublime confidence in the rulers of germany, returned from berlin to tell us through mr. asquith and viscount grey that never were the relations between germany and england better! it was in this same year, too, that mr. lloyd george and the whole radical party were convinced that great britain might safely reduce her armaments on land and on sea, and the unionists themselves scarcely dared to take up the challenge. it was in this same year, again, that nearly all the leaders of the labour party convinced themselves that the germans had the best of good feeling towards france and england. having been most artistically and hospitably “put through” in the fatherland, they returned to england brimful of zeal against all who, knowing germany and germans well for some fifty years, could not take the asseverations of the kaiser, or of his trusted friend lord haldane, at their face value: a value which this legal nobleman admitted a few years later he knew at the time to be illusory, and not in accordance with what he then declared to be the truth.
clemenceau did not condescend to such shameless falsification. whatever mistakes he made, from the socialist and anti-imperialist point of view, in matters of domestic importance, or concerning morocco, where the danger of france from the other side of the frontier had to be considered, whether in office[243] or out of it, he treated his countrymen with the utmost frankness.
so time passed on. the preparations of germany were becoming more and more complete. the influence of the pan-german junkers and their flamboyant young crown prince was becoming so powerful that the kaiser felt his hand being forced before success in “the great design” appeared quite so certain as he would like it to be. the german army was largely increased, powerful war-vessels were being added to the navy. a policy was being pursued which roused fears of aggression. all through 1913 and the first months of 1914 clemenceau in his new paper, l’homme libre, continued day after day his warnings and his injunctions to all frenchmen. he had no mercy for those who unceasingly preached fraternity and disarmament for france when germany, more powerful and increasingly more populous, was arming to the teeth.
“such fraternity,” he said, at the unveiling of scheurer-kestner’s statue, “is of the cain and abel kind. against the armed peace and armed fraternity with which germany is threatening us nothing short of the most perfect military education and military organisation can be of any avail. all europe knows, and germany herself has no doubt whatever, that we are solely on the defensive. her fury for the leadership of europe decrees for her a policy of extermination against france. therefore prepare, prepare, prepare. here you see 870,000 men in the active army of germany on a peace footing, better trained, better equipped, better organised than ours, as opposed to 480,000 frenchmen on our side. doesn’t that convince you? and alsace-lorraine at the mercy of such creatures as schadt and f?rstner? observe, germany has great projects in all parts of the world. it would be childish for us to complain. what is intolerable is her pretension to keep europe in perpetual terror of a general war, instead of general international discussion of her claims. every frenchman must remember that, if germany’s increasing armaments do impel her to war, the loss of the conflict would mean for us the subjugation of our race,[244] nay, even the termination of our history. meanwhile, with alsace-lorraine before me and the statue of scheurer-kestner now unveiled, i claim for us the right never to forget. to be or not to be, that is for us the question of the hour. gambetta, after sedan, called upon all frenchmen in their day of deepest depression to rise to the level of their duty. he consecrated once again republicans as the party of patriotic pride. france must live. live we will!”
unfortunately, one of the chief reasons why france was unready to meet the onrush of the modern huns was that the socialists were all bemused with their own fatuous notion that the german social-democracy could stop the war. instead, therefore, of investigating the truth of clemenceau’s statements, they merely denounced him as a chauvinist and an enemy of the people, and twaddled on about a general strike on both sides of the rhine. as an old socialist myself, who, as a member of the international socialist bureau, had discussed the whole question at length with liebknecht, bebel, singer, kautsky and others, i knew that, as they themselves explained to me, there was little or no hope of anything of the sort being done when war was once declared. i viewed this whole propaganda, therefore, with grave alarm, and bebel himself warned the french that the social-democrats would march with the rest. if an opportunity came something might be done, but——since then the old leaders had died and the new chiefs, as we all see now, were imperialists to a man. thus clemenceau’s prognostications and warnings were only too completely justified. prince lichnowsky’s revelations conclusively prove this, and the german social-democrats have been at pains to confirm it. on march 11th, 1914, clemenceau stated precisely what they would do.
how anxious, how eager, the french were at the critical moment to avoid even the slightest cause of offence is shown by the fact that all their troops were withdrawn fully eight miles back along the german frontier, a portion of french territory which the germans made haste to seize. even before[245] this, every effort was made to provoke the french troops by petty raids across the frontier, and at last the germans declared that the french had sent aeroplanes to drop bombs on nuremberg—a statement which the germans themselves now admit to have been a pure fabrication. but the facts of the invasion of belgium and france are too well known to call for recital here.
clemenceau did what might have been expected of him. he appealed to all frenchmen of every shade of opinion to sink all minor differences in one solid combination for the defence of the country. day after day, this powerful journalist and orator laboured to encourage his countrymen and to denounce unceasingly all who, honestly or dishonestly, stood in the way of the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war which should free france for ever from yet other attempts by germany to destroy her as an independent nation. the memory of the dark days of 1870 was obliterated by the horrors of 1914 onwards. in good and bad fortune the radical leader kept the same resolute attitude and used the like stirring language. l’homme libre, defaced and then suppressed by the censor, was succeeded by l’homme encha?né. ever the same policy of relentless warfare, against the enemy at the front, and the traitors at the rear, was steadily pursued. ministry might come, ministry might go, but still clemenceau was at his post, save when illness compelled him to quit his work for a short time.
nor did he waver in his views as to the general strategy to be pursued. without making any pretence to military knowledge, but well advised by experts on military affairs, and firmly convinced that whatever success germany might achieve elsewhere she would never be satisfied unless france was crushed, he persistently opposed diversion of strength from the western front. there this terrific struggle for world-domination would eventually be decided. the civilisation of the west must be subdued to german culture, france and england must be brought under german control, before the great programme of eastern expansion for the teutonic empire could be entered[246] upon with the certainty of success. these were the opinions he held as to germany’s real objects.
therefore, in opposition to the views of important personages in great britain and in allied countries, clemenceau withstood any frittering away of force on tempting adventures, away from the main field of warfare. this not because he confined himself to the narrow programme of freeing france from the invaders, but because the waste of troops on wild-cat enterprises weakened the general strength of the allies at the crucial point of the whole struggle. in that decision his judgment was at one with the ablest british strategists, and the event has shown that he did not underrate the importance of the warfare on the western front. there alone, especially after the collapse of russia, was it possible to deliver a crushing blow at the german power. there alone could all the forces of the allies of the west be effectively concentrated for the final blow.
