khyber pass afridis.
from the year 1857 onwards the khyber pass afridis have given the punjab government a good deal of trouble, and it has been necessary to carry out many raids and expeditions against one or other of the clans, and, at times, against all of them. just before the outbreak of the mutiny, when the amir dost muhammad was encamped at jamrud after his interview with sir john lawrence, a party of kuki khels fired upon some british officers near the mouth of the khyber, and mortally wounded one of them. the blockade then established was maintained throughout that troublous year, and was so injurious to the interests of the clan that they paid up a fine and agreed to other terms proposed by us. the zakha khels were at the same time under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, but they also early made their submission.
they broke out again in 1861, and raided british territory in the neighbourhood of kajurai—a tract of country occupied during the winter by the remainder 302of the clans of the khyber pass afridis, and it was found necessary to put the usual pressure on these to induce them for the future to refuse passage through their lands at kajurai to zakha khel and other robbers.
the zakha khel and kuki khel continued to give trouble, and maintained their reputation as the most inveterate and audacious of robbers, whose depredations up to the very walls of peshawar, and even within the city and cantonments, have been notorious since the days of sikh rule. in those days, moreover, the sikh governors cultivated methods of repression and punishment such as we have never practised. in general thackwell’s diary, dated peshawar, 23rd november, 1839, he writes, “called on general avitabili to take leave. they say avitabili is a tiger in this government, he has been known to flay criminals alive and to break the bones of poor wretches on the wheel previous to hanging them in chains, and at our conference to-day very gravely wondered we did not put poison in sugar to send in traffic among the khyberees.”
in december 1874, the bandmaster[113] of the 72nd highlanders, stationed at peshawar, was carried off by some zakha khel raiders and taken to the khyber, being subsequently released uninjured; and during the operations against the jawakis in 1877–78 the zakha khels sent to their aid a contingent of from 300–400 men, who fired on some british troops in the kohat pass and then turned back.
expedition of 1878
303expedition against the zakha khels of the bazar valley, december 1878.—from the very commencement of the second afghan war in 1878, the afridis of the khyber pass began to give trouble. at the end of november a signalling party on the shagai heights, east of ali musjid in the khyber, was attacked by some kuki khels from the village of kadam, two men being killed and one wounded, but for this outrage punishment was inflicted by the tribal jirgah. annoyance did not, however, cease; our communications in the khyber were continually harassed, and the camp at ali musjid was fired into regularly every night, the culprits belonging chiefly to the zakha khel clan. one or two small raids upon tribal villages proving ineffectual, a punitive expedition into the bazar valley was decided upon, the troops composing it being drawn from the 2nd division of the peshawar valley field force, the headquarters of which were then at jamrud, and from the 2nd brigade of the 1st division then at dakka. the following composed the two columns:
jamrud column.
3
guns, d/a. r.h.a.
300
bayonets, 1/5th fusiliers.
200
bayonets, 51st foot.
1
troop, 11th bengal lancers.
1
troop, 13th bengal lancers.
500
bayonets, 2nd gurkhas.
400
bayonets, mhairwara battalion.
304dakka column.
2
guns, 11/9th r.a.
300
bayonets, 1/17th foot.
41
bayonets, 8th company bengal sappers and miners.
263
bayonets, 27th punjab native infantry.
114
bayonets, 45th sikhs.
the jamrud column, starting at 5 p.m. on the 19th december, and moving by chora, a village inhabited by friendly malikdin khels, reached walai in the bazar valley by midday on the 20th, and from here communication was established with the dakka column, which had then reached the sisobi pass[114]—about three miles to the east—and expected to effect a junction with the jamrud column next day.
on the 21st the jamrud column marched to china, and visited every village of any importance in the valley, destroying all the towers, returning that night to walai, and withdrawing thence unopposed to ali musjid on the 22nd.
the dakka troops destroyed the towers in the vicinity of their bivouac, marching later to nikai, which was also burnt. it being then too late to arrive at the sisobi pass on the return march before 305nightfall, the general (tytler) halted, owing to difficulties as to water, in the thabai pass, with the intention of retiring on dakka by this route. during the night the tribesmen assembled in strength about the camp, and when the march was resumed at daybreak it was seen that the enemy meant disputing every foot of it. the afridis notoriously attack the baggage guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore determined to change the usual order of march. orders were consequently issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it; the artillery and sappers, being most encumbered with mules, followed close to the advanced guard; while a very strong rearguard was left behind, which, being wholly relieved from the charge of baggage, was able to resist the pressure from the rear.
the road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, and from the moment the force started a lively but ineffective fusillade was opened on the column. the heights were taken and held by flanking parties; the rearguard was hotly engaged; the enemy seized the positions of the rearguard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned; and dakka was not reached by the whole column until 11.30 p.m., when the force had marched 22 miles, and had lost two men killed and twenty wounded.
expedition of 1879
second expedition against the zakha khels of the bazar valley, january 1879.—after the expedition of december 1878, the khyber pass afridis continuing to give trouble, every effort was made to break up the tribal combination, and the kuki khels 306and kambar khels came in and tendered their submission. the attitude of the zakha khels was, however, so unsatisfactory that the political officer, major cavagnari, recommended a temporary occupation of the bazar valley, coupled with visits to all the recusant villages in that and the bara valley. in consequence, lieutenant-general maude, commanding the 2nd division, peshawar valley field force, applied on the 16th january for sanction for the proposed operations, in concert with a force furnished from the 1st division. sanction was accorded by the commander-in-chief, but a time-limit of ten days was laid down within which the operations were to be concluded. the following troops were placed at the disposal of lieutenant-general maude:
jamrud column.
2
guns, d/a royal horse artillery.
2
guns, 11/9th royal field artillery.
315
bayonets, 5th fusiliers.
316
bayonets, 25th foot.
145
sabres, 13th bengal lancers.
55
bayonets, madras sappers and miners.
356
bayonets, 24th punjab native infantry.
basawal column.
2
guns, 11/9th royal artillery.
361
bayonets, 1/17th foot.
210
bayonets, 4th battalion rifle brigade.
32
sabres, guides cavalry.
43
bayonets, bengal sappers and miners.
201
bayonets, 4th gurkhas.
307ali musjid column.
2
guns, 11/9th royal artillery.
213
bayonets, 51st foot.
31
bayonets, madras sappers and miners.
312
bayonets, 2nd gurkhas.
320
bayonets, mhairwara battalion.
311
bayonets, 6th native infantry.[115]
dakka column.
