harry kendall thaw shot and killed stanford white on the 25th day of june, 1905. although most of the coroner's jury which first sat upon the case considered him irrational, he was committed to the tombs and, having been indicted for murder, remained there over six months pending his trial. during that time it was a matter of common knowledge that his defence was to be that he was insane at the time of the shooting, but as under the new york law it is not necessary specifically to enter a plea of insanity to the indictment in order to take advantage of that defence (which may be proven under the general plea of "not guilty"), there was nothing officially on record to indicate this purpose. neither was it possible for the district attorney to secure any evidence of thaw's mental condition, since he positively refused either to talk to the prosecutor's medical representatives or to allow himself to be examined by them. mr. jerome therefore was compelled to enter upon an elaborate and expensive preparation of the case, not only upon its merits, but upon the possible question of the criminal irresponsibility of the defendant.
the case was moved in january, 1906, and the defence thereupon proceeded to introduce a limited amount of testimony tending to show that thaw[pg 351] was insane when he did the shooting. while much of this evidence commended itself but little to either the prosecutor or the jury, it was sufficient to raise grave doubt as to whether the accused was a fit subject for trial. the district attorney's experts united in the opinion that, while he knew that he was doing wrong when he shot white, he was, nevertheless, the victim of a hopeless progressive form of insanity called dementia pr?cox. in the midst of the trial, therefore, mr. jerome moved for a commission to examine into the question of how far thaw was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and consulting with counsel, and frankly expressed his personal opinion in open court that thaw was no more a proper subject for trial than a baby. a commission was appointed which reported the prisoner sane enough to be tried, and the case then proceeded at great length with the surprising result that, in spite of the district attorney's earlier declaration that he believed thaw to be insane, the jury disagreed as to his criminal responsibility, a substantial number voting for conviction. of course, logically, they would have been obliged either to acquit entirely on the ground of insanity or convict of murder in the first degree, but several voted for murder in the second degree.
a year now elapsed, during which equally elaborate preparations were made for a second trial. the state had already spent some $25,000, and yet its experts had never had the slightest opportunity to examine or interrogate the defendant, for the latter had not taken the stand at the first trial. the district attorney still remained on record as[pg 352] having declared thaw to be insane, and his own experts were committed to the same proposition, yet his official duty compelled him to prosecute the defendant a second time. the first prosecution had occupied months and delayed the trial of hundreds of other prisoners, and the next bid fair to do the same. but at this second trial the defence introduced enough testimony within two days to satisfy the public at large of the unbalanced mental condition of the defendant from boyhood.
after a comparatively short period of deliberation the jury acquitted the prisoner "on the ground of insanity," which may have meant either one of two things: (a) that they had a reasonable doubt in their own minds that thaw knew that he was doing wrong when he committed the murder—something hard for the layman to believe, or (b) that, realizing that he was undoubtedly the victim of mental disease, they refused to follow the strict legal test.
nearly two years had elapsed since the homicide; over a hundred thousand dollars had been spent upon the case; every corner of the community had been deluged with detailed accounts of unspeakable filth and depravity; the moral tone of society had been depressed; and the only element which had profited by this whole lamentable and unnecessary proceeding had been the sensational press. yet the sole reason for it all was that the law of the land in respect to insane persons accused of crime was hopelessly out of date.
the question of how far persons who are victims of diseased mind shall be held criminally responsible for their acts has vexed judges, jurors,[pg 353] doctors, and lawyers for the last hundred years. during that time, in spite of the fact that the law has lagged far behind science in the march of progress, we have blundered along expecting our juries to reach substantial justice by dealing with each individual accused as most appeals to their enlightened common sense.
and the fact that they have obeyed their common sense rather than the law is the only reason why our present antiquated and unsatisfactory test of who shall be and who shall not be held "responsible" in the eye of the law remains untouched upon the statute-books. because its inadequacy is so apparent, and because no experienced person seriously expects juries to apply it consistently, it fairly deserves first place in any discussion of present problems.
