the secretary of state of venezuela, soon after this refusal of great britain to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration, in a despatch dated the second day of april, 1884, still urged that method of settlement, citing precedents and presenting arguments in its favor; and in conclusion he asked the minister of the english government at caracas “to have the goodness to think out and suggest any acceptable course for attaining a solution of the difficulty.” this was followed, a few days afterward, by another communication from the venezuelan secretary of state, repeating his urgent request for arbitration. from this communication it may not be amiss to make the following quotation:
venezuela and great britain possess the same rights in the question under discussion. if the republic should yield up any part of her pretensions, she would recognize the superior right of great britain, would violate the above-quoted article of the constitution, and draw down the censure of her 213 fellow-citizens. but when both nations, putting aside their independence of action in deference to peace and good friendship, create by mutual consent a tribunal which may decide in the controversy, the same is able to pass sentence that one of the two parties or both of them have been mistaken in their opinions concerning the extent of their territory. thus the case would not be in opposition to the constitution of the republic, there being no alienation of that which shall have been determined not to be her property.
on the tenth day of june, 1884, arbitration was again refused in a curt note from lord granville, declaring that “her majesty’s government adhere to their objection to arbitration as a mode of dealing with this question.”
about this time complaints and protests of the most vigorous character, based upon alleged breaches of the agreement of 1850 concerning the non-occupation of the disputed territory broke out on both sides of the controversy, and accusations of aggression and occupation were constantly made. i shall not attempt to follow them, as in detail they are not among the incidents which i consider especially relevant to the presentation of my theme.
on the thirteenth day of december, 1884, venezuela, in reply to a proposition of the british government that the boundary question and 214 certain other differences should be settled simultaneously, suggested, in view of the unwillingness of great britain to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration, that it should be presented for decision to a court of law, the members of which should be chosen by the parties respectively.
the british government promptly declined this proposition, and stated that they were not prepared to depart from the arrangement made in 1877 to decide the question by adopting a conventional boundary fixed by mutual accord between the two governments. this was in the face of the efforts which had been made along that line and found utterly fruitless.
immediately following the last-mentioned proposition by venezuela for the presentation of the difficulty to a court of law mutually chosen, negotiations were entered upon for the conclusion of a treaty between great britain and venezuela, which should quiet a difference pending between the two countries relating to differential duties and which should also dispose of other unsettled questions. in a draft of such a treaty submitted by venezuela there was inserted an article providing for arbitration in case of all differences which could not 215 be adjusted by friendly negotiation. to this article great britain suggested an amendment, making such arbitration applicable only to matters arising out of the interpretation or execution of the treaty itself, and especially excluding those emanating from any other source; but on further representation by venezuela, lord granville, in behalf of the government of great britain, expressly agreed with venezuela that the treaty article relating to arbitration should be unrestricted in its operation. this diplomatic agreement was in explicit terms, her majesty’s government agreeing “that the undertaking to refer differences to arbitration shall include all differences which may arise between the high contracting parties, and not those only which arise on the interpretation of the treaty.”
this occurred on the fifteenth day of may, 1885. whatever lord granville may have intended by the language used, the government of venezuela certainly understood his agreement to include the pending boundary dispute as among the questions that should be submitted to arbitration; and all other matters which the treaty should embrace seemed so easy of adjustment that its early completion, embodying a stipulation for the final arbitration of the 216 boundary controversy, was confidently and gladly anticipated by the republic.
the high hopes and joyful anticipations of venezuela born of this apparently favorable situation were, however, but short-lived.
on the twenty-seventh day of july, 1885, lord salisbury, who in the meantime had succeeded the earl of granville in great britain’s foreign office, in a note to venezuela’s envoy, declared: “her majesty’s government are unable to concur in the assent given by their predecessors in office to the general arbitration article proposed by venezuela, and they are unable to agree to the inclusion in it of matters other than those arising out of the interpretation or alleged violation of this particular treaty.”
no assertion of the irrevocability of the agreement which venezuela had made with his predecessor, and no plea or argument of any kind, availed to save the enlarged terms of this arbitration clause from lord salisbury’s destructive insistence.
on the twentieth day of june, 1886, lord rosebery suggested for great britain, and as a solution of the difficulty, that the territory within two certain lines which had been already proposed as boundaries should be equally divided between the contestants, either by arbitration 217 or the determination of a mixed commission.
this was declined by venezuela on the twenty-ninth day of july, 1886, upon the same grounds that led to the declination of prior proposals that apparently involved an absolute cession of a part of her territory; and she still insisted upon an arbitration embracing the entire disputed territory as the only feasible method of adjustment.