52
bayonets, 1/17th foot.
104
bayonets, 27th punjab native infantry.
257
bayonets, 45th sikhs.
the different columns
leaving jamrud on the 24th january, the jamrud column marched by way of the khyber stream and the chora pass to berar kats, arriving there late on the following afternoon. there was some firing at the baggage escort en route and at the camp after dark, but it soon ceased.
the ali musjid column started on the 25th, and, moving by alachi, reached karamna the same afternoon, being there joined by the 6th native infantry, which had marched thither from lundi kotal by way of the bori pass, the southern foot of which is in the north-west corner of the karamna valley. on this day the towers of the karamna villages were destroyed, as were those of barg, to which place the column marched on the 27th.
the basawal column reached china on the afternoon of the 25th january, and was here joined by the dakka force, the united columns moving on to 308kasaba and sisobi on the 26th; the sisobi pass was occupied on the 27th, and made practicable. here a junction was effected with the jamrud force, and on the afternoon of this day all the columns were united in the bazar valley under lieutenant-general maude, who early that morning had secured possession of the china hill.
during all these movements the zakha khel had shown great hostility; the force had been fired on night and day from the moment of entry into the country, while the inhabitants had deserted their villages and had, in many instances, themselves set fire to them. in a reconnaissance on the 28th of the bukar pass leading to the bara valley a good deal of opposition was experienced, and in the destruction on the 29th of the towers of halwai the enemy disclosed their presence in large numbers. it was now clear that any invasion of the bara valley would bring on an afridi war, and it subsequently transpired that other tribes, as well as other clans of afridis, were assembling to oppose our further advance—detachments from the shinwaris and orakzais, as well as from the kuki khel, aka khel, kambar khel, malikdin khel, and sipah afridis, gathering together and holding the passes over the bara hills.
the responsibility of lieutenant-general maude as to further operations was not lightened by the receipt on the 29th january of a circular letter from army headquarters, reminding column commanders in afghanistan that the operations then in progress were directed against the amir and his troops alone, 309and that unnecessary collisions with the tribes were to be as far as possible avoided. lieutenant-general maude therefore telegraphed for more explicit instructions, especially as to whether he should force an entrance to the bara valley.
close of the operations
before any reply could be expected, an urgent demand was received from the general officer commanding first division, peshawar valley field force, for the immediate return of his troops, in view of an expected attack upon jalalabad and dakka by mohmands and bajauris; but the awkwardness of such a request in the middle of operations was smoothed by the afridis of the bazar valley now evincing a disposition to open negotiations, while a deputation from all divisions of the bara valley zakha khels actually arrived in camp. on the 2nd february the political officer reported that he had made satisfactory terms with the jirgah; and although the same evening general maude was informed that the words of the circular above referred to did not preclude his carrying out an expedition into the bara valley should he consider such to be necessary, he decided that the whole force under his command should commence its withdrawal on the 3rd; and on that date accordingly the different columns left the bazar valley, the dakka force by the sisobi pass and the troops of the second division via chora for jamrud and ali musjid. there was no molestation by the afridis during the retirement of any of the columns, which, during the operations described, had sustained a loss of five killed and thirteen wounded.
310the effect of this expedition did not last more than a few weeks, for by the end of march the zakha khels had again begun to give trouble, continuing to do so until the termination in may of the first phase of the second afghan war. on the withdrawal from afghanistan in june, the khyber afridis made only one insignificant attempt to molest our troops; and, fortunately for us, the trials of what has been called “the death march”[116] were not aggravated by the attacks of fanatical tribesmen, during the retirement india-wards through the khyber of the peshawar valley field force.
after the close of the first phase of the campaign in afghanistan, arrangements, which worked generally satisfactorily, were made with the afridis for the safety of the khyber; while the agreement come to in 1881, and honourably kept on both sides for sixteen years, will be found in chapter xi.
it has been said that the afridis of the khyber kept faithfully to their treaty engagements during the sixteen years which followed the events which have been just described, but in 1892 there was one comparatively minor case of misconduct, when a kuki khel malik, smarting under a grievance connected with the deprivation for misbehaviour of a portion of his allowances, collected a body of 500 or 600 men and attacked three of the khyber posts. the tirah mullahs made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade other afridi clans to join, and the prompt despatch 311of troops to jamrud was sufficient to cause the dispersal of the lashkar.
the outbreak of 1897
five years afterwards there was a sudden, unaccountable, and widespread display of hostility towards the government, in which almost all the border tribes from the malakand to the tochi were concerned; and it seems necessary to make something of the nature of a statement of the causes which have been put forward, at various times and by different persons, for an outbreak so serious and so wholly unexpected. it must, however, from the outset be borne in mind that, when we made our agreement for the safeguarding of the pass with and by the khyber afridis, they put the recognition upon record of the independence of their responsibility for the security of the road from any government aid in the matter of troops; while it was further by them admitted that “it lies with the indian government to retain its troops within the pass or withdraw them and to re-occupy it at pleasure.” in face of this admission it is not easy to see how the afridis can justify their complaint (made to the amir of afghanistan), that our hold on the khyber was an infringement of treaty rights.
it may be admitted that a strong case is presented by those who hold that the real cause of the general pathan revolt of 1897 is traceable to the policy which dictated the afghan boundary agreement of 1893. it is indisputable that one of the results of this measure—imperatively demanded by the difficulty, always present and ever increasing, of controlling the 312tribes immediately beyond our border—aroused a sense of distrust and uneasiness among the pathans of the frontier. ‘they watched in impotent wrath the erection of the long line of demarcation pillars; they were told that henceforth all to the east of that line practically belonged to the british, and that the allegiance of all who dwelt within it must be to us; they saw their country mapped and measured; they witnessed the establishment of military posts, not merely on their borders, but in their very midst, as at wana; and they came to a conclusion, not unnatural to an ignorant people ever hostile to any form of settled and civilised government, that their country was annexed and their independence menaced.’ the tribesmen themselves put forward many pretexts for their action—after the event; but religious fanaticism undoubtedly furnished the actual incentive, while there are not wanting indications that the discomfiture of the infidel (the greek) at the hands of the followers of islam (the turk), furnished the spur which incited the tribesmen to try and throw off the yoke of the unbeliever.
