("die feuerwaffe beherrscht die taktik")

i.—general von bernhardi on south africa.

"the rifle (or literally, the firearm) rules tactics." the phrase was originally my own, but the general has done me the honour of adopting and sanctioning it, and i may fitly bring this criticism of his writings to a conclusion by briefly noting the occasion and origin of this remarkable admission. my book, "war and the arme blanche," was published in march, 1910, a month before the publication in england of his own second work, "cavalry in war and peace," whose consideration we have just concluded. in the course of the summer of 1910 the general published a series of articles in the milit?r wochenblatt criticizing my book, and those articles were translated and printed in the cavalry journal of october, 1910.

the critic covers limited ground. he makes no rejoinder or allusion of any sort to my own[pg 187] chapter of detailed criticism upon his own earlier work, "cavalry in future wars." he scarcely notices my discussion of the manchurian war. he confines himself almost wholly to the south african war, and makes it plain (1) that his knowledge of that war is exceedingly deficient; (2) that his principal explanation for the comparative failure of our regular cavalry in that war was that they were timidly led; (3) that he had misunderstood the nature of the case which i had endeavoured to construct against the arme blanche, and that, so far as he did understand it, he agreed with my conclusions.

1. internal evidence shows—what one would naturally infer from the extraordinary conceptions of the technique of fire-action for mounted troops developed in his book—that the general[7] has never studied closely the combats of our war, except, perhaps, in such publications as the german official history, which leaves off at march, 1900, practically ignores the mounted question, regards the boers throughout as infantry (presumably because, though mounted,[pg 188] they did not carry lances and swords), and, as a result of this method of exposition, is of no value towards the present controversy. unfamiliar with the phenomena of our war, the general nevertheless taunts me, who argued solely from the facts of war and went not an inch beyond the facts, with being a "speculative theorist"—a taunt which comes strangely from an author who declares in his current volume (p. 7) that "the groundwork of training" for modern cavalry can only be created from "speculative and theoretical reflection." he proceeds further to obliterate my humble personality by remarking that i am "naturally devoid of all war experience," and that he would never have taken the trouble to discuss the subject at all if lord roberts had not declared his agreement with what i had written. the personal point, of course, is wholly immaterial, and i welcome his perfectly correct choice of an opponent. but his spontaneous allusion to war experience raises a somewhat important point. until reading the words, i had never dreamed that my own war experience was a serious factor in the discussion. i have never alluded to it or argued from it; but since the point is raised, let me say to general von bernhardi that, in common with some hundreds of thousands of my countrymen here or in the colonies, i have had,[pg 189] in a very humble capacity, a certain kind of war experience, of which he, as a reflective theorist, stands in bitter need. we have seen the modern rifle at work in what he calls "real war." we have seen what he has only reflected about and imagined—the revolution wrought by it on the battle-field since the days of 1870. he has not; and if he had, he would have avoided many of the painful solecisms and blunders which disfigure his work, enlightened as that work is by comparison with the retrograde school he attacks.

2. timid leading.—the boers, says the general, were a "peasant militia," who were "tied to their ox-waggons," "incapable of assuming the offensive on a large scale," in "disappearing smaller numbers against greatly superior numbers," "not often strong enough either to charge the english cavalry or to attack the english infantry," "directed by halting leadership," and so on—altogether, according to the general's standards, a most contemptible foe, hardly worthy of the steel of a respectable professional cavalry, and certainly not the kind of foe to force such a cavalry to abandon its traditional form of combat. but there was the rub. our cavalry, it seems, was even more contemptible. they "made no relentless pursuits, despite the lack of operative mobility in the[pg 190] enemy"; "they did not attack even when they had the opportunity"; and "one could scarcely find a european cavalry which was tied down to such an extent during the big operations as the boers, or one which, against such little resistance, did not try to overcome it as the english." he cites the action of dronfield,[8] where sir john french was in command, as a specific instance, and in as plain language as it is possible to use without penning the word "cowardice," accuses the cavalry present of that unpardonable crime. "mr. childers," he remarks with perfect truth, "relates the story without any spite to show the little value of english cavalry equipment and training. i think it shows much beside."[9] (the italics are mine.)

