primary rule.-after a contract has been formed, it does not make much difference whether it is under seal or whether it is a simple contract; the rules governing the contract, subsequent to its formation, are very much the same though there are a few distinctions. the primary rule running through the law, governing obligations to perform contracts, is that if a man has once formed a good contract he must do as he agreed, and if he fails substantially (not merely slightly) to do so the other party may refuse to perform on his part. if you remember that fundamental principle you cannot generally go far wrong.

conditional contracts—insurance.-what one agrees to often depends on the conditions which he includes as part of his promise. take the insurance policy previously alluded to. an insurance company promises to pay $5,000, but it does not promise to pay in any event; the condition "if the house burns down" is obviously a qualification of the promise. but there are other conditions in the insurance policy. the insurance company says that it will not be liable if gasoline is kept in the house beyond a small quantity necessary for cleaning. that, too, is a condition of its promise to pay $5,000; so that[pg 87] "if the house burns down," "if gasoline is not kept in the house," "if the house is not unoccupied more than three months," and "if mechanics are not allowed in possession of the property for more than a certain length of time," are all conditions, and the company's main promise need only be kept if the conditions are complied with. that is why an insurance policy is not always quite as good as it seems—because there is a large promise in large print; but there are a good many qualifications in smaller print which are really part of the promise and must be taken into account.

conditions in building contracts.—another kind of conditional promise often occurs in building contracts. the employer agrees to pay the builder or contractor on the production of an architect's certificate. now it doesn't do the builder any good to build that house unless he gets the architect's certificate, for he has been promised pay only on condition that he produce it. that is the promise between the parties. that is the only promise.

when performance of conditions is excused.—it is obvious that these conditions in promises may be sometimes used to defeat the ends of justice, and undoubtedly at times they are so used. a person who draws a contract cleverly will put in a great many conditions qualifying his own liability, and will try to make the promise on the other side as unconditional as possible. the law cannot wholly do away with these conditions, because in general, so long as parties do not make illegal bargains, they have[pg 88] a right to make such bargains as suit themselves. the court cannot make their agreement for them, but it is held that if a condition will lead to a real forfeiture by an innocent promisee, the law will relieve the promisee. thus, in the architect's certificate case, if the house was properly built and it was merely ill temper on the part of the architect that caused him to withhold giving the certificate, the court would allow the builder to recover, and even if the architect had some good reason for refusing the certificate, the court would not allow the builder to be permanently prevented from recovering anything on the contract, providing the builder had substantially though not entirely performed his contract and had acted in good faith. if, however, his default was wilful, if he had tried to beat the specifications, and the architect had found him out and therefore refused the certificate, the only thing the builder could do would be to go at it again, tear out his faulty construction and build as he had agreed.

in contracts of employment, work must be performed before payment is due.—there are other matters which qualify the obligation of a promisor to perform besides express conditions such as those we have alluded to. take this case: john promises to work for the a. b. company; the a. b. company promises to employ him and to pay him a salary of $1,000 a year. john comes to work the first day and works a while, and then he says he would like his thousand dollars. the a. b. company says, "well, you have got to do[pg 89] your work first." john says, "why should i work first and trust you for pay, rather than you pay first and trust me for the work? i will keep on working, but i want the pay now." of course, the employer is right in refusing to pay until the work has been done, even though the promise of the employer is not expressly qualified by the statement that after the work has been done he will pay $1,000. it has been dictated by custom, rather than by anything else, that where work is to be performed on one side and money to be paid on the other, in the absence of any statement in the contract to the contrary, the work must be done before the pay is given. the result is this: that john must work anyway, his promise to work being absolute; but the employer's promise to pay the money is, in effect, conditional. it is subject to an implied condition, as it is called, that john shall have done the work he agreed to do. the promise of the employer is, in effect, "i will pay if you previously have done the work." but john's promise is absolute: "i will work." he has to trust for the pay.

performance first due under a contract must be given before performance subsequently due from the other party can be demanded.—and that case is an illustration of a broader principle which may be stated in this way: where the performance promised one party to a contract is to precede in time the performance by the other side, the party who is to perform first is bound absolutely to perform; whereas the party who is to perform subsequently[pg 90] may refuse to perform unless and until the other party performs. in the cases thus far alluded to, the promises of the two parties could not be performed at the same time. you cannot work for a year and pay $1,000 simultaneously. one performance takes a whole year and the other performance takes only a moment.