then, again, there seems no doubt that the men of the border believed that they might safely rely upon the support, moral and material, of the amir of afghanistan. it was known that the durand boundary agreement was not particularly palatable to the ruler of the unruly; he had lately written a book on jehad; he had recently assumed a title[117] which seemed to include all muhammadans under his sovereignty; 313for years he had been a personal friend of the hadda mullah, one of the chief apostles of insurrection. as a matter of fact, however, subsequent revelations proved that the amir’s attitude towards his ally had been perfectly correct, throughout a situation which for him was both difficult and dangerous; he issued proclamations enjoining neutrality; he caused afghan reinforcements moving eastward to be stopped and dispersed; the afridis themselves admitted that “his highness advised us not to fight with the british government;” but the amir was not able effectively to control the active sympathies with the insurrectionary movement of some of his people in general, and of ghulam haidar, his commander-in-chief, in particular.
amir and afridis
the initial outbreaks, preceding that of the afridis, occurred on the 10th june, 1897, in the tochi valley, on the 26th july at the malakand, and on the 7th august at shabkadar in the peshawar valley; and shortly after this latter date the possibility of the rising, already sufficiently formidable, spreading to the afridis and orakzais, caused the concentration at rawal pindi of two brigades, in addition to those which had already been formed for service against other tribes on the frontier. at the same time a movable column, composed of the three arms, was formed at peshawar, intended for the protection of the frontier immediately adjacent to that cantonment, but not intended to carry on operations in the khyber; the garrison of jamrud was doubled, and regular troops occupied the frontier forts at michni and 314abazai. for some reason, not readily apparent, the authorities on the spot, military and civil, do not seem to have felt any real apprehension for the safety of the khyber; and, as has been said elsewhere, reports sent from kohat, emphasising the serious and widespread character of the rising, and pointing out the extent to which afridis and orakzais seemed to be implicated, appear to have been discredited or were considered to be exaggerated.
on the 17th august, definite information reached peshawar from the khyber that an afridi force, reported 10,000 strong, had left bagh in tirah on the 16th, with the intention of attacking the khyber posts on the 18th. both the general officer commanding and the commissioner of peshawar decided against any occupation of the khyber forts by regular troops, for the reason that such a course would imply distrust of the tribesmen holding to their treaty obligations. this decision, and the resultant abandonment of the khyber, and the failure to support the khyber rifles holding its different posts, have been widely criticised and greatly condemned. holdich says: “but, alas! whilst the afridi fought for us, we failed to fight for ourselves; 9500 troops about the peshawar frontier looked on, whilst 500 afridis maintained british honour in the khyber.” and those who were present at a lecture given at simla in 1898, on “the campaign in tirah,” will not have forgotten the general chorus of approval which there greeted the remarks of a prominent punjab civilian, that “the 23rd of august was a day of pain and 315humiliation for every englishman in india. we had 12,000 troops at the mouth of the pass or within easy reach of ali musjid, marking time as it were, or held in leash, and we allowed these forts to fall one after the other.”
but whatever opinion may be held in regard to the reasons of policy which held back the troops of the regular army, there seems no question that at the time any forward movement on anything like a large scale was practically out of the question; pack transport especially was very scarce, all immediately and locally available having already been requisitioned for military operations elsewhere in progress. at the same time, it cannot be denied that the military authorities in peshawar had been in receipt of at least a fortnight’s definite notice of what might be expected, while, for any operations in the khyber pass itself, wheeled transport, contrary to ordinary frontier experience, could have been utilised practically throughout.
precautionary measures
the following precautionary measures were taken: ali musjid and fort maude were reinforced by 100 tribesmen each; the zakha khel and shinwari maliks were reminded of their obligations; additional troops were sent to fort bara, and a column of all arms to jamrud; while—a step which aroused, perhaps, more adverse comment than any other—the british commandant of the khyber rifles was recalled from lundi kotal to peshawar, the commissioner considering that his presence at the former place might hamper the action of the indian government.
316on the 23rd august, when the storm finally broke over the khyber, the distribution of the khyber rifles was as under:
jamrud, 271.
bagiar, 13.
jehangira, 7.
fort maude, 42 + 100 tribesmen.
ali musjid, 80 + 100 tribesmen
(of whom only 40 were present on the 23rd).
katta kushtia, 7.
gurgurra, 10.
lundi kotal, 374.
fort tytler, 20.
fort maude was attacked at 10 in the morning, but in the afternoon brigadier-general westmacott, commanding at jamrud, moved out to the entrance to the khyber, and thence shelled the enemy about fort maude.
attack on lundi kotal
the attackers thereupon dispersed, and, on general westmacott withdrawing again to jamrud, fort maude, bagiar and jehangira were evacuated by their garrisons and then destroyed by the enemy. the afridi lashkar then attacked ali musjid, and by evening the garrison, short of ammunition and hearing of the fall of the three posts above mentioned, escaped to jamrud, having lost three of their number killed and wounded. from ali musjid the tribesmen marched on the morning of the 24th for lundi kotal, their numbers being swelled en route, and being unmolested in their passage, since the garrisons of katta kushtia and gurgurra early abandoned their posts 317and took to the hills. the attack on the fortified serai at lundi kotal began at 8 a.m., and during the whole of that day and the night that followed, the defence was resolutely maintained under subadar mursil khan, who had two sons in the attacking force and one with him in the khyber rifles. the garrison consisted of five native officers, and 369 men of the khyber rifles. of these, 120 belonged to miscellaneous clans—shilmani mohmands, peshawaris, and kohat pass afridis; of the remaining 249, 70 were loargai shinwaris, 50 were mullagoris, the remainder being zakha khel and malikdin khel afridis. during the 24th the fire from the walls kept the attack at a distance; but on the morning of the 25th, a shinwari jemadar being wounded, his men seemed to think they had done enough for honour, scaled the north wall, and deserted to their homes—the afridis of the garrison, it is said, sending a volley after them. it is not clear exactly what proportion of the besieged gave friendly admittance to the besiegers and what proportion remained true to their salt; but negotiations were opened, mursil khan was killed, and about 11 a.m. the gate was opened from inside by treacherous hands and the tribesmen swarmed in. the mullagori and shilmani sepoys fought their way out and escaped—the native officer of the mullagori company eventually bringing his little command back to jamrud without the loss of a rifle. it was estimated that in the attacks on the khyber posts the enemy had sustained some 250 casualties, and immediately after the fall of lundi kotal they dispersed to 318their homes, promising to reassemble on the 15th september.
one of the most serious results of the capture of the lundi kotal serai was that fifty thousand rounds of ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy.
