the reply of great britain to this communication consisted of two despatches addressed by lord salisbury to the british ambassador at washington for submission to our government. though dated the twenty-sixth day of november, 1895, these despatches were not presented to our state department until a number of days after the assemblage of the congress in the following month. in one of these communications lord salisbury, in dealing with the monroe doctrine and the right or propriety of our appeal to it in the pending controversy, declared: “the dangers which were apprehended by president monroe have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day.” he further declared:

but the circumstances with which president monroe was dealing and those to which the present american government is addressing itself have very few features in common. great britain is imposing no “system” upon venezuela and is not concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political institutions under which the venezuelans may prefer 263 to live. but the british empire and the republic of venezuela are neighbors, and they have differed for some time past, and continue to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are separated. it is a controversy with which the united states have no apparent practical concern.... the disputed frontier of venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by president monroe.

his lordship, in commenting upon our position as developed in mr. olney’s despatch, defined it in these terms: “if any independent american state advances a demand for territory of which its neighbor claims to be the owner, and that neighbor is a colony of an european state, the united states have a right to insist that the european state shall submit the demand and its own impugned rights to arbitration.”

i confess i should be greatly disappointed if i believed that the history i have attempted to give of this controversy did not easily and promptly suggest that this definition of our contention fails to take into account some of its most important and controlling features.

speaking of arbitration as a method of terminating international differences, lord salisbury said:

it has proved itself valuable in many cases, but it is not free from defects which often operate as 264 a serious drawback on its value. it is not always easy to find an arbitrator who is competent and who, at the same time, is wholly free from bias; and the task of insuring compliance with the award when it is made is not exempt from difficulty. it is a mode of settlement of which the value varies much according to the nature of the controversy to which it is applied and the character of the litigants who appeal to it. whether in any particular case it is a suitable method of procedure is generally a delicate and difficult question. the only parties who are competent to decide that question are the two parties whose rival contentions are in issue. the claim of a third nation which is unaffected by the controversy to impose this particular procedure on either of the two others cannot be reasonably justified and has no foundation in the law of nations.

immediately following this statement his lordship again touched upon the monroe doctrine for the purpose of specifically disclaiming its acceptance by her majesty’s government as a sound and valid principle. he says:

it must always be mentioned with respect, on account of the distinguished statesman to whom it is due and the great nation who have generally adopted it. but international law is founded on the general consent of nations; and no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which has not since been accepted by the government of any other country. the united 265 states have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in any controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they are the judge whether those interests are touched and in what measure they should be sustained. but their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by the fact that the controversy affects some territory which is called american.

in concluding this despatch lord salisbury declared that her majesty’s government “fully concur with the view which president monroe apparently entertained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any european state would be a highly inexpedient change. but they are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that expediency is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of international law. they are not prepared to admit that the interests of the united states are necessarily concerned in any frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the states who possess dominions in the western hemisphere; and still less can they accept the doctrine that the united states are entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of territory which one of those states may make against another.” 266

the other despatch of lord salisbury, which accompanied the one upon which i have commented, was mainly devoted to a statement of facts and evidence on great britain’s side in the boundary controversy; and in making such statement his lordship in general terms designated the territory to which her majesty’s government was entitled as being embraced within the lines of the most extreme claim which she had at any time presented. he added:

a portion of that claim, however, they have always been willing to waive altogether; in regard to another portion they have been and continue to be perfectly ready to submit the question of their title to arbitration. as regards the rest, that which lies within the so-called schomburgk line, they do not consider that the rights of great britain are open to question. even within that line they have on various occasions offered to venezuela considerable concessions as a matter of friendship and conciliation and for the purpose of securing an amicable settlement of the dispute. if, as time has gone on, the concessions thus offered have been withdrawn, this has been the necessary consequence of the gradual spread over the country of british settlements, which her majesty’s government cannot in justice to the inhabitants offer to surrender to foreign rule.

in conclusion his lordship asserts that his government has

repeatedly expressed their readiness to submit to arbitration the conflicting claims of great britain 267 and venezuela to large tracts of territory which from their auriferous nature are known to be of almost untold value. but they cannot consent to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another power or of foreign jurists however eminent, claims based on the extravagant pretensions of spanish officials in the last century and involving the transfer of large numbers of british subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a british colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life and property.

these despatches exhibit a refusal to admit such an interest in the controversy on our part as entitled us to insist upon an arbitration for the purpose of having the line between great britain and venezuela established; a denial of such force or meaning to the monroe doctrine as made it worthy of the regard of great britain in the premises; and a fixed and continued determination on the part of her majesty’s government to reject arbitration as to any territory included within the extended schomburgk line. they further indicate that the existence of gold within the disputed territory had not been overlooked; and they distinctly put forward the colonization and settlement by english subjects in such territory, during more than half a century of dispute, as creating a 268 claim to dominion and sovereignty, if not strong enough to override all question of right and title, at least so clear and indisputable as to be properly considered as above and beyond the contingencies of arbitration.

