the great panama canal affair was only one of many financial scandals which seriously damaged the good fame of the french republic founded upon the fall of the empire, and consecrated by the collapse of the commune of paris. but this panama scandal was by far the most important and most nefarious, alike in respect to the amount of money involved, the position and character of the people mixed up in it, and the wide ramifications of wholesale corruption throughout the political world that were in the end revealed.
m. ferdinand de lesseps, the originator and organiser of the suez canal, was a man of quite exceptional ability, energy and force of character. he carried through his great project in the face of obstacles, political and financial, that would certainly have broken the heart and frustrated the purpose of a weaker personality. at no period did he show any disposition to keep the canal under harmful restrictions, and the khedive ismail pasha, though a turk of no scruples, who backed him throughout, also took a very wide view of the services which the canal would render to the world at large. it was to be neutral and open under the same conditions to the ships of all nations. unfortunately, england, whose commerce has chiefly benefited by the canal, bitterly opposed its construction, going so far at one time as actually to prohibit the khedive from carrying on the canal works in his own territory, thus occasioning considerable delay. as it happened, however, this delay itself was turned by de lesseps to the advantage of the canal company, as he used the time to create new[107] engines for excavation which in the end expedited the completion of the waterway.
the result of this ignorant british opposition was that the finance of the great enterprise was chiefly provided in france, and, when the canal was first opened in 1869, it was considered, as in fact it was, a triumph of french sagacity and foresight over the obstructionist jealousy of england. this view was accompanied also by natural jubilation at the consequent increase of french influence in egypt itself. count ferdinand de lesseps, therefore, became a great french hero who, by his capacity, persistence and diplomacy, had not only gained glory for france and extended her power, but had also furnished his countrymen with an excellent investment for their savings, on which british commerce was paying the interest. his popularity in france was well earned and unbounded. the work of de lesseps was, in fact, regarded as the one great and indisputable success of the french empire. anything which he took in hand thereafter was certain to prove of great value to the country and an assured benefit to those who followed his financial lead. he was also a lucky man. he and his set had won against heavy odds.
it is true the cost of the suez canal had been more than double his original estimate, even up to the time when it was first opened, and many millions sterling had been expended since; it was likewise the fact that his great idea had taken fully ten years to realise in the shape of a completed enterprise. but this was the larger tribute to his foresight and power of overcoming obstacles due either to natural causes or to the malignity of enemies. thus ferdinand de lesseps, ten years after the suez canal had been made available for shipping between the mediterranean and the red sea, held an unequalled position in the eyes of french engineers, french bankers and, what was more important, french investors.
early in the year 1879 m. de lesseps, following the course adopted by him in the case of the isthmus of suez, called a congress of the nations to consider the entire project of a[108] panama canal. there was nothing new in the matter. the line of the canal had been surveyed by a capable french engineer nearly forty years before. the congress estimated the actual cost of the construction of the canal at about ￡25,000,000, or a little more than the highest sum thought sufficient by the english engineer of the panama railroad. but the mere figures are of little importance. that they were quite insufficient, as the business was managed, has since been abundantly proved. but at first there is no reason to believe that de lesseps was other than quite straightforward. he had bought the concession for the canal from mr. buonaparte wyse, who had acquired it from the united states of colombia, through whose territory the canal as surveyed ran. that this concession itself had previously been found very difficult to finance in any shape was a matter of common knowledge; that also the canal, when constructed, might prove far less valuable in every way than was calculated for world commerce was the opinion of many skilled engineers. but then the same things had been said about suez. so the french public rushed in to subscribe the money required for the french company immediately formed by m. de lesseps to exploit the concession.
