in 1876—thirty-two years after the discontinuance of efforts on the part of great britain and venezuela to fix by agreement a line which should divide their possessions—venezuela was confronted, upon the renewal of negotiations for that purpose, by the following conditions:
the claim by her, of a divisional line, founded upon her conception of strict right, which her powerful opponent had insisted could not in any way be plausibly supported, and which therefore she would in no event accept.
an indefiniteness in the limits claimed by great britain—so great that, of two boundary-lines indicated or suggested by her, one had been plainly declared to be “merely a preliminary measure open to future discussion between the governments of great britain and venezuela,” while the other was distinctly claimed to be based not on any acknowledgment of the republic’s rights, but simply upon generous concessions and a “desire to avoid all 191 cause of serious controversies between the two countries.”
a controversy growing out of this situation impossible of friendly settlement except by such arrangement and accommodation as would satisfy great britain, or by a submission of the dispute to arbitration.
a constant danger of such an extension of british settlements in the disputed territory as would necessarily complicate the situation and furnish a convenient pretext for the refusal of any concession respecting the lands containing such settlements.
a continual profession on the part of great britain of her present readiness to make benevolent concessions and of her willingness to co-operate in a speedy adjustment, while at the same time neither reducing her pretensions, nor attempting in a conspicuous manner to hasten negotiations to a conclusion.
a tremendous disparity in power and strength between venezuela and her adversary, which gave her no hope of defending her territory or preventing its annexation to the possessions of great britain in case the extremity of force or war was reached.
the renewed negotiations began with a communication dated november 14, 1876, addressed 192 by the minister of foreign affairs for venezuela to lord derby, then great britain’s principal secretary of state. in this communication the efforts made between the years 1841 and 1844 to establish by agreement a divisional line between the two countries, and their interruption, were referred to, and the earnest desire was expressed that negotiations for that purpose might at once be resumed. the minister suggested no other line than the essequibo river, but in conclusion declared that the president of venezuela was led to “hope that the solution of this question, already for so many years delayed, will be a work of very speedy and cordial agreement.”
on the same day that this note was written to lord derby, one was also written by the same venezuelan official to mr. fish, then our secretary of state. after speaking of the united states as “the most powerful and the oldest of the republics of the new continent, and called on to lend to others its powerful moral support in disputes with european nations,” the minister directs attention to the boundary controversy between venezuela and great britain and the great necessity of bringing it to a speedy termination. he concludes as follows: “but whatever may be the result of the new steps of 193 the government, it has desired that the american government might at once take cognizance of them, convinced, as it is, that it will give the subject its kind consideration and take an interest in having due justice done to venezuela.” a memorandum was inclosed with the note, setting forth the claims of venezuela touching the boundary location.
this appears to be the first communication addressed to our government on the subject of a controversy in which we afterward became very seriously concerned.
a short time after the date of these communications, a venezuelan envoy to great britain was appointed; and, on the thirteenth day of february, 1877, he addressed to lord derby a note in which, after asserting the right of venezuela to insist upon the boundary previously claimed by her, he declared the willingness of his government “to settle this long-pending question in the most amicable manner,” and suggested either the acceptance of a boundary-line such as would result from a presentation by both parties of spanish and dutch titles, maps, documents, and proofs existing before the advent in south america of either venezuela or british guiana, or the adoption of “a conventional line fixed by mutual accord 194 between the governments of venezuela and great britain after a careful and friendly consideration of the case, keeping in view the documents presented by both sides, solely with the object of reconciling their mutual interests, and to fix a boundary as equitable as possible.” the suggestion is made that the adoption of a divisional line is important “to prevent the occurrence of serious differences in the future, particularly as guiana is attracting the general attention of the world on account of the immense riches which are daily being discovered there.”