i do not know if this kind of thing will finally compel sir john french to examine more[pg 191] thoroughly the foundations of his own belief in the lance and sword, and to apply more searching criticism to the works of the "acknowledged authority" whom he lauds to the skies as a model and mentor for british cavalrymen. i should hope that, on their behalf, he now resents as hotly as i resent the contemptuous patronage of an officer holding and expressing the view that "any european cavalry"—and he afterwards expressly names the german cavalry—would have shown more aggressive spirit in south africa than our own—more aggressive spirit, be it understood, with the lance and sword; for if that be not the meaning, the general's lengthy appreciation of the worth and exploits of the rival forces in south africa is, in its context, as part of a hostile criticism of my work, either destructive of his own argument or meaningless. sir john french refuses to read through british eyes the plain moral of the war for cavalry. this is his reward, and it is of no use to pretend that he does not deserve it. anyone who throws the dearly-bought experience of his own countrymen to the winds, and runs to foreigners who have no relevant experience for corroboration of an outworn creed, gratuitously courts the same humiliation.

perhaps i make too much of a point of pride. let sir john french at any rate see the amusing[pg 192] side of the situation. he has set forth[10] his own four reasons for the failure of the lance and sword in south africa: (1) the lightning speed of the boers in running away from combat—a habit which left our cavalry nothing even to reconnoitre; (2) the fact that our military object was nothing less than the complete conquest and annexation of the enemy's country; (3) that, owing to the release of prisoners who fought again against us, we had to contend with double the number of men nominally allowed for; (4) the condition of the horses.

the last factor the german author does not pretend to take seriously as an explanation of the failure of the cavalry; and with regard to the first three his view, as far as it receives clear expression, is diametrically the reverse of that of sir john french. so far from alleging that the boers "dispersed for hundreds of miles when pressed," he dwells repeatedly on the immobility imposed by their ox-waggons, says that they were "tied down" to an unparalleled extent, and censures the cavalry for what he regards as their unparalleled slackness in attack against such a vulnerable and unenterprising enemy. so far from agreeing that there was "nothing to reconnoitre," he points out that the cavalry "did not[pg 193] understand reconnaissance by cavalry patrols," a statement true enough in itself, but valueless without the reason—namely, the mistaken armament and training of the cavalry—a reason which would, of course, have applied with infinitely greater force to "any other european cavalry," because no cavalry but our own would have had the invaluable assistance of colonial mounted riflemen, armed and trained correctly. so far from finding an excuse for the failure of the lance and sword in the fact that our aim was conquest and annexation, he appears in the last page of his article to argue that, had these weapons been used more "relentlessly," the british nation would not now be in what he evidently regards as the degrading situation of having boers on a footing of political equality with british citizens! finally, so far from pleading the abnormal accretions to the boer army through the release of captured prisoners, he makes a particular point of our vast numerical superiority and of the "disappearing smaller numbers" of the enemy.

but the climax comes when he coolly tells sir john french that the german cavalry, whose backwardness and "indolence" he condemns in the very book which sir john french sponsors, whom he regards as absolutely "un[pg 194]prepared for war," whose "prehistoric" tactics, "old-fashioned knightly combats," "antiquated regulations," and "tactical orgies," he is at this moment satirizing, would, twelve years ago, with still more antiquated regulations, with still less education, and with a far worse armament, have taught the boer peasants lessons with the steel which our faint-spirited cavalry could not teach them! all patriotic feelings apart, and merely as a military experiment, one would like to have seen the german uhlans of 1899, with their popgun carbine and frederician traditions, and without a vestige of aid, inspiration or example from colonial or mounted infantry sources, tackling the boers at talana or zand river, at colenso, diamond hill, or magersfontein, at ladysmith or sannah's post, at roodewal or bakenlaagte. at the last two episodes the general is quite certain that they would have done far more marvellous feats with the steel by means of an old-fashioned knightly combat than the boers did with the rifle.