the great name of de lesseps covered the whole risk and rendered criticism quite useless. but the management of the excavation was wildly incapable and inconceivably extravagant. it was very soon discovered that the original estimates were absurdly at variance with the cost of the real work to be done. the entire enterprise, as undertaken in 1884, was entered upon possibly in good faith, but in a wholly irresponsible and ignorant manner. in spite of warnings as to the certainty of encountering exceptional obstacles, no steps were taken to provide against contingencies, to inform the shareholders as to the position, or to revise the plans in accordance with the facts. the canal was inspected by m. rousseau at the end of 1885. this engineer gave a most unfavourable report in regard to the excavations and constructions already carried out at vast expense, and the enormous additional sum[109] needed to give any chance of completing the works. instead of honestly facing this most unpromising situation and disclosing to the shareholders the real state of the case, or declaring that at least three times the amount would be required to bring the project to a satisfactory conclusion, and calling for this huge sum at once, the directors resorted to all the worst tactics of the unscrupulous promoter. this part of the matter went into the hands of m. jacques reinach and m. cornelius herz, names and persons afterwards covered with obloquy in connection with the whole affair. they set to work systematically, and were restrained by no inconvenient scruples. strong political influence in both chambers was needed in order to obtain the passing of the panama lottery bill. strong political influence was bought, though the bill itself was not carried. from 1885-86 onwards this wholesale bribery was continued on an enormous scale.
the company was as careless of men’s lives as it was of shareholders’ money. labourers from all parts of the world had been gathered together in what was then a deadly climate, without proper sanitation or reasonable medical attendance. some time prior to the financial troubles it was known that such anarchy and horror prevailed on the isthmus that intervention by the french government, or even by an international commission, was called for. nothing but the great reputation of de lesseps could possibly have upheld such a state of things, or have obtained more and still more money to perpetuate the chaos. even when the truth as to the frightful mortality of the men employed and the incredible waste, due to incompetence and corruption, must have been known to the president of the company (m. de lesseps himself) and his fellow-directors, when, likewise, they must have been convinced that the company was drifting into a hopeless position, they still appealed to their countrymen for more and more and more money to throw into the bottomless quagmire at panama, and sink of french savings in paris, to which the whole company had been reduced.
[110]
by the year 1888 no less than 1,400,000,000 francs had been expended in one way or another, while not one-third of the necessary work had been done. of that ￡55,000,000 nominal amount not a few millions sterling found their way into the pockets of deputies, senators, and even academicians, to say nothing of commissions and brokerages of more or less legitimate character.
politicians in france are no worse than politicians in other countries. but the proportion of well-to-do men among them is less than elsewhere. there was consequently a margin of them always on the look-out for an opportunity of adding to their income, and this margin was much larger in the national assembly before payment of members than it is to-day. for such men the panama finance was a glorious opportunity. nobody could suspect de lesseps of being consciously a party to a fraud. to make a french venture like the panama a great success, in spite of all difficulties, was a patriotic service. to receive good pay for doing good work was a happy combination of circumstances none the less gratifying that, the work being honestly done, remuneration followed or preceded in hard cash. the extent to which this form of corruption was carried and the high level in the political world to which streams from the panama pactolus were forced up is only partially known even now. but so wide was the flow and so deep the stream that, when the outcry against the company began in earnest, statesmen whose personal honour had never been challenged were afflicted with such alarm, on the facts being laid before them, that they did their very utmost to suppress full investigation.
this, however, was not easy to accomplish. for there were no fewer than 800,000 french investors in the panama company. all of these were voters and all had friends. it became a question, therefore, whether it was more dangerous to the republic and its statesmen—for personal as well as political considerations came in—to compel full publicity, or to hush the whole thing up as far as possible. meanwhile, the public,[111] and important journals not suspected of panamism, took the whole thing down from the cabinet and the bureaux into the street.
for the opponents of the republic it was a fine opening. that enormous sums out of the ￡55,000,000 subscribed had been paid away to senators, deputies and academicians, for services rendered, was certain. who had got the money, and under what conditions? imputations of the most sinister character were made all round. paris rang with accusations of fraud. that more than a hundred deputies were concerned in panama corruption is a matter of common knowledge. one who was in a position to know all the facts declared that more than a hundred who were mixed up in other nefarious transactions used panama to divert attention from their own malfeasances. however that may be, public opinion, excited by the clamour and denunciations of eight hundred thousand shareholders and electors, clove to panama. it became an instrument of political warfare as well as of personal delation. the obvious determination of presidents carnot and loubet to prevent a clear statement from being issued and the directors prosecuted only rendered the sufferers more determined to get at the facts and wreak vengeance on somebody.
