mr. bayard, in a despatch transmitting this to our minister to england, says that our government has heretofore acted upon the assumption that the boundary controversy between great britain and venezuela was one based on historical facts, which without difficulty could be determined according to evidence, but that the british pretension now stated gives rise to grave disquietude, and creates the apprehension that their territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence, but is apparently indefinite. he refers to the british colonial office list of previous years, and calls attention to the wide detour to the westward in the boundaries of british guiana between the years 1877 and 1887, as shown in that record. he suggests that our minister “express anew to lord salisbury the great gratification it would afford our government to see the venezuelan dispute amicably and honorably settled by arbitration or otherwise,” and adds: “if indeed it should appear that there is no fixed 244 limit to the british boundary claim, our good disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.”
it was about this time that the venezuelan minister, in a note expressing his appreciation of our efforts to bring about a settlement of the dispute, made the following statement:
disastrous and fatal consequences would ensue for the independence of south america if, under the pretext of a question of boundaries, great britain should succeed in consummating the usurpation of a third part of our territory, and therewith a river so important as the orinoco. under the pretext of a mere question of boundaries which began on the banks of the essequibo, we now find ourselves on the verge of losing regions lying more than five degrees away from that river.
on may 1, 1890, mr. blaine, mr. bayard’s successor as secretary of state, instructed mr. robert t. lincoln, our minister to england, “to use his good offices with lord salisbury to bring about the resumption of diplomatic intercourse between great britain and venezuela as a preliminary step toward the settlement of the boundary dispute by arbitration.” he also requested him “to propose to lord salisbury, with a view to an accommodation, that an informal conference be had in washington or in 245 london of representatives of the three powers.” the secretary added: “in such conference the position of the united states is one solely of impartial friendship toward both litigants.”
in response to this instruction mr. lincoln had an interview with lord salisbury. on this occasion his lordship said that her majesty’s government had not for some time been keen in attempts to settle the dispute, in view of their feeling of uncertainty as to the stability of the present venezuelan government and the frequency of revolutions in that quarter; but that he would take pleasure in considering our suggestion after consulting the colonial office, to which it would first have to be referred. mr. lincoln, in giving his impressions derived from the interview, says that “while lord salisbury did not intimate what would probably be the nature of his reply, there was certainly nothing unfavorable in his manner of receiving the suggestion”; and he follows this with these significant words: “if the matter had been entirely new and dissociated with its previous history, i should have felt from his tone that the idea of arbitration in some form, to put an end to the boundary dispute, was quite agreeable to him.” 246
on the 26th of may, 1890, lord salisbury addressed a note to mr. lincoln, in which his lordship stated that her majesty’s government was at that moment in communication with the venezuelan minister in paris, who had been authorized to express the desire of his government for the renewal of diplomatic relations, and to discuss the conditions on which it might be effected; that the terms on which her majesty’s government considered that a settlement of the question in issue between the two countries might be made, had been communicated to venezuela’s representative; that his reply was still awaited, and that the british government “would wish to have the opportunity of examining that reply, and ascertaining what prospect it would afford of an adjustment of existing differences, before considering the expediency of having recourse to the good offices of a third party.”
no mention was made, in this communication, nor at any time thereafter, so far as i can discover, of mr. blaine’s proposal of a conference among representatives of the three nations interested in an adjustment.
lord salisbury, in a despatch to the english representative at washington, dated november 11, 1891, stated that our minister to 247 england had, in conversation with him, renewed, on the part of our government, the expression of a hope that the government of great britain would refer the boundary dispute to arbitration; that his lordship had expressed his willingness to submit to arbitration all the questions which seemed to his government to be fairly capable of being treated as questions of controversy; that the principal obstacle was the rupture of diplomatic relations caused by venezuela’s act; and that before the government of great britain could renew negotiations they must be satisfied that those relations were about to be resumed with a prospect of their continuance.
while our government was endeavoring to influence great britain in the direction of fair and just arbitration, and receiving for our pains only barren assurances and procrastinating excuses, the appeals of venezuela for help, stimulated by allegations of constantly increasing english pretensions, were incessantly ringing in our ears.