thanks to human sympathy, the law governing insanity has had comparatively few victims, but the fact remains that more than one irresponsible insane man has swung miserably from the scaffold. but "hard cases" do more than "make bad law," they make lawlessness. a statute systematically violated is worse than no statute at all, and exactly in so far as we secure a sort of justice by evading the law as it stands, we make a laughing-stock of our procedure.
the law is, simply, that any person is to be held criminally responsible for a deed unless he was at the time laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of his act and that it was wrong.
this doctrine first took concrete form in 1843, when, after a person named mcnaughten, who had[pg 354] shot and killed a certain mr. drummond under an insane delusion that the latter was sir robert peel, had been acquitted, there was such popular uneasiness over the question of what constituted criminal responsibility that the house of lords submitted four questions to the fifteen judges of england asking for an opinion on the law governing responsibility for offences committed by persons afflicted with certain forms of insanity. it is unnecessary to set forth at length these questions, but it is enough to say that the judges formulated the fore-going rule as containing the issue which should be submitted to the jury in such cases.[51]
now, with that commendable reverence for judicial utterance which is so characteristic of the english nation, and is so conspicuously absent in[pg 355] our own country, it was assumed until recently that this solemn pronunciamento was the last word on the question of criminal responsibility and settled the matter once and forever. barristers and legislators did not trouble themselves particularly over the fact that in 1843 the study of mental disease was in its infancy, and judges, including those of england, probably knew even less about the subject than they do now. in 1843 it was supposed that insanity, save of the sort that was obviously maniacal, necessitated "delusions," and unless a man had these delusions no one regarded him as insane. in the words of a certain well-known judge:
"the true criterion, the true test of the absence or presence of insanity, i take to be the absence or presence of what, used in a certain sense of it, is comprisable in a single term, namely, delusion.... in short, i look on delusion ... and insanity to be almost, if not altogether, convertible terms."[52]
this in a certain broad sense, probably not intended by the judge who made the statement, is nearly true, but, unfortunately, is not entirely so.
[pg 356]
the dense ignorance surrounding mental disease and the barbarous treatment of the insane within a century are facts familiar to everybody. lunatics were supposed to be afflicted with demons or devils which took possession of them as retribution for their sins, and in addition to the hopelessly or maniacally insane, medical science recognized only a so-called "partial" or delusionary insanity. to-day it would be regarded about as comprehensive to relate all mental diseases to the old-fashioned "delusion" as to regard as insane only those who frothed at the mouth.
but the particular individual out of whose case in 1843 arose the rule that is in 1908 applied to all defendants indiscriminately was the victim of a clearly defined insane delusion, and the four questions answered by the judges of england relate only to persons who are "afflicted with insane delusions in respect to one or more particular subjects or persons." nothing is said about insane persons without delusions, or about persons with general delusions, and the judges limit their answers even further by making them apply "to those persons who labor under such partial delusion only and are not in other respects insane"—a medical impossibility.
modern authorities agree that a man cannot have insane delusions and not be in other respects insane, for it is mental derangement which is the cause of the delusion.
in the first place, therefore, a fundamental conception of the judges in answering the questions was probably fallacious, and in the second, although the test they offered was distinctly limited to[pg 357] persons "afflicted with insane delusions," it has ever since been applied to all insane persons irrespective of their symptoms.
finally, whether the judges knew anything about insanity or not, and whether in their answers they weighed their words very carefully or not, the test as they laid it down is by no means clear from a medical or even legal point of view.
was the accused laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or not to know that it was wrong? what did these judges mean by know? what does the reader mean by know? what does the ordinary juryman mean by it?
