i have thus far dealt with this dispute as one in which great britain and venezuela, the parties primarily concerned, were sole participants. we have now, however, reached a stage in the affair which requires a recital of other facts which led up to the active and positive interference of our own government in the controversy. in discussing this branch of our topic it will be necessary not only to deal with circumstances following those already narrated, but to retrace our steps sufficiently to exhibit among other things the appeals and representations made to the government of the united states by venezuela, while she was still attempting to arrive at an adjustment with great britain.
i have already referred to the first communication made to us by venezuela on the subject. this, it will be remembered, was in 1876, when she sought to resume negotiations with great britain, after an interruption of thirty-two years. i have also called attention to the fact 229 that coincident with this communication venezuela presented to great britain a willingness to relax her insistence upon her extreme boundary claim, based upon alleged right, and suggested that a conventional line might be fixed by mutual concession.
venezuela’s first appeal to us for support and aid amounted to little more than a vague and indefinite request for countenance and sympathy in her efforts to settle her differences with her contestant, with an expression of a desire that we would take cognizance of her new steps in that direction. i do not find that any reply was made to this communication.
five years afterward, in 1881, the venezuelan minister in washington presented to mr. evarts, then our secretary of state, information he had received that british vessels had made their appearance in the mouth of the orinoco river with materials to build a telegraph-line, and had begun to erect poles for that purpose at barima: and he referred to the immense importance to his country of the orinoco; to the efforts of his government to adjust her difficulty with great britain, and to the delays interposed; and finally expressed his confident belief that the united states would not 230 view with indifference what was being done in a matter of such capital importance.
mr. evarts promptly replied, and informed the venezuelan representative that “in view of the deep interest which the government of the united states takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the republics of this continent, this government could not look with indifference to the forcible acquisition of such territory by england, if the mission of the vessels now at the mouth of the orinoco should be found to be for that end.”
again, on the thirtieth day of november, 1881, our minister to venezuela reported to mr. blaine, who had succeeded mr. evarts as secretary of state, an interview with the president of venezuela at his request, in which the subject of the boundary dispute was discussed. our minister represented that the question was spoken of by the president as being of essential importance and a source of great anxiety to him, involving a large and fertile territory between the essequibo and orinoco, and probably the control of the mouth and a considerable portion of the latter river; and he alleged that the policy of great britain, in the treatment of this question, had been delay—the interval 231 being utilized by gradually but steadily extending her interest and authority into the disputed territory; and “that, though the rights of venezuela were clear and indisputable, he questioned her ability, unaided by some friendly nation, to maintain them.”
in july, 1882, mr. frelinghuysen, successor to mr. blaine, sent to our representative at venezuela a despatch to be communicated to the government of the republic, in which he stated that, if venezuela desired it, the united states would propose to the government of great britain that the boundary question be submitted to the arbitrament of a third power.
it will be remembered that a proposition for arbitration had been made by venezuela to great britain in february, 1881, and that great britain had refused to accede to it.
in july, 1884, mr. frelinghuysen sent a confidential despatch to mr. lowell, our minister to great britain, informing him that guzman blanco, ex-president of venezuela, who had recently been accredited as a special envoy from his country to great britain, had called on him relative to the objects of his mission, in respect of which he desired to obtain the good offices of this government, and that doubtless he would seek to confer with mr. 232 lowell in london. he further informed mr. lowell that he had told the venezuelan envoy that, “in view of our interest in all that touches the independent life of the republics of the american continent, the united states could not be indifferent to anything that might impair their normal self-control”; that “the moral position of the united states in these matters was well known through the enunciation of the monroe doctrine,” though formal action in the direction of applying that doctrine to a speculative case affecting venezuela seemed to him to be inopportune, and therefore he could not advise venezuela to arouse a discussion of that point. he instructed our minister to show proper consideration to the venezuelan envoy, and to “take proper occasion to let lord granville know that we are not without concern as to whatever may affect the interest of a sister republic of the american continent and its position in the family of nations.”
in july, 1885, the venezuelan minister to the united states addressed a communication to secretary of state bayard, setting forth the correspondence which had already taken place between our government and that of venezuela touching the boundary dispute, and referring 233 to the serious condition existing on account of the renewed aggressions of great britain.
