the relations of clemenceau to general boulanger form an important though comparatively brief episode in the career of the french statesman. boulanger was clemenceau’s cousin, and in his dealings with this ambitious man he did not show that remarkable skill and judgment of character which distinguished him in regard to carnot and loubet, whose high qualities clemenceau was the first to recognise and make use of in the interest of the republic. boulanger was a good soldier in the lower grades of his profession, and owed his first important promotion to the duc d’aumale. this patronage he acknowledged with profound gratitude and even servility at the time; but repaid later, when he turned radical, by what was nothing short of treacherous persecution of the orleanist prince. boulanger went even so far as to deny that he had ever expressed his obligations to the duke for aid in his profession, a statement to which the publication of his own letters at once gave the lie.
the general was, in fact, vain, ostentatious and unscrupulous. but having gained popularity among the rank and file of the french army by his good management of the men under his command and his sympathy with their grievances, he was appointed director of infantry, and in that capacity introduced several measures of military reform and suggested more. a little later, circumstances led him into close political harmony with the radicals and their leader. at this juncture clemenceau seems to have convinced himself that good use could be made of the general, who owed his first great advance to orleanist favour, without any danger to the republic. having, as usual, upset another short-lived cabinet, clemenceau there[96]fore exercised his influence to secure his relation the post of war minister in the new administration of m. freycinet. this was in january 1886. at first he was true to his radical friends and carried out the programme of army reforms agreed upon between himself and clemenceau, thus justifying that statesman’s choice and support. the general treatment of the french conscript was taken in hand. his food was improved, his barrack discipline rendered less harsh, his relations to his officers made more human, his spirit raised by better prospects of a future career. all this was good service to the country at a critical time and should have redounded to the credit of the radical party far more than to boulanger’s own glorification. this, however, was not the case. all the credit was given to the general himself. hence immense personal influence from one end of the country to the other.
practically every family in france was beneficially affected, directly or indirectly, by boulanger’s measures of military reform, and thanked the brave general for what had been done. not a young man in the army, or out of it, but felt that his lot, when drawn for service or actually serving, had been made better by the war minister himself. so it ever is and always has been. the individual who gives practical expression to the ideas which are forced upon him by others is the one who is regarded as the real benefactor: the real workers, as in this instance clemenceau and his friends, are forgotten.
one of the incidents which helped to enhance boulanger’s great popularity was what was known as the schn?bele affair. this person was a french commissary who crossed the french frontier into alsace-lorraine to carry out some local business with a similar german official which concerned both countries. he was arrested by the german military authorities as not being in possession of a passport. this action may possibly have been technically justifiable, but certainly was a high-handed proceeding conducted in a high-handed way. at that time france was constantly feeling that she was in an inferior position to germany, and her statesmen were slow to[97] resent small injuries, knowing well that france was still in no position to make head against the great german military power, still less to avenge the crushing defeats of 1870-71. when, therefore, boulanger took a firm stand in the matter and upheld in a very proper way the dignity of france, the whole country felt a sense of relief. france, then, was no longer a negligible quantity in europe. m. de bismarck could not always have his way, and boulanger stood forth as the man who understood the real spirit of his countrymen. that was the sentiment which did much to strengthen the general against his opponents when he began to carry out a purely personal policy. he had inspired the whole nation with a sense of its own greatness.
he was then the most popular man in the country. he stood out to the people at large as a patriotic figure with sound democratic sympathies and an eminent soldier who might lead to victory the armies of france.