let us here note that this renewal by venezuela of her efforts to settle her boundary-line was accompanied by two new features. these, though in themselves entirely independent, became so related to each other, and in their subsequent combination and development they so imperiously affected our government, that their coincident appearance at this particular stage of the controversy may well strike us as significant. one of these features was the abandonment by venezuela of her insistence upon a line representing her extreme claims, and which england would not in any contingency accept, thus clearing the field for possible arbitration; and the other was her earnest appeal 195 to us for our friendly aid. neither should we fail to notice the new and important reference of the venezuelan envoy to the immense riches being discovered in the disputed territory. gold beneath soil in controversy does not always hasten the adjustment of uncertain or disputed boundary-lines.
on the twenty-fourth day of march, 1877, lord derby informed the venezuelan envoy that the governor of british guiana was shortly expected in london, and that he was anxious to await his arrival before taking any steps in the boundary discussion.
after waiting for more than two years for a further answer from the english government, the venezuelan representative in london, on the 19th of may, 1879, addressed a note on the subject to lord salisbury, who, in the meantime, had succeeded lord derby. in this note reference was made to the communication sent to lord derby in 1877, to the desire expressed by him to await the arrival of the governor of british guiana before making reply, and to the fact that the communication mentioned still remained unanswered; and on behalf of venezuela her representative repeated the alternative proposition made by him in february, 1877, in these words: “the boundary treaty 196 may be based either on the acceptance of the line of strict right as shown by the records, documents, and other authoritative proofs which each party may exhibit, or on the acceptance at once by both governments of a frontier of accommodation which shall satisfy the respective interests of the two countries”; and he concluded his note as follows:
if her britannic majesty’s government should prefer the frontier of accommodation or convenience, then it would be desirable that it should vouchsafe to make a proposition of an arrangement, on the understanding that, in order to obviate future difficulties and to give great britain the fullest proof of the consideration and friendship which venezuela professes for her, my government would not hesitate to accept a demarcation that should satisfy as far as possible the interests of the republic.
at all events, my lord, something will have to be done to prevent this question from pending any longer.
thirty-eight years ago my government wrote urging her majesty’s government to have the boundary treaty concluded, and now this affair is in the same position as in 1841, without any settlement; meanwhile guiana has become of more importance than it was then, by reason of the large deposits of gold which have been and still are met with in that region.
now, at the date of this communication england’s most extreme claims were indicated 197 either by the schomburgk line or by the line which lord aberdeen suggested in 1844 as a concession. these were indeed the only lines which great britain had thus far presented. when in such circumstances, and with these lines distinctly in mind, the envoy of venezuela offered to abandon for his country her most extreme claims, and asked that great britain should “vouchsafe to make a proposition of an arrangement” upon the basis of a “frontier of accommodation or convenience,” what answer had he a right to expect? most assuredly he had a right to expect that if great britain should prefer to proceed upon the theory of “accommodation or convenience,” she would respond by offering such a reduction of the claims she had already made as would indicate a degree of concession or “accommodation” on her part that should entitle her to expect similar concession from venezuela.
what was the answer actually made? after a delay of nearly eight months, on the tenth day of january, 1880, lord salisbury replied that her majesty’s government were of the opinion that to argue the matter on the ground of strict right would involve so many intricate questions that it would be very unlikely to lead to a satisfactory solution of the question, and they would 198 therefore prefer the alternative “of endeavoring to come to an agreement as to the acceptance by the two governments of a frontier of accommodation which shall satisfy the respective interests of the two countries.”