performances concurrently due.—but frequently there arise cases where both promises can take place at the same time. the commonest illustration of that is a contract to buy and sell. you can pay the price and hand over the goods simultaneously, and when a contract is of this character, that is, where both performances can be rendered at the same time, the rule is that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, they must be performed simultaneously. john agrees to buy james' horse and pay $200 for it, and james agrees to sell the horse for $200; that is a bilateral contract of purchase and sale. now suppose neither party does anything, has each party broken his promise? it might seem so, for john has not bought the horse or paid for it as he agreed, nor has james sold the horse. but where each party is bound to perform simultaneously with the other, if either wants to acquire any rights under the contract he must do what is called putting the other party in default, that is, he must offer to perform himself. john, therefore, must go to james, offer $200 and demand the horse if he wants to assert that james has broken his contract. and james, on the other hand, if he wishes to enforce the contract, must go with the horse to john and say, "here is the horse which i[pg 91] will hand over to you on receiving simultaneously the $200 which you promised me for it." the obligation of the two promises when they can be performed simultaneously is called concurrently conditional, that is, each party has a concurrent right to performance by the other, and has a right to refuse performance until he receives, concurrently with his own performance, performance by the other party.

installment contracts.—sometimes contracts are more complicated than those which we have stated, such as contracts of service and contracts to buy and sell. this, for instance, is a type of a very common sort of contract in business: a leather manufacturer uses large quantities of tanning extract in his tannery. he makes a contract for a regular supply, so many barrels each week for a year, for which he agrees to pay a specified price a barrel on delivery. for a time the extract promised him is sent just as agreed. we will suppose, then, that perhaps the extract manufacturer is slow in sending what he promised; there is a delay; perhaps the extract that is furnished is not as good as it was or as the contract called for. what can the leather manufacturer do about it? of course, he can keep on with the contract, taking what the extract manufacturer sends him, getting as much performance as he can, and then sue for such damages as he may suffer because of the failure to give what was promised completely. but he does not always want to do that. suppose it is necessary for his business that he should get tanning extract and get it regularly. he does not want to wait and[pg 92] take chances on the extract manufacturer's delays in delivery and inferiorities in quality. he wants to make a contract with somebody else and get out of his bargain with the first extract manufacturer altogether. may he do so? no question in contracts comes up in business more often than that. and the answer to the question is this: it depends on the materiality of the breach, taking into consideration the terms of the contract and the extent of the default. is the breach so serious as to make it fair and just in a business sense to call the contract wholly off; or will justice be better obtained by making the injured party keep on with the contract and seek redress in damages for any minor default?

breach in contracts of employment.—the same thing comes up very often in contracts of employment. suppose an employer hires an employee for a year, and in the course of the year the employee at some time or other fails to fulfill his contractual duty as an employee. he is negligent and in some respect fails to comply with his contract to render good and efficient service. can the employer discharge him? we must ask how serious is the breach. a merely negligent breach of duty is not so serious as one which is wilful. or the breach might be on the other side of the contract. suppose the employer has promised to pay a certain sum each month as salary during the year, and does not pay promptly. has the employee a right to say, "you pay my salary on the first day of the month as you agreed, or i leave"? no, he does[pg 93] not have a right to speak so positively as that. a single day's delay in the payment of one month's installment of salary would not justify throwing up a year's contract. on the other hand, if the delay ran along for any considerable time, it would justify the employee in refusing to continue. you will see that this principle of materiality of the breach on one side, as justifying a refusal to perform on the other, is rather an indefinite one. it involves questions of degree. that is so in the nature of the case. the indefiniteness of the rule, therefore, cannot very well be helped.

illustrations and distinctions.—a few concrete illustrations may help to bring out the points under discussion. suppose an agreement for the sale of real estate, and, for instance, the buyer is unable to be on hand the day the sale is to be completed, and the owner is present, and, finding the buyer absent, immediately sells the land to another. now is there any action against the owner, or might he justly refuse to go on with the contract because of the momentary breach of contract? no, he cannot refuse to go on in the case of a contract of that sort to sell real estate, unless the contract very expressly provided that the transaction must be carried through at the specified time and place or not at all. the case would be governed otherwise by the principle of materiality of the breach, to which we have alluded. a brief delay would not be a sufficiently material breach to justify the seller in refusing to go on, but a long delay, of course, would be sufficient. in sales of personal property[pg 94] time is regarded by the law as more important than in sales of land. in contracts to sell stocks varying rapidly in value, time is a very important element. suppose now that an option for a piece of land was given by the owner. may he dispose of the land to another a few minutes after the time specified in the option for the acceptance of the offer? that is different from the case previously put. the option is in effect an offer to make a sale, and the offer is by its terms to expire, we will say, at 12 o'clock, noon, october 23. it will expire at that time, and an acceptance a minute later will be too late. the difference is in the terms of the promise made by the different parties. in the case put first, there is an unqualified contract to buy and sell. in the case now put there is a promise to sell only if the price is tendered or if acceptance is made prior to 12 o'clock, noon, october 23. the terms of the option, assuming in its favor that it was given for consideration or was under seal and therefore not merely a revocable offer, were expressly conditional. the vital thing in contracts is to be sure of the terms of your promise. the term option indicates a right which exists up to a certain point; beyond that point there is no right.

