and so the strict blockade of the fortress, which we had dreaded, had now commenced in grim reality. no sooner had we abandoned wolf's hills than the civil population, who felt sure that the fall of the fortress itself could not now be long postponed, were seized with fresh panic. they had lost confidence in our power of resistance, and those who could afford it, at once took steps to charter chinese junks for their conveyance to chifu. the district staff, being incapable of dealing with the situation, said, in reply to all inquiries, that they had nothing to do with the civil population, who should go to the commandant. every one, accordingly, hurried to the fortress staff office, where those who had the right to go away were at once given permission to leave, and we, accordingly, soon saw a long line of carriages stretching along the road to pigeon bay. the majority of these, however, returned after a few days, as the japanese would allow no junks to leave. a few did succeed in evading the enemy's guard-ships and got away to sea; the others were stopped and had to make for land.
meanwhile there was no news from the north.
on august 4 we had the usual church parade and march past, and the usual martial speech to the troops from general st?ssel. the sun was shining, and to see this collection of gaily-dressed ladies and glittering[pg 141] uniforms, one would not have said that an enemy was crouching below the hills within view of the heedless crowd. its indifference was curious. was it submission to fate, trust in luck, or stupidity?
the first bombardment from the land side began suddenly on august 7. it was a glorious day, and the churches were filled with crowds attending a service to pray for the safety of port arthur, when the booming of guns and shriek of shells commenced. alarm was at once visible among the kneeling congregation, who got up, then again knelt down. the priest in a trembling voice brought the service to an abrupt end, and every one dispersed in search of safety. the bombardment continued all day, though doing little material damage.
next morning, from 2 to 5 a.m., we heard heavy musketry fire from the direction of ta-ku-shan: the enemy, leaving the town and the main defences in peace, were turning their attention to it. this hill corresponded in the east to 203 metre hill in the west, and was equally important and equally unfortified. it and sia-gu-shan, the natural forts of arthur on the eastern front, had a bad time. in the first place, they had not been made the most of, for in the original plan of defence of port arthur they had not been thought to be important points, and so had been neither fortified nor armed as their position with regard to the fortress warranted, and smirnoff had only recently succeeded in arming them to a small extent. in the second place, they became, after the abandonment of wolf's hills, open to flanking fire, and therefore untenable. the companies of the 13th east siberian rifle regiment sent there went literally to their death, but, together with the gunners, they held on as long as possible. as ta-ku-shan was not a fort or even a semi-permanent work, but only an artillery position, without casemates or splinter-proofs in which the defenders could get[pg 142] protection during the artillery preparation, it can be easily imagined what the place was like when the enemy turned on to it the fire of both big and small guns. at eight in the evening the last small force on the right flank retired behind the main line of works after a desperate fight. the japanese attacked fiercely in dense masses, and also pounded the whole of the eastern front, as well as some of the shore batteries. when they at length did succeed in getting possession of ta-ku-shan and sia-gu-shan, after heavy loss, we in our turn concentrated such a heavy gun-fire on those hills that they were unable to effect their object of building batteries.
later in the evening i climbed up on to golden hill battery to see what was to be seen. during supper a telephone message was received instructing us to open fire at once on ta-ku-shan, firing at intervals of five minutes. captain zeitz, who was in command, immediately set to work at the chart and got out the range. above, men began moving about the guns, while we remained below, sitting in the concrete casemate, which, in spite of its solidity, had been penetrated by a 12-inch shell during the sea bombardment. when after five minutes the battery opened fire with its 11-inch monsters the lamps in the casemate were at once extinguished, and several of the table utensils were smashed by the blast through the open hatch. hatches and doors were then shut, but to little purpose, for almost every discharge put out the lights and the noise was deafening. i went up on to the battery, and found it quite dark, though the howitzers, their muzzles cocked up, showed clearly against the white masonry. the howitzer crews were moving about with lanterns.
'number 1!' a streak of flame, a stunning roar, and away sped the steel messenger with its ever-lessening scream up into the air.
[pg 143]
down below in the casemate the telephone rang.
'short, sir. please shell the slopes towards the enemy,' was the message.
'number 2!' again the roar and shock.
one could scarcely distinguish the shots being fired from the neighbouring sea batteries. uncle moshinsky had opened fire, and, further off, cape flat and cross hill also; in fact, the whole front was rumbling with noise.
'sir, that shell fell on the saddle of ta-ku-shan. you are requested to shell the slopes towards the enemy,' again came on the telephone. captain zeitz ran down below into the casemate. after consulting the outspread map, he dashed up again and altered the sighting.
