adam khels.
as has been already mentioned, british connection with the afridis as a tribe commenced in 1839, when colonel wade, with a contingent of sikh troops, forced the khyber pass. the first occasion, however, after the annexation of the peshawar valley, upon which we came into actual conflict with any of the clan, was in 1850. in the previous year, following the example of former governors of peshawar, the british entered into an agreement with the adam khel, or kohat pass afridis, to pay them rs. 5700 per annum, in consideration of which they were to protect and keep open the road through the pass connecting peshawar and kohat. the agreement had not, however, been in force a year, when a party of our sappers, road-making in british territory on the kohat side of the pass, were surprised by a body of 1000 tribesmen, and sustained eighteen casualties before they were able even to take to their arms. it was found that the assailants belonged to the galai and hassan khel 282divisions of the adam khel afridis; and while the reputed reason for their act of aggression was the raising of the rates at which salt had hitherto been sold at the kohat mines, the chief cause was undoubtedly the construction of the kohat road, now recognised as increasing the accessibility of the hill fastnesses of the neighbouring clans.
expedition of 1850
expedition against the kohat pass afridis, february 1850.—sir charles napier, then commander-in-chief in india, happened at this time to be visiting peshawar, and within a week of the outrage orders had been issued for the advance of a force through the kohat pass. the column, which was accompanied by the commander-in-chief, was under brigadier sir colin campbell, k.c.b., and consisted of one troop horse artillery with elephant transport (25?-inch mortars carried on one elephant), two companies each of the 60th rifles, 61st and 98th foot, the 15th irregular and 1st punjab cavalry, the 23rd and 31st native infantry, and the 1st punjab infantry. the object was to escort the 1st punjab cavalry and 1st punjab infantry to kohat, and to punish the offenders of the adam khel afridis. the advance commenced on the 9th february, 1850, and the troops were back in peshawar by the 14th, but in the interval they had fought their way through the kohat pass and back again. strong opposition was offered at akhor, at the northern entrance to the pass, which was taken and destroyed, and the tribesmen had then to be driven from positions they had occupied on the heights above the village of zargun khel, 283which was also burnt. here the column camped for the night, but sniping was carried on from the surrounding hills, and several casualties occurred in the force. when next day the advance was resumed, the village of khui had in like manner to be attacked, while the rearguard was throughout the day’s march exposed to considerable annoyance from large bodies of the enemy who pressed heavily on rear and flanks, occupying each height as it was vacated by our troops. the force encamped for the night of the 11th at the foot of the kohat kotal, and the regiments intended to garrison kohat were passed on. during the night the picquets in front of the camp were attacked by the enemy, who were driven off without difficulty. early the next morning, however, as some of the picquets furnished by the 23rd and 31st were withdrawing from their positions, they were suddenly and heavily attacked by the afridis, and sustained several casualties before the enemy was dispersed. during this day the village of bosti khel, to the west of the pass, was destroyed, and early on the 13th brigadier campbell’s force started on its return march to peshawar; but from sharaki to akhor, nearly the whole length of the defile, the afridis contested the ground, opposing the force in front and hanging on its flanks and rear with even greater perseverance than they had manifested during the advance. no transport animals or baggage, however, were lost throughout these operations, but our casualties amounted to nineteen killed, seventy-four wounded and one missing.
284within a fortnight of the return of the troops from this expedition hostilities broke out afresh. on the 28th february a jirgah of the neighbouring clans agreed to attack the police post in the tower on the summit of the pass, and next day the pass afridis, assisted by bizoti and utman khel orakzais, surrounded the tower, held the road, and drove back a police reinforcement arriving upon the scene. the defenders of the tower were nearly out of ammunition when captain coke reached the kotal from kohat, with a squadron of cavalry, two guns, and 450 bayonets, and found himself opposed to a force of from 1500 to 2000 afridis and orakzais. he attacked at once, drove off the enemy, and placed reinforcements, supplies and ammunition in the post. of his party eleven were killed and fourteen wounded.
on the night of the 2nd–3rd march the tower was again attacked by a mixed band of kohat pass and khyber afridis and orakzais, to the number of 2000, who cut off the water supply and erected breastworks close up to the post, which was defended with great spirit by a subadar of the 1st punjab infantry. coke moved out from kohat again with 450 of his regiment and some bangash levies, and withdrew the garrison of the tower, which was thereupon destroyed by the enemy, who now dispersed to their homes.