serious students of land-war, anxious only to elucidate the purely technical question as to whether horsemen in modern days can fight effectively on horseback with steel weapons, look on in amazed bewilderment, while high authorities on the affirmative side conspire to render them[pg 195]selves and one another ridiculous by dragging in political, psychological, strategical, and even lyrical factors which have nothing whatever to do with the simple issue of combat. there, as i have often said, is the reader's clue through the labyrinth of contradictions. neither sir john french nor general von bernhardi ever really discusses at all the real point at issue. that is why they succeed in agreeing upon it, while differing radically in their logical processes. as the reader probably realizes now, nearly everything the latter general writes is either susceptible of two constructions or is subject to subsequent qualification. this critical essay on the opinions of lord roberts and on my book, "war and the arme blanche," is only another illustration of the same mental habit. though he is explicit enough on what he regards as the feeble initiative of the british army in general and the british cavalry in particular, he never attempts to trace any direct causal connection between this topic and the topic of the lance or sword. he dare not. remote insinuation is his only weapon. yet, for the purposes of his article, that specific link is the only thing worth talking about. so far as he does touch the question of physical combat—as, for example, where he says that the boers "fought entirely with the rifle, and this the[pg 196] mounted troops of england had to learn," "that the boers were far superior in the fire-fight," that the absence of "cavalry duels" in south africa was caused (mark this deliciously na?ve admission) by the fact of the armament and the numerical weakness of the boers—he is on my side. and i need scarcely add that the reader will find it easy to demolish the general's whole dream of the lost opportunities of the lance and sword in south africa or manchuria, or of its golden chances in any future war, by passages from the general's own work, criticized in this volume, as when he implores his own cavalry to remember that they may have to meet mounted riflemen, or even heterodox cavalry, who, using their horses only as a means of mobility in the boer fashion, will, in defiance of the german text-books, advance dismounted, and force the german troopers to do the same; or when he lays down that the attack or defence of any "locality," entrenched or unentrenched, and by whomsoever defended or attacked, must be accomplished through fire-action. it is true that the theoretical limitations he sets to fire-action, from sheer ignorance of what fire-action by mounted troops is, reduce that form of combat also to a nullity; but on that point anyone can test his views by facts. although it is quite possible to[pg 197] prove from his premisses, if their truth be postulated, that the south african war never took place at all, without going to the trouble of proving that it was "abnormal" in the matter of the futility of the lance and sword, we know that it did take place, why lances and swords were futile, and why fire was supreme.

3. so in reality does general von bernhardi himself, and in the title of this chapter is crystallized his explicit statement of the truth. faithful to his habitual system of alternate adhesion to two incompatible theories, the general, after clearly enough condemning the british cavalry for their timidity with the steel, makes the following remarkable volte face:

"in one particular, however, i will own he [i.e., mr. childers] is correct: the firearm rules tactics. that is indisputable. nobody can with the arme blanche compel an opponent on his side tactically to use the arme blanche." (this last is a very dark saying, for the boers had no arme blanche; but it does not affect the general sense.) "to the laws of the fire-fight everything must be subordinated in war."

well, that is precisely what lord roberts, the greatest soldier living, and many humbler persons, including myself, have contended for. cadit qu?stio. why not have begun "cavalry in[pg 198] war and peace" with these illuminating axioms? why not have them placed in the forefront of our own cavalry manual, in the approaching revision of that important work? why give the dominating operative weapon only 10 or 15 per cent. of the time of the cavalry soldier, and make it officially subordinate to steel weapons which can only be used by its indulgence? but i am going a little too fast. the general, as usual, has a qualification. what is it? "but as a necessary corollary from this, to say that there can be no fight with the arme blanche is a mischievous sophism." again we agree—in the sense, that is, in which the author now elects to use the phrase "arme blanche." for he means the bayonet. "every infantryman carries a bayonet, because he requires it for the assault. even lord roberts will not take this away," etc. no; and no one in the world, so far as i know, wants to take away the bayonet from the infantryman. but, as i asked at page 121, what has the bayonet got to do with the lance and sword? the bayonet is fixed to the rifle, and used on foot as an element in fire-tactics. the lance and sword are used from horseback in tactics which are diametrically opposite to and absolutely incompatible with fire-tactics, and every word lord roberts or i have written has[pg 199] been directly aimed against this antiquated system of fighting on horseback with the lance and sword. if the cavalryman, because, by universal consent, he has constantly to do work similar to that of infantry, requires a bayonet, by all means give it to him. i discussed the question in my previous book, and ventured to regard it as an open one, for reasons which i need not repeat now. but i over and over again took pains to point out the fundamental distinction between the bayonet and the lance and sword.

on another point the general misrepresents me. because i showed by illustration from war the marked physical and moral effects of rifle-fire from the saddle, he treats me as advancing the specific plan of substituting rifle-fire on horseback for the use of the lance and sword on horseback in what his translator calls the "collision of the mounted fight" (handgemenge zu pferde). this is a perversion of my meaning. the collisions he is thinking of are obsolete. though i think that for all conceivable purposes a pistol would be better than a lance or sword, i adhered to the facts, and pointed out that saddle-fire in south africa was used before contact, and that in order to consummate their destructive rifle-charges, the boers dismounted, either at close quarters or within point-blank range.