prospective inability of one party excuses the other.—there is one other thing besides actual breach by his co-contractor, which justifies one party to a contract in refusing to go on with the contract, and that may be called prospective inability to perform on the part of the other side.[pg 95]

insolvency or bankruptcy.—let us give one or two illustrations of that. you have entered into a contract to sell a merchant 100 barrels of flour on thirty days' credit. the time has come for the delivery of the flour, but the merchant is insolvent. he says to you, "i want you to deliver that flour; the agreed day has come." you say, "but you cannot pay for the flour." "well," he replies, "it is not time to pay for it. you agreed to give me thirty days' credit: perhaps i shall be able to pay all right then. i have not broken my promise yet, and as long as i am not in default in my promise you have no right to break yours." you have a right to refuse to deliver the flour because, though the buyer has not yet broken his contract, the prospect of his being able to keep it, in view of his insolvency, is so slight that his prospective inability to perform in the future, when the time comes, excuses you from going on now. insolvency or bankruptcy of one party to a contract will always excuse the other party from giving credit or going on with an executory contract, unless concurrent performance is made by the insolvent party or security given for future performance.

repudiation.—repudiation of a contract by one party is also a good excuse. repudiation means a wrongful assertion by one party to a contract that he is not going to perform in the future what he agreed. after such repudiation the other party may say, "i am not going to perform now what i agreed to perform, since you have said you will not perform in the future what you agreed. i shall not go ahead and[pg 96] trust you, even though i did by the contract agree to give you credit, in view of the fact that you have now repudiated your agreement by saying that you are not going to do what you agreed." repudiation may be indicated by acts as well as by words, and often is indicated partly by words and partly by acts.

transfer of property to which the contract relates.—still another illustration of prospective inability arises where a contract relates to specific property, as a certain piece of land, and before the time for performance comes, the owner of the land, who had agreed to sell it we will suppose, transfers it to somebody else or mortgages it. the man who had agreed to buy that piece of land may withdraw from the contract. he may say, "you might get the land back at the time you agreed to perform, but i am not going to take any chances on that. i am off the bargain altogether."

importance of exact provisions in contracts.—so much for the rather difficult subject of the mutual duties of parties to a contract in the performance of it. the best way to avoid doubt or uncertainty in such matters is to provide very exactly in the contract what the rights of the parties shall be in certain contingencies. the law always respects the intention of the parties when it is manifested, and it is only when they have said nothing about their intention that the rules which we have considered become important.

fraud.—the next question in regard to contracts arises out of certain grounds of defense that[pg 97] may come up and the most important of these is fraud. fraud is deception; it is inducing the other party to believe something which is not true, and, by inducing him to believe that, influencing his action. the ordinary way in which fraud is manifested is by misrepresentations. a purchase or sale of stock or of goods may be induced by fraud. a loan may be obtained from a bank by fraud, that is, by misrepresentation of material facts which influence the other side to act.

misstatements of opinion are not fraudulent.—now what kind of misrepresentation amounts to fraud? there must be misrepresentation of a fact. merely misrepresentation of opinion is insufficient and what is opinion and what is fact has been the basis of a good many lawsuits. john offers his horse to james for sale at $300. he says that it is the best horse in town. well, it is not the best horse in town by a good deal, but that sort of statement cannot be the basis of an allegation of fraud. that a thing is "good," or "the best in the market," or similar general statements, all of which ought to be known to the hearer to be simply expressions of opinion, are not statements of positive fact. take these two statements in regard to the horse. "he can trot very fast." that is a mere statement of opinion. to some minds eight miles an hour is very fast; to more enterprising persons fifteen miles an hour is necessary in order to make travel seem fast. those are matters of opinion. but a statement that the horse can trot twelve miles an hour, or has trotted one mile[pg 98] in three minutes on the track, are statements of fact, and if untrue are fraudulent. a statement of value is a statement of opinion and cannot be the basis of fraud. a statement that the horse is worth $300, or is worth twice as much as the owner is asking for him, cannot be relied upon; but a statement that $300 was paid for this horse, or was offered for him, is an assertion of fact, and if untrue would be the basis of an allegation of fraud.

promises are not fraudulent because broken.—a promise is not a statement of fact. a man may promise to do something and fail to carry out the promise, and in consequence the person he was dealing with may regret the bargain he entered into, but his only remedy is to sue for damages for breach of the promise if it was part of a contract. he cannot assert that merely because the promise was not kept the transaction was fraudulent. but if a man makes a promise knowing when he makes it that he cannot keep it, he is committing a fraud. the commonest illustration of this is where a man buys goods on credit, having at the time an intention not to pay for them, or well knowing that he cannot pay for them.

