笔下文学
会员中心 我的书架

LETTER XI. OF OPINION AND THE AFFECTION OF MEN.

(快捷键←)[上一章]  [回目录]  [下一章](快捷键→)

in selecting the same route, in which the agitated crowd is pressing onward, we are evidently on the wrong road to happiness; since we hear the multitude on every side expressing dissatisfaction with their life. if we choose a different path, we cannot expect to evade the shafts of censure, since the same multitude are naturally disposed, from pride of opinion, to think all, not on the same road with themselves, astray. it is, then, an egregious folly to hope for a happiness thus pursued by system, and for the approbation of the vulgar at the same time. among the obstacles which are at war with our repose, one of the greatest, and at the same time most frivolous, is the fatal necessity of becoming of importance to others, instead of becoming calmly sufficient to ourselves. like restless children, always seduced by appearances, it is a small point, that we are happy in our condition. we desire that it should excite envy. a happiness which glares not in the eyes of the multitude, compelling them to take note of it, is no longer regarded as happiness. there are both dupes and victims of opinion. those who are devoured by the fever of intrigue, and[91] those who, to dazzle others, dissipate their fortune, are the miserable victims. the dupes are those who voluntarily weary themselves out of three quarters of their life, and offer this as their apology—‘these visits, these ceremonies, these evening parties! they are tiresome, we grant. but we must mix with good company.’ why not always mix with the best—your own enlightened and free thoughts?

i shall be obliged to present one truth under a thousand forms. it is that much courage is exacted for the attainment of happiness. such a man has estimable qualities, an interesting family, tried friends, a fortune equal to his wants. his lot ought to seem a delightful one. how differently the public judge! ‘this man,’ says the public, ‘has intelligence. why has he not increased his fortune? he is able to distinguish himself. why has he not sought place or office? he seems to stand aloof, that he may pique himself on a proud and foolish originality. we judge him less favorably. every one distinguishes himself, that can. to be without distinction is a proof that he has not power to acquire it.’ if the man, of whom this is said, has not courage, mourn over him. the public will end, by rendering him ashamed of his happiness.

to hear the false reasoning of the multitude is not what astonishes me. that stupid people, full of self-esteem, should hold these foolish discourses, with strong emphasis, is perfectly natural. what i wonder at is, that their maxims should guide people of understanding.

we are guilty of the whimsical contradiction of judging our own ideas with complacency, and of pronouncing upon those of others with severity. yet we[92] every day sacrifice principles which we esteem, through fear of being blamed by people whom we despise.[23]

the moment i escape the yoke of opinion, what a vast and serene horizon stretches out before my eyes! the pleasures of vanity scatter, like morning mists. those of repose and independence remain. i no longer sacrifice to the disquieting desire of preserving a protector, or eclipsing my rivals. i am no longer the slave of gloomy etiquette. i henceforward prolong my delightful evenings for my own enjoyment. the caprices of men have lost their empire over me. if poor, i shall remain a stranger to the pains excited by blasting ridicule and overwhelming contempt. if rich, indolent and impertinent people will no longer regulate my expenses; and the happy choice of my pleasures will multiply my riches. these are presented to a wise man in two opposite relations. do they call for a service? the most tender interest excites him to their aid. do they show a disposition to manage him? he meets the attempt only with profound disdain. he who possesses a disciplined reason, and a courageous mind, does not choose to walk by the faith of a feeble and uncertain guide, who has need himself to be led. allow yourself to become docile to the eccentric laws of opinion, and the slave of its imperious caprices, and follow it with the most earnest perseverance of loyalty; still it will finally terminate in condemning you.

but hypocrisy opens against me, and feeble men ask me, if it be not dangerous, thus to inculcate contempt of opinion? in following but a part of the ideas, which i announce, my readers might be led astray. the whole must be adopted, for a fair experiment of the result. a physician had chosen many plants, from which to form[93] a salutary decoction. his patient swallowed the juice of but one and was poisoned.

let us discard that timidity, which conducts to falsehood; and, to subserve morals, let us be faithful to truth. the wicked and the sage alike break the yoke of opinion; the former to increase his power of annoyance; the latter that of doing good.

i can conceive, that a depraved man will commit fewer faults, in yielding to the caprices of opinion, than in abandoning himself to his own errors. there are cruel passions and shameful vices, which he reproves even in the midst of his aberrations. but in doing so he gives to falsehood the name of politeness, and to cowardice the title of prudence. his favorite inculcation is, the terror of ridicule. to form true men, it is indispensable, that this precept should be engraven on their hearts—fear nothing but remorse.

the simple and generous mind, that follows these lessons, and is worthy of happiness, need not blush, in view of his course. only let him march on with unshrinking courage. in breaking the yoke of opinion, let him fly the still more shameful chains which the passions impose. in contemning the prejudices of the multitude dread still more those fatal instructers, who treat morality as a popular fable, and pretend to the honor of dispelling our errors. the aberrations of opinion prove only, that the most bold, not the most virtuous, press forward to announce their principles. these principles cannot annihilate that secret and universal opinion, that voice of conscience, without which the moral world would have presented only a chaos; and the human race would have perished. consult those men, who[94] have been instructed by the lessons of wisdom and experience. consult those whom you would choose to resemble. their first precept will be, that you descend into yourself. if we interrogate conscience, in good faith, she will enlighten us. she makes herself heard in the tumult of our vices, even against our will. if she become distorted, during the storm of our passions, she recovers the serenity of truth, as soon as that passes away; as a river, which has been agitated by a tempest, as soon as calm returns, reflects anew the verdure of the shores and the azure of heaven.

if there were a people formed by sage laws, whose words were frank, and whose actions upright, there it would be a duty to hearken to the voice of opinion in religious silence; and to follow its decrees, as though they were those of the divinity. phocion asked, what foolish thing he had done when the athenians applauded him? happy the country, where this would have been a criminal pleasantry, and where the pages of that chapter which condemns opinion ought to be torn out.

perhaps i may be accused of contradiction, in saying that, in the enlightened pursuit of happiness, the opinion of the multitude must be received with neglect; and yet, that it is pleasant to be esteemed by the society, of which we are members. we receive their services, and ought to know the pleasure of obliging them. we often share those weaknesses, which we censure in them. our multiplied relations with them render their affection desirable. it may not be necessary to happiness; but it gives to enjoyment a more vivid charm.

may we be able, in pursuing the path indicated by wisdom, to obtain esteem, and taste the delight of a sentiment[95] still pleasanter, and more precious. friendship is, to esteem, what the flower is to the stem which sustains it.

but i can never imagine, that we ought to become subservient to the caprices of opinion. we should first be satisfied with ourselves; and afterwards, if it may be, with others. to merit affection, i perceive but two methods; to love our kind, and to cultivate those virtues which diffuse a charm over life.

先看到这(加入书签) | 推荐本书 | 打开书架 | 返回首页 | 返回书页 | 错误报告 | 返回顶部