without mentioning a number of these appeals, and passing over a period of more than two years, i shall next refer to a representation made by the venezuelan minister at washington on march 31, 1894, to mr. gresham, who 248 was then our secretary of state. in this communication the course of the controversy and the alleged unauthorized acts of england from the beginning to that date were rehearsed with circumstantial particularity. the conduct of great britain in refusing arbitration was again reprobated, and pointed reference was made to a principle which had been asserted by the united states, “that the nations of the american continent, after having acquired the liberty and independence which they enjoy and maintain, were not subject to colonization by any european power.” the minister further declared that “venezuela has been ready to adhere to the conciliatory counsel of the united states that a conference, consisting of its own representative and those of the two parties, should meet at washington or london for the purpose of preparing an honorable re?stablishment of harmony between the litigants,” and that “great britain has disregarded the equitable proposition of the united states.”
on july 13, 1894, mr. gresham sent a despatch to mr. bayard, formerly secretary of state, but then ambassador to england, inclosing the communication of the venezuelan minister, calling particular attention to its contents, and at the same time briefly discussing the boundary dispute. in this despatch mr. gresham said: 249
the recourse to arbitration first proposed in 1881, having been supported by your predecessors, was in turn advocated by you, in a spirit of friendly regard for the two nations involved. in the meantime successive advances of british settlers in the region admittedly in dispute were followed by similar advances of british colonial administration, contesting and supplanting venezuelan claims to exercise authority therein.
he adds: “toward the end of 1887, the british territorial claim, which had, as it would seem, been silently increased by some twenty-three thousand square miles between 1885 and 1886, took another comprehensive sweep westward to embrace” a certain rich mining district. “since then,” the secretary further states, “repeated efforts have been made by venezuela as a directly interested party, and by the united states as the impartial friend of both countries, to bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been suspended in consequence of the dispute now under consideration.”
this despatch concludes as follows:
the president is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and honorable adjustment of the existing difficulties between an american state and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would be glad to see the re?stablishment of such diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end. i can discover but 250 two equitable solutions to the present controversy. one is the arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the respective successors to the historical rights of holland and spain over the region in question. the other is to create a new boundary-line in accordance with the dictates of mutual expediency and consideration. the two governments having so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent and conspicuous advocacy by the united states and england of the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in settlement of important questions arising between them, makes such a mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present instance; and this government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense.
in another despatch to mr. bayard, dated december 1, 1894, mr. gresham says:
i cannot believe her majesty’s government will maintain that the validity of their claim to territory long in dispute between the two countries shall be conceded as a condition precedent to the arbitration of the question whether venezuela is entitled to other territory, which until a recent period was never in doubt. our interest in the question has repeatedly been shown by our friendly efforts to further a settlement alike honorable to both countries, and the president is pleased to know that venezuela will soon renew her efforts to bring about such an adjustment.
two days afterward, on december 3, 1894, the president’s annual message was sent to the 251 congress, containing the following reference to the controversy:
the boundary of british guiana still remains in dispute between great britain and venezuela. believing that its early settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties is in the line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, i shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants and to induce a reference to arbitration—a resort which great britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.
on the twenty-second day of february, 1895, a joint resolution was passed by the congress, earnestly recommending to both parties in interest the president’s suggestion “that great britain and venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration.”
a despatch dated february 23, 1895, from great britain’s foreign office to the english ambassador at washington, stated that on the twenty-fifth day of january, 1895, our ambassador, mr. bayard, had, in an official interview, referred to the boundary controversy, and said “that his government would gladly lend their good offices to bring about a settlement by means of an arbitration.” the despatch further 252 stated that mr. bayard had thereupon been informed that her majesty’s government had expressed their willingness to submit the question, within certain limits, to arbitration, but could not agree to the more extensive reference on which the venezuelan government insisted; that mr. bayard called again on the twentieth day of february, when a memorandum was read to him concerning the situation and a map shown him of the territory in dispute; that at the same time he was informed that the venezuelans had recently made an aggression upon the territory of english occupation, and, according to report, ill-treated some of the colonial police stationed there, and that it was the boundary defined by the schomburgk line which had thus been violated in a marked manner by the venezuelans.