statements must have been calculated to induce action.—generally speaking, the statement relied on as fraudulent must have been made with the purpose of inducing action. for instance, suppose john likes to tell large stories. he tells james things about his neighbor's horse. john does not do this for any purpose except to brag[pg 99] about living near a man who has such a splendid horse, but james suddenly takes the notion he would like to have that horse and he goes and buys it. now it was not legal fraud on john's part to tell those lies about the horse, even though they did induce james to go and buy it, unless john, as a reasonable man, ought to have known that james was likely to buy the horse, as might have been the case if james had been talking about buying him. then it would be fraud, and it would not make any difference in regard to its being fraudulent that john had nothing to gain by telling these lies, that he was simply doing it for the fun of the thing.

remedies for fraud.—what remedy has the defrauded person? the law gives him two remedies of which he may take his choice; he cannot have both, but he can have either. one is to sue the fraudulent person for such damages as have been suffered, and the other is to rescind the transaction, to get back what has been given, or to refuse to go on with the contract at all if it is still wholly executory.

duress and undue influence.—there are certain defences similar to fraud; duress, or undue influence, is one of them. however, this is comparatively rare. it is compelling a person to do what he does not want to do, making him agree to a bargain that he would not agree to accept under compulsion, as by fear of personal violence or imprisonment; and a bargain made under these circumstances can be rescinded or set aside. merely threatening to enforce your legal rights by suit against another is not[pg 100] duress, though it may in fact induce him to agree to what he would not otherwise have agreed; but to threaten criminal prosecution as a means of extorting money or inducing an agreement is illegal and in many jurisdictions is itself a crime.

mistake of fact.—in certain cases, also, a mutual mistake of a vital fact is ground for setting aside a contract, but these cases are not very common. mistakes generally do not prevent the enforcement of contracts. usually where there is a mistake, it is of a character for which one party or the other is to blame. if the mistake arises out of deception it is fraud. if the mistake arises simply because the mistaken party has failed to inform himself of the facts, as he might have done, then it is no defence at all. but if both parties were acting under the mutual assumption that some vital fact was true in making a bargain, either one of them may avoid or rescind the bargain when it appears they were both mistaken.

impossibility.—impossibility is sometimes a defence to the performance of a contract. perhaps the simplest illustration of this arises in a contract for personal services of any kind. illness or death of the person who promises the services excuses performance. death does not usually terminate a contract or serve as a defence to it. if a man contracts to sell 100 bushels of grain and dies the next day his estate is liable on the contract just as if he continued alive; but if he agreed to hire a man as an employee for a year, his death or the employee's death within the year would terminate the obligation of both. unexpected[pg 101] difficulty is not impossibility. for instance, take a building contract: the builder agrees to put up a building within a certain time; he is prevented by strikes. nevertheless, he is liable for not doing as he agreed. he should have put a condition in his promise, qualifying his agreement to build, that if strikes prevented, he would not be liable. so, if the foundation gave way and the building tumbled down before it was finished, the builder must put it up again. also, if lightning struck it, he must put it up again.

illegal contracts.—one other matter to be considered in connection with contracts and defences to them is illegality. some kinds of illegal contracts are so obviously illegal that it is not necessary to say anything about them. anybody would know that they were illegal and that they could not be enforced for that reason. a contract to steal or murder or take part in any crime is a good example. but other kinds of illegal contracts are not so obviously wicked as to make it clear that they are unenforceable. it may be worth while to mention a few of these kinds of illegality.

contracts in restraint of trade.—one class of contracts which has become very important in late years in business is the contract in restraint of trade, so called. the original contracts in restraint of trade were contracts by which one man agreed that he would not thereafter exercise his trade or profession, the object generally being that the promisee should be freed from the competition of the man who had promised to refrain from exercising[pg 102] his trade; and the law became settled a good many years ago that if the promise was general not to exercise the trade or profession anywhere, or at any time, it was illegal, but that if it was only for a reasonably limited space of time it would not be illegal. that old law still exists, but there has grown up further a much more important class of cases where contracts are made to further an attempted monopoly, and one may say pretty broadly that all such attempts are illegal. it does not matter how much business reason there is for it; any attempt to combine in order to get a monopoly, or in order to put up prices, is bad. moreover, if the attempted restraint of trade or monopoly concerns interstate commerce, the agreement is a federal crime under the sherman law.