mr. bayard thereupon sent a despatch on the subject to mr. phelps, our diplomatic representative to england, in which, after stating that the venezuelan government had never definitely declared what course she desired us to pursue, but, on the contrary, had expressed a desire to be guided by our counsel, he said: “the good offices of this government have been tendered to venezuela to suggest to great britain the submission of the boundary dispute to arbitration; but when shown that such action on our part would exclude us from acting as arbitrator, venezuela ceased to press the matter in that direction”; and the next day after writing this despatch mr. bayard informed the venezuelan minister that the president of the united states could not entertain a request to act as umpire in any dispute unless it should come concurrently from both contestants.
in december, 1886, our minister to venezuela addressed a despatch to mr. bayard, in which he reported that matters looked very angry and threatening in venezuela on account of fresh aggressions on the part of great britain in the disputed territory; and he expressed the fear that an open rupture might 234 occur between the two countries. he inclosed a statement made by the venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, containing a list of grievances, followed by this declaration: “venezuela, listening to the advice of the united states, has endeavored several times to obtain that the difference should be submitted to the award of a third power.... but such efforts have proven fruitless, and the possibility of that result, the only one prescribed by our constitution, being arrived at, becomes more and more remote from day to day. great britain has been constant in her clandestine advances upon the venezuelan territory, not taking into consideration either the rights or the complaints of this republic.” and he adds the following declaration: “under such circumstances the government has but two courses left open: either to employ force in order to recover places from which force has ejected the republic, since its amicable representations on the subject have failed to secure redress, or to present a solemn protest to the government of the united states against so great an abuse, which is an evident declaration of war—a provocative aggression.”
thereupon, and on the twentieth day of december, 1886, a despatch was sent by mr. bayard 235 to mr. phelps, in which the secretary comments on the fact that at no time theretofore had the good offices of our government been actually tendered to avert a rupture between great britain and venezuela, and that our inaction in this regard seemed to be due to the reluctance of venezuela to have the government of the united states take any steps having relation to the action of the british government which might, in appearance even, prejudice the resort to our arbitration or mediation which venezuela desired; but that the intelligence now received warranted him in tendering the good offices of the united states to promote an amicable settlement of the difficulty between the two countries, and offering our arbitration if acceptable to both countries—as he supposed the dispute turned upon simple and readily ascertainable historical facts.
additional complaints against great britain on account of further trespasses on venezuelan territory were contained in a note from the venezuelan minister to mr. bayard, dated january 4, 1887. i shall quote only the following passage:
my government has tried all possible means to induce that of london to accept arbitration, as advised by the united states; this, however, has resulted 236 in nothing but fresh attempts against the integrity of the territory by the colonial authorities of demerara. it remains to be seen how long my government will find it possible to exercise forbearance transcending the limits of its positive official duty.
pursuant to his instructions from mr. bayard, our minister to great britain formally tendered to the english government, on the eighth day of february, 1887, the good offices of the united states to promote an amicable settlement of the pending controversy, and offered our arbitration, if acceptable to both parties.
a few days afterward lord salisbury, on behalf of great britain, replied that the attitude which had been taken by the president of the venezuelan republic precluded her majesty’s government from submitting the question at that time to the arbitration of any third power.
the fact that lord salisbury had declined our offer of mediation and arbitration, was promptly conveyed to the government of venezuela; and thereupon, on the fourth day of may, 1887, her minister at washington addressed another note to our secretary of state indicating much depression on account of the failure of all efforts up to that time made to induce great britain to agree to a settlement 237 of the controversy by arbitration, and expressing the utmost gratitude for the steps taken by our government in aid of those efforts. he also referred to the desire his government once entertained that, in case arbitration could be attained, the united states might be selected as arbitrator, and to the fact that this desire had been relinquished because the maintenance of impartiality essential in an arbitrator would “seriously impair the efficiency of action which for the furtherance of the common interests of america, and in obedience to the doctrine of the immortal monroe, should possess all the vitality that the alarming circumstances demand”; and he begged the secretary to instruct our representative in london “to insist, in the name of the united states government, upon the necessity of submitting the boundary question between venezuela and british guiana to arbitration.”