for some months individual outrages continued, and it appeared that, while certain maliks were willing to submit to our terms, the body of the clan was still recalcitrant. a blockade of the offending divisions was therefore established, and men belonging to them who 285happened to be in british territory were seized. the reply of the tribesmen to these measures was an incursion into our border and the raiding of one of our villages in july.
trouble in the pass
for some time after this negotiations were carried on with the afridis in regard to safeguarding the pass, and temporary arrangements were made whereby, up to 1853, the pass remained generally open—occasional robberies only being committed. these arrangements thereafter broke down, and towards the end of this year the bangash were asked if they would undertake to hold the pass against other tribesmen. they agreed, but they had hardly occupied the position on the kotal and commenced the reconstruction of its defences, when they were attacked by the afridis in force. there was a general panic among the bangash, who hurriedly evacuated their position and retired, covered by a small force under captain coke.
subsequently an arrangement was come to by which the defence of the kotal was entrusted, on payment, to divisions of the orakzais, afridis and bangash; and the galai and hassan khel divisions of the adam khel afridis having offered their submission, the blockade was removed and the pass might now again be said to be open.
the total allowances at this time paid to all the pass tribesmen amounted to an annual payment of rs. 14,600.
while the shortest and easiest route between peshawar and kohat traverses the kohat pass, there is an alternative, though tortuous, connection between 286these two outposts by way of the jamu and bori[107] passes through the country of the jawaki division of the adam khel afridis; and when the early disturbances which have been above described made communication difficult and hazardous by way of the kohat pass, the jawaki afridis offered to carry the mails by their route, which for a short time was in actual use. but the misbehaviour of the jawakis was soon found to be at least equal to that of their fellow-tribesmen, and during 1851–53 they committed serious raids in the kohat, khushalgarh and peshawar districts, the bori villages especially becoming the refuge for every robber and murderer of that part of the border. the amount of plunder taken by the men of bori in 1852–53 was said to have surpassed that of any former period, and captain coke reported that there were half a dozen stolen cattle in every house. every effort was made to persuade the jawaki afridis to see the error of their ways, to avoid the committal of crimes in british territory, to refuse passage through their lands to outlaws and criminals, and to come to terms with the punjab government, but they rejected all propositions and nothing therefore remained but to send a military force against them.
jawaki expedition of 1853
expedition against the jawaki afridis, november 1853.—the bori valley is about twelve miles long and has an entrance at each extremity; but as they are both very narrow and very defensible defiles, it 287was determined to cross the outer range at the most favourable point, and the sarghasha pass, crossing the outer range between kandao and taruni and believed to be the most practicable road, was chosen. the force—a squadron 7th irregular cavalry, a mountain battery, two nine pounders, 22nd foot, corps of guides, 20th native infantry,[108] 66th gurkhas, and a company of sappers and miners—under colonel boileau, advanced very early on the 29th november from bazid khel where it had been covering the construction of fort mackeson. the sarghasha pass was found to be steep, winding, narrow and long, but fortunately it was not held, and the bori villages were not occupied in any strength, the afridis inhabiting them having taken to the spurs commanding them. from these they had to be dislodged by the guides and gurkhas, led by lieutenant w. s. r. hodson of the former regiment, who had a hot struggle with the enemy in holding the heights, while the villages were being destroyed, and in withdrawing when the retirement commenced. the valley was left by the taruni exit, up to which point the rearguard was as usual hotly pressed. camp at bazid khel was regained at 8 p.m., the force having suffered a loss of eight killed and twenty-nine wounded. the effect of the expedition was apparent—not in the losses of the tribesmen, which were actually rather fewer than our own—but in the fact that within a few days the men of bori made overtures of submission, and, after somewhat protracted negotiations, they agreed to our 288terms and gave hostages for their future good behaviour.
after the settlement of 1853 with the kohat pass afridis, the pass remained open until 1866, when the basl khel and hassan khel divisions seemed inclined to give trouble, endeavouring to interfere with the pass arrangements, plundering the mail, kidnapping our subjects and firing on our posts. the assembly, however, of a punitive force soon changed the aspect of affairs, the tribesmen at once submitted to our terms, gave hostages, and for another ten years free passage through the pass was assured.
in 1876 the question of the construction of a cart road through the pass was reopened; the majority of the pass afridis appeared to raise no objection, but the sharaki men absolutely refused to listen to the proposal, and by placing obstructions on the road, ill-using travellers, and insulting the government messenger sent to summon them to a meeting, they necessitated the closing of the pass to afridi trade. reprisals immediately commenced; raids were made in british territory, cattle were carried off, and the towers on the crest of the pass and which were in charge of the levies were burnt. in these outrages the galai khel alone were at first implicated, but ere long the hassan khel and ashu khel divisions were included in the blockade which had been established. by march 1877, however, all the offenders had submitted and the pass was again opened.
