for some time previous to the sortie of the fleet on august 10, admiral witgeft used to assemble conferences of the admirals and captains, at which the question of the fleet breaking through to vladivostock was thoroughly discussed. the majority were in favour of the fleet putting out to sea. some urged that we should engage the enemy's fleet, and at the same time operate by making a demonstration towards dalny as the nearest of the enemy's naval bases. others thought it more opportune to go out on to the line between korea and shantung, where, after a battle, the enemy's communications between japan and his army might be interrupted. this plan had the advantage that those of our ships which were injured could return to arthur for repairs. at a council of war held on july 18 with regard to this question the majority had been opposed to a sortie, their chief arguments being that (1) the fleet would have to take away with it those of its guns which were being used on the land front, and this would reduce the power of the land defence by nearly 30 per cent.; (2) its departure would have a bad effect on the moral of the garrison; (3) most of our destroyers were unfit for a long voyage. three weeks later, at a council held on august 7, when it was evident that the enemy, by bombarding the harbour, could cause[pg 151] great damage to the ships, not only above the water-line, but below it, as in the case of the retvisan, several of those who hitherto had been opposed to the plan of making for vladivostock altered their opinion.
pic
rear-admiral grigorovitch.
the day before the fleet's departure rear-admiral grigorovitch proposed to admiral witgeft, at first verbally, and afterwards on paper, that to force its way successfully to vladivostock the fleet ought to be composed only of the fastest ships, and the slow ones—the poltava and the sevastopol—should be left in arthur to strengthen the shore defences. rear-admiral loschinsky supported this proposal; but he developed the idea by suggesting that when the squadron moved out of arthur towards shantung he, with the two battleships, four gunboats, and ten destroyers, should make a demonstration towards dalny. if the larger part of the japanese force followed the departing squadron, then his force would be able to bombard dalny, the naval and principal supply base of the japanese army. if by some mistake, or owing to other circumstances, the enemy's main force attacked him, then, taking advantage of the mine defences and supported by the coast batteries, he would be able to engage the enemy's force, although superior both in numbers and strength, for a considerable time. unfortunately, witgeft did not agree.
'my orders are to go to vladivostock with the whole squadron, and this i shall do.'
if he had agreed to grigorovitch's proposal, togo would not have had a balance of advantage, and his force, being split up by reason of the demonstration at dalny, would have been weaker than ours. our squadron would have successfully broken through to vladivostock without serious injury, and dalny would have been destroyed by admiral loschinsky. if only we had not let slip the excellent opportunities we had had for sinking the enemy's ships,[pg 152] their force would have been considerably weaker than ours.
as the time approached for the squadron's departure, the admiral and most of the officers were depressed, for the approaching voyage promised little good. they all realized that the squadron was going to sea short of guns (most of those put ashore were left there), and of very much else; they knew that our shells did little destruction, sometimes not even bursting, whilst those, even the 4·7-inch shells, of the enemy caused great havoc, and that, having superior speed, the enemy would have the initiative.
the admiral was wounded by a splinter of shell bursting on the cesarevitch the day before the sortie, and, as if foreseeing his near end, his last words to those on shore were: 'gentlemen, we shall meet in the next world.'
at daybreak on the 10th the fleet steamed out into the outer roads, and, forming into single-column line ahead, steered for liao-tieh-shan. the hospital ship mongolia left exactly at eight o'clock, and overtook the fleet at 8.30. some japanese destroyers showing themselves in the direction of dalny, the novik was sent towards them, and having rapidly driven them away, the whole fleet started at nearly full speed—a formidable array of yellow-brown vessels, brought up in rear by the mongolia, glistening white, with the red cross on her funnels.
as the commandant, from the top of electric cliff, watched it steam out, he said:
'may god grant it luck! if only it can vanquish the foe and gain possession of the sea, the fortress will be saved. but evil will be the day if it is defeated and does not return. how many men, guns and shells has it not taken with it, all of which we badly want!'
port arthur's weary day of strained suspense came to an end; the night passed and morning dawned. the[pg 153] signal station at liao-tieh-shan reported that our squadron was approaching. it did return; but heavens! in what a plight! by the afternoon it was drawn up in the inner roads, less four ships, the cesarevitch, askold, novik, and diana, which had not returned, and about whose fate no one knew. admiral witgeft had been killed. what had happened at sea has been described by others, and i will spare the reader the details of this sad engagement.
thus weakened by the loss of one of our best battleships and three of our fastest cruisers, the r?le of the fleet might be said to have come to an end, for the sea was held by an enemy powerful in numbers as well as quality, and till the coming of the baltic fleet our squadron would not be able to engage them in battle. all it could now do was to give us men, guns and ammunition for the land defence. why the pacific ocean fleet, consisting of the best ships in the navy, had done nothing during a seven months' campaign, and why in the end it had been forced to abandon all idea of an active r?le and its chief raison d'être—to get command of the sea and interrupt the japanese sea communications—are questions which demand an answer.
'who was to blame?' there is but one answer.
the very essential and fundamental reforms in the navy, which had been pointed out as necessary years ago by the better and more enlightened officers, should have been introduced, and the prehistoric naval customs of the time of peter the great should have been consigned to oblivion. to blame the individual for this is impossible: it was the system that was at fault, as well as that official class which, like a thousand-headed hydra, sucks and nibbles at the really healthy organism of russia. british and german officers will not believe my assertion that everything on russian ships was neglected save the personnel, which was fairly well looked after materially[pg 154] and moderately well trained. the education of the higher ranks in staff duties, as well as their training in shooting, torpedo and other work, was so neglected that the majority of officers had but the vaguest notion of the practical application of theory. in most cases, owing to their constant transfer from one to another, they did not know even their ships. for three-quarters of the year these were in harbour and hardly any cruising was done, while the officers were made to work so little that at the commencement of the war they did not even know the shores of the kwantun peninsula.
the return of the squadron with its mutilated hulls, battered funnels and masts, had a bad effect, and on all sides was heard, 'the end will now soon come!'