i have heretofore refrained from stating in detail the quite numerous instances of quarrel and collision that occurred in and near the disputed territory, with increasing frequency, during this controversy. one of these, however, i think should be here mentioned. it seems that in 1883 two vessels belonging to english subjects were seized and their crews taken into 238 custody by venezuelan officials in the disputed region, for alleged violations of the laws of venezuela within her jurisdiction, and that english officials had assumed, without any judicial determination and without any notice to venezuela, to assess damages against her on account of such seizure and arrests, in an amount which, with interest, amounted in 1887 to about forty thousand dollars. on the seventh day of october in that year, the governor of trinidad, an english island near the mouth of the orinoco, in a letter to the minister of foreign affairs for venezuela, declared that her majesty’s government could not permit such injuries to remain unredressed, or their representations to be disregarded any longer, and thereupon it was demanded that the money claimed, with interest, be paid within seven days from the delivery of said letter. the letter concluded as follows:
failing compliance with the above demands her majesty’s government will be reluctantly compelled to instruct the commander of her majesty’s naval forces in the west indies to take such measures as he may deem necessary to obtain that reparation which has been vainly sought for by friendly means; and in case of so doing they will hold the venezuelan government responsible for any consequences that may arise.
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venezuela did not fail to appreciate and frankly acknowledge that, in her defenseless condition, there was no escape from the payment of the sum which england, as a judge in its own cause, had decreed against her. the president of the republic, however, in a prompt reply to the governor’s note, characterized its terms as “offensive to the dignity of the nation and to the equality which, according to the principles of the rights of nations, all countries enjoy without any regard to their strength or weakness.” thereupon he sought the good offices of our minister to venezuela in an effort to procure a withdrawal of the objectionable communication. this was attempted in a note sent by the american minister to the governor of trinidad, in which he said:
i hope your excellency will permit me to suggest, as a mutual friend of both parties, the suspension or withdrawal of your note of the 7th instant, so that negotiations may at once be opened for the immediate and final settlement of the afore-mentioned claims without further resort to unpleasant measures. from representations made to me, i am satisfied that if the note of the 7th instant is withdrawn temporarily even, venezuela will do in the premises that which will prove satisfactory to your government.
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a few days after this note was sent, a reply was received in which the governor of trinidad courteously expressed his thanks to our minister for his good offices, and informed him that, as the government of venezuela regarded his note of october 7 “as offensive, and appeared desirous of at last settling this long-pending question in a friendly spirit,” he promptly telegraphed to her majesty’s government asking permission to withdraw that note and substitute a less forcible one for it; and that he had just been informed by his home government in reply that this arrangement could not be sanctioned.
our minister reported this transaction to his home government at washington on the fourth day of november, 1887, and stated that the money demanded by great britain had been paid by venezuela under protest.
venezuela may have been altogether at fault in the transaction out of which this demand arose; the amount which england exacted may not have been unreasonable; and the method of its assessment, though not the most considerate possible, has support in precedent; and even the threat of a naval force may sometimes be justified in enforcing unheeded demands. i have not adverted to this incident for the purpose 241 of inviting judgment on any of its phases, but only to call attention to the fact that it was allowed to culminate with seemingly studied accompaniments of ruthlessness and irritation, at a time when a boundary question was pending between the two nations, when the weaker contestant was importuning the stronger for arbitration, and when a desire for reconciliation and peace in presence of strained relations should have counseled considerateness and magnanimity—all this in haughty disregard of the solicitous and expressed desire of the government of the united states to induce a peaceful adjustment of the boundary dispute, and in curt denial of our request that this especially disturbing incident should be relieved of its most exasperating features.
in the trial of causes before our courts, evidence is frequently introduced to show the animus or intent of litigating parties.
perhaps strict decorum hardly permits us to adopt the following language, used by the venezuelan minister when reporting to our secretary of state the anticipated arrival of a british war-steamer to enforce the demand of great britain:
such alarming news shows evidently that the government of her britannic majesty, encouraged 242 by the impunity on which it has counted until now for the realization of its unjust designs with regard to venezuela, far from procuring a pacific and satisfactory agreement on the different questions pending with the latter, is especially eager to complicate in order to render less possible every day that equitable solution which has been so fully the endeavor of my people.
on the fifteenth day of february, 1888, the venezuelan minister, in communicating to our government information he had received touching a decree of the governor of demerara denying the validity of a contract entered into by the government of venezuela for the construction of a railway between certain points in the territory claimed by venezuela, commented on the affair as follows:
england has at last declared emphatically that her rights are without limit, and embrace whatever regions may be suggested to her by her insatiate thirst for conquest. she even goes so far as to deny the validity of railway grants comprised within territory where not even the wildest dream of fancy had ever conceived that the day would come when venezuela’s right thereto could be disputed. the fact is that until now england has relied upon impunity. she beholds in us a weak and unfriended nation, and seeks to make the venezuelan coast and territories the base of a conquest which, if circumstances are not altered, will have no other bounds than the dictates of her own will.