there were two views as to count de lesseps—to give him his title, which had its value in the affair—and his conduct in the panama canal company. there were those who held that de lesseps, beginning as an enthusiast, and believing himself perhaps to be inspired in everything he undertook, no sooner found that his carelessness, in disregarding real natural difficulties and in organising the excavations on the spot, must result in failure, unless he could obtain unlimited resources, and doubtful of ultimate success even then, began at once to display the worst side of his character. the successful adventurer became, by degrees, the desperate gambler with the savings of his countrymen. instead of regarding himself as the trustee of the people who, on the strength of his reputation and character, had risked their money, he deliberately shut[112] his eyes to the real facts. he resorted to all the tricks of an unscrupulous charlatan, misrepresented the truth in every respect and had no thought for any other consideration than to get in more funds. for this purpose he paraded the country, making the utmost use of his personal and social advantages, and losing no opportunity for unworthy advertisement. all this time he knew perfectly well that his enterprise was doomed. consequently, there was little to choose between de lesseps and reinach, herz and the rest of them, except that he was perhaps the greatest criminal of all. such was the view of the promoter-in-chief taken by lawyers and men of business who looked upon the whole matter as a venture standing by itself, to be judged by the ordinary rules of financial probity.
on the other side a capable and influential minority regarded de lesseps as an enthusiast, a man of high character and noble conceptions, quite devoid of the power of strict analysis of any matter presented to him, and destitute of common sense. his financial methods and commercial obliquities were due to his overweening confidence in his own judgment and faith in his good fortune to pull him through against all probabilities. the one great success he had achieved rendered him a man not to be argued with or considered on the plane of ordinary mortals. he saw the object he was aiming at, felt convinced he would accomplish it, regarded all who differed from him as ignorant or malignant, and went straight ahead to get money, not for his own purposes but in order to carry out the second magnificent scheme to which he had committed himself. corruption and malversation by others were no concern of his.
president sadi-carnot, a cold, silent, upright man, little given to allow his feelings to inflame him at any time, warmly took this view of de lesseps’ character. m. carnot had been brought into close contact with de lesseps on another of his vast projects. the president, like many others, refused to look at the panama matter from the point of view of fraud or imposture. money was for de lesseps always a means, never an end. when the whole matter was brought before him, and[113] one of the legal personages whose duty it was to investigate the whole of the facts came to a very harsh conclusion as to de lesseps’ responsibility for the waste, corruption and malversation, m. carnot said with some vivacity: “no, no; m. de lesseps is not a man of bad faith. i should rather consider him punctilious. only his natural vehemence carries him away; he is a bad reasoner, and has no power of calculation. hence many regrettable acts on his part, done without any intention of injuring anybody. i knew him well, having seen him very close, when his imagination suggested to him the scheme for excavating an inland sea in africa. a commission of engineers, of whom i was one, was appointed to hear him and study his proposal. we had no difficulty in showing that the whole thing was a pure chimera. he seemed very much astonished, and we saw that we had not convinced him. take it from me as a certainty that he would have spent millions upon millions to create his sea, and that with the best of good faith in the world.”
this was probably the truth, so far as de lesseps himself was personally concerned. promoters, discoverers and inventors of genius are men of mighty faith in their respective enterprises. as a great anarchist once said of his own special nostrum for regenerating humanity at a blow: “all is moral that helps it, all is immoral that hinders it.” so with de lesseps. all was moral that got in money to construct his canal: all was immoral that checked the flow of cash to the isthmus. but an enthusiast of this temper, “without power of calculation,” is a very dangerous man, not only to the subscribers to his shares, but to the republican politicians who confined their enthusiasm to the acquisition of hard cash for use not in panama but in paris.