[pg 200]

ii.—views of the general staff.

i wish to lay special stress on these two misrepresentations, because both have been also made by our own general staff. in a review of my previous book, whose general fairness and courtesy i gladly recognize, the monthly notes of july, 1910, took exactly the same erroneous points, and, for the rest, adopted the strange course of ruling out all the remarkable south african charges with the rifle by quietly assuming that they would have been done better with the sword or lance.

he takes as an example the action of bakenlaagte, and convinces himself that cavalry "as ably led" would, by sticking persistently to their saddles, have done better with the steel than the boers who inflicted such terrible punishment with their rifles upon benson's brave and seasoned troops. this is an unintentional slur not only upon benson's men but upon our cavalry, who, on the reviewer's assumption, ought certainly to have inflicted similar punishment upon the boers on scores of occasions where the tactical conditions were approximately the same as those at bakenlaagte. the reviewer arbitrarily begins his imaginary parallel at the moment at which botha's final charge started, and pictures the steel-trained troops already in full career like the fire-trained[pg 201] troops who actually made the charge. war is not so easy as all that. he ignores the characteristically clever fire-tactics which for hours before had been leading up to the requisite situation, and forgets that steel-trained troops would never have had the skill or insight to produce and utilize that situation. moreover, their training manual not only does not contemplate, but renders prohibitive any such instantaneous transition from fire to shock as would have been required. but the reviewer surpasses himself when, having triumphantly brought his steel-trained troops through the preparatory phase and the charging phase (with the incidental riding down and capture of several detached bodies of men), he pictures them confronted with the objective ultimately charged—namely, benson's rearguard of guns and riflemen on gun hill. these men had had just time to rally, and were lined out on a long ridge in open order and in splendid fighting fettle. their fire hitherto had been masked by the rearmost sections of their own men, who were galloping in with the boers at their heels. what the boers now did was to fling themselves from their ponies, by instinct, in the dead ground below the ridge, and to charge up it on foot, where after a brief and desperate encounter they exterminated benson's heroic rearguard and captured the guns. this[pg 202] action the reviewer regards as clumsy and dilatory. his lancers, disdaining to dismount, would have ridden up the hill—painfully vulnerable targets for the rifles on the ridge—and, arrived on the top, would either have gone riding about among the scattered defenders trying to impale with lances or reach with swords riflemen who would have laughed in their faces at this ineffectual method of fighting, or (and the reviewer favours this alternative) would have been content to impale a chance few en passant, and, without drawing rein, would have galloped on towards the main body and convoy, leaving "supporting squadrons," whom he coolly invents for the occasion (for the boers had none), to "deal with" the rearguard in the knightly fashion aforesaid. sweeping on, and again disdaining to dismount on reaching the next objective, our lancers would have "spread havoc and consternation" among the convoy. would they? you cannot stampede or disable inspanned oxen and mules or their drivers by brandishing swords and lances. and surely one does not "charge" ox-waggons with those weapons. what you want for these occasions is the bullet, whether for beasts, drivers, or escort. by bitter experience of our own on only too many occasions we know all about the right way of spreading havoc and consternation among convoys. lances[pg 203] and swords never produced these effects in a single case in three years. and the escort and main body? why, a few dozen steady men with rifles would turn the tables on, and, in their turn, spread havoc among a whole brigade of lancers who insisted on remaining in their saddles.

one falls, i must frankly admit, into profound discouragement when one meets arguments of this sort coming from a quarter where arguments lead to rules and regulations. it is quite true that this important review, in its moderate tone and in its tacit avowal that there was need of some reform in the present regulations, bore no resemblance to the criticisms which proceeded from some individual cavalry officers. there were indications—reliable, i hope—that the old knee-to-knee knightly shock-charge, now regarded officially as the "climax of cavalry training," was doomed, and that the open-order charge with the steel, presumed to be analogous to the open-order charge with the rifle, was the utmost now contemplated. but in truth, as i pointed out in chapters iv. and vi., there exists no such analogy, or the war would have demonstrated it. if such steel-charges were possible, our cavalry had innumerable chances of carrying them out under far more favourable conditions, owing to our permanent numerical superiority, than the boers[pg 204] ever obtained for their attacks, by the charge or otherwise.