we are left in doubt as to whether the word should be given, as justice stephens contended it should be, a very broad and liberal interpretation such as "able to judge calmly and reasonably of the moral or legal character of a proposed action,"[53] or a limited and qualified one. there are all grades and degrees of "knowledge," and it is more than probable that there is a state of mind which i have heard an astute expert call upon the witness stand "an insane knowledge," and equally obvious that there may be "imperfect" or "incomplete knowledge," where the victim sees "through a glass darkly." certainly it seems far from fair to interpret the test of responsibility to cover a condition where the accused may have had a hazy or dream-like realization that his act was technically contrary to the law, and even more dangerous to make it exclude one who was simply unable to "judge calmly and reasonably" of his proposed action, a doctrine[pg 358] which could almost be invoked by any one who committed homicide in a state of anger.
ordinarily the word is not defined at all and the befuddled juryman is left to his own devices in determining what significance he shall attach not only to this word but to the test as a whole.
an equally ambiguous term is the word "wrong." the judges made no attempt to define it in 1843, and it has been variously interpreted ever since. now it may mean "contrary to the dictates of conscience" or, as it is usually construed, "contrary to the law of the land"—and exactly what it means may make a great difference to the accused on trial. if the defendant thinks that god has directed him to kill a wicked man, he may know that such an act will not only be contrary to law, but also in opposition to the moral sense of the community as a whole, and yet he may believe that it is his conscientious duty to take life. in the case of hadfield, who deliberately fired at george iii in order to be hung, the defendant believed himself to be the lord jesus christ, and that only by so doing could the world be saved. applying the legal test and translating the word "wrong" as contrary to the common morality of the community wherein he resided or contrary to law, hadfield ought to have achieved his object and been given death upon the scaffold instead of being clapped, as he was, into a lunatic asylum.
on the other hand, if the word "wrong" is judicially interpreted to mean "contrary to the dictates of conscience," it would seem to be given an elasticity which would invite inevitable confusion as well as abuse.
[pg 359]
moreover, the test in question takes no cognizance of persons who have no power of control. the law of new york and most of the states does not recognize "irresistible impulses," but it should admit the medical fact that there are persons who, through no fault of their own, are born practically without any inhibitory capacity whatever, and that there are others whose control has been so weakened, through accident or disease, as to render them morally irresponsible,—the so-called psychopathic inferiors.
most of us are only too familiar with the state of a person just falling under the influence of an anesthetic, when all the senses seem supernaturally acute, the reasoning powers are active and unimpaired, and the patient is convinced that he can do as he wills, whereas, in reality, he says and does things which later on seem impossible in their absurdity. such a condition is equally possible to the victim of mental disease, where the knowledge of right and wrong has no real relevancy.
the test of irresponsibility as defined by law is hopelessly inadequate, judged by present medical knowledge. there is no longer any pretence that a perception of the nature and quality of an act or that it is wrong or right is conclusive of the actual insanity of a particular accused. in a recent murder case a distinguished alienist, testifying for the prosecution, admitted that over seventy per cent. of the patients under his treatment, all of whom he regarded as insane and irresponsible, knew what they were doing and could distinguish right from wrong.
countless attempts have been made to reconcile[pg 360] this obvious anachronism with justice and modern knowledge, but always without success, and courts have wriggled hard in their efforts to make the test adequate to the particular cases which they have been trying, but only with the result of hopelessly confounding the decisions.
but, however it is construed, the test as laid down in 1843 is insufficient in 1908. medical science has marched on with giant strides, while the law, so far as this subject is concerned, has never progressed at all. it is no longer possible to determine mental responsibility by any such artificial rule as that given by the judges to the lords in mcnaughten's case, and which juries are supposed to apply in the courts of to-day. i say "supposed," for juries do not apply it, and the reason is simple enough—you cannot expect a juryman of intelligence to follow a doctrine of law which he instinctively feels to be crude and which he knows is arbitrarily applied.
no juryman believes himself capable of successfully analyzing a prisoner's past mental condition, and he is apt to suspect that, however sincere the experts on either side may appear, their opinions may be even less definite than the terms in which they are expressed. the spectacle of an equal number of intellectual-looking gentlemen, all using good english and all wearing clean linen, reaching diametrically opposite conclusions on precisely the same facts, is calculated to fill the well-intentioned juror with distrust. painful as it is to record the fact, juries are sometimes almost as sceptical in regard to doctors as they always are in regard to lawyers.