in 1888 the panama canal company collapsed, and the thing was put into liquidation. but that was not the end of it. all sorts of schemes were afoot for carrying on the works and completing the canal before the concession expired in 1893. although, however, from the date of the breakdown onwards—[114] when it was stated that fully ￡70,000,000 would be needed in addition to the amount already expended or frittered away to carry out the canal—most virulent attacks were continually made upon prominent politicians and financiers, as well as upon the directors of the company, neither the political nor the legal consequences of the disaster were felt to the full extent until four years later. judicial investigations, it is true, were going on. but it was an open secret that, in spite of the losses and complaints of the shareholders, and the strong desire of the public that the whole vast transaction should be exposed in every detail, the anxiety of men in high place was to calm down natural feeling in the matter. what made this attitude more suspicious was the fact that the government had certainly not shown itself unfavourable to the scheme, but on the contrary had helped it, even when the gravest doubts had been thrown upon its practicability, at a cost vastly exceeding anything contemplated by the company. in fact, an atmosphere of general distrust pervaded paris and the whole of france. yet panama still had its friends, and it was believed that somehow or other the affair would be tided over.
but there was a good deal more to come. things, in fact, now took that dramatic turn which seems the rule in france with affairs which directly or indirectly influence high politics and high finance. there were people who believed that the entire enterprise could be set on its legs, although parts of the recent excavations were deteriorating and some of them had been covered already with luxuriant tropical growths which one imaginative critic spoke of as “forests.” either the government, they thought, could be forced to take up the enterprise itself, or at any rate would think it best, in view of what had already been done, to support de lesseps in a fresh scheme, should the concession be renewed. this, no doubt, was the opinion of m. gauthier, who urged the government in the assembly to appoint a commission to prepare plans for the completion of the canal. this, he declared, was the only means of safeguarding the interests of the shareholders and the[115] many hundreds of millions of francs sunk by poor french investors in this great enterprise.
such a daring proposal necessarily raised the whole question of the responsibility for the serious engineering and financial fiasco. the government was at once charged from several quarters, not as being answerable for past mistakes in supporting the panama company, but with present obliquity in screening and protecting delinquents who should long since have been brought to justice. one deputy vehemently declared that the only reason why no adequate action was taken was that “men possessed of great names and high positions” checked any attempt to handle the scandal boldly. other deputies declaimed with equal warmth against throwing good money after bad. meanwhile rumours floated round the chamber as to the number of deputies who had put their services at the disposal of the company for money received. later, this accusation took definite shape as a formal accusation that fifty deputies had received among them the sum of ￡120,000. senators and academicians were in the same galley. exaggeration was imputed, but the figures were proved afterwards to be less than the truth. then everybody concerning whose position there could be the slightest doubt was accused of having “touched.”
even mm. rouvier and floquet were taunted with having accepted large sums. the chamber passed a resolution “calling for prompt and vigorous action against all who have incurred responsibilities in the panama affair.” this might mean anything or nothing. it was pointed out, however, by a high authority that a judicial inquiry was proceeding all the time. but the public became impatient because nothing was done to stop the campaign of vilification on the one hand or to prosecute the directors on the other; though de lesseps was being denounced daily in the press as a fraudulent adventurer. excitement ran very high. the shareholders and some of the deputies cried aloud for justice.
matters being thus exceptionally perturbed, baron jacques[116] reinach, the chief agent in the manipulation of political corruption, committed suicide by apoplexy. that was the gruesome explanation given in the press of this financier’s sudden death. his fellow semite, cornelius herz, survived the tragedy. just at this moment, when everybody thought that something must be done, the panama concession was extended for a year. the panamists took heart again and believed all would blow over. so the ups and downs of public expectation went on.
then, quite suddenly and without any general notification, all the directors of the panama canal company, count ferdinand de lesseps, m. c. de lesseps, m. fontane, m. eiffel and m. cottu were formally charged in court with having resorted to fraudulent methods in order to engender confidence in chimerical schemes, and with obtaining credits on imaginary facts, squandering the money of the shareholders and lending themselves to most nefarious practices. a terrible indictment!