in this year a consideration of the re-allotment of the pass allowances was rendered necessary, as it was 289found that in some cases these were paid to divisions which rendered no appreciable service, while others received more than their dues. the jawakis had hitherto been paid a sum of rs. 2000 per annum, despite the fact that their settlements did not abut on the pass, and that they had in the past proved themselves incapable of assisting in the safeguarding of the road. it was proposed by government to withdraw this kohat pass allowance from the jawakis, but to give them an equivalent sum for guarding the khushalgarh road and telegraph line, which, running close to the hills of independent tribes, were always liable to attack. without, however, awaiting the decision of the government, the jawakis began, in july 1877, to give trouble; on the 15th they cut the kohat-khushalgarh telegraph line in several places; on the 24th they attacked a police escort on the kohat road and rescued a couple of afridi prisoners; on the 17th august they carried off a number of government mules from near khushalgarh; on the 19th they attacked and burnt a village; on two other occasions bodies of jawaki afridis attacked small armed parties moving along the road; villages in our territory were constantly raided; and finally, on the 27th august, a bridge on the khushalgarh road was burnt. at the end of august it was decided to make a sudden dash into the jawaki country with the object of quickly effecting as much damage as possible, and so bring them to terms, the season of the year being unfavourable for protracted operations.
trouble with the jawakis
expedition against the jawaki afridis in august 2901877.—brigadier-general c. p. keyes, c.b., commanding the punjab frontier force, was to have had charge of the proposed operations, but in his absence through illness the command devolved upon colonel mocatta, commanding the 3rd sikhs. the force employed was divided into three small columns, of which the first, consisting of a mountain battery, 45 sabres, and 625 bayonets, was to enter the jawaki country by the tortang defile, thence pushing forward, as rapidly as possible, until arrival at a central point at the northern end of the gandiali ravine, so as to cut off the retreat in that direction of the enemy’s main body, which, it was anticipated, would be opposed to no. 2 column in the gandiali defile. the second column—621 bayonets—was to advance up the gandiali pass at daylight, and keep the enemy in play until the first column should be in position. the third column—201 bayonets of the guides—advancing from shadipur on the indus, via sheikh aladad ziarat, was to cut off the enemy’s retreat along the tambal hills, thereafter effecting a junction with the other two columns, the whole force retiring to british territory by the gandiali pass.
the operations were carried out as arranged, the junction with no. 3 column being effected at the village of lashkari banda; but, owing to the difficulties of the road and the pressure of the enemy on the rear guard, the original intention of retiring by the gandiali pass had to be abandoned, and the whole force was withdrawn by the kuka china pass to the border village of talanj, and thence to gumbat on the kohat-khushalgarh 291road. the men had been under arms in a burning sun for twenty hours, had marched nearly thirty miles, and had sustained eleven casualties—one killed and ten wounded.
these operations did not have the quieting effect which had been anticipated, chiefly because the loss of the jawakis in killed and wounded had been but trifling, while the actual destruction of property had fallen upon one small section of the division alone. their hostile attitude consequently remained unchanged, and aggressions upon british territory did not cease. outrages of all kinds continued throughout september and october, and another expedition into the jawaki country became imperative.
expedition of 1877–78
expedition against the jawaki afridis, november 1877 to january 1878.—the arrangements made followed the procedure adopted earlier in the year—that is to say, three columns were formed which entered the jawaki country at the same points as had the columns under command of colonel mocatta, but the strength of each had been slightly increased. brig.-gen. keyes was in command.
no. 1 column.
colonel mocatta.
no.
1 mountain battery.[109]
25
sabres, 2nd punjab cavalry.
380
bayonets, corps of guides.
225
bayonets, 1st sikh infantry.
225
bayonets, 3rd sikh infantry.
292no. 2 column.
major williams.
25
sabres, 2nd punjab cavalry.
350
bayonets, 4th punjab infantry.
300
bayonets, 6th punjab infantry.
no. 3 column.
colonel gardiner.
2
guns, no. 2 mountain battery.[110]
280
bayonets, 5th punjab infantry.