this declination on the part of venezuela of lord rosebery’s proposition terminated the second attempt in point of time, to settle this vexed question. in the meantime the aggressive conduct which for some time the officials of both countries had exhibited in and near the contested region had grown in distinctness and significance, until great britain had openly and with notorious assertion of ownership taken possession of a valuable part of the territory in dispute. on the 26th of october, 1886, an official document was published in the london “gazette” giving notice that no grants of land made by the government of venezuela in the territory claimed by great britain would be admitted or recognized by her majesty; and this more significant statement was added: “a map showing the boundary between british 218 guiana and venezuela claimed by her majesty’s government can be seen in the library of the colonial office, downing street, or at the office of the government secretary, georgetown, british guiana.” the boundary here spoken of, as shown on the map to which attention is directed, follows the schomburgk line. protests and demands in abundance on the part of venezuela followed, which were utterly disregarded, until, on the thirty-first day of january, 1887, the venezuelan secretary of state distinctly demanded of great britain the evacuation of the disputed territory which she was occupying in violation of prior agreement and the rights of the republic, and gave formal notice that unless such evacuation should be completed, and accompanied by acceptance of arbitration as a means of deciding the pending frontier dispute, by the twentieth day of february, 1887, diplomatic relations between the two countries would on that day cease.
these demands were absolutely unheeded; and thereupon, when the twentieth day of february arrived, venezuela exhibited a long list of specific charges of aggression and wrongdoing against great britain, and made the following statement and final protest: 219
in consequence, venezuela, not deeming it fitting to continue friendly relations with a state which thus injures her, suspends them from to-day.
and she protests before the government of her britannic majesty, before all civilized nations, before the whole world, against the acts of spoliation which the government of great britain has committed to her detriment, and which she will never on any consideration recognize as capable of altering in the slightest degree the rights which she has acquired from spain, and respecting which she will be always ready to submit to a third power, as the only way to a solution compatible with her constitutional principles.
notwithstanding all this, three years afterward, and on the tenth day of january, 1890, an agent of venezuela, appointed for that purpose, addressed a note to lord salisbury, still in charge of great britain’s foreign relations, expressing the desire of venezuela to renew diplomatic relations with great britain, and requesting an interview to that end.
a short time thereafter the government of great britain expressed its satisfaction that a renewal of diplomatic relations was in prospect, and presented to the representative of venezuela “a statement of the conditions which her majesty’s government considered necessary for a satisfactory settlement of the questions pending between the two countries.” 220
as the first of these conditions it was declared that “her majesty’s government could not accept as satisfactory any arrangement which did not admit the british title to the territory comprised within the line laid down by sir r. schomburgk in 1841; but they would be willing to refer to arbitration the claims of great britain to certain territory to the west of that line.”
naturally enough, this statement was received by venezuela with great disappointment and surprise. her representative promptly replied that his government could not accept any single point of the arbitrary and capricious line laid down by sir r. schomburgk in 1841, which had been declared null and void even by the government of her majesty; and that it was not possible for venezuela to accept arbitration in respect to territory west of that line. he further expressed his regret that the conditions then demanded by lord salisbury were more unfavorable to venezuela than the proposals made to the former agent of the republic prior to the suspension of diplomatic relations.
on the 19th of march, 1890, the british government reiterated its position more in detail. its refusal to admit any question as to great britain’s title to any of the territory within the 221 schomburgk line was emphatically repeated, and the british claim was defined to extend beyond any pretension which i believe had ever been previously made except by lord salisbury himself in 1880. a map was presented indicating this extreme claim, the schomburgk line, and a certain part of the territory between the boundary of this extreme claim on the west and the schomburgk line, which great britain proposed to submit to arbitration, abandoning all claim to the remainder of the territory between these last-named two lines. this scheme, if adopted, would give to england absolutely and without question the large territory between british guiana’s conceded western boundary and the schomburgk line, with an opportunity to lay claim before a board of arbitration for extensive additional territory beyond the schomburgk line.
this is pitiful. the schomburgk line, which was declared by the british government, at the time it was made, to be “merely a preliminary measure, open to further discussion between the governments of great britain and venezuela,” and which had been since largely extended in some mysterious way, is now declared to be a line so well established, so infallible, and so sacred that only the territory that england exorbitantly 222 claims beyond that line is enough in dispute to be submitted to impartial arbitration. the trader is again in evidence. on this basis england could abundantly afford to lose entirely in the arbitration she at length conceded.