by this time all who cherished a political or personal grudge against any public man of note had no better or surer means of discrediting him than by imputing to him some connection with the panama affair. mud of that sort was warranted to stick. never was there a greater scandal. never were people more credulous. never did political feeling run higher, and never certainly was there a keener anxiety to connect leading republicans with the seamy side of the concern. the more that could be done in this way the better for the conservatives and anti-republicans who still constituted a very formidable combination in parliament and in the press. it was not likely, therefore, that clemenceau would be able to escape criticism and calumny if he had been in any way connected with men some of whom were then rightly regarded as malefactors.
in a time of so much excitement it was easy to mix up truth and fiction to an extent which would render it extremely difficult for clemenceau to clear the public mind of allegations made against him, however false they might be. all clemen[117]ceau’s enemies, and he had not a few, took advantage of the situation to try and overwhelm him with obloquy. now was the opportunity to pay off many old scores; and they set to work to do it with whole-souled zest and vitriolic acrimony. circumstances aided them. they did not stick at trifles in their efforts to crush the radical leader who had fought the good fight against reaction and imperialism with such vigour and success for so many long years. m. clemenceau was at this time editor of la justice, a journal founded by himself and written by men of ability, most of whom are still his friends. the tone of the paper and the style of the contributions were no more calculated to bring over recruits from his adversaries than were his speeches and tactics in the assembly. he was ever a fighter with tongue and with pen. though he wrote little, if anything, in la justice himself, the inspiration came from its editor. one thing he lacked, and always has lacked—money. if now they could only get hold of evidence that clemenceau was contaminated with panama, the worst foe of french obscurantism would be put out of action and his influence permanently destroyed. so they calculated. and not without good reason, as afterwards appeared.
cornelius herz, the co-corrupter of political impeccables, with jacques reinach, his “apoplectic” fellow-jew, had subscribed ￡1,000 to la justice in its early days. what could be better? a semite of semites, a panamist of panamists, he it was who with sinister features and corrupt record stood forth as the dexterous wire-puller of the malignant marionette, georges clemenceau. if la justice had been tainted with the accursed thing, clemenceau had had his share, and the lion’s share, too, in this wretched swindle. did anybody really care what a journal of small circulation like la justice published or stood for? certainly not. but clemenceau, the terrible leader of the left, the upsetter of ministries, the creator of presidents, the overthrower of the church and the enemy of all religion, here was a man worth buying; and beyond all question clemenceau had been bought—bought by reinach and herz,[118] whose tool, therefore, he was and had been! the calumnies were credible; for if senators and academicians had succumbed to the wiles of the serpents of old jewry, why should not the aristides of draguignan have fallen a victim to the astute de lesseps and his “entourage du ghetto“? nor did this wind up the indictment. there was more to come. a group of rascals of the titus oates type were set to work, to put incriminating facts on record in writing, behind the scenes. they forged the endorsement as well as the bill. documents of this character proved to the complete satisfaction of all who wished to believe it that clemenceau was corrupt. the very fact that he was known not to be well-off strengthened the case against him. the empty sack could not stand upright! the petit journal, a paper of great circulation, was foremost in all this business, and its editor, m. judet, distinguished himself by his exquisite malignity amid the crowd of clemenceau’s detractors.
it was an ugly experience. panama was dinned into clemenceau’s ears daily. and there was enough to go upon to make the attacks most galling. herz had been a large subscriber to the funds of clemenceau’s organ. moreover, reinach and herz had called upon him, though not he upon them. that was quite enough. the assailants did not stop to inquire when herz ceased to have anything to do with la justice, neither did they investigate who sent reinach and herz to the radical leader, nor what passed between clemenceau and the two jewish financiers. they were only too glad to be able to take the whole thing for granted and to strengthen any weak links in the chain of evidence by the suborned perjuries of m. norton and his colleagues.