the tirah expedition of 1897–98 against the khyber pass and aka khel afridis.—on the 3rd september the necessary orders were issued for the formation and concentration of the tirah expeditionary force, the actual date for the expedition to start being fixed as the 12th october. by this date it was hoped that the operations, then in progress in other parts of the frontier and elsewhere described, would have ceased, and that both troops and transport there in use would be available for the larger expedition now projected. these anticipations, however, were not altogether justified by events, only one brigade with its accompanying transport being set free for employment under sir william lockhart, who was recalled from leave in england to command the tirah field force, consisting of some 44,000 men. (for composition of the force see note at end of chapter.)
kohat was made the base of operations, with an advanced base at shinawari, thirty miles from maidan. this route was on the whole considered an easier and shorter one into tirah than those from peshawar by the bara and mastura valleys, or from kohat via the khanki, despite, too, the fact that the nearest railway terminus was at khushalgarh on the left bank of the indus, and thirty miles to the east of kohat.
the troops were divided into a main column of two 319divisions, each of two brigades of infantry with divisional troops; two subsidiary columns; line of communication troops; and a reserve mixed brigade at rawal pindi.
transport requirements
the main column, operating from kohat and shinawari, was to move on tirah via the chagru kotal, sampagha and arhanga passes; while of the two subsidiary columns one was to operate from peshawar, and the other from the miranzai and kurram valleys, as circumstances might require. from railhead at khushalgarh to shinawari, the advanced base, the road was practicable for carts, thence onwards the troops could only be served by pack animals, and of these some 60,000 were required for the use of the tirah expeditionary force alone, not counting those already engaged with other frontier expeditions still in progress.[118] the collection of so vast an amount of transport naturally caused delay, and it was not until the 20th october that any forward movement could take place.
with the arrival of troops at shinawari a commencement had been made at improving the road from thence over the chagru kotal to kharappa, and by the 15th october it was fit for transport animals as far as the top of the pass. in order, however, to work on the north side of the kotal, and so complete the road construction in readiness for the 320advance on the 20th, it was necessary to drive the enemy from the vicinity so as to prevent them from disturbing our working parties.
on the 18th, then, lieutenant-general sir a. p. palmer, temporarily commanding at shinawari, moved out with troops of the 2nd division, distributed in two columns. the main column was composed of brigadier-general kempster’s 1st brigade of the 2nd division:
1st battalion gordon highlanders.
1st battalion dorsetshire regiment.
1st battalion 2nd gurkhas.
15th sikhs.
to which were added
no. 4 company madras sappers and miners.
no. 8 mountain battery.
machine gun detachment, 16th lancers.
scouts, 5th gurkhas.
the second column was under brigadier-general westmacott, who had either with him, or was joined by on reaching the chagru kotal, three of the battalions of his own, the 2nd brigade of the 2nd division, viz.:
2nd battalion king’s own scottish borderers.
1st battalion northamptonshire regiment.
1st battalion 3rd gurkhas,
supplemented for this day by
no. 5 mountain battery.
no. 9 mountain battery.
rocket detachment royal artillery.
first action at dargai
321the two columns left camp at shinawari, the one at 4.30 a.m., the other half an hour later. the main column moved along the foothills to the north-west of camp and, then, making a wide circle to the east, was to operate against the right flank and right rear of the enemy occupying the cliffs about dargai. the second column was to make a frontal attack upon dargai from the chagru kotal; and on its arrival here about 8.30, and seeing few of the enemy on the dargai position, it was decided to at once attack without awaiting the turning movement of the main column. some description of the famous position must now be given. [119] “the chagru kotal is at the top of the hill, 5525 feet high, between the plain on the southern or shinawari side of the samana range and the khanki valley, but at the lowest point of the gap between the samana sukh, or western extremity of that part of the samana range on which stand forts gulistan, saraghari and lockhart, and the heights above dargai. these heights, continued to the north beyond the village of dargai, form what is called the narikh sukh, from which a rough track drops down into the narikh darra a short distance above its junction with the chagru defile, which again meets the khanki river almost at right angles some two miles further on. the road from shinawari to the khanki valley runs very nearly due north. at 322the chagru kotal it is overlooked on the east by the samana sukh, a steep cliff rising precipitously to a height of some 700 feet above it, at a distance of from 700 to 800 yards. opposite and nearly parallel to this on the western side of the kotal, but 1000 yards from it, are the dargai heights, which attain an elevation of slightly over 6600 feet, 1100 feet above the chagru kotal. although the range from the kotal to the enemy’s sangars on the top of the heights was only 1800 yards, the distance to be traversed on foot was about a couple of miles. for the first mile or more the track followed a more or less level course, until, passing through the village of mamu khan, it took a sharp turn to the right and began to zigzag up a very steep watercourse, which became gradually narrower as it neared the top of a small wooded, rocky ridge running roughly parallel to the enemy’s position and connected with it by a narrow col or saddle. this ridge was 400 feet lower than the crest of the position, and some 350 yards from the foot of it. the angle of descent from the position to the top of the ridge, or rather to the narrow gap at which alone it was possible to cross the ridge—which elsewhere was precipitous on the side nearest the position—was less steep than the slope from the gap downwards—or rearwards. consequently, except at a point not far beyond the village of mamu khan, which was too distant from the position to be of any importance, the attacking force was not exposed to the enemy’s fire until it reached the gap. the approach to the gap was, as has been already stated, 323up a watercourse which narrowed at the top until it formed a sort of funnel, not wide enough to admit of the passage of more than two or three men abreast, who, as they issued from it, found themselves at the edge of a narrow ledge, 350 yards long to the foot of the position, exposed every inch of the way to a fire from half a mile of sangared crest.”
the cliffs of dargai are everywhere almost sheer, the final ascent being made by a rough track, which climbs up at a point where the cliff is rather more broken and shelving than elsewhere.
the dargai position
the advance commenced about 9 a.m., the 3rd gurkhas leading, followed by the king’s own scottish borderers and northamptons; and just before midday the position had been taken, the enemy, chiefly orakzai ali khels, at the last only offering a comparatively feeble resistance, as they were beginning to feel the pressure of the main column. these fled towards the khanki valley, leaving twenty dead behind them. the attacking force had sustained but fifteen casualties—two killed and thirteen wounded. the advance of the main column had been greatly delayed by the impracticable character of the ground, which had necessitated the return of the mountain battery and all other pack animals; and it was after 3 p.m. before the junction of the two columns was effected at dargai, by which time parties of the enemy had commenced to harass the rear of the main column, and some 4000 afridis appeared to be advancing from the direction of the khanki valley, with the intention of attempting a re-occupation of the position.