the steel-charge, close or open, was the traditional function of our cavalry; it was the only form of combat that they really understood when they landed in south africa, and they were supremely efficient in it. the point is that in practice they could not charge with the steel, except in the rare and well-nigh negligible cases which are on record. they ceased altogether to try so to charge, because to fight with the steel on horseback was physically impossible. their steel weapons were eventually returned to store on that account. and they profited by the resulting change of spirit, and by the acquisition, late as it came, of a respectable firearm. to say that the fire-charge invented and practised by the boers as early as march, 1900, when lances and swords were still in the field, and imitated to some extent by our own colonials and mounted infantry, could, after all, have been done as well and better with the lance and sword, is conjecture run mad. sir john french has never used the argument. he could not, with any shadow of plausibility, combine it with his complaint about the lightning flights of the boers and the absence of anything to reconnoitre. it is, i grant, the most impressive official testimonial ever given to[pg 205] the arme blanche, but it is not business. one might as well argue that the work done by togo's torpedo-boats would have been done better by the beaks of triremes. we know and have seen what actually happened. we had nearly three years in which to arrive by experiment at tactical truths. in the name of common sense let us accept the results, especially when they are corroborated by the results of the other great modern war, that in manchuria.

iii.—other cavalry views.

directly or indirectly, i think that in the course of this volume i have replied to most of the criticisms which my previous book, "war and the arme blanche," drew forth. but i should like to make a brief reference to an interesting discussion of the subject conducted mainly by cavalry officers on october 19, 1910, at the royal united service institution. a reader of the report in the journal of november, 1910, must feel that the proceedings would have gained in clarity and harmony had von bernhardi's belated maxim that the "firearm rules tactics" been made the basis of the debate. strange things were said on the side of the arme blanche. one officer urged that cavalry should not have a rifle—[pg 206]that arbiter of tactics—at all, should use shock alone, and should not be "frittered away as scouts." another complained that, in arguing mainly from the south african and manchurian wars, i "could not have selected two worse examples." i am not to blame. it is not a case of selection. these are the only great civilized wars since the "revolution" (to use von bernhardi's phrase) wrought by modern firearms.

the close-order shock-charge has never even been tried or contemplated in civilized war since 1870, and even then it was moribund. yet the lecturer argued from waterloo, and, unconscious of the slight upon his arm, was at great pains to claim that even now cavalry kept in reserve for the occasion could attack two-year conscripts who had already been reduced to "pulp" by several days of fire and fatigue. "if," he said, "they could stick their lances into quite a large proportion," the rest "would have the most marked reluctance to remain upon the ground." perhaps. von bernhardi also claims that infantry, who under stress of fire have reached the point of throwing away their arms, may be attacked successfully with the steel. let us allow the claim, only remarking that experience shows a rifle to be a far more destructive weapon for such circumstances than a lance or sword. but, instead of[pg 207] idly awaiting these not very glorious opportunities for the steel, would it not be better for the cavalry to be mobile and busy from the first in using the same formidable weapon which originally reduced the infantry to pulp, using it in that limitless sphere of envelopment, interception, and surprise to which the possession of horses gives them access?

another extraordinary feature of the discussion was the dissociation of moral effect from killing effect by some of the cavalry officers present, who really seemed to think that riflemen in war are afraid of horses, irrespective of weapons, whereas in fact they welcome so substantial a target for their rifles, and fear only the rider's weapon in direct proportion to its deadliness. these officers were convinced that their arm, trained to charge as it now is, exercises great moral effect, yet they agreed that the importance of killing the enemy with the steel is at present neglected, and that the art of so killing is not even taught. the lecturer argued that our cavalry would be a "more terrifying weapon than it is at present" if every trooper could be brought to "understand that he has to stick his sword or lance into the body of his opponent." another officer urged that "each horseman in a charge should be taught that he must kill at least one[pg 208] adversary"; and the chairman strongly emphasized "the necessity of training the men to kill." "the reason," he said, "that a man had a sword or spear was to kill." the truth is that some arts perish from disuse. this art cannot be exercised in war, so wars come and go, and the very tradition of its exercise disappears, and in peace is replaced, as the chairman said, by "piercing yells" and the "waving of swords."

a horse artillery officer threw a bombshell into the debate by complaining that his arm was often forbidden at man?uvres to open fire on the hostile cavalry masses (vide supra, pp. 127 and 131), in order to allow the collision to take place on "favourable ground," and asked for guidance. the chairman replied that the artillery could be trusted to be "loyal." but can they, in this particular matter? let us hope not.