so it went on. the fact that first the murdered president carnot, who could not believe that de lesseps was worse than a misguided enthusiast, and then president loubet, who wished to deal with the entire matter in a thoroughly judicial fashion, had owed their positions to clemenceau’s nomination and support rendered the hunting down of their political friend a delightful pastime for the whole reactionary combination.[119] things had come to such a pass that the common opinion grew that there was “something in it.” people actually believed that clemenceau really had wrecked his entire career and ruled himself out of public life by taking bribes like the hundred other deputies, when he had refused to accept time after time positions which would have given him control of the national treasury and of france.
clemenceau was quite unmoved by the storm of detraction which raged around him. he bided his time with a coolness that could scarcely have been expected from a man of his character. at length his chance came. the whole affair was brought up again before the national assembly. clemenceau rose to defend himself against this long campaign of successful misrepresentation. so great had been the effect of the attacks upon him that rarely, if ever, has a favourite orator stood up to address a more hostile audience. it seemed as if he had not a single friend in the whole house. not a sound of greeting was heard. he was met with cold and obviously hostile silence. clemenceau dealt in his most telling manner with his own personal conduct throughout. he completely immolated his accusers and dissipated their calumnies. when he sat down, the whole assembly, which had received him as if persuaded of his guilt, cheered him enthusiastically as a much wronged man. a greater triumph could hardly be. the condemnation in open court of the forgers, whose nefarious malpractices had built up the edifice of calumny and misrepresentation upon which clemenceau’s enemies relied for the proof of their case, cleared the atmosphere so far as his personal integrity was concerned.
but, unfortunately for clemenceau, there were other charges against him from which he could not hope to clear himself, and would not have cleared himself if he could. now all his political crimes were recited against him at once. he had been the means of bringing to naught m. jules ferry’s great schemes of colonial expansion in the east. he had opposed running the risk of war for the sake of egypt. he had been largely instru[120]mental in causing the failure of general boulanger, whom not only reactionists but many vigorous radicals admired and believed in. he had never lost a chance of pointing to the danger of priestly influence and the anti-republican attitude of the heads of the catholic church. by his action in favour of the strikers at carmaux, whom he went down himself specially to encourage and support, he had alienated a large section of the bourgeoisie.
not the least weighty of the charges brought against him, and one which perhaps had as much effect as any in bringing about the crushing result of the poll, was that clemenceau had steadily opposed the alliance with russia. this was regarded as still further and more conclusive evidence of downright treachery to france. those were the days when france felt the need for an ally who could give her powerful military support, and her people were not disposed to inquire too closely into the character of the czar’s government. clemenceau regarded the connection as immoral, injurious, calculated to reduce france’s democratic influence and to lessen the probability of a close entente with england. but clemenceau’s adversaries had no concern whatever with the radical leader’s reasons for his action, which all democrats and socialists, at any rate, must have cordially approved. all they wanted was another ugly weapon wherewith to discredit and defeat the man who, though he had not gone so far as the extreme socialists desired, had done enough to hinder and rout reactionaries with their monarchist or buonapartist restorations. at the moment clemenceau’s anti-czarist policy injured him as a politician, but it certainly did him great credit as a man.
but, worse than all, he had steadily pursued his policy of a lifetime as a close and constant friend of england and of the english entente. that was still more criminal than panamism or anti-imperialism. for england at that time was, and to a large extent naturally, very unpopular in france. clemenceau, therefore, was overwhelmed with charges of being in the pay of great britain and working for great britain as well as for[121] panama. broken english was used to hurl insults at him, which lost none of their fervour by being uttered in a foreign tongue. he had escaped from the obloquy of panama, but it should go hard if one or other of these counts did not ruin him. the political warfare became more bitter than ever. his persecutors were relentless: la politique n’a pas d’entrailles.