and yet venezuela was not absolutely discouraged. soon after the receipt of great britain’s last depressing communication, she appointed still another agent who was to try his hand with england in the field of diplomacy. on the twenty-fourth day of june, 1890, this new representative replied to the above proposal made to his predecessor by her majesty’s government, and expressed the great regret of venezuela that its recent proposals for a settlement of the boundary difficulty by arbitration affecting all the disputed territory had been peremptorily declined. he also declared that the emphatic statement contained in great britain’s last communication in reference to this question created for his government “difficulties not formerly contemplated,” and thereupon formally declined on behalf of venezuela the consideration of the proposals contained in said communication. this statement of discouraging conditions was, however, supplemented by a somewhat new suggestion to the effect that a preliminary agreement should be 223 made containing a declaration on the part of the government of venezuela that the river essequibo, its banks, and the lands covering it belong exclusively to british guiana, and a declaration on the part of her majesty’s government that the orinoco river, its banks, and the lands covering it belong exclusively to venezuela, and providing that a mixed commission of two chief engineers and their staffs should be appointed to make, within one year, careful maps and charts of the region to the west and northwest of the essequibo river, toward the orinoco, in order to determine officially the exact course of its rivers and streams, and the precise position of its mountains and hills, and all other details that would permit both countries to have reliable official knowledge of the territory which was actually in dispute, enabling them to determine with a mutual feeling of friendship and good will a boundary with perfect knowledge of the case; but in the event that a determination should not be thus reached, the final decision of the boundary question should be submitted to two arbitrators, one selected by each government, and a third chosen by the other two, to act as umpire in case of disagreement, who, in view of the original titles and documents presented, should fix a boundary-line 224 which, being in accordance with the respective rights and titles, should have the advantage as far as possible of constituting a natural boundary; and that, pending such determination, both governments should remove or withdraw all posts and other indications and signs of possession or dominion on said territory, and refrain from exercising any jurisdiction within the disputed region.
on the 24th of july, 1890, lord salisbury declined to accept these suggestions of the venezuelan representative, and declared: “her majesty’s government have more than once explained that they cannot consent to submit to arbitration what they regard as their indisputable title to districts in the possession of the british colony.”
is it uncharitable to see in this reference to “possession” a hint of the industrious manner in which great britain had attempted to improve her position by permitting colonization, and by other acts of possession, during the half-century since the boundary dispute began?
efforts to settle this controversy seem to have languished after this rebuff until march, 1893, when still another agent was appointed by venezuela for the purpose of re?stablishing diplomatic relations with great britain, and 225 settling, if possible, the boundary trouble and such other differences as might be pending between the two countries. as a means to that end, this agent, on the twenty-sixth day of may, 1893, presented a memorandum to the british government containing suggestions for such settlement. the suggestion relating to the adjustment of the boundary question rested upon the idea of arbitration and did not materially differ from that made by this agent’s immediate predecessor in 1890, except as to the status quo, pending final adjustment, which it was proposed should be the same as that existing after the agreement of non-interference in the disputed territory made by the two governments in 1850.
the plan thus suggested was declined by the government of great britain, because, in the first place, it involved an arbitration, “which had been repeatedly declined by her majesty’s government,” and, further, because it was, in the language of the british reply, “quite impossible that they should consent to revert to the status quo of 1850 and evacuate what has for some years constituted an integral portion of british guiana.”
a further communication from the agent of venezuela, offering additional arguments in 226 support of his suggestions, brought forth a reply informing him that the contents of his note did not “appear to her majesty’s government to afford any opening for arriving at an understanding on this question which they could accept.”
six months afterward, on the twenty-ninth day of september, 1893, a final communication was addressed by the representative of venezuela to the british government, reviewing the situation and the course of past efforts to arrive at a settlement, and concluding with the words:
i must now declare in the most solemn manner, and in the name of the government of venezuela, that it is with the greatest regret that that government sees itself forced to leave the situation produced in the disputed territory by the acts of recent years unsettled, and subject to the serious disturbances which acts of force cannot but produce; and to declare that venezuela will never consent to proceedings of that nature being accepted as title-deeds to justify the arbitrary occupation of territory which is within its jurisdiction.
here closed a period in this dispute, fifty-two years in duration, vexed with agitation, and perturbed by irritating and repeated failures to reach a peaceful adjustment. instead 227 of progress in the direction of a settlement of their boundaries, the results of their action were increased obstacles to fair discussion, intensified feelings of injury, extended assertion of title, ruthless appropriation of the territory in controversy, and an unhealed breach in diplomatic relations.