gambling contracts.—another kind of illegal contract is a gambling contract. this seems obvious in agreements for the more extreme kinds of gambling, but in certain business transactions where the matter becomes important, the dividing line is not so clear; especially in dealings on stock exchanges and exchanges for sales of staple products, such as grain, cotton and coffee. the stock exchanges and other exchanges are made the means of a great deal of speculation, which is virtually gambling. now, in what cases does the law regard these transactions as gambling and, therefore unenforceable, and in what cases are they legal? the answer is, if an actual delivery of the stock, or commodity bought, is contemplated, then the transaction is not gambling in the legal sense; but if a settlement merely of the differences[pg 103] in buying and selling prices is contemplated, as the only performance of the bargain, then the transaction is gambling. the difference is between a stock-exchange business and a bucket-shop business. if you give an order to a stock-exchange house to buy stock, even though you put up but a small margin and could put up but a small margin, and the stock-exchange house knows you could put up but a small margin, nevertheless, the stock-exchange house actually buys that stock, and it is delivered to it. the stock-exchange house would then have a right to demand of you that you pay for that stock in full and take delivery of it, and could sue you for the price if you failed to comply with the demand. however, as a matter of fact, it does not ordinarily do that. if it wants to get the price which you promised to pay, and you fail on demand to take up the stock, it sells the stock which it has been holding as security. the bucket-shop, on the other hand, though it takes your order to buy, does not actually buy the stock; it simply settles with you when you want to settle, or when it wants to settle, because the margin is not sufficiently kept good, by calculating the difference between the price at which the stock was supposedly bought and the price at which it is supposedly sold, those prices being fixed by the ruling market quotations at the time. it would be perfectly possible to make a gambling transaction out of the stock-exchange transaction by a very slight change. if a stock-exchange house should agree, for instance, that the customer should not be compelled to take delivery of the stock,[pg 104] then that added agreement would make the transaction between broker and customer a gambling transaction, even though the broker actually bought the stock on the exchange, and, as between himself and the other broker on the exchange with whom he dealt, there was a perfectly valid sale of the stock. in some jurisdictions, by statute, speculative contracts which are not gambling contracts at common law are made illegal.

breach of fiduciary duties.—another very important class of illegal transactions arises from breach of fiduciary duties. a fiduciary is rather hard to define. he is somebody that owes a duty higher than a mere contractual obligation, a duty involving something of trust and confidence. a trustee is a fiduciary, so is an agent. a director or officer of a corporation is a fiduciary, and any dealing in which a fiduciary violates his duty to the person for whom he is fiduciary is illegal, and any agreement for such a violation is an illegal contract. it is illegal for a trustee to bargain for any advantage from his trust other than his regular compensation. it would be illegal for a trustee to bargain with a bank to give the bank a trust account in return for some personal advantage, as a loan to be made to the trustee personally. it would be a breach of fiduciary duty for a corporation officer and director to bargain for any personal advantage by virtue of his official action.

knowledge of another's illegal purpose.—the knowledge of another's illegal purpose will not make the person who knows of it[pg 105] himself guilty of illegality; but if one not only knows but in any way promotes the illegal purpose of another, he will be considered a party to the illegality. a may sell goods to b, knowing that b is going to use them illegally, and a's sale will not be illegal; but if a does anything to help b in using them illegally, or if the goods are of such a character that they can be used only illegally, then a would be guilty of illegality himself.

meaning of assignments.—much of the difficulty regarding assignment of contracts is due to different meanings which may be attached to the word assignment. when property is assigned the assignee becomes the owner in every sense, if the person from whom he took the assignment had a valid title. this is not true of the assignment of contracts. by the common law, contract rights or "choses in action," as they are termed in law, were not assignable, the reason being that one who contracted with a, cannot without his consent become bound to b.

power of attorney to collect a claim.—though when a man had a contract right he could not by common law make b in a complete sense the owner of the claim, he could give b a power to collect the claim as his, a's, agent, and authorize him to keep the proceeds when the claim was collected. it long ago became established that when an owner of a claim purported to make an assignment of a claim he thereby gave the assignee the power to enforce the claim in his stead, and this power given the assignee is irrevocable.[pg 106]

effect of assignment of rights.—it may be supposed that the effect of an assignment of a right, though the result may be worked out by treating the assignee as an agent or attorney of the assignor, is the same as if the assignee were fully substituted in the position of the assignor as owner of the claim, but this is not quite true. assuming that the claim is not represented by negotiable paper, the legal owner of the claim is still the assignor. this is shown by the fact that if the debtor pays the assignor in ignorance of the assignment, the debt is discharged and the assignee can only go against his assignor for the latter's fraudulent conduct in collecting the claim after having assigned it. so, too, if the assignor makes a subsequent assignment, this subsequent assignee also has a power of attorney to collect the claim and keep the proceeds; so that if the second assignee in good faith collects the claim in ignorance of the prior assignment, he can keep what he has collected; nor is the debtor liable to the first assignee who must as before seek redress from his assignor. it is, therefore, always important for the assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action to give immediate notice of his assignment to the debtor. if after such notice the debtor should pay the assignor or a subsequent assignee, such payment would not discharge the debtor, and the first assignee could collect the claim from him.

non-assignable rights.—rights cannot be assigned which are personal in their nature. the one who has contracted to paint a picture cannot[pg 107] delegate the duty to another, no matter how skillful. one who has a right to the personal services of an employee cannot assign that right to another. a publisher who has a right to publish all books written by a certain author cannot assign his right to another publisher.