if we had been obliged to accept lord salisbury’s estimate of the monroe doctrine, and his ideas of our interest, or rather want of interest, in the settlement of the boundary between great britain and venezuela, his despatches would have certainly been very depressing. it would have been unpleasant for us to know that a doctrine which we had supposed for seventy years to be of great value and importance to us and our national safety was, after all, a mere plaything with which we might amuse ourselves; and that our efforts to enforce it were to be regarded by great britain and other european nations as meddlesome interferences with affairs in which we could have no legitimate concern.

the reply of the english government to mr. olney’s despatch, whatever else it accomplished, seemed absolutely to destroy any hope we might have entertained that, in our changed position in the controversy and upon our independent solicitation, arbitration might be conceded to us. since, therefore, great britain 269 was unwilling, on any consideration, to co?perate with venezuela in setting on foot an investigation of their contested claim, and since prudence and care dictated that any further steps we might take should be proved to be as fully justified as was practicable in the circumstances, there seemed to be no better way open to us than to inaugurate a careful independent investigation of the merits of the controversy, on our own motion, with a view of determining as accurately as possible, for our own guidance, where the divisional line between the two countries should be located.

mr. olney’s despatch and lord salisbury’s reply were submitted to the congress on the seventeenth day of december, 1895, accompanied by a message from the president.

in this message the president, after stating lord salisbury’s positions touching the monroe doctrine, declared:

without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. it was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our 270 republic endures. if the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the governments of the old world and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is the observance of the monroe doctrine of vital concern to our people and their government.

speaking of the claim made by lord salisbury that this doctrine had no place in international law, it was said in the message: “the monroe doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.”

referring to the request contained in mr. olney’s despatch that the entire boundary controversy be submitted to arbitration, the following language was used:

it will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that this proposition has been declined by the british government upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far from satisfactory. it is deeply disappointing that such an appeal, actuated by the most friendly feelings toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world, and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small, should have produced no better results.

the course to be pursued by this government in view of the present condition does not appear to 271 admit of serious doubt. having labored faithfully for many years to induce great britain to submit their dispute to impartial arbitration, and having been finally apprised of her refusal to do so, nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly. great britain’s present proposition has never thus far been regarded as admissible by venezuela, though any adjustment of the boundary which that country may deem for her advantage and may enter into of her own free will cannot, of course, be objected to by the united states. assuming, however, that the attitude of venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the united states to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the republic of venezuela and british guiana. the inquiry to that end should, of course, be conducted carefully and judicially; and due weight should be given to all available evidence, records, and facts in support of the claims of both parties.

after recommending to the congress an adequate appropriation to meet the expense of a commission which should make the suggested investigation and report thereon with the least possible delay, the president concluded his message as follows:

when such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the united states to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression 272 upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by great britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to venezuela.

in making these recommendations i am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow.

i am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great english-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people’s safety and greatness.

the recommendations contained in this message were acted upon with such promptness and unanimity that on the twenty-first day of december, 1895, four days after they were submitted, a law was passed by the congress authorizing the president to appoint a commission “to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between the republic of venezuela and british guiana,” and making an ample appropriation to meet the expenses of its work.

on the first day of january, 1896, five of our 273 most able and distinguished citizens were selected to constitute the commission; and they immediately entered upon their investigation. at the outset of their labors, and on the fifteenth day of january, 1896, the president of the commission suggested to mr. olney the expediency of calling the attention of the governments of great britain and venezuela to the appointment of the commission, adding: “it may be that they would see a way entirely consistent with their own sense of international propriety to give the commission the aid that it is no doubt in their power to furnish in the way of documentary proof, historical narrative, unpublished archives, or the like.” this suggestion, on its presentation to the government of great britain, was met by a most courteous and willing offer to supply to our commission every means of information touching the subject of their investigation which was within the reach of the english authorities; and at all times during the labors of the commission this offer was cheerfully fulfilled.

in the meantime, and as early as february, 1896, the question of submitting the venezuelan boundary dispute to mutual arbitration was again agitated between the united states and great britain. 274

our ambassador to england, in a note to lord salisbury, dated february 27, 1896, after speaking of such arbitration as seeming to be “almost unanimously desired by both the united states and great britain,” proposed, in pursuance of instructions from his government, “an entrance forthwith upon negotiations at washington to effect this purpose, and that her majesty’s ambassador at washington should be empowered to discuss the question at that capital with the secretary of state.” he also requested that a definition should be given of “settlements” in the disputed territory which it was understood her majesty’s government desired should be excluded from the proposed submission to arbitration.

lord salisbury, in his reply to this note, dated march 3, 1896, said:

the communications which have already passed between her majesty’s government and that of the united states have made you acquainted with the desire of her majesty’s government to bring the difference between themselves and the republic of venezuela to an equitable settlement. they therefore readily concur in the suggestion that negotiations for this purpose should be opened at washington without unnecessary delay. i have accordingly empowered sir julian pauncefote to discuss the question either with the representative of venezuela 275 or with the government of the united states acting as the friend of venezuela.