he then gives a most startling statement of the english government’s claim, by specifying boundaries which overlap the schomburgk line and every other line that had been thought of or dreamed of before, declaring that such claim is justified “by virtue of ancient treaties with the aboriginal tribes and of subsequent cessions from holland.” he sets against this claim, or “on the other hand,” as he says, the fact that the president of venezuela, in a message dated february 20, 1877, “put forward a claim on the part of venezuela to the river essequibo as the boundary to which the republic was entitled”—thereby giving prejudicial importance to a claim of boundary made by the president of venezuela three years before, notwithstanding his lordship was answering a communication in which venezuela’s present diplomatic representative distinctly proposed “a frontier of accommodation.” his declaration, therefore, that the boundary which was thus put forward by the president of venezuela would involve “the surrender of a province now inhabited 199 by forty thousand british subjects,” seems quite irrelevant, because such a boundary was not then under consideration; and in passing it may occur to us that the great delay in settling the boundaries between the two countries had given abundant opportunity for such inhabitation as lord salisbury suggests. his lordship having thus built up a contention in which he puts on one side a line which for the sake of pacific accommodation venezuela no longer proposes to insist upon, and on the other a line for great britain so grotesquely extreme as to appear fanciful, soberly observes:
the difference, therefore, between these two claims is so great that it is clear that, in order to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement, each party must be prepared to make considerable concessions to the other; and although the claim of venezuela to the essequibo river boundary could not under any circumstances be entertained, i beg leave to assure you that her majesty’s government are anxious to meet the venezuelan government in a spirit of conciliation, and would be willing, in the event of a renewal of negotiations for a general settlement of boundaries, to waive a portion of what they consider to be their strict right, if venezuela is really disposed to make corresponding concessions on her part.
and ignoring entirely the humbly respectful request of the venezuelan minister that great 200 britain would “vouchsafe to make a proposition of an arrangement,” his lordship thus concludes his communication: “her majesty’s government will therefore be glad to receive, and will undertake to consider in the most friendly spirit, any proposal that the venezuelan government may think fit to make for the establishment of a boundary satisfactory to both nations.”
this is diplomacy—of a certain sort. it is a deep and mysterious science; and we probably cannot do better than to confess our inability to understand its intricacies and sinuosities; but at this point we can hardly keep out of mind the methods of the shrewd, sharp trader who demands exorbitant terms, and at the same time invites negotiation, looking for a result abundantly profitable in the large range for dicker which he has created.
an answer was made to lord salisbury’s note on the twelfth day of april, 1880, in which the venezuelan envoy stated in direct terms that he had received specific instructions from his government for the arrangement of the difficulty, by abandoning the ground of strict right and “concurring in the adoption for both countries of a frontier mutually convenient, and reconciling in the best possible manner their 201 respective interests—each party having to make concessions to the other for the purpose of attaining such an important result.”
it will be remembered that in 1844, when this boundary question was under discussion, lord aberdeen proposed a line beginning in the mouth of the moroco river, being a point on the coast south and east of the mouth of the orinoco, thus giving to venezuela the control of that river, but running inland in such a manner as to include, in the whole, little if any less area than that included in the schomburgk line; and it will also be recalled that this line was not then acceptable to venezuela. it appears, however, that the delays and incidents of thirty-six years had impressed upon the government of the republic the serious disadvantages of her situation in contention with great britain; for we find in this reply of the venezuelan envoy the inquiry “whether her britannic majesty’s government is disposed now, as it was in 1844, to accept the mouth of the river moroco as the frontier at the coast.” to this lord salisbury promptly responded that the attorney-general for the colony of british guiana was shortly expected in england, and that her majesty’s government would prefer to postpone the boundary discussion until his arrival. 202
this was followed by a silence of five months, with no word or sign from england’s foreign office; and in the meantime earl granville had succeeded lord salisbury as secretary of state for foreign affairs. after waiting thus long, the representative of venezuela, on the 23d of september, 1880, reminded lord granville that in the preceding april his immediate predecessor had informed him that the arrival of the attorney-general of british guiana was awaited before deciding the question of boundaries between the two guianas; and as he had not, after the lapse of five months, been honored with a communication on the subject, he was bound to suppose that the attorney-general had not accomplished his voyage, in which case it was useless longer to wait for him. he further reminded his lordship that on the 24th of march, 1877, lord derby, then in charge of british foreign affairs, also desired to postpone the consideration of the question until the arrival in london of the governor of british guiana, who was then expected, but who apparently never came. he then proceeds as follows:
consequently it is best not to go on waiting either for the governor or for the attorney-general of the colony, but to decide these questions ourselves, considering 203 that my government is now engaged in preparing the official map of the republic and wishes of course to mark out the boundaries on the east.