assignment of duties.—the duties under a contract are not assignable under any circumstances. that is, one who owes money or is bound to any performance can not by any act of his own or by any act in agreement with any other person except his creditor, divest himself of liability and substitute the liability of another. this is sufficiently obvious when attention is called to it; for otherwise debtors would find an easy practical way of escaping from their debts by assigning the duty to pay to irresponsible persons. but the principle is not always recognized. a person who is subject to a duty, though he cannot escape liability, may delegate the performance of his obligation provided the duty is of such a character that performance by an agent will be substantially the same thing as performance by the obligor himself. thus if a contractor engages to build a house, he may delegate the actual building to another, but he cannot escape responsibility for the work. one who owes a mortgage may delegate the payment of the mortgage to a purchaser of the land who assumes and agrees to pay the debt. if the purchaser of the land actually pays, the debt is discharged; but if he fails to do so, the mortgagee may sue the original mortgagor and the latter will be obliged to bring[pg 108] another action against the purchaser who promised to pay the debt and failed to do so. so where a partnership is changed and a new firm formed, it is very common for the new firm to assume the obligations of the old firm.

original debtor not discharged unless there is a novation.—though a creditor cannot be deprived of his right against his original debtor without his consent, he may consent. if he does thus consent to take in lieu of the obligation of his original debtor that of the person who assumed the debt, what is called a novation is created. that frequently happens where a new firm succeeds an old one. the new firm goes on dealing with the old creditors, and they impliedly, if not expressly, assent to taking the new firm instead of the old firm as a debtor. but in order to make out a novation you have got to find as a fact that the creditor agreed to give up his right against the old debtor. if the creditor does not assent to a novation then the situation is that the creditor retains his claim against the old debtor, but the person who has assumed the debt has contracted to pay that debt. if he keeps his contract he will pay it and the debt will be cancelled. if he does not keep his contract the creditor will sue the original debtor and the original debtor will sue the man who assumed the debt.

assignment of bilateral contracts.—in bilateral contracts each party is under a duty to perform his promise, and also has a right to the performance of the other party. if an[pg 109] attempt is made to assign such a contract the effect is this: the assignor delegates to the assignee the duty of performing the assignor's promise, but the assignor himself still remains liable if his agent, the assignee, fails to carry out the duty. further, the assignor authorizes the assignee to receive the payment or performance due from the other party to the contract and to keep it for himself.

what amounts to an assignment.—no particular words are necessary to constitute an assignment. any words which show an intention that another shall be the owner of a right are sufficient to constitute the latter an assignee. especially it should be observed that an order directed to a debtor of the drawer ordering him to pay the debt to a named payee, is an assignment of the debt when delivered to the payee. this case must be sharply distinguished from a bill of exchange or check. a bill of exchange or check is an order to pay a certain amount unconditionally, irrespective of the existence of any particular fund. it is only an order to pay from a particular fund, that is, an order which is conditional expressly or impliedly on the existence of that fund, which constitutes an assignment.

partial assignment.—a creditor may not only assign his whole claim to an assignee, but he may assign part of it. such a partial assignment authorizes the assignee to collect the portion of the claim assigned and keep it for himself. but the debtor is not bound to pay the claim piecemeal; he may insist on making but a single payment unless his contract[pg 110] with his creditor provides otherwise. a bank in accepting a deposit contracts to pay that deposit in such amounts as the depositor may indicate on the checks drawn by him, but an ordinary debtor who owes $100 cannot be required to pay in such amounts as his creditor may see fit to demand. for this reason a few courts hold that even if the debtor has notice of a partial assignment, he may pay the whole debt to the original creditor though that results in defrauding the partial assignee. most courts hold, however, that the debtor when notified of the facts cannot do this, and if he objects to paying fractional parts of his indebtedness he must pay the whole sum into court to be distributed by it among the parties entitled. so, on a question of this character, the local statute should be examined.

assignment of future claims.—assignments of future claims, as well as of existing claims, may be made, but there are in many states some special provisions of statute law in regard to assigning future wages. such assignments must often be recorded, and there are certain other special statutory provisions in regard to them. the assignment of future debts is also subject to this qualification: the law does not allow the assignment of a future claim unless the contract or employment out of which the claim is expected to arise has already been made or is already in existence.

discharge of contracts.—contracts are discharged in much the same way as they are made. the simplest way of discharging a contract is[pg 111] by performing it. when both parties do exactly what they agreed to do the contract is discharged by performance. where seals still retain their common law effect, it may be discharged without performance by agreement under seal that it shall be discharged, just as a contract may be made by an agreement under seal. the agreement under seal to discharge a contract is called a release. you may release any right that you have—a right for money, a right to have work done or any right. just as contracts may be made either under seal or by an agreement with consideration, so they may be discharged not only by a release under seal but by an agreement for rescission of the contract. but this agreement must have consideration.