[pg 361]
the usual effect of the expert testimony on one side is to neutralize that on the other, for there is no practical way for the jury to distinguish between experts, since the foolish ones generally look as learned as the wise ones. the result is hopeless confusion on the part of the juryman, an inclination to "throw it all out," and a resort to other testimony to help him out of his difficulty. of course he has no individual way of telling whether the defendant "knew right from wrong," whatever that may mean, and so the ultimate test that he applies is apt to be whether or not the defendant is really "queer," "nutty" or "bughouse," or some other equally intelligible equivalent for "medically insane."
the unfortunate consequence is that there is so general and growing a scepticism about the plea of insanity, entirely apart from its actual merits, that it is difficult in ordinary cases, whatever the jurors may think or say in regard to the matter, to secure twelve men who will give the defence fair consideration at the outset.
this is manifest in frequent expressions from talesmen such as: "i think the defence of insanity is played out," or "i believe everybody is a little insane, anyhow" (very popular and regarded by jurymen as witty), or "well, i have an idea that when a fellow can't cook up any other defence he claims to be insane."
the result is a rather paradoxical situation: the attitude of the ordinary jury in a homicide case, where the defence of insanity is interposed, is usually at the outset one of distrust, and their impulse is to brush the claim aside. this tendency is[pg 362] strengthened by the legal presumption, which the prosecutor invariably calls to their attention, that the defendant is sane. every expert who has testified for the defence in the ordinary "knock down and drag out" homicide case must have felt with the prisoner's attorneys, that it was "up to them" not so much to create a doubt of the defendant's sanity as to prove that he was insane, if they expected consideration from the jury.
now let us assume that the defence is meritorious and that the prisoner's experts have created a favorable impression. let us go even further and assume that they have generated a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to the defendant's responsibility at the time he committed the offence. what generally occurs? not, as one would suppose, an acquittal, but, in nine cases out of ten, a conviction in a lower degree.
the only usual result of an honest claim of irresponsibility on the ground of insanity is to lead the jury to reduce the grade of the offence from murder in the first, entailing the death penalty, to murder in the second degree. the jury have no intention of "taking the chance" involved in turning the man loose on the community and their minds are filled with the predominating fact that a human being has been killed. they have an idea that it is as easy to get "sworn out" of a lunatic asylum as they suppose it is to get "sworn into" one, and they know that if the prisoner is found to be insane when sent to state's prison he will be transferred elsewhere. they, therefore, as a rule, waste little time upon the question of how far the defendant was irresponsible within the legal definition when[pg 363] he committed the deed, but convict him "on general principles," trusting the prison officials to remedy any possible injustice. the jury in such cases ignore the law and decline either to acquit or to convict in accordance with the test. their action becomes rather that of a lay commission condemning the prisoner to hard labor for life on the ground that he is medically insane.
assuming that the jury take the defence seriously, there is only one class of cases where, in the writer's opinion, they follow the legal test as laid down by the court—that is to say, in cases of extreme brutality. here they hold the prisoner to the letter of the law, and the more abhorrent the crime (even where its nature might indicate to a physician that the accused was the victim of some sort of mania) the less likely they are to acquit. the writer has prosecuted perhaps a dozen homicide and other cases where the defence was insanity. in his own experience he has known of no acquittal. in several instances the defendants were undoubtedly insane, but, strictly speaking, probably vaguely knew the nature and quality of their acts and that they were wrong. in a few of these the juries convicted of murder in the first degree because the circumstances surrounding the homicides were so brutal that the harshness of the technical doctrine they were required to apply was overshadowed in their minds by their horror of the act itself. in other cases, where either the accused appeared obviously abnormal as he sat at the bar of justice, or the details of the crime were less abhorrent, they convicted of murder in the second degree in accordance with the reasoning set forth in the fore-going para[pg 364]graph. the writer seriously advances the suggestion that the more the brutality of a homicide indicates mental derangement the less chance the defendant has to secure an acquittal upon the plea of insanity.