280
bayonets, 5th gurkhas.
the first and second columns, advancing on the 9th november from kohat and gumbat and by tortang and gandiali respectively, met at turki, and moved in combination upon paia, which was occupied after but insignificant opposition. meanwhile, the third column had pushed forward from shadipur through the namung pass, finding the enemy holding the ridges on the right of the exit from the defile; these were quickly driven off, and the column moved on to kakhto and there entrenched. on the 12th the third column was again engaged, and the 13th and 15th were occupied in the destruction of towers about zal-beg and in the paia valley, the main body then moving to shindih and turki. there was very heavy rain between the 16th and 25th, but a good deal of reconnaissance and survey work was carried out. no further military operations were, however, possible until the 1st december, when an advance on jamu had been decided upon. as it 293appeared that heavy loss must accompany any retirement from jamu after its capture, brigadier-general keyes suggested that his operations should be assisted by the advance of a force from peshawar upon bori: this was agreed to.
combined operations
on the 1st december the force under general keyes, divided into three columns, left camp at 4 a.m. the right column moved to the plateau to the north-east of the camp in the direction of paia; the centre column advanced towards bagh and saparai; while the third, or left, moved by a high ridge to a point to the north-west of the camp. the general advance commenced at 6.30 a.m.; the enemy were completely surprised and, although they had constructed breastworks, did not in any place attempt to make a stand. they were driven into and beyond the two villages of shahi khel, close to the nara khula defile, where the jamu valley is very narrow, and these villages were then occupied by our troops and finally burnt. the force then fell back and bivouacked at saparai and bagh. on the 2nd and 3rd the jamu valley was surveyed and the bazid khel kotal reconnoitred, and on the 4th the village of bagh was burnt, the whole force now bivouacking in its vicinity.
meanwhile, the operations from the peshawar side had been delayed and hampered by the weather. heavy rain caused a flood on the indus, the bridge of boats at attock was destroyed and communications with rawal pindi were interrupted, so that it was not until the 3rd december that the peshawar column was concentrated and ready to move forward into 294the jawaki country. this force was under brigadier-general c. c. g. ross, c.b., and was composed as under:
first brigade.
colonel j. doran, c.b.
three guns, i/c r.h.a.
51st regiment.
two companies sappers and miners.
22nd punjab native infantry.
27th punjab native infantry.
second brigade.
colonel h. buchanan.
three guns, i/c r.h.a.
13/ 9th r.a. (40–pounders).
9th regiment.
4th battalion rifle brigade.
14th native infantry.[111]
20th punjab native infantry.
the bori valley is separated from the plain to the south of the mackeson-sham shatu road by a rocky range of hills, as already described in the account of the operations against the bori villages in 1853. this range is crossed by a comparatively low pass at kandao, and by a second, more direct pass, known as the sarghasha, over a higher part of the ridge. the plan of operations was to occupy the crest of the ridge with artillery and infantry, and from this position—completely commanding the bori valley—to 295take such measures as should be found most suitable for attacking the villages and destroying their towers and other defences.
the first brigade advanced via kandao with orders to proceed to the top of the ridge, turning the sarghasha pass, while the other brigade made a direct attack upon it. by these arrangements the crest of the pass became untenable, and the enemy abandoned the position and retired firing, partly towards the bori valley and partly along the ridge towards khui. the whole force bivouacked on the ridge. for the next few days the troops were employed in destroying the towers and villages in the bori valley under a brisk but ineffective fire from the tribesmen. while these operations were in progress, the force under command of brigadier-general keyes had advanced upon and destroyed the towers of the village of ghariba, a place which had long been considered the alsatia of jawaki thieves, and, from the difficult nature of its approaches, secure from attack. this operation was effected by a rapid and combined movement of two columns of attack, without any casualties on our side.
the country traversed
although the chief places of the jawakis had now been occupied and destroyed, and the blockade satisfactorily maintained by our forces, yet the enemy showed no signs of surrender. a further advance, therefore, by both forces in combination, into the pustawani valley was decided upon. the strategic value of this valley to any force operating against the adam khel afridis had long been recognised, and it was known that this part of the country was 296considered impregnable by the jawakis, while its careful survey was very desirable. on the peshawar side, the road from the bori valley to pustawani leads through the bori china pass, which a reconnaissance, conducted on the 25th december, proved to be just practicable for mules. the actual advance to pustawani was to have been made on the 27th, but heavy rain, with the probable consequent floods in the pass, delayed forward movement until the 31st, and it was hoped that the troops of both the peshawar and kohat columns would arrive on the same day in the pustawani valley.