it was at this time that i begged clemenceau to make some terms with the socialists, who were gaining ground rapidly and appeared to be the coming party in france. his recent tactics had been decidedly favourable to socialist views. and again i express my surprise that clemenceau, while holding fast to his opinions as to the necessity for maintaining “law and order” in every sense, should never have seen his way to adopting the definite socialist view as to the necessary and indeed inevitable policy of collective social progress. but his strong personal individualism has prevented him from embracing our principles.
the statesman may quite honestly accept the theories of economists and sociologists, while compelled to adapt their application to the circumstances of his time. no really capable socialist who has taken an active part in public life has ever attempted to do anything else. in france the guesdists, who are certainly the most thoroughgoing marxists in the country, have always proceeded on these lines in their municipal, and not unfrequently in their state, policy. jaurès was a specially fine example of the opportunist in public affairs; so much so that he was taunted by more extreme men with being a ministerialist before he was a minister. vaillant the blanquist, in theory at least an advocate of a physical force revolution where possible, was in favour of an eight-hour law, compensation for injury to workmen, and so on. one and all, that is to say, were ready to use the social and political forms of to-day in order to prepare the way for the complete revolution tomorrow. all clemenceau’s speeches and writings, before and after the panama crash and its consequences to him, contain many passages which every convinced socialist would accept.[122] i always felt, nevertheless, that i was arguing with a man deaf of both ears when i put forward my well-meant suggestions. socialism, clemenceau then declared—this, of course, was now nearly a generation ago—would never become an effective political power in france. france, and above all rural france, which is the real france, constituting the bulk of frenchmen, is and will always remain steadfastly individualist—“founded on property, property, property.” that was their guiding principle in every relation in life, and, he added, “i have seen them close at every stage of existence from birth to death. it is as useless to base any practical policy upon socialist principles as it is chimerical to repose any confidence in socialist votes.” “but,” i urged, “extremes meet: the catholics and socialists, both of whom are your opponents, may combine with the men whose minds have been poisoned by the panamist and anglophobe imputations of the petit journal and turn you out of your constituency in the var for which you now sit as deputy.” he laughed at the very idea of such a defeat.
but the persistence and malignity of monarchists and men of god of the catholic persuasion are hard to beat. socialists with an anarchist twist in their mental conceptions are not far behind them. so the fight for the constituency of draguignan, which clemenceau had chosen in preference to a paris district at the previous election, developed into a personal tussle unequalled in bitterness at that period. every incident of the candidate’s life was turned to his discredit. the panama scandal and his relations with semitic masters of corrupt practices were only a portion of an atheist record unparalleled for infamy. all the ministries he had destroyed, all the true lovers of france whom he had gibbeted, all the patriotic colonial policies he had frustrated were brought up against him, embroidered with every flaming design the modern votaries of the inquisition could invent! he had been guilty, in fact, of the unpardonable offence of making too many enemies at once. what might have been counted to him for[123] righteousness by one faction was blazoned forth as the blackest iniquity by another. his anti-imperialism with his friendly attitude to the strikers incensed the reactionaries. his refusal to make common cause with them in an out-and-out programme against bourgeois republicanism infuriated the extremists. all his energy, all his oratory, all his genuine love for and services to france in days gone by went for nothing. the friends of jules ferry, too, were eager for their revenge. clemenceau had thought his loss of the seat was impossible. nevertheless the impossible occurred. he was thrown out of draguignan at this general election of 1893, and after more than seventeen years of arduous and extremely useful service was compelled to retire from parliamentary life. it was a complete break in his career.
clemenceau at this period was fifty-two, and still in the prime of a vigorous life. he looked what he was, active, alert, capable and highly intelligent. his face was an index to his character. it gave an impression of almost barbarous energy, which induced his socialist detractors, long afterwards, to speak and write of him as “the kalmuck.” but this was merely caricature. refinement, mental brilliancy, deep reflection and high cultivation shone out from his animated features. a teetotaller, abstemious in his habits, and always in training, clemenceau, with his rapidity of perception, quickness of retort and mastery of irony combined with trenchant wit, was a formidable opponent indeed. add to this that he was invariably well-informed—très bien documenté—in the matters of which he treated. it is quite inconceivable that he should refer to or deal with any speech, or convention, or treaty which he had not thoroughly studied. it was hopeless to catch clemenceau tripping on any matter of fact or political engagement. moreover, as remarked before, his rule in politics was based upon the soundest principle in all warfare: never fail to attack in order to defend.