'number 3!' every five minutes a shot boomed out.
going to the edge of the glacis, i looked over the steep precipice dropping down to the water. on the sea everything was quiet; the horizon was clear, and nothing was to be seen on the watery expanse lit up by the searchlights. turning round, i saw the smooth edge of the hill; at an equal distance one from another, the four evil-looking mouths of the howitzers. two minutes had passed since the last shot; everything in the battery was quiet and dark, and i was alone on the glacis. down below stretched the town, buried in darkness, with no sign of light or life in street or house; it might have been a city of the dead. suddenly the battery was lighted up as if it were day: a pillar of flame flashed from the mouth of one of the howitzers, and the blast swept up the pebbles from the ground and hurled them over the cliff.
i went back into the casemate, and found it hot and stuffy. the majority of officers were lying down, as was every one in the battery above, with the exception of zeitz; but it was impossible to sleep, because of the deafening noise of each shot. i sat down to the table[pg 144] close to a lamp and began to read over my daily 'news' for the novy kry. the telephone rang, and orders came that we were to cease fire for half an hour. in the distance shots became fewer and fewer, and in the battery noise gave place to silence. for three hours incessantly the whole of the shore front from golden hill had bellowed at ta-ku-shan.
next day i was permitted to accompany general smirnoff upon his inspection, and had the good luck to witness our attempt to recapture ta-ku-shan. before giving me permission to accompany him, however, he warned me that by being with him i should probably earn st?ssel's ill-will. we first visited a battery, where the garrison was taking cover from the enemy's rifle fire, and whence we could see the japs moving about on the hill. having given his instructions here, the general rode on, and we descended along the road leading from the fortress into dalny, where we found ourselves exposed to ta-ku-shan, and bullets whistled overhead one after another. smirnoff began to go slower, as if on purpose. passing through the deep ravine towards b battery, we saw a group of officers in the distance, amongst whom was general gorbatovsky. on reaching the battery general smirnoff gave orders for all the guns on the eastern front to open fire immediately, and for the companies which had been told off to advance and attack ta-ku-shan. on the hill itself nothing was now visible; the japanese had hidden. our batteries were covering it with shrapnel and common shell, which we could see bursting on the slopes.
'colonel tokhateloff, order the batteries to shell the top of the hill and behind it: there is certain to be a number of the enemy there. what is the good of firing on the near slope?' said smirnoff.
the colonel dashed down into the casemate. he tried[pg 145] to telephone to the further batteries, but could not manage it, as the central exchange would not answer.
'put me on to a battery! a battery! i say, are you all mad? a battery! a! a! a!'
at last the exchange replied, but time was flying, and the shells, instead of bursting on the top of the position, were still falling on the near slopes. at last those from a battery began to reach the saddle of the hill.
'ah! that's right; but only one battery has got the range. pass the word to the others at once. what are they looking at?' said smirnoff, getting angry.
tokhateloff was beside himself; he shouted from the top to the nearest battery, and gave orders to transmit by semaphore. at last they all concentrated their fire on the top of the hill.
it was here and now that i for the first time realized practically the splendid inefficiency of our fortress telephone system. owing to its construction, the officer commanding a section of the fortress artillery not only was unable to issue simultaneous orders to all the batteries under him, but could not even get through quickly to any one of them. in the central exchange they well knew that the commandant himself was in b battery on this occasion, and was personally directing the fire. and if it was not even possible for him to issue urgent orders in such a case, what must have happened when a mere section commander wanted to transmit an important order to one of the batteries under him? in some cases messengers actually went and returned before the stations were connected through.
the sun was fairly high when our infantry firing-line got near to the foot of the hill. our artillery fire had intensified to prepare their way, and the hill-top was hidden by bursting shell. the moment for the assault was at hand, and we all nervously watched the attacking[pg 146] columns. by midday they had begun to ascend the hill, and were with difficulty climbing up the spurs under a burning sun.
'colonel tokhateloff, tell the guns to cease fire,' said smirnoff. again the colonel dashed down to carry out the order, a by no means easy task for a corpulent person like himself, and after a long time at the telephone, and much semaphoring, the fire gradually began to stop.
the interesting phase of the attack had begun, and in the battery and far beyond, to left and to right, there was the silence of expectation—the attention of the whole front was directed on the hill, of which our infantry had now seized half. we could see them crawling up higher and higher. suddenly, from a ravine on the left slope of the hill appeared a column of the enemy, which quickly moved against the flank of our infantry, who, not seeing them, continued to press upwards.