illustrations.—suppose a has promised to build a house and b has promised to pay $10,000 for it. before anything has been done, a and b agree to call that contract off. this is a valid agreement for rescission, because each party agrees to give up something—one party to give up his right to have the house built, the other party to give up the right to get $10,000 pay. so an agreement between employer and employee that a contract shall be terminated before the time originally agreed has sufficient consideration—the employer gives up his right to the employee's services, the employee gives up his right for future pay. but compare with these this case: a owes b a thousand dollars; it is simply a debt. a and b agree to call that square. that agreement is of no validity, for here only one party agrees to give up[pg 112] anything. the creditor agrees to give up his thousand dollars, and he does not get any promised amount in return for it. but that obligation, that debt, could be satisfied if valid consideration were given for the surrender of the claim; and anything agreed upon, as a horse, or ten shares of stock, or anything else the parties agreed to, would be good consideration for the agreement to surrender the claim, so long as one did not get into the difficulty alluded to under the heading of consideration, of trying to surrender a right to a larger liquidated sum in consideration of the payment of a smaller sum of money.

sending a check as full payment.—it is very common for a debtor in making payment by check of his debt to seek to make the check operate as a receipt in full of all claims by the creditor against him. he may do this by writing on the check itself that it is "in full of all demands" or "in full payment" of a certain bill; or he may by a letter accompanying the check state that the check is sent as full satisfaction. the acceptance by the creditor of the check under either of these circumstances is an assent by him to the proposition stated on the check or in the accompanying letter, that the check is in full payment. such an assent, however, does not necessarily prove that the debtor is discharged; consideration as well as mutual assent is essential to the validity of any agreement which is not under seal. accordingly if the debt was a liquidated and undisputed one, and the check was for less than the amount due, the agreement of the creditor to take it in full satisfaction is[pg 113] not supported by sufficient consideration under principles previously considered. on the other hand, if the debt was an unliquidated one, or there was an honest dispute in regard to the amount due, the creditor's claim is fully satisfied.

receipt in full.—it may be said generally that though a receipt in full is often thought by business men to be a discharge irrespective of consideration, like a release, this is not true in most states. a receipt in full is good evidence, if payment has been made in full, that it has been so made; but where payment has not been made in full a receipt will not be effectual without consideration, as a release under seal would be.

renunciation of obligation on negotiable instrument.—there is one case where the law allows a party who has a right to surrender it without consideration. this is by virtue of the negotiable instruments law, which provides that the holder of a note may discharge any party to it by a written renunciation of his claim. no particular form of words is necessary, but the renunciation must be in writing. no consideration is necessary.

alteration of written contracts.—the alteration of a written contract in a material particular with fraudulent intent by a promisee in effect discharges the contract so far as he is concerned. he cannot enforce it either in its original form or its altered form, though the other party to the contract may enforce it against him. if the alteration is not material, the contract may be enforced even by the[pg 114] party who altered it whatever the motive of the alteration may have been. if the alteration is material but not fraudulently intended, that party is generally allowed to enforce the contract in its original form. no alteration by a third person affects the rights of a party to a contract. by material alteration is meant one which if given effect would alter the legal obligations of the parties to the contract. the rule of the negotiable instruments law in regard to alteration of negotiable instruments, it should be observed, is somewhat more severe than that generally prevailing in regard to other contracts.

suggestions for drafting contracts.—while it is unwise to attempt the drafting of any contract at all complicated, without the services of an attorney, there are certain times when it may be necessary to act suddenly, and a few fundamental facts should be kept in mind. if you are called upon to draft a contract for two other people, the first requisite is to obtain as full information as possible from both parties as to the plans they have in mind. after obtaining this, the details should be arranged in writing, gone over carefully by the draftsman, and submitted to the parties for their approval. a most common mistake made by laymen is to fail to cover contingencies which are more or less likely to happen. for example, what effect would the death of either party have on the contract? this should be provided for. the careful draftsman, whether he be a layman or a lawyer, should draw contracts with the idea of making them so plain that litigation will not result.[pg 115] contracts should always be drawn in duplicate, so that each party may have a copy, and it is well, if you are the draftsman, to keep a copy for yourself. it is not necessary to appear before a notary public unless you are dealing with a deed, or a similar formal document. if there is good consideration for the contract, no seal is necessary, but under some statutes, a sealed contract is good for a longer period of time, so that there is an added advantage in having the contract under seal.

quasi contracts.—the term quasi contract is one which has appeared within the last thirty years. the law in this branch of contracts is still in the process of development and the field of quasi contracts is still not one of settled limits. for our purposes we confine ourselves to those obligations arising from "unjust enrichment," that is, the receipt by one person from another of a benefit, the retention of which is unjust. the term "enrichment" has recently been criticized by one of the ablest writers on this topic, as there are many cases where it is sufficient to show that the defendant has received something which he desired, although the question whether he is thereby enriched, is immaterial. in vickery v. ritchie, 202 mass. 247, we find that where a renders services, and furnishes materials and supplies for the erection of a building for b under a supposed contract and the contract itself is invalid, b is under a supposed quasi contractual obligation to pay a for the services he has rendered and the material he has furnished, regardless of whether b's property is increased in value. we[pg 116] may state the point to be emphasized in quasi contract is the fact that the retention of the benefit received by the defendant would be unjust rather than "enrichment."