both forces effected their purposes successfully and with but small loss. brigadier-general ross moved almost entirely unopposed through the bori china pass to pustawani, and thence to walai, where he met brigadier-general keyes. the peshawar force bivouacked unmolested in or about pustawani, which was destroyed on the 2nd january, when general ross retraced his steps, and, meeting with but very slight opposition, regained the bori valley early that afternoon, and reached the sarghasha camp without any casualties.
early on the 31st december brigadier-general keyes left his camp in front of bagh, debouched on the paia plain, and having reached ghariba, moved to the left up the spur of the dargai sar, and sent troops through the dargai pass. thence the general rode on to walai, where he met general ross, and it was agreed that nothing was to be gained by further operations or a prolonged occupation of the 297pustawani valley. on the next day the whole force commenced its retirement, the rear guard being followed up by the enemy, who had collected in some strength. the retirement was, however, admirably covered by the pathan company of the 5th punjab infantry, and from paia the troops marched back unmolested to camp.
the remaining operations carried out by the troops under generals keyes and ross were mainly of topographical importance. on the morning of the 15th january both columns occupied the positions they had held on the 31st december, and thence they moved towards jamu for the purpose of exploring the nara khula defile and the valley to the west of it, now the only remaining strongholds of the jawakis. despite a certain amount of opposition, this country was traversed by our troops, and by the 23rd january the bulk of the force employed had been withdrawn to peshawar and kohat, a small body of the three arms only remaining temporarily on the sarghasha ridge as a force of observation. during the whole operations, from november 1877 to january 1878, our casualties had amounted to eleven killed and fifty-one wounded.
submission of the jawakis
almost immediately upon the withdrawal of our troops the jawakis had begun to show signs of submission, and after negotiations, protracted until march, a settlement was effected, the tribesmen agreeing to make complete submission in full durbar at peshawar, to pay a fine of rs. 5000, to expel certain ringleaders of recent raids, to surrender a number of english 298rifles and native matchlocks, and to give hostages for future good conduct.
after the conclusion of the jawaki expedition, the adam khel afridis continued to behave well as a clan. during the afghan war it was rumoured that they intended to close the peshawar-kohat road, and that they had offered help to the amir of kabul; but not only was the pass never closed for a single hour during the campaign, but it was freely used by us for the passage of troops and convoys, while the adam khels hired themselves and their camels out to us for transport purposes.
there have been disagreements since then—notably in 1883—and chiefly connected with the salt duties, but these differences, like “the quarrels of lovers, are the renewal of love”—the pass has remained open, the adam khels continue in the undisturbed enjoyment of their pass allowances, few important offences have of late years been committed, and—most significant of all—the adam khels remained quiescent throughout the troubles of 1897, in spite of many endeavours made by the other clans to induce them to join in the risings of that year.
aka khels.—the first occasion upon which, after our arrival in the peshawar valley, we came in collision with the aka khel afridis was in 1854. the aka khel settlements lie, some of them, to the west of the country of the adam khels; and in 1854 the basi khel section of the aka khel, not finding themselves admitted to any share in the kohat pass 299allowances, began to give trouble on the peshawar border, murdering british subjects, threatening the village of matanni close to peshawar, and attacking the camp of the assistant civil engineer.
coercion of the aka khels
the operations which, during 1855, were carried out against the aka khels can hardly, even collectively, be dignified by the name of an “expedition,” and consisted for the most part in a blockade of the clan, and in the carrying out of sudden raids into their winter settlements, the surprise of their border villages, and the seizure of their cattle from their grazing grounds. since during the hot weather the aka khel migrate to their summer settlements in tirah, any blockade to be effective must be long sustained, and the commissioner of peshawar, lieutenant-colonel h. b. edwardes, obtained sanction to keep up the blockade until the clan surrendered at discretion. when, therefore, the aka khels returned in the winter to the low country, not a man of them could venture into peshawar, their wood trade fell into other hands, and finally—after a determined but fruitless attempt to induce the other tribesmen to make common cause and take the field with them—the aka khel gave in about the middle of december, and agreed to the terms imposed upon them. they estimated their losses during the blockade at more than seventy-seven thousand rupees.
“thus,” said lieutenant-colonel edwardes, “ended the struggle of the aka khel afridis with a settled government. instead of haughtily exacting blackmail 300from the british for the safety of the kohat road, they paid a judicial fine for a highway robbery.”
since then the aka khels as an individual clan have given little or no trouble on our border.