and this leads us to that increasingly large body of cases where the usual scepticism of the jury in regard to such defences is counterbalanced by some real or imaginary element of sympathy. in cities like new york, where the jury system is seen at its very best, where the statistics show seventy per cent. of convictions by verdict for the year 1907, and where the sentiment of the community is against the invocation of any law supposedly higher than that of the state, our talesmen are unwilling to condone homicide or to act as self-constituted pardoning bodies, for they know that an obviously lawless verdict will bring down upon them the censure of the public and the press. this is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that in new york county a higher percentage of women are convicted of homicide than of men.
but the plea of insanity, with its vague test of responsibility, whose terms the juryman may construe for himself (or which his fellow-jurors may construe for him) offers an unlimited and fertile field for the "reasonable" doubt and an easy excuse for the conscientious talesman who wants to acquit if he can. juries take little stock in irresistible impulses and emotional or temporary insanity save as a cloak to cover an unrighteous acquittal.
in no other class of cases does "luck" play so large a part in the final disposition of the prisoner. a jury is quite as likely to send an insane man to the[pg 365] electric chair as to acquit a defendant who is fully responsible for his crime.
to recapitulate from the writer's experience:
(1) the ordinary juror tends to be sceptical as to the good faith of the defence of insanity.
(2) when once this distrust is removed by honest evidence on the part of the defence, he usually declines to follow the legal test as laid down by the court on the general theory that any one but an idiot or a maniac has some knowledge of what he is doing and whether it is right or wrong.
(3) he applies the strict legal test only in cases of extreme brutality.
(4) in all other cases he follows the medical rather than the legal test, but instead of acquitting the accused on account of his medical irresponsibility, merely convicts in a lower degree.
the following deductions may also fairly be made from observation:
(1) that the present legal test for criminal responsibility is admittedly vague and inadequate, affording great opportunity for divergent expert testimony and a readily availed of excuse for the arbitrary and sentimental actions of juries, to which is largely due the distrust prevailing of the claim of insanity when interposed as a defence to crime.
(2) that expert medical testimony in such cases is largely discounted by the layman.
(3) that in no class of cases are the verdicts of jurors so apt to be influenced solely by emotion and prejudice, or to be guided less by the law as laid down by the court.
(4) that a new definition of criminal responsi[pg 366]bility is necessary, based upon present knowledge of mental disease and its causes.
(5) lastly, that, as whatever definition may be adopted will inevitably be difficult of application by an untutored lay jury, our procedure should be so amended that they may be relieved wherever possible of a task sufficiently difficult for even the most experienced and expert alienists.
a classification of the different forms of insanity, based upon its causes to which the case of any particular accused might be relegated, such as has recently been urged by a distinguished young neurologist, would not, with a few exceptions, assist us in determining his responsibility. it would be easy to say then, as now, that lunatics or maniacs should not be held responsible for their acts, but we should be left where we are at present in regard to all those shadowy cases where the accused had insane, incomplete or imperfect knowledge of what he was doing. it would be ridiculous, for example, to lay down a general rule that no person suffering from hysterical insanity should be punished for his acts. yet, even so, such a classification would instantly remedy that anachronism in our present law which refuses to recognize as irresponsible those born without power to control their emotions—the psychopathic inferiors of science, and the real victims of dementia pr?cox.