324no operation of this campaign has been more criticised, either by those who took part in it or by historians, than the evacuation on the 18th october of the dargai position and its recapture thereby necessitated only two days later. the matter is barely touched upon in sir william lockhart’s despatch, appearing in the gazette of india of january 22nd, 1898, beyond a remark that “the track to the water supply was afterwards found to be about three miles in length, so commanded from the adjacent heights that water could not have been obtained in the presence of an enemy unless these heights as well as dargai itself had been held.” the inference is that, to hold the position won on the 18th, and safeguard the water supply, a far larger force would have been required than could at the time be spared. “colonel (now lieutenant-general) hutchinson in his book, the campaign in tirah, states[120] as the principal excuse for the failure to hold the dargai heights when they had once been captured, that ‘the water supply of dargai was at a place called khand talao, nearly three miles away to the west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained for the troops, unless these heights, as well as the village of dargai, had been held in force.’ this statement is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that, on the excellent map of the position which he gives three pages before, are clearly marked both the small talao (or tank), 100 yards 325below the village, containing muddy but not undrinkable water, which we used at first on the morning of the 21st, but also the larger tank some 500 yards further to the east.... the summit of the narikh sukh completely dominates the village of dargai and the reverse slope of the enemy’s position, and commands an extensive view of the country for miles round. it is strewn with large rocks, very much like a dartmoor tor, and abounds in natural cover. a battalion left there on the 18th could have set at defiance any number of tribesmen, and, supported by another battalion on the kotal to connect it with the base and furnish it with supplies, could with little difficulty, in conjunction with the troops already in possession of the samana across the valley, have effectually prevented any attempt of the afridis to come up to meet us from the khanki valley.”
retirement from dargai
immediately the junction of the two columns had been effected the retirement to camp commenced; a mountain battery was posted at the chagru kotal, and another, with a battalion, on the samana sukh, to cover the withdrawal—a difficult operation and attended with considerable loss, for the path was very steep and broken, and the enemy pressed the rearguard closely. they do not, however, appear to have pursued beyond the heights, and the further retirement of sir power palmer’s force to shinawari via the chagru kotal was unmolested. our total casualties this day amounted to one officer and seven men killed, five officers and twenty-nine men wounded.
the reports which he had received, as to the 326relation of the dargai position in occupation by the enemy to the use of the road over the chagru kotal, seem to have convinced general yeatman-biggs, now again commanding his division, that passage could not safely be attempted unless the tribesmen were dislodged from the heights on the left flank. he, therefore, proposed to sir william lockhart on the 19th, that the advance be made by way of gulistan, the samana sukh, and the talai spur;[121] but this suggestion was negatived, and the previous arrangement for the advance to kharappa over the chagru kotal was to stand, sir william considering that the well-known anxiety of the enemy as to their flanks, would cause them to evacuate the dargai position on our troops arriving at the junction of the narikh and chagru ravines; at the same time the g.o.c.-in-chief admitted that “it would be necessary to clear the dargai heights overlooking the road to the west.” it seems, then, that what sir william lockhart suggested was a frontal attack on the dargai position, combined with a threatening of the flanks by continuing the advance towards kharappa.
the force placed at the disposal of general yeatman-biggs on the 20th, was composed of the troops of his own division, which had already taken the dargai position on the 18th, less the 36th sikhs, but strengthened by the inclusion of the 21st madras pioneers (divisional troops) and by the loan of two 327infantry battalions (2nd battalion derbyshire regiment and 3rd sikhs) from the 1st division. the whole force left camp at shinawari at 4.30 a.m. on the 20th by the direct road to the chagru kotal: no flank attack was attempted as on the previous occasion, but, fortunately, the expectation of such a movement kept a large contingent of the enemy from the actual point of attack during the whole day. as might have been expected with the passage by a single narrow road of so large a body of troops and transport, the block, inevitable under ordinary conditions, was accentuated by the opposition experienced; and, while some of the baggage was unable even to leave the shinawari camp that day, late on the 21st the shinawari-chagru kotal road was for quite half its length still absolutely choked with transport of all kinds—many of the animals had been standing loaded up for upwards of thirty-six hours.
second action at dargai
the dargai position, which on the 18th had been held by a limited number of orakzais, was now occupied by a gathering of tribesmen estimated to number 12,000, partly orakzais, but more than half consisting of afridis from the malikdin khel, kambar khel, kamar khel, zakha khel, kuki khel, and sipah clans.
the advanced troops, under brigadier-general kempster, reached the kotal about 8 a.m., and, on being joined there by major-general yeatman-biggs, were at once ordered to take the position; the remainder of the force being halted on the summit or the south side of the pass, and no attempt being 328made to threaten the enemy’s flanks by continuing the advance. the assault on dargai was led by the gurkha scouts and 1st battalion 2nd gurkhas, with the dorsets in support and the derbyshire regiment in reserve, covered by the long-range fire of the gordons and maxim gun from a ridge immediately west of the kotal, of three mountain batteries on the pass, and of another on the samana sukh. the whole of the infantry of the attack was able to mass, without loss and under cover, within less than 500 yards of the position, and from here the gurkhas dashed out, and, with something over fifty casualties, succeeded in establishing themselves in shelter in the broken and dead ground immediately under the cliffs. the enemy now concentrated a rapid, accurate, and well-sustained fire upon the narrow col or saddle described on page 322. the remainder of the gurkhas were unable to get across, and attempts made, first by the dorsets and then by the derbyshires, to rush forward in driblets (necessitated both by the narrow exit from the “funnel” and the congested state of the ground whereon these regiments were massed) were beaten back with considerable loss. about 2.30 p.m. the colonel of the dorsets, the senior officer on the spot, signalled for reinforcements. the gordon highlanders and 3rd sikhs were then sent up, and, under a rapid concentrated fire from all the batteries, the gordons led a dash, which was joined by all the other troops in the position, and the enemy, not waiting for the final assault, fled towards the khanki valley.
second capture of position
329by this time it was too late to continue the advance; consequently, while the bulk of the force bivouacked about the chagru kotal, the narikh sukh was held by the derbyshires, the position at dargai by the gurkhas and dorsets, with the gordon highlanders lower down the hill. the total casualties sustained in this, the second assault on dargai, amounted to four officers and thirty-four men killed, fourteen officers and 147 men wounded. it may here be mentioned that the troops now holding these heights remained wholly unmolested, even when, after the 23rd, the position was occupied by no more than one battalion—the 30th punjab infantry.