thenceforth boulanger gradually became a personage round whom every kind of social and reactionary influence and intrigues of every sort were concentrated. to capture the imposing figure on the black horse, to fill him with grandiose ideas of the splendid part he could play, if only he would look at the real greatness and glory of his country through glasses less tinted with red than those of his radical associates, to inspire him with conceptions of national unity and sanctified religious patriotism which should bring france, the france of the grand old days, once more into being, with himself as its noble leader—this was the work which the fine ladies of the boulevard st. germain, hand in hand with the catholic church, its priests and the cultivated reactionaries generally, set themselves to accomplish. from this time onwards the mot d’ordre to back boulanger went round the salons. legitimists, orleanists and buonapartists were, on this matter, temporarily at one. each section hoped at the proper moment to use the possible dictator for the attainment of its own ends. thus boulanger was diverted from the radical camp and weaned[98] from radical ideas even during his period as war minister in m. freycinet’s cabinet. so subtle is the influence of “society” and ecclesiastical surroundings upon some natures, so powerful the effect of refined and charming conversation and genial flattery delicately conveyed, that men of far stronger character than boulanger have now and then succumbed to it. only devotion to principle or ruthless personal ambition can hold its own against such a combination of insidious forces dexterously employed—and women of the world and jesuits are both very dexterous—when once the individual to be artistically trepanned permits himself to be experimented upon. boulanger, though not devoid of cleverness, was at bottom that dangerous description of designing good fellow who all the time means well; and he fell a victim to the delightful women and clever adventurers around him. he himself was probably not aware that he had passed over to the enemy until the irresistible logic of events and his changed relations with his old friends proved to him how far he had gone.
m. rouvier, a shrewd and cynical politician of the financial school, saw through the general, understood how dangerous he might become, and refused to accept the ex-minister of war into the cabinet he formed on the fall of freycinet. but boulanger had now so far established himself personally that neither a political check nor even general ridicule affected his career. even his duel with m. floquet, a farce in which general boulanger made himself the clown, could not shake him. floquet was a well-known radical of those days, who had been a fellow-member of the league of the rights of man with clemenceau at the time of the commune. boulanger was a soldier, accustomed to the use of arms all his life, and reported to be a good fencer. floquet, quite unlike his old friend of years before, scarcely knew which end of his weapon to present to his opponent, so inexperienced was he in this sort of lethal exercise. when, therefore, the duel between the two men was arranged, the only point discussed was how small an injury would boulanger, in his generosity, deign to inflict upon[99] his radical antagonist, in order that the seconds might declare that “honour is satisfied.” no doubt clemenceau himself, who acted as one of floquet’s seconds on this occasion, took that view of the matter.
what actually occurred was quite ludicrous. floquet, duly instructed thereto by his own friends, stood, good harmless bourgeois as he was, like a waxwork figure, with his rapier stuck out at arm’s length straight in front of him. no science there. but there was still less on the other side. boulanger, to the amazement of clemenceau and everybody on the ground, in what appeared to be a sudden stroke of madness, immediately rushed at floquet and his rigid skewer and, without any such elaborate foolishness as the laws of fence enjoin, carefully spitted his own throat on the point of floquet’s weapon. honour was thus satisfied and ridicule began. but ridicule did not kill.
no sooner was boulanger cured of his self-inflicted wound than he went on much as he did before. having ceased to be minister for war, he was sent down to command an army corps at clermont-ferrand. according to all discipline, and regulations duly to be observed by generals at large, this kept the man appointed out of paris. not so boulanger. he visited the capital at least twice. thereupon he was deprived of his command and his name was removed from the army list. that, by the rules of war and politics, ought to have finished him. but it didn’t. the radicals and republicans had still no idea what an ugly frankenstein they had created for themselves. true, clemenceau had declared definitely against his own protégé the moment he saw the line he was taking; but he underrated entirely the position to which boulanger had attained, not only among the reactionaries but in the hearts and minds of the french people. for boulanger, now gifted with a free hand, went into the political arena at once, and was a candidate simultaneously for the nord and the dordogne: provincial districts with, of course, a totally different sort of electorate from that of the capital,[100] where the brav’ général with his fine figure on horseback was already the hero of the parisians. he was elected and sat for the nord.