this despatch concludes as follows:
on mr. bayard’s observing that the united states government was anxious to do anything in their power to facilitate a settlement of the difficulty by arbitration, i reminded his excellency that although her majesty’s government were ready to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory which i had pointed out to him, they could not consent to any departure from the schomburgk line.
it now became plainly apparent that a new stage had been reached in the progress of our 253 intervention, and that the ominous happenings embraced within a few months had hastened the day when we were challenged to take our exact bearings, lest we should miss the course of honor and national duty. the more direct tone that had been given to our despatches concerning the dispute, our more insistent and emphatic suggestion of arbitration, the serious reference to the subject in the president’s message, the significant resolution passed by congress earnestly recommending arbitration, all portended a growth of conviction on the part of our government concerning this controversy, which gave birth to pronounced disappointment and anxiety when great britain, concurrently with these apprising incidents, repeated in direct and positive terms her refusal to submit to arbitration except on condition that a portion of the disputed territory which venezuela had always claimed to be hers should at the outset be irrevocably conceded to england.
during a period of more than fourteen years our government, assuming the character of a mutual and disinterested friend of both countries, had, with varying assiduity, tendered its good offices to bring about a pacific and amicable settlement of this boundary controversy, only to be repelled with more or less civility by 254 great britain. we had seen her pretensions in the disputed regions widen and extend in such manner and upon such pretexts as seemed to constitute an actual or threatened violation of a doctrine which our nation long ago established, declaring that the american continents are not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any european power; and despite all this we had, nevertheless, hoped, during all these years, that arrangement and accommodation between the principal parties would justify us in keeping an invocation of that doctrine in the background of the discussion. notwithstanding, however, all our efforts to avoid it, we could not be unmindful of the conditions which the progress of events had created, and whose meaning and whose exigencies inexorably confronted us. england had finally and unmistakably declared that all the territory embraced within the schomburgk line was indisputably hers. venezuela presented a claim to territory within the same limits, which could not be said to lack strong support. england had absolutely refused to permit venezuela’s claim to be tested by arbitration; and venezuela was utterly powerless to resist by force england’s self-pronounced decree of ownership. if this decree was not justified by the facts, and it 255 should be enforced against the protest and insistence of venezuela and should result in the possession and colonization of venezuelan territory by great britain, it seemed quite plain that the american doctrine which denies to european powers the colonization of any part of the american continent would be violated.
if the ultimatum of great britain as to her claim of territory had appeared to us so thoroughly supported upon the facts as to admit of small doubt, we might have escaped the responsibility of insisting on an observance of the monroe doctrine in the premises, on our own account, and have still remained the disinterested friend of both countries, merely contenting ourselves with benevolent attempts to reconcile the disputants. we were, however, far from discovering such satisfactory support in the evidence within our reach. on the contrary, we believed that the effects of our acquiescence in great britain’s pretensions would amount to a failure to uphold and maintain a principle universally accepted by our government and our people as vitally essential to our national integrity and welfare. the arbitration, for which venezuela pleaded, would have adjudged the exact condition of the rival claims, would have forever silenced venezuela’s complaints, 256 and would have displaced by conclusive sentence our unwelcome doubts and suspicions; but this great britain had refused to venezuela, and thus far had also denied to us.
recreancy to a principle so fundamentally american as the monroe doctrine, on the part of those charged with the administration of our government, was of course out of the question. inasmuch, therefore, as all our efforts to avoid its assertion had miscarried, there was nothing left for us to do consistently with national honor but to take the place of venezuela in the controversy, so far as that was necessary, in vindication of our american doctrine. our mild and amiable proffers of good offices, and the hopes we indulged that at last they might be the means of securing to a weak sister republic peace and justice, and to ourselves immunity from sterner interposition, were not suited to the new emergency. in the advanced condition of the dispute, sympathy with venezuela and solicitude for her distressed condition could no longer constitute the motive power of our conduct, but these were to give way to the duty and obligation of protecting our own national rights.