with this transfer of treaty negotiations to washington, mr. olney and sir julian pauncefote, the ambassador of great britain to this country, industriously addressed themselves to the subject. the insistence of great britain that her title to the territory within the schomburgk line should not be questioned, was no longer placed by her in the way of submitting the rights of the parties in the entire disputed territory to arbitration. she still insisted, however, that english settlers long in the occupancy of any of the territory in controversy, supposing it to be under british dominion, should have their rights scrupulously considered. any difference of view that arose from this proposition was adjusted without serious difficulty, by agreeing that adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years should make a good title, and that the arbitrators might deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.

on the 10th of november, 1896, mr. olney addressed a note to the president of the commission which had been appointed to investigate 276 the boundary question on behalf of our government, in which he said: “the united states and great britain are in entire accord as to the provisions of a proposed treaty between great britain and venezuela. the treaty is so eminently just and fair as respects both parties—so thoroughly protects the rights and claims of venezuela—that i cannot conceive of its not being approved by the venezuelan president and congress. it is thoroughly approved by the counsel of venezuela here and by the venezuelan minister at this capital.” in view of these conditions he suggested a suspension of the work of the commission.

the treaty was signed at washington by the representatives of great britain and venezuela on the second day of february, 1897. no part of the territory in dispute was reserved from the arbitration it created. it was distinctly made the duty of those appointed to carry out its provisions, “to determine the boundary-line between the colony of british guiana and the united states of venezuela.”

the fact must not be overlooked that, notwithstanding this treaty was promoted and negotiated by the officers of our government, the parties to it were great britain and venezuela. 277 this was a fortunate circumstance, inasmuch as the work accomplished was thus saved from the risk of customary disfigurement at the hands of the united states senate.

the arbitrators began their labors in the city of paris in january, 1899, and made their award on the third day of october in the same year.

the line they determined upon as the boundary-line between the two countries begins in the coast at a point considerably south and east of the mouth of the orinoco river, thus giving to venezuela the absolute control of that important waterway, and awarding to her valuable territory near it. running inland, the line is so located as to give to venezuela quite a considerable section of territory within the schomburgk line. this results not only in the utter denial of great britain’s claim to any territory lying beyond the schomburgk line, but also in the award to venezuela of a part of the territory which for a long time england had claimed to be so clearly hers that she would not consent to submit it to arbitration.

thus, we have made a laborious and patient journey through the incidents of a long dispute, to find at last a peaceful rest. as we 278 look back over the road we have traversed, and view again the incidents we have passed on our way, some may be surprised that this controversy was so long chronic, and yet, in the end, yielded so easily to pronounced treatment. i know that occasionally some americans of a certain sort, who were quite un-american when the difficulty was pending, have been very fond of lauding the extreme forbearance and kindness of england toward us in our so-called belligerent and ill-advised assertion of american principle. those to whom this is a satisfaction are quite welcome to it.

my own surprise and disappointment have arisen more from the honest misunderstanding and the dishonest and insincere misrepresentation, on the part of many of our people, regarding the motives and purposes of the interference of the government of the united states in this affair. some conceited and doggedly mistaken critics have said that it was dreadful for us to invite war for the sake of a people unworthy of our consideration, and for the purpose of protecting their possession of land not worth possessing. it is certainly strange that any intelligent citizen, professing information on public affairs, could fail to see that when we aggressively interposed in this 279 controversy it was because it was necessary in order to assert and vindicate a principle distinctively american, and in the maintenance of which the people and government of the united states were profoundly concerned. it was because this principle was endangered, and because those charged with administrative responsibility would not abandon or neglect it, that our government interposed to prevent any further colonization of american soil by a european nation. in these circumstances neither the character of the people claiming the soil as against great britain, nor the value of the lands in dispute, was of the least consequence to us; nor did it in the least concern us which of the two contestants had the best title to any part of the disputed territory, so long as england did not possess and colonize more than belonged to her—however much or however little that might be. but we needed proof of the limits of her rights in order to determine our duty in defense of our monroe doctrine; and we sought to obtain such proof, and to secure peace, through arbitration.

but those among us who most loudly reprehended and bewailed our vigorous assertion of the monroe doctrine were the timid ones who feared personal financial loss, or those engaged 280 in speculation and stock-gambling, in buying much beyond their ability to pay, and generally in living by their wits. the patriotism of such people traverses exclusively the pocket nerve. they are willing to tolerate the monroe doctrine, or any other patriotic principle, so long as it does not interfere with their plans, and are just as willing to cast it off when it becomes troublesome.

but these things are as nothing when weighed against the sublime patriotism and devotion to their nation’s honor exhibited by the great mass of our countrymen—the plain people of the land. though, in case of the last extremity, the chances and suffering of conflict would have fallen to their lot, nothing blinded them to the manner in which the integrity of their country was involved. not for a single moment did their government know the lack of their strong and stalwart support.

i hope there are but few of our fellow-citizens who, in retrospect, do not now acknowledge the good that has come to our nation through this episode in our history. it has established the monroe doctrine on lasting foundations before the eyes of the world; it has given us a better place in the respect and consideration of the people of all nations, and especially 281 of great britain; it has again confirmed our confidence in the overwhelming prevalence among our citizens of disinterested devotion to american honor; and last, but by no means least, it has taught us where to look in the ranks of our countrymen for the best patriotism.