distinguishing characteristics.—there are four characteristics which distinguish quasi-contracts: 1. the obligations of quasi contracts are imposed by law without reference to the assent of the obligor. 2. they are imposed because of a special state of facts and in favor of a particular person and do not rest upon one at all times and in favor of all persons. 3. although equitable in their origin they are enforced by a common law court. 4. they require that the obligee shall be compensated for the benefit which he has conferred upon the obligor and not for any loss suffered by the obligee.

application of the principle.—the following are the more common illustrations of the application of the principles of quasi contracts. where there has been a mistake, and hence the minds of the parties never really met, yet benefit has really been conferred; or, where the attempted contract cannot be enforced as a contract, because it did not comply with the statute, or was illegal, and yet one of the parties has received a benefit; or, where a benefit has been conferred under compulsion or duress.

mistake.—where parties have attempted to make a contract and a mistake of fact occurs, no contract results. the minds of the parties never really meet. yet if benefits have been conferred, justice requires that the benefit should be returned, or compensation[pg 117] given, and this, in fact, is just what the law seeks to do when there has been such a mistake that upon the attempted contract itself no suit can be brought. the essentials of mistake, and the way in which a mistake usually arises, are:

(1) it would not be a mistake if a party had paid money when he had any reason to suppose it was not due. a recovery of money under such circumstances cannot be allowed.

(2) the payment must have been induced by mistake in order to allow the recovery. this rule prevents the recovery of money paid in settlement of a disputed matter; but it must be assumed that it was to the party's interest to make the payment. however, suppose that a compromise settlement has been made in the belief that certain facts were different from what they really were. here the mistake would have induced the payment, and, hence, in such a situation a recovery will be allowed.

(3) the fact regarding which a mistake has been made must also be a material fact, and the fact must have been a part of the transaction itself, not collateral to it in any way. a mistake as to the value of an article purchased, for instance, is not a material fact.

(4) ordinarily, money paid under mistake of law cannot be recovered, although it is against conscience for the defendant to retain it. a mistake as to the law of another state, however, is a mistake of fact, and money paid under such a mistake can be recovered.

(5) where the party who mistakenly parted with the money did so because of his own negligence, and to[pg 118] allow a recovery would throw a loss on the other party, he cannot recover what he parted with. one party cannot make another suffer because of his own negligence. where a party paid money under mistake, and the payee was negligent, the party paying may recover.

(6) when parties suppose they have made a contract, and money has been paid, or services rendered, under that supposed contract, but in fact there was no valid contract at all, or there was a mutual mistake as to a term, this money, or the value of the services, may be recovered.

(7) when money has been paid for the transfer of something by defendant, whether recovery will be allowed in case it should turn out that the defendant had no title, depends on the nature of transaction. if the defendant made a warranty that he had title, a recovery may be had. if, however, the defendant simply sold what he had, whether that was something or nothing, a recovery cannot be allowed unless, as is the law in some states, a vendor impliedly warrants his title by the fact of having possession.

(8) in the case of parties mistaking the existence of a subject matter of sale, if the understanding was that a was purchasing an existing thing, then he can recover the money paid if it should turn out that the thing was not in existence. but if he bought simply a chance, he cannot recover.

benefits conferred under color of contract.—aside from the cases of mistake, there are other grounds for allowing recovery under[pg 119] the principle of quasi contract. a group of these is made up of cases where there cannot be a recovery upon the contract itself, although the parties have come together and agreed without any mistake or misunderstanding, because of the absence of some essential necessary to create an enforceable contract obligation; yet a benefit has been conferred upon the one party who, but for the lack of that essential, would have been liable in an action upon the contract itself. such cases arise largely where there has been a partial performance of an illegal contract, or of a contract unenforceable because of non-compliance with the statute of frauds, or where full performance is excused by impossibility. some states also allow recovery on the theory of benefits conferred, where, after partial performance, a party defaults under circumstances not excusing default.

benefits conferred without contract.—we next take up that class of relations where there has been an absence of distinct offer and acceptance, and yet a benefit has been conferred resulting in an unjust enrichment of the other party. if a confers benefit on b, though at b's request, it may be merely a gift. a cannot afterward change his mind and recover for that, as if there had been a contract. a may have paid b's debt in order to prevent a sale of his own property. he may then recover the amount so paid. for example, a left his property with b to have some repairs made. a third party recovered a judgment against b, and a's property was seized on an execution. a paid the judgment in[pg 120] order to release his own property. it was held that he might recover the money so paid from b, who should have paid the judgment. or a may have paid b's debt because he was surety for b. he then may recover from b the amount so paid; or, if b had two sureties, a and c, and a paid the whole or more than his share, he could recover the share of such payment which c should have paid, on the principle of contribution that equality is equity. but a must have actually made the payment of more than his proportionate share.