as an orator he was and is destitute of those telling gestures, modifications of tone and carefully turned phrases which we[124] associate with the highest class of french public speaking. his voice rarely rises above the conversational level and, as a rule, he is quiet and unemotional in his manner. but the directness of his assaults and the dynamitical force of his short periods gain rather than lose on that account; while his power of logical, connected argument, marshalling with ease such facts and quotations as he needs, has never been surpassed. his famous parliamentary encounter with my friend and comrade jean jaurès was a remarkable example of his controversial ability. my sympathies were, of course, entirely with the eloquent and able champion of socialism, whose power of holding even a hostile audience was extraordinary, as was shown in that same national assembly many a time. i was of opinion then, and i believe now, that jaurès had much the stronger case. he spoke then, as he always did, with eloquence, fervour and sincerity. as an oratorical display it was admirable. but i am bound to admit that, as a mere question of immediate political dialectics, the radical premier got the better of the fray. it is possible, of course, that had jaurès followed clemenceau instead of having preceded him, that might have made a difference. but jaurès’s style, with its poetic elevation and long and imposing periods, was not so well suited as that of clemenceau to a personal debate on immediate practical issues before such an audience as the french national assembly.
in private conversation clemenceau is the most delightful yet unartificial talker i ever had the pleasure of listening to. others who possess great gifts in this direction are apt to work up their effects so that you can hear, as it were, the clank of the machinery as their pyrotechnic monologues appeal to your sense of cleverness while they balk your desire for spontaneity. there is none of this with clemenceau. he takes his fair share in any discussion and leaves nothing unsaid which, from his point of view, can elucidate or brighten up the friendly discussion. never was any man less of a brilliant bore.
another quality he possesses, which proved exceedingly[125] useful to him at more than one stage of his adventurous career. clemenceau was, and possibly is even to-day, at the age of seventy-seven, the most dangerous duellist in france. a left-handed swordsman and a perfect pistol-shot, no one who valued the integrity of his carcase was disposed to encounter with either rapier or pistol the leader of the extreme left. even the reactionary fire-eater, paul de cassagnac, who himself had killed three men, shrank from meeting his quietus from clemenceau. his power of work also is extraordinary. in this he was only equalled by jaurès. even an english barrister of exceptional physique, striving to make his mark or endeavouring to keep the place already won, could scarcely surpass the inexhaustible energy and endurance of either of these great frenchmen. it is doubtful whether the generation of younger men keep abreast with the pace set by their elders in this respect. both jaurès and vaillant complained to me more than once that, to use an english expression, the younger deputies did not “last over the course,” and thus frequently lost in the committees what they had gained in the set debates. certainly, few of the french politicians of to-day, at half clemenceau’s age, would care to attempt to do the work which he is doing now, day after day, with all the anxiety and responsibility that now rest upon his shoulders.
what perhaps is still more noteworthy, especially from the english point of view, clemenceau has never at any period of his career been a well-to-do man. his complete independence of monetary considerations, at a time when place-hunting had been brought to a fine art in french politics, gave him an influence all the greater by consequence of its rarity. politicians whom he could have easily eclipsed in the race for well-paid positions, or the acquisition of wealth, became prime ministers, and rich people, while clemenceau remained what he had always been, the leader of the most difficult party to control, without the means which have usually been considered indispensable for such a thankless post. only once did he offer himself as the candidate for a well-paid office—the president[126]ship of the chamber—to which his experience and services fully entitled him. he was then beaten by one vote. honourable and dignified as is the chairmanship of such an assembly, it was well for france, in the long run, that the recorder of that single vote should have allowed what he believed to be a personal grievance to influence his natural inclination to support clemenceau.