of course, if the insanity under which the defendant labors bears no relation to or connection with the deed for which he is on trial, there would logically be no reason why his insanity on other subjects should be any defence to his crime. for[pg 367] example, there is the well-known case of the harvard professor who was apparently sane on all other matters, yet believed himself to be possessed of glass legs. had this man in wanton anger struck and killed another, his "glass leg" delusion could not logically have availed him. if, however, he had struck and killed one who he believed was going to shatter his legs it might have been important. the illustration is clear enough, but its application probably involves a mistaken premise. if he thought he had glass legs his mind was undoubtedly deranged—whether enough or not enough to constitute him irresponsible or beyond the effect of penal discipline might be a difficult question. the generally accepted doctrine is, that if a man has a delusion concerning something, which if actually existing as he believed it to be would be no excuse for his committing the criminal act, he is responsible and liable to punishment; but, as bishop well says:
"this branch of the doctrine should be cautiously received; for delusion of any kind is strongly indicative of a generally diseased mind."
the new test to determine responsibility will recognize, as does the law of germany, that there can be no criminal act where the free determination of the will is excluded by disease, and that the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong is inconclusive. it may perhaps have to take a general form, leaving it to a lay, expert, or a mixed lay-and-expert jury to say merely whether the accused had a disease of the mind of a type recognized by science, and whether the alleged criminal act was of such a character as would naturally flow from that type of insanity, in which case it would seem[pg 368] obviously just to regard the defendant as partially irresponsible, and perhaps entirely so. possibly the practical needs of the moment might be met by permitting such a jury to determine whether the defendant had such a knowledge of the wrongful nature and consequences of his act and such a control over his will as to be a proper subject of punishment.[54] this would require the jury to find that the defendant had some knowledge of right and wrong and the power to choose between them. in any event, to render the accused entirely irresponsible, his act should arise out of and be caused solely by the diseased condition of his mind. the law, while asserting the responsibility of many insane people, should recognize "partial" responsibility as well.
the reader may feel that little after all would be gained, but he will observe that at any rate such a test, however imperfect, would permit juries to do lawfully that which they now do by violating their oaths. the writer believes that the best concrete test yet formulated and applied by any court is that laid down in parsons vs. the state of alabama (81 ala., 577):
"1. was the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, as matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to be either idiotic, or otherwise insane?
"2. if such be the case, did he know right from wrong as applied to the particular act in question? if he did not have such knowledge, he is not legally responsible.
"3. if he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur:
"(1) if, by reason of the duress of such mental disease,[pg 369] he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed.
"(2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely."
but whatever modification in the present test of criminal responsibility is adopted, there must come an equally, if not even more important, reform in the procedure in insanity cases, which to-day is as cumbersome and out of date as the law itself. as things stand now in new york and most other jurisdictions there are no adequate means open to the state to find out the actual present or past mental condition of the defendant until the trial itself, and ofttimes not even then.
in new york, in cases like thaw's, the accused, while fully intending to interpose the defense of insanity (which he is now permitted to do simply under the general plea of "not guilty") may not only conceal the fact until the trial, but may likewise successfully block every effort of the authorities to examine him and find out his present mental condition. he may thus keep it out of the power of the district attorney to secure the facts upon which to move for a commission to determine whether or not he ought to be in an insane asylum or is a fit subject for trial, and at the same time prevent the prosecutor from obtaining any evidence through direct medical observation by which to meet the claim, which may be "sprung" suddenly upon him later at the trial, that the defendant was irresponsible.
in order that this may be clearly understood by the reader he should fully appreciate the distinction[pg 370] between (1) the claim on the part of an accused that he is at present insane, and for that reason should not be either tried or punished for his alleged offence, and (2) the defence that he was (irrespective of his present mental condition) insane within the legal definition of irresponsibility at the time he committed it. no person who is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or of consulting with counsel and preparing his defence can be placed on trial at all, or, if already on trial, can continue to be tried, and if a defendant "appears to the court to be insane," the judge may appoint a commission to examine him and report as to his present condition. this may be done upon the application either of the state or of the accused through his counsel.