on the 21st the second division resumed its march; on the 24th the first division began to move from shinawari; and by the evening of the 27th the whole of the main force under sir william lockhart’s command, was, with its supplies and transport, concentrated at kharappa ready for a further advance. during this time the sampagha pass to the north was reconnoitred, foraging parties were sent out, camps were strengthened and communications improved; the enemy was always active, following up reconnoitring and foraging parties, and “sniping” nightly into camp, whereby several casualties were sustained.
by the 28th a force of some 17,600 fighting men, nearly as many followers, and 24,000 animals, was concentrated in camp, and marched out this day to ghandaki, a short four miles from kharappa, proceeding by two roads; and in the afternoon a 330reconnaissance by the 1st brigade of the first division was pushed to the foot of the sampagha pass. on the following day the same brigade moved out while it was still dark; the devons seized a village and some spurs on the right of the road to the pass, the derbyshire regiment occupied a mass of small brown hills in the centre—afterwards the first artillery position, and the 1st gurkhas moved against the kandi mishti villages on the left. the sampagha was captured by direct attack, the opposition not being very serious, and by 11.30 a.m. was in our hands, at a cost of two killed and thirty wounded. three brigades were that same day pushed forward into the mastura valley, where up to this date no european had ever penetrated, the 1st brigade remaining on the south of the sampagha to help forward the transport, and eventually joining the main body on the night of the 30th.
on the 31st the force moved against the arhanga pass leading into afridi tirah, but the general expectation that the tribesmen would here make a real stand proved unfounded. the pass was captured practically by a single brigade—general westmacott’s—at the expense of only three casualties, and the 2nd brigade, first division, with the whole of the second division, hurried on to maidan, leaving the 1st brigade of the first division in the mastura valley.
arrived in maidan, expeditions were now made into the settlements of the different tribesmen in arms against us. as a preliminary, bagh was visited 331on the 1st november. this was about three miles to the west of the maidan camp, is the political centre of tirah, and the meeting place of the afridi jirgahs. on the 9th, a reconnaissance was made of saran sar, a pass into the bara valley, a number of defensive villages of the zakha khel were destroyed, and grain and forage supplies were removed; we sustained a considerable number of casualties in the retirement, the northampton regiment especially losing heavily. on the 13th, a force under general kempster visited the waran valley to overawe and punish the aka khels, and the house of the notorious mullah, saiyid akbar, was destroyed. in the retirement our rearguard was again heavily handled, over 70 casualties being sustained at the hands of the aka khel, zakha khel, kamar khel and sipah afridis who took part in the action.
in afridi tirah
on the 18th november, the main force moved from maidan to bagh, which was considered a better political and strategical centre; and on the 22nd, sir william lockhart accompanied thence a force which, under general westmacott, started on a three days’ reconnaissance to dwa toi to explore the approaches to the bara valley and to punish the kuki khels. in all these expeditions our losses were not light, the rearguard being invariably followed up and harassed; the clans in general, and the zakha khel in particular, appeared irreconcilably hostile; and skirmishes and attacks on convoys were of almost daily occurrence. foraging parties from mastura camp were also attacked by the orakzais, but it was evident that the back of 332the resistance of this tribe had been broken at dargai, and, indeed, by the 20th november they had accepted our terms and paid their fines in full, both in rifles and in money. the greater part of afridi tirah had now been traversed and surveyed; the chamkannis and westerly orakzais were visited and punished as mentioned in chapter xvi., and sir william lockhart now resolved to evacuate tirah and attack the afridis in their winter settlements near peshawar.
heavy baggage was now sent back from bagh and mastura to shinawari, the base was changed from khushalgarh to peshawar, and on the 7th december the maidan and mastura valleys were evacuated, the 2nd brigade of the first division rejoining its division detailed to march down the mastura valley. the second division withdrew by the bara valley, and experienced some of the heaviest rearguard fighting ever encountered in an indian frontier campaign.
the march of the first division was but little opposed throughout. on the 9th the 1st brigade marched from haidar khel into the waran valley, destroyed a large number of fortified houses, and also the house of saiyid akbar, which had been partially repaired since destroyed by general kempster’s brigade. in its retirement the aka khel and zakha khel pressed upon our rearguard, but the losses were not heavy. the remainder of the march down the valley was practically unmolested, and the division was concentrated at ilmgudar near peshawar on the 17th november.
in the bara valley
general westmacott’s brigade of the second division 333marched from bagh on the 7th, through the shaloba pass to dwa toi, where it was joined on the 9th by general kempster’s troops, whose march had been delayed, at the outset, by the necessity for destroying the defences of the kambar khel and malikdin khel, and, during its execution, by the state of the road rendered slippery by rain and congested by the baggage of the advanced brigade. on the 10th, the march of the two brigades was unopposed, but on the 11th, movement and communication were rendered difficult by a thick mist, touch was lost between the two brigades, and the afridis following up closely, favoured by the mist and abundant cover, inflicted great loss among the transport and followers. part of the rearguard did not get into camp at all that night, and, seizing some houses, the commander defended his rearguard and a large amount of transport against the attacks of the tribesmen, who kept up a fire all night. on the 12th the second division closed up and remained halted. on the 13th the march was resumed, and the tribesmen attacking with great boldness as soon as the rearguard of the rear brigade (general westmacott’s) left camp, the fighting was continuous throughout the day. the enemy suffered heavily in his attacks on the baggage column and rearguard, but, nothing daunted, came on again and again, making most determined rushes. firing was incessant throughout the night into the bivouac of westmacott’s brigade, which encamped where darkness found it, and the brigade was again attacked at daybreak, but the enemy did not on this day follow 334the column very far or for very long. on the 17th december the two brigades of the second division had reached respectively bara and mamanai; here they remained for the present guarding the bara valley line, while the peshawar column and first division advanced into the khyber pass and bazar valley.
on the 18th december the peshawar column reconnoitred the khyber pass as far as fort maude; on the 23rd ali musjid was occupied; and on the 26th the column marched to lundi kotal, finding villages deserted, barracks destroyed, and everywhere damage done to government property. the shinwaris living about lundi kotal, who had assisted in the early attacks on the khyber posts, had by now paid up their fines and submitted, and proved their repentance by assisting in picqueting the hills and keeping off zakha khel raiders, and even restored some of the property taken away when the serai at lundi kotal was looted.