in my despatch of the 12th of april last, i informed your excellency [excellency’s predecessor?] that as a basis of a friendly demarcation my government was disposed to accept the mouth of the river moroco as the frontier on the coast. if her britannic majesty’s government should accept this point of departure, it would be very easy to determine the general course of the frontier, either by means of notes or in verbal conferences, as your excellency might prefer.
on the twelfth day of february, 1881, lord granville, replying to venezuela’s two notes dated april 12 and september 23, 1880, informed her representative, without explanation, that her majesty’s government would not accept the mouth of the moroco as the divisional boundary on the coast.
a few days afterward, in an answer to this refusal, venezuela’s representative mentioned the extreme claims of the two countries and the fact that it had been agreed between the parties that steps should be taken to settle upon a frontier of accommodation; that in pursuance thereof he had proposed as the point of departure for such a frontier the mouth of the moroco river, which was in agreement thus far with the proposition made by lord aberdeen on 204 behalf of great britain in 1844; and pertinently added: “thus thirty-seven years ago her britannic majesty’s government spontaneously proposed the mouth of the moroco river as the limit on the coast, a limit which your excellency does not accept now, for you are pleased to tell me so in the note which i have the honor of answering.” he thereupon suggests another boundary, beginning on the coast at a point one mile north of the mouth of the moroco river and thence extending inland in such manner as to constitute a large concession on the part of venezuela, but falling very far short of meeting the claims of great britain. he declares, however, that this demarcation “is the maximum of all concessions which in this matter the government of venezuela can grant by way of friendly arrangement.”
apparently anticipating, as he well might, that the boundary he proposed would fail of acceptance, he suggests that in such case the two governments would have no alternative but to determine the frontier by strict right, and that on this basis they would find it impossible to arrive at an agreement. therefore he declares that he has received instructions from his government to urge upon great britain the 205 submission of the question to an arbitrator, to be chosen by both parties, to whose award both governments should submit.
in this proposal of arbitration by venezuela we find an approach to a new phase of the controversy. at first, the two countries had stood at arm’s-length, each asserting strict right of boundary, only to be met by obstinate and unyielding resistance. next, the field of mutual concession and accommodation had been traversed, with no result except damaging and dangerous delay. and now, after forty years of delusive hope, the time seemed at hand when the feebler contestant must contemplate ignominious submission to dictatorial exaction, or forcible resistance, futile and distressing, unless honorable rest and justice could be found in arbitration—the refuge which civilization has builded among the nations of the earth for the protection of the weak against the strong, and the citadel from which the ministries of peace issue their decrees against the havoc and barbarism of war.
the reply of lord granville to the communication of the envoy of venezuela proposing an alternative of arbitration was delayed for seven months; and when, in september, 1881, it was received, it contained a rejection of the boundary 206 offered by venezuela and a proposal of a new line apparently lacking almost every feature of concession; and, singularly enough, there was not in this reply the slightest allusion to venezuela’s request for arbitration.
i do not find that this communication of great britain was ever specifically answered, though an answer was often requested. no further steps appear to have been taken until september 7, 1883, when lord granville instructed the british minister to venezuela to invite the serious attention of the venezuelan government to the questions pending between the two countries, with a view to their early settlement. these questions are specified as relating to the boundary, to certain differential duties imposed on imports from british colonies, and to the claims of british creditors of the republic. his lordship declared in those instructions that as a preliminary to entering upon negotiations it was indispensable that an answer should be given to the pending proposal which had been made by her majesty’s government in regard to the boundary.