still clemenceau, far-seeing and sagacious as he generally is in his judgment of political events and personal character, failed to appreciate what his cousin had drifted into rather than had deliberately worked for. nor perhaps did he estimate highly enough either the cleverness or the unscrupulousness of the men and women who were backing him. certain it is that, although boulangism was now becoming a powerful political cult, clemenceau and other advanced men, such as my old friend paul brousse, president of the paris municipal council, were still of opinion that boulanger was going down rather than up. it was a mistake that might have cost not only the radicals but the french republic as a whole very dear. for the general had the qualities of his defects. agreeable, good-natured, frank, accessible and friendly to all who approached him, with enough ability to gauge fairly well what was going on around him, loving display for its own sake, and ever ready to pose in dignified and pleasing attitude, before a populace by no means averse from well-managed advertisement, while not apparently bent upon forcing his own will or dictatorship upon the country—boulanger, both before and after his election for the nord, was much more formidable than he looked to those who only measured his power from the standpoint of wide intelligence. this the rather because there was no lack of money to push his pretensions to high place.
boulanger came to the front also at a time when the bourgeois republic (owing to the weakness, incapacity and instability of the bourgeois politicians themselves) was discredited and was believed to be tottering. clemenceau’s own unceasing campaign against widespread abuses and incapable ministers was largely responsible for this. there was a general sense of insecurity and unsettlement, engendered by the fall of administration after administration, due to political or[101] financial proceedings of doubtful character, exposed and denounced by clemenceau and the radicals themselves. some of the radicals and intellectuals even now supported boulanger as an alternative to perpetual upsets. disgusted with lawyers, professional politicians and place-hunters of high and low degree, the people likewise were again on the look-out for a saviour of france who should secure for them democracy without corruption, and honest leadership devoid of socialism. the old story, in fact.
at this particular moment, too, the organised forces in paris, the army and the gendarmerie, were boulangists almost to a man. the danger, therefore, of the boulangist agitation now being carried on alike in paris and in the departments seemed to a looker-on to be growing more serious every day. this, however, continued not to be the view of clemenceau and his party. they thought, in spite of the voting in the nord and the dordogne and the apparent popularity of the general in paris, that the whole thing would prove a mere flash in the pan; that the good sense and republican conservatism of the french people would display itself when peril really threatened the republic; and that boulanger would be even less successful than the duc de broglie. then came the general elections. boulanger was candidate for paris. once more the obvious evidence of his great popularity was overlooked by the clemenceau group, the boulangist fervour went on unrecognised, and it seemed that it might depend upon the general himself at any moment—as indeed proved to be the case—whether he should follow in the footsteps of louis napoleon and accomplish a successful coup d’état, or fall permanently into the background. but up to the last moment his opponents could not believe that a general with no great military career behind him, a citizen with no great name to conjure with, a politician with no great programme to attract voters, could win paris or become master of france.
the crisis really was the more acute since there was no rival personality, no republican of admitted ability and[102] distinction ready to stake his reputation against boulanger. though clemenceau, as the preparations for the election proceeded and boulanger’s growing strength became manifest, now did his utmost to stem the tide, there was no doubt that, failing a really powerful opponent, boulanger would hold the winning place at the close of the poll. he took up a bold position. he was the hero of the hour. the whole contest was admirably stage-managed and advertised on his side. he rode through the city on his black horse, a fine figure of a man, full of confidence of victory, the halo of a coming well-earned triumph around him. it was universally felt that the previous votes of the provinces would be quite eclipsed by the vote of the capital. parisians, peasants and miners, small owners and proletariat would for once be together.