the bazar valley, which is one of a series of parallel valleys running almost due east and west, is only about twenty miles long, with an average breadth of between eight and twelve miles from watershed to watershed, and lies at an elevation of 3000 feet. on the north the alachi mountains separate it from the khyber, and on the south the sur ghar range divides it from the bara valley. through the valley the bazar stream runs almost due east till it joins the khyber stream at jabagai. the east end of the valley is narrow, and just before its 335final debouchure into the peshawar plain it contracts into an almost impassable defile. the west end, on the other hand, is comparatively wide and open, and climbs gradually up to the snow-capped range of the safed koh, the lower ridges of which form the boundary of the bazar valley. the zakha khel own this upper portion of the valley. it consists of two main branches, each about two miles broad, enclosing between them an irregular spur. this spur, running out from the main watershed in a series of relatively small hills, ends in an abrupt peak just above china. about two and a half miles east of china the two branch valleys unite, and in the apex of their junction, closing the mouth of the china plain, is an isolated hill known as khar ghundai.
through the circle of mountains to the south-west and west go four main passes—mangal bagh and bukar leading into the bara valley, and the thabai and sisobi, or tsatsobi, into afghanistan. the former give communication to neighbours, the latter form back-doors or “bolt-holes” into afghanistan, and the existence of these back-doors constitutes the real difficulty of dealing effectively with the zakha khels. the “front-door” is over the alachi range, crossed by the chora, alachi, bori, and bazar passes, and of these the first named is the easiest, but it leads, as has been already stated, through malikdin khel territory.
the bazar valley
on the 25th the first division entered the bazar valley in two columns from the immediate vicinity of ali musjid, where it had concentrated the day previous. the 1st brigade moved by the alachi pass 336to karamna, and the 2nd by way of the chora pass to chora; neither was seriously opposed, but the roads were found to be very difficult. on the 26th the 1st brigade was only able to march as far as barg, no more than two and a half miles, but a road presenting extraordinary difficulties to the progress of troops and almost impassable to transport. the same day the 2nd brigade was advancing to china, with its rearguard harassed all the way; it returned next day to chora, followed up on both flanks, and reached the khyber on the 28th and jamrud on the 29th. the 1st brigade supported, on the 27th, the retirement of the 2nd brigade from china, moved back to karamna on the 28th, and on the next day returned to the khyber, the rearguard, furnished by the derbyshire regiment, being persistently followed up nearly to lala china in the khyber.
during the latter part of december and beginning of january 1898, the peshawar column was frequently engaged with the zakha khels about lundi kotal, and on all sides punitive measures, accompanied by desultory and indecisive fighting, continued as before. many of the afridi clans—the malikdin khels, kambar khels, sipah and kamar khels—had sent in asking for peace, while bewailing the severity of our terms; but the aka khels were obdurate, and the zakha khels as defiant as at the very commencement of the campaign, their two most recalcitrant maliks, khwas khan and wali muhammad khan, from the secure haven of afghanistan, exhorting them to stand firm and to continue to resist.
end of tirah campaign
337the last action of the campaign took place at the shinkamar pass on the 29th january, when all the four brigades combined to endeavour to surround the kajurai plain, where the afridis were reported to be again grazing their cattle. few of the columns employed experienced any opposition, but one operating from mamanai, and belonging to general westmacott’s brigade, when about to retire was hotly engaged by the enemy, and sustained some seventy casualties; these were chiefly among the yorkshire light infantry and the 36th sikhs, the last-named regiment losing a splendid frontier soldier in their commanding officer, colonel john haughton.
before the end of february nearly all the afridi clans had submitted or were making advances towards a settlement; the khyber pass had been reopened to kafilas, but the zakha khels evinced no real intention of giving in. on the 17th march, therefore, preparations were made for a spring campaign; sir william lockhart returned to jamrud, fresh transport was distributed among the troops, and one of the brigades of the second division made a short advance towards the bara valley. the effect upon the zakha khels was immediate. by the 3rd april all the clans had definitely submitted and given hostages for fines still due; hostilities then ceased and demobilisation commenced, but for some months regular troops were retained in occupation of the khyber posts.
by november 1898 the arrangements for the 338government of the khyber previously in force were practically re-established.
the total casualties during the campaign amounted to 287 killed, 853 wounded and ten missing.
it was hoped that the settlement effected, coupled with the knowledge the afridis now possessed that no part of their country was inaccessible to british troops, would have proved satisfactory to both sides; and it was noticed as a favourable sign that the enlistment of pathans, and especially of afridis, into the regiments of the indian army, had never been brisker than during the months immediately succeeding the close of hostilities. it was hardly to be expected that individual raids and outrages would cease, and had any such expectations been cherished they would have speedily been disappointed; but at any rate for a brief term of years it was not considered necessary to undertake military operations against any of the afridis. but among these tribesmen the mullahs appear to be specially inimical to the british government—as they probably would be to any civilised administration—while there is also always present in afghanistan a faction opposed to british interests, and from this faction disaffected tribesmen can safely reckon upon a large measure of support. in 1904 a number of afridis visited kabul—whether by invitation or not is not certain—were accorded a very friendly reception, and seem to have returned determined—especially the zakha khel members of the deputation—upon a policy of opposition to the british authorities. during the next four years raids, ever 339increasing in audacity, were committed on and within our border by the zakha khels, culminating on the 28th january, 1908, in a raid carried out by some seventy or eighty men upon the city of peshawar, whence property valued at a lakh of rupees was carried off, the raiders getting clear away. tribal allowances were stopped in the endeavour to force the more well-behaved tribesmen to undertake the coercion of the zakha khel, but they declared their inability to restrain the clan—and their impotence was recognised—while suggesting to the british authorities the occupation of the bazar valley, as the only means of dealing effectively with a situation which was rapidly becoming intolerable, since security of life and property on the kohat and peshawar borders was seriously menaced.
expedition of 1908
by the beginning of 1908 the government of india saw that military operations must inevitably be undertaken, and proposed that three brigades (one in reserve) should be mobilised in view of an expedition into the bazar valley; and on the 13th february major-general sir j. willcocks, who had been appointed to command, moved out from peshawar.
the three brigades were thus constituted:
first brigade.
brigadier-general anderson.
1st battalion royal warwickshire regiment.
53rd sikhs.
59th scinde rifles.
2nd battalion 5th gurkhas.
340second brigade.
major-general barrett.
1st battalion seaforth highlanders.
28th punjabis.
45th sikhs.
54th sikhs.
third (reserve) brigade.
major-general watkis.
