the extraordinary legal licence of disordered and offensive imputation has been limited since 1842. in those days, officers of the law, who always professed high regard for morality and truth, had no sense of either, when they were drawing up theological indictments. in the affair at cheltenham i delivered a lecture on home colonies (a proposal similar to the garden cities of to-day), to which nobody objects now. as i always held that discussion was the right of the audience, as self-defensive against the errors of lecturer or preacher, an auditor, availing himself of this concession, arose in the meeting and asked: "since i had spoken of duty to man, why i had said nothing of duty to god"? my proper answer was, that having announced one subject, the audience would have a right to complain that i had trepanned them into hearing another, which they would not hear willingly. such a reply would have been received with outcries, and the christian auditor would have said, "i dare not answer the question—that i held opinions i was afraid to disclose." all the while the questioner knew that an honest answer might have penal consequences, which he intended to invoke. christians in those days lacked winning ways. i gave a defiant answer, which caused my imprisonment. there was no imputation in my reply, which merely produced merriment.
yet my indictment said i "was a wicked, malicious, evil-disposed person," and that i "wickedly did compose, speak and utter, pronounce and publish with a loud voice, of and concerning the holy scriptures, to the high displeasure of almighty god, and against the peace of our lady the queen." every sentence was an outrage, and nearly every word untrue. i was not wicked, nor malicious, nor evil-disposed. i did not compose the speech—it was purely spontaneous. i never had a loud voice. i never referred to the holy scriptures, and i only disturbed the peace of our lady the queen by a ripple of laughter.
i carried no arms. i was known as belonging to the "moral force party" in politics, and was entirely unprepared to attack any person, let alone one omnipotent with "force of arms." the imputations in the indictment were not only untrue, but contained more blasphemy than was in the mind of any one to utter. i called the judge's attention to the atrocity of the language of the indictment he did not say there was anything objectionable in it, which showed that the morality of the bench was not higher at that time than the morality of the magistrates. in the cheltenham chronicle, known in the town as the rev. francis close's (afterwards dean of chichester) paper, i was described as a "miscreant" for the answer i had given to my auditor. mr. justice erskine had no word of reproof for the infamous term applied to me.
as i have elsewhere said, i spoke in my defence upwards of nine hours. the length was owing to the declaration of one of the magistrates (mr. bransby cooper) that the court would not hear me defend myself. why i defended myself at all, was from a very different reason.
no barrister in those days would defend any one charged with dissenting from the christian religion. the counsel always apologised to the jury for the opinions of his client, which admitted his guilt. this was done at that very assizes at which i was tried. a mr. thompson, a barrister in court, who we mistook for a son of general perronet thompson, also at the bar, was engaged to defend george adams, charged with an act of heresy. the false thompson expressed contrition for adams, without knowing or inquiring whether it was true that he felt it. neither counsel nor magistrate nor judge seemed to think it necessary that what they said should be true.
thus my justification of the seeming presumption of defending myself was the fact that no counsel would defend us without compromising us. i had no taste for martyrdom. i did not want martyrdom; i did not like martyrdom. martyrdom is not a thing to be sought, but a thing to be submitted to when it comes.
this narrative shows that, in one respect, legal taste and truth have improved in my time.