this was the unshaken opinion of his friends and followers, who seemed in those exciting days to have with them the great majority of the people. on the other side a wave of incapacity was actually flooding the intelligence of his opponents. instead of putting forward a really representative man, either republican or socialist, with a fine democratic record behind him, they made an absolutely contemptible choice for their champion. one jacques, an obscure liquor-dealer, whom nobody ever heard of before the election, or gave a thought to after it, was chosen to fight for paris against the general. this man had never done or said or written anything that anybody could remember, or would remember if he could. if no radical republican was ready to stand, joffrin, an old member of the commune and a skilled artisan most loyal to his principles, always returning at once to his trade when he failed to be elected for the national assembly, would have been a far better and more worthy candidate in every way. the election then would have been a conflict between the enthusiasm of social revolution and the fervour of chauvinist reaction. as it was, the boulangists could say and did say with truth that the general would represent the citizens of paris much more genuinely than jacques. the result of this[103] error of tactics could, have been foreseen from the first. general boulanger won by a heavy majority.
that evening saw the crisis of the whole boulangist agitation. such a victory at such a time called for immediate and decisive action. that was the universal opinion. a political triumph so dramatic and so conclusive could only find a fitting climax in the victor proclaiming himself to be a cromwell, a monk or a napoleon. nothing less was hoped for by the reactionists: nothing less was feared by the republicans. the figures of the poll were welcomed with enthusiastic cheering all along the boulevards, and the boulangist anthem, “en revenant de la revue,” was played from one end of paris to the other. the ball was at the general’s feet. he might have failed to win his goal, but all paris expected he would make a good try for it. this meant that the very same night he should either go straight to the elysée himself or make some bold stroke for which he had prepared beforehand, that would fire the imagination of the people. such was the prevailing impression. the general celebrated his election for the city of paris at dinner at durand’s famous restaurant, surrounded by his intimate supporters. the excitement outside was tremendous. hour after hour passed. nothing was done, nothing apparently had been made ready. the strain of waiting became almost unbearable. the crowd gradually got weary of anticipating the opening of a drama whose prologue had so roused their expectations. at last, instead of staying to watch the first scenes of a revolution, they took themselves off quietly to bed. boulanger’s chance of obtaining supremacy was gone.
it was always said that, backed by the radicals, and supported by the president, the minister of the interior, m. constans, a most resolute and unscrupulous man, who was himself in the crowd outside the restaurant, was the main cause of this miserable fiasco. strong precautions had been taken against any attempt at violence. powerful forces whose loyalty to the republic was beyond question had been[104] substituted for brigades of known boulangist tendencies. that m. constans would not, under the conditions, have stuck at trifles was well known. he was kept at a distance from france for years afterwards, on account of his ugly character, in the capacity of french ambassador at constantinople, a city where at that time such a trifling peccadillo as murder was scarcely noticed. so boulanger knew what to expect. moreover, clemenceau and the radical republicans, as well as jaurès and socialists of every shade of opinion, had become thoroughly alarmed by what they had heard and seen during the election, and would not have given way without a fight to the death. the jubilant group at durand’s, intimidated by these assumed facts, and boulanger with his lack of determination and easy self-indulgence, let the opportunity slip.
all sorts of excuses and explanations were made for the hesitation of the general to provoke civil war. but on that one night he should have made his position secure or have died in the attempt. success was, so far as a foreigner on the spot could judge, quite possible. it might even have been achieved without any forcible action. there was no certainty that, when the move decided upon was actually made, either troops or the people would have sided against the hero of the day. but that hero failed to rise to the level of the occasion, and the result was fatal to the immediate prospects of himself and his followers. a warrant was issued for his arrest and he ran away from paris. he now became an object of pity rather than of alarm. he was condemned in his absence, and not long afterwards his suicide on the grave of his mistress, in brussels, ended his career. thus the estimate which clemenceau had formed of his permanent influence was justified. but it was a narrow escape. the three pretenders who had come to france to watch the final development soon found their way across the frontier. nevertheless, general boulanger, with all his weakness and hesitation, was for many months the most dangerous enemy the republic ever faced. his downfall[105] helped also to add to the number of clemenceau’s bitter enemies, and was partly instrumental in bringing about the political disaster which befell him later. for the radicals who had been deceived by boulanger cherished animosity against the radical leader for reasons which, though quite incompatible, were decisive for them.