1st battalion royal munster fusiliers.
1st battalion 5th gurkhas.
1st battalion 6th gurkhas.
55th coke’s rifles.
no. 9 company 2nd sappers and miners.
23rd peshawar mountain battery.
divisional troops.
two squadrons 19th lancers.
two squadrons 37th lancers.
23rd sikh pioneers.
25th punjabis.
no. 3 mountain battery.
four guns, 22nd derajat mountain battery.
no. 6 company 1st sappers and miners.
800 khyber rifles.
the main force, under general willcocks, left peshawar on the 13th february, and on the 15th, marching by the chora pass, entered the bazar valley. the second brigade, with some divisional troops, pushed on rapidly through malikdin khel country, 341accompanied by little or no transport and all ranks carrying three days rations on the person, and bivouacked that night near walai. the latter part of the march was opposed. the first brigade followed more leisurely, escorting the baggage and supply columns of both brigades, and halted for the night at chora, sending forward next day the second brigade baggage and supplies. on the same day a small column under colonel roos-keppel, political adviser with the force, and composed of a wing of the 2nd battalion 5th gurkhas and the khyber rifles, left lundi kotal, and, marching by the bazar pass, arrived that evening at china. there was no opposition en route, but the camps, both here and at walai, were subjected to the usual “sniping” after nightfall.
the walai camp was particularly well chosen; it was well covered, was surrounded by a circle of hills admitting of effective picqueting, had a secure line of communication with chora, and, commanding as it did the whole valley, was especially well placed for carrying out punitive operations among the zakha khels.
in the bazar valley
from the 17th to the 24th the troops were engaged in destroying towers and defensive enclosures, and in collecting wood and fodder; the columns were always followed up by the enemy, who, however, usually suffered heavily; the whole of the bazar valley was visited and important surveys were completed; sniping occurred on most nights; but already by the 23rd the resistance offered was no more than half-hearted, and that afternoon a tolerably representative 342jirgah came in professing anxiety to effect a settlement. an agreement was rendered difficult by the presence about the thabai pass of a gathering of shinwaris and mohmands, who had come to offer their services to the zakha khels, but these were prevailed upon to withdraw; and after protracted negotiations, lasting from the 25th to the 27th, a satisfactory settlement was arrived at. on the 29th the force withdrew wholly unmolested to the khyber and peshawar, the afridi jirgah having undertaken the punishment of raiders, responsibility for future good behaviour, and restitution, as far as possible, of stolen property.
the casualties in this short and successful campaign amounted to three killed and thirty-seven wounded.
343
note.
composition of the tirah expeditionary force.
the main column.
first division.
commanding—brigadier-general w. p. symons, c.b.
first brigade.
commanding—brigadier-general r. c. hart, v.c., c.b.
1st battalion, the devonshire regiment.
2nd battalion, the derbyshire regiment.
2nd battalion, 1st gurkha (rifle) regiment.
30th (punjab) regiment of bengal infantry.
second brigade.
commanding—brigadier-general a. gaselee, a.d.c., c.b.
1st battalion, royal west surrey regiment.
2nd battalion, the yorkshire regiment.
2nd battalion, 4th gurkha (rifle) regiment.
3rd regiment of sikh infantry, punjab frontier force.
divisional troops.
no. 1 mountain battery, royal artillery.
no. 2 (derajat) mountain battery.
no. 1 (kohat) mountain battery.
two squadrons, 18th regiment of bengal lancers.
28th regiment of bombay infantry (pioneers).[122]
no. 3 company, bombay sappers and miners.
344no. 4 company, bombay sappers and miners.
the nabha regiment of imperial service infantry.
the maler kotla imperial service sappers.
second division.
commanding—major-general a. g. yeatman-biggs, c.b.
third brigade.
commanding—colonel f. j. kempster, a.d.c., d.s.o.
1st battalion, the dorsetshire regiment.
1st battalion, the gordon highlanders.
1st battalion, 2nd gurkha (rifle) regiment.
15th (the ludhiana sikh) regiment of bengal infantry.
fourth brigade.
commanding—brigadier-general r. westmacott, c.b., d.s.o.
2nd battalion, the king’s own scottish borderers.
1st battalion, the northamptonshire regiment.
1st battalion, 3rd gurkha (rifle) regiment.
36th (sikh) regiment of bengal infantry.
divisional troops.
no. 8 mountain battery, royal artillery.
no. 9 mountain battery, royal artillery.
no. 5 (bombay) mountain battery.
machine gun detachment, 16th lancers.
two squadrons, 18th regiment of bengal lancers.
21st regiment of madras infantry (pioneers).
no. 4 company, madras sappers and miners.
the jhind regiment of imperial service infantry.
the sirmur imperial service sappers.
line of communications.
commanding—lieutenant-general sir a. p. palmer, k.c.b.
3rd regiment of bengal cavalry.
18th regiment of bengal lancers.
no. 1 kashmir mountain battery.
22nd (punjab) regiment of bengal infantry.
3452nd battalion, 2nd gurkha (rifle) regiment.
39th garhwal (rifle) regiment of bengal infantry.
2nd regiment punjab infantry, punjab frontier force.
no. 1 company bengal sappers and miners.
the jeypore imperial service transport corps.
the gwalior imperial service transport corps.
composition of force
the peshawar column.
commanding—brigadier-general a. g. hammond, v.c., c.b., d.s.o., a.d.c.
57th field battery, royal artillery.
no. 3 mountain battery, royal artillery.
2nd battalion, the royal inniskilling fusiliers.
2nd battalion, the oxfordshire light infantry.
9th regiment of bengal lancers.
no. 5 company, bengal sappers and miners.
9th gurkha (rifle) regiment of bengal infantry.
34th pioneers.
45th (rattray’s sikh) regiment of bengal infantry.
the kurram movable column.
commanding—colonel w. hill.
3rd field battery, royal artillery.
6th regiment of bengal cavalry.
2nd regiment of central india horse.[123]
12th (khelat-i-ghilzie) regiment of bengal infantry.
1st battalion, 5th gurkha rifles.
the kapurthala regiment of imperial service infantry.
the rawal pindi reserve brigade.
commanding—brigadier-general c. r. macgregor, d.s.o.
1st battalion, the duke of cornwall’s light infantry.
2nd battalion, the king’s own yorkshire light infantry.
27th regiment (1st baluch battalion) of bombay (light) infantry.[124]
2nd regiment of infantry, hyderabad contingent.[125]
jodhpur imperial service lancers.