a small minority ably upheld the case against the arme blanche, and the discussion, as a whole, was of considerable value. general sir r.s. baden-powell went to the root of the matter when he confessed that a "policy had never properly been laid down" for the cavalry, and that they "wanted a policy to begin with before they commenced training." that is the literal truth, and i hope to have proved that no rational, clear, consistent policy ever will be laid down until the rifle is[pg 209] made in peace-theory what it already is in war-practice—the dominant, all-important weapon of cavalry—and until the axiom that the rifle rules tactics is accepted and systematically acted upon. i claim that von bernhardi's writings, and the manner of their acceptance in this country, prove conclusively that that is the condition precedent to a sound policy. he has no policy; we have no policy. we have not even a terminology suitable to modern conditions.

i believe it correct also to say that the principal cause of the persistence of the arme blanche theory in this country is its retention by foreign cavalries who are without war experience, and who, on account of its retention, are backward in every department of their science.

in sir john french's words, we try to assimilate the best foreign customs, and we choose for assimilation the very customs which we ourselves have proved in war to be not only valueless, but vicious.

i have not thought it worth while to deal with other continental cavalries. in the matter of the lance and sword, the austrian and french cavalries may be regarded as more backward than the german. both would regard von bernhardi as a fanatical heretic. count wrangel, for the austrians, states that it is impossible to[pg 210] train cavalry to the use of two weapons so different as the sword and the rifle, and, in deciding for the former, frankly admits that, after the experience of manchuria, cavalry have no business within the zone of fire. the views and practice of the french cavalry may be learnt from the scathing exposure to which they have been submitted by general de négrier. our cavalry, excessive as its reliance on the steel is, stands, of course, in the matter of fire-action, ahead of all continental rivals.

relying too much on foreign practice in peace, we also exaggerate foreign exploits in bygone wars where conditions were radically different. i scarcely think it too much to say, after a close study of the criticisms of my book, that, if one could only succeed in proving to present-day cavalrymen that von bredow's charge at vionville was not a valid precedent for modern war, more than half the battle for rational armament and tactics would be won. quite half my critics threw that famous charge in my teeth, and some accused me of not even knowing about it, since i had not mentioned it. why should i have mentioned it? i was not aware at the time i wrote that it was seriously accepted as relevant to present conditions. von bernhardi, whom i was taking as a representative of the most enlightened cavalry[pg 211] views on the subject of the steel-charge, does not mention it in either of his works, and in his first work went to some trouble to show how the german and french cavalry at mars-la-tour frittered away time and opportunity by hanging about in masses which "mutually paralyzed" one another, instead of using golden chances for fire-action. he expressly says that the war of 1870 "presents a total absence of analogy," and, as i showed above (p. 140), his own limitations for the steel-charge in modern war absolutely preclude the possibility of any such charge being repeated. those limitations have for long been accepted by cavalry in this country also—in theory. but the immortal fascination of that charge! next door to von bernhardi's article on my book in the cavalry journal of october, 1910, is an interesting descriptive account of it, with maps. and the author ends thus: "the days of cavalry are not over. for they 'can ride rapidly into the danger that infantry can only walk into.'" these two little sentences typify perfectly, i believe, the state of mind of those who cling to the arme blanche out of sentiment and without scientific justification. nobody supposes that the days of cavalry are over. far from being weakened, cavalry, if properly equipped and trained, have potentialities im[pg 212]mensely greater than the cavalry of 1870, because they now possess—in our country at any rate—the weapon which, united with the horse, qualifies them to tackle any other arm on their own terms. and as the writer of this article truly says, they can ride into the danger that infantry can only walk into. south africa proves that, to a certain point. but, alas! that is not the moral that the writer means to draw. he forgets that the rifle of 1870 is, as i remarked before, a museum curiosity, and that, feeble as it was, it nearly cut to pieces bredow's regiments on their return from the charge. he draws the wrong moral—that cavalry can still make charges by remaining indefinitely in their saddles and wielding steel weapons from their saddles. in that sense the days of cavalry are indeed over. nobody should regret it. what is there to regret?

but let me repeat one last caution. it is a harmful result of this otherwise healthy controversy that we tend to argue too much in terms of the "charge," meaning the mounted charge, culminating in a fight at close quarters, or even in a mêlée. for all we know, future science, by making it a sheer impossibility to get so large an object as a horse through a fire-zone, may eventually render such an attack by horse[pg 213]men, in whatever formation and with whatever weapon, altogether impracticable. what will there be to regret in that? sailors do not mourn over the decay of the cutlass and the ram. so long as we win, it does not matter whether or not we charge on horseback, or how near we can ride to the objective before we begin the fire-fight. and, come what will, the horse, by the correct use of ground and surprise, will always be a priceless engine of strategical and tactical mobility.