the representations made to the government of venezuela by the british minister, in obedience to those instructions, elicited a reply, in which a provision of the venezuelan constitution 207 was cited prohibiting the alienation or cession of any part of the territory of the republic; and it was suggested that, inasmuch as the essequibo line seemed abundantly supported as the true boundary of venezuela, a concession beyond that line by treaty would be obnoxious to this constitutional prohibition, whereas any reduction of territory brought about by a decree of an arbitral tribunal would obviate the difficulty. therefore the urgent necessity was submitted for the selection of an arbitrator, “who, freely and unanimously chosen by the two governments, would judge and pronounce a sentence of a definitive character.”
the representative of her majesty’s government, in a response dated february 29, 1884, commented upon the new difficulty introduced by the statement concerning the prohibition contained in the constitution of the republic, and expressed a fear that if arbitration was agreed to, the same prohibition might be invoked as an excuse for not abiding by an award unfavorable to venezuela; and it was declared that if, on the other hand, the arbitrator should decide in favor of the venezuelan government to the full extent of their claim, “a large and important territory which has 208 for a long period been inhabited and occupied by her majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the colony of british guiana would be severed from the queen’s dominions.” this declaration is immediately followed by a conclusion in these words:
for the above-mentioned reasons, therefore, the circumstances of the case do not appear to her majesty’s government to be such as to render arbitration applicable for a solution of the difficulty; and i have accordingly to request you, in making this known to the venezuelan government, to express to them the hope of her majesty’s government that some other means may be devised for bringing this long-standing matter to an issue satisfactory to both powers.
let us pause here for a moment’s examination of the surprising refusal of great britain to submit this difficulty to arbitration, and the more surprising reasons presented for its justification. the refusal was surprising because the controversy had reached such a stage that arbitration was evidently the only means by which it could be settled consistently with harmonious relations between the two countries.
it was on this ground that venezuela proposed arbitration; and she strongly urged it on the further ground that inasmuch as the prohibition of her constitution prevented the relinquishment, 209 by treaty or voluntary act, of any part of the territory which her people and their government claimed to be indubitably venezuelan, such a relinquishment would present no difficulties if it was in obedience to a decree of a tribunal to which the question of ownership had been mutually submitted.
in giving her reasons for rejecting arbitration great britain says in effect: the plan you urge for the utter and complete elimination of this constitutional prohibition—for its expurgation and destruction so far as it is related to the pending dispute—is objectionable, because we fear the prohibition thus eliminated, expunged, and destroyed will still be used as a pretext for disobedience to an award which, for the express purpose of avoiding this constitutional restraint, you have invited.
the remaining objection interposed by great britain to the arbitration requested by venezuela is based upon the fear that an award might be made in favor of the venezuelan claim, in which case “a large and important territory which has for a long period been inhabited and occupied by her majesty’s subjects and treated as a part of the colony of british guiana would be severed from the queen’s dominions.” 210
it first occurs to us that a contention may well be suspected of weakness when its supporters are unwilling to subject it to the test of impartial arbitration. certain inquiries are also pertinent in this connection. who were the british subjects who had long occupied the territory that might through arbitration be severed from the queen’s dominions? how many of them began this occupancy during the more than forty years that the territory had been steadily and notoriously disputed? did they enter upon this territory with knowledge of the dispute and against the warning of the government to which they owed allegiance, or were they encouraged and invited to such entry by agencies of that government who had full notice of the uncertainty of the british title? in one case, being themselves in the wrong, they were entitled to no consideration; in the other, the question of loss and indemnification should rest between them and their government, which had impliedly guaranteed them against disturbance. in any event, neither case presented a reason why great britain should take or possess the lands of venezuela; nor did either case furnish an excuse for denying to venezuela a fair and impartial adjudication of her disputed rights. by whom had this territory “been 211 treated as a part of the colony of british guiana”? surely not by venezuela. on the contrary, she had persistently claimed it as her own, and had “treated” it as her own as far as she could and dared. england alone had treated it as a part of british guiana; her immense power had enabled her to do this; and her decrees in her own favor as against her weak adversary undoubtedly promised greater advantages than arbitration could possibly assure.