mr. gresham, who since the fourth day of march, 1893, had been our secretary of state, 257 died in the latter days of may, 1895. his love of justice, his sympathy with every cause that deserved sympathy, his fearless and disinterested patriotism, and his rare mental endowments, combined to make him a noble american and an able advocate of his country’s honor. to such a man every phase of the venezuelan boundary dispute strongly appealed; and he had been conscientiously diligent in acquainting himself with its history and in considering the contingencies that might arise in its future development. though his death was most lamentable, i have always considered it a providential circumstance that the government then had among its cabinet officers an exceptionally strong and able man, in every way especially qualified to fill the vacant place, and thoroughly familiar with the pending controversy—which seemed every day to bring us closer to momentous duty and responsibility.
mr. olney was appointed secretary of state early in june, 1895; and promptly thereafter, at the suggestion of the president, he began, with characteristic energy and vigor, to make preparation for the decisive step which it seemed should no longer be delayed.
the seriousness of the business we had in hand was fully understood, and the difficulty or 258 impossibility of retracing the step we contemplated was thoroughly appreciated. the absolute necessity of certainty concerning the facts which should underlie our action was, of course, perfectly apparent. whatever our beliefs or convictions might be, as derived from the examination we had thus far given the case, and however strongly we might be persuaded that great britain’s pretensions could not be conceded consistently with our maintenance of the monroe doctrine, it would, nevertheless, have been manifestly improper and heedless on our part to find conclusively against great britain, before soliciting her again and in new circumstances to give us an opportunity to judge of the merits of her claims through the submission of them to arbitration.
it was determined, therefore, that a communication should be prepared for presentation to the british government through our ambassador to england, detailing the progress and incidents of the controversy as we apprehended them, giving a thorough exposition of the origin of the monroe doctrine, and the reasons on which it was based, demonstrating our interest in the controversy because of its relation to that doctrine, and from our new standpoint 259 and on our own account requesting great britain to join venezuela in submitting to arbitration their contested claims to the entire territory in dispute.
this was accordingly done; and a despatch to this effect, dated july 20, 1895, was sent by mr. olney to her majesty’s government through mr. bayard, our ambassador.
the monroe doctrine may be abandoned; we may forfeit it by taking our lot with nations that expand by following un-american ways; we may outgrow it, as we seem to be outgrowing other things we once valued; or it may forever stand as a guaranty of protection and safety in our enjoyment of free institutions; but in no event will this american principle ever be better defined, better defended, or more bravely asserted than was done by mr. olney in this despatch.
after referring to the various incidents of the controversy, and stating the conditions then existing, it was declared:
the accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status cannot, it is believed, be challenged. it shows that status to be such, that those charged with the interests of the united states are now forced to determine exactly what those interests are and what course of action they require. it compels them to decide 260 to what extent, if any, the united states may and should intervene in a controversy between, and primarily concerning, only great britain and venezuela, and to decide how far it is bound to see that the integrity of venezuelan territory is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist.
after an exhaustive explanation and vindication of the monroe doctrine, and after asserting that aggressions by great britain on venezuelan soil would fall within its purview, the despatch proceeded as follows:
while venezuela charges such usurpation, great britain denies it; and the united states, until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with neither. but while this is so,—while the united states may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right and which is wrong,—it is certainly within its right to demand that the truth be ascertained. being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of venezuelan soil by great britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on.... it being clear, therefore, that the united states may legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration.
the demand of great britain that her right to a portion of the disputed territory should be 261 acknowledged as a condition of her consent to arbitration as to the remainder, was thus characterized:
it is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently characteristic of the english race. it in effect deprives venezuela of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress. territory acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested from her by the strong hand as if occupied by british troops or covered by british fleets.
the despatch, after directing the presentation to lord salisbury of the views it contained, concluded as follows:
they call for a definite decision upon the point whether great britain will consent or decline to submit the venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. it is the earnest hope of the president that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration, and that great britain will add one more to the conspicuous precedents she has already furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of settling international disputes. if he is to be disappointed in that hope, however,—a result not to be anticipated, and in his judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and great britain,—it is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable him to lay the whole subject before congress in his next annual message.