'sir, sir,' shouted every one, 'look! there are the japanese!'
'open fire with shrapnel,' commanded smirnoff. we watched the japanese intently, and could clearly see them climbing up, with an officer in front waving a sword.
'open fire, open fire quickly; a good shot would mow them down,' said smirnoff angrily.
captain vakhneieff tried to get the range.
'no. 1!' it was short.
'no. 2!'
'no. 3!'
still they dashed forward, though some were seen to fall.
'why are the other batteries silent? pass the word to the other batteries,' shouted gorbatovsky.
behind us zaliterny battery, high up on the hill, opened fire, as did one other battery on the left. but further to the left and on the right there was silence; either these batteries did not see the enemy, or they[pg 147] were asleep. colonel tokhateloff, despairing of transmitting the necessary order by telephone, ran out to the gorge of the battery and shouted as loudly as he could and semaphored to them:
'fire on the column—on the c-o-l-u-m-n—f-i-r-e!'
the fire gradually increased, and shrapnel after shrapnel tore after the japanese, but it was late; they had got cover behind an outlying spur. our men were still climbing up—on and on—they would soon be near the top! but they never reached it, for the enemy were too cunning. the moment the attackers became exposed, a ring of musketry fire burst out from the summit. some of our men fell back, retreating right away down the hill; others could be seen to halt, take cover behind the rocks and folds of the ground, and to crawl along the hollows. more men came up from behind, but it was no good; they stopped gradually, and crawled downwards one by one. the attempt had failed.
the attack of this huge hill could never have succeeded by daylight, nor should it have been undertaken with so few men. to take it, a much larger force—at least one regiment—should have been sent; but although advised of this, general st?ssel would have his way. he considered that he knew best, and he alone was responsible for the failure.
evening came on, and, according to the intelligence reports of the chinese, there seemed every reason to believe that the japanese would make a general attack that night. this information was common knowledge, and no one looked forward to the coming of night; we expected an assault, but knew not where the chief blow would fall. however, chinese information was always most inaccurate and confused, and did not justify the reliance we placed in it.
the morning after this fight the japanese did a thing[pg 148] which surprised us: they fired on a small party of our stretcher-bearers which had gone out to pick up a wounded man who had lain all night on the slope of the hill, and succeeded in again wounding him and also one of the bearers—an action as disgusting as it was incomprehensible.
the bombardment of arthur by land was now systematic, lasting generally from 7 a.m. till 11 or 12 noon, and then again from 2 or 3 p.m. to 6 or 7 p.m. the shooting was apparently carried out by 'squares,' as all shells fired at the same time, fell into a comparatively small space. they did their best to destroy the fleet, the port, and the harbour workshops, and their shooting was so good that after two or three 'overs' and 'shorts' they were able to get on.
and now a word as to the press censorship in the fortress. from august 9 right up to september 8 the novy kry printed my notes, under the heading 'news of the novy kry.' these notes were based entirely on personal observations or on information received by me in the fortress staff office. by the direction of the commandant and with the knowledge of st?ssel and reuss, the following procedure was observed.[15] every day, after going round the line of defences, i went to the fortress staff office, where i was given all the telephone messages of the preceding twenty-four hours up to twelve noon that day. i busied myself with this budget in the office of the chief of the staff, in his presence, and under the supervision of lieutenants kniazeff or hammer.
when my account was ready i handed it to colonel khvostoff for him to see, and everything that i said relating to the operations of the fleet was given to lieutenant mackalinsky of the navy, attached to the fortress staff, to[pg 149] look through. these two then deleted such parts of it as, in their opinion, ought not to be published, and at once returned it to me with permission to send to press. i then despatched it by my orderly to colonel artemieff in the editor's office, who in his turn cut out such parts as seemed to him suspicious—i.e., parts to which objection might be taken by the censors. after he had done this—it always had to be done by him personally—the manuscript was sent to be set up. two corrected proofs were sent, one to general st?ssel's office and one to the naval office, to be censored. the proofs, when signed by the censors, were returned to the printing-offices, where they were checked by the assistant editor, and sent by him to the type-room to be amended. thence a revised proof was sent to the editor for checking with the censors' original remarks. it was only after very careful checking of this revised proof with the original that colonel artemieff permitted it to be printed.
see what an amount of correction and checking my 'news' was subjected to before it reached the reader. however, notwithstanding all this absurd severity—the almost impossible requirements of two censors, naval and military—general st?ssel deemed it so dangerous that he stopped the publication of the novy kry for one month!