it was such a commission to determine the accused's present mental condition that district attorney jerome, upon the basis of the evidence introduced by the defence, applied for and secured during the first trial of harry k. thaw. the commission reported that thaw was sane enough to be tried and the court then proceeded with the original case for the purpose of allowing the jury to say whether he knew the nature and quality of his act and that it was wrong when he shot and killed white.
this was a totally distinct proceeding from the interposition of the defence that the accused was irresponsible when he committed the crime charged against him and was not inconsistent with it.
now supposing that the commission had reported that thaw was insane at the time of examination and not a fit subject for trial, but, on the contrary, ought to be confined in an insane asylum, the dis[pg 371]trict attorney would have spent some twenty odd thousand dollars and a year's time of one or more of his assistants in fruitless preparation. yet, as the law stands on the books to-day in new york, there is no adequate way for the prosecution to find out whether this enormous expenditure of time or money is necessary or not, for it cannot compel the defendant to submit either to a physical or mental examination. to do so has been held to be a violation of his constitutional rights and equivalent to compelling him to give evidence against himself.
thus when thaw came to the bar at his first trial the state had never had any opportunity, through an examination by its physicians, to learn what his present condition was or past mental condition had been. the accused, on the other hand, had had over six months to prepare his defence and had fully availed himself of the time to submit to the most exhaustive examinations on the part of his own experts. the defendant's physicians came to court brimming with facts to which they could testify; while the state's experts had only the barren opportunity for determining the defendant's condition afforded by observing him daily in the court room and hearing what thaw's own doctors claimed that they had discovered. there was no chance to rebut anything which the latter alleged that they had observed, and their testimony, save in so far as it was inconsistent or contradictory in itself, remained irrefutable.
there is probably no procedure which would be held constitutional whereby a compulsory examination of the accused could be had upon the mere application of the prosecuting authorities; but as[pg 372] a commission may generally be appointed at any time after an accused has been indicted if he "appears" to the court to be "insane," and as it is usually within the power of the district attorney where such is the case to bring sufficient evidence of it to the attention of the court before the prisoner is brought to trial, little time is actually lost and justice is rarely defeated except in those cases (such as thaw's) where an attempt is to be made to prove the accused insane at the time of the alleged crime although sane at the time of trial. even here it would be the simplest thing in the world to remedy the difficulty and the proper legal steps in all jurisdictions should be taken immediately.
the two chief objects of such reforms should be, first, to relieve the ordinary jury in as many cases as possible from the necessity of passing upon the delicate issue of a defendant's mental condition at a previous time, and second, where this may not be avoided, to make their task as easy as possible by providing (a) a more scientific and definite test of legal responsibility and (b) an opportunity for adequate examination of defendants availing themselves of this defence.
this last and most practical reform can be easily secured by a slight alteration in the new york code of criminal procedure, which already provides both for the entering of the specific plea of insanity and for the introduction of the defence and the proof of insanity under the general plea of "not guilty." at present the defendant has his choice of openly announcing or of concealing until the trial his intention of claiming that he was insane and so irresponsible for his crime. this is an advantage the results[pg 373] of which were probably not fully contemplated by the legislature, and one to which an accused has no fair claim.
fortunately, in the same section of the code (658), which provides that the court may appoint a commission to inquire into the sanity of a defendant at the time of his trial, there exists another provision, hitherto little noticed, that
"when a defendant pleads insanity, as prescribed in section 336, the court in which the indictment is pending, instead of proceeding with the trial of the indictment, may appoint a commission of not more than three disinterested persons to examine him and report to the court as to his insanity at the time of the commission of the crime."
if a defendant intends to prove himself irresponsible for his offence, why should he not be compelled to enter a specific plea to that effect? once he has entered that plea, the law as it stands just quoted will do the rest. no reason has been brought to the attention of the writer why the admission of any evidence upon the defendant's trial tending to show that he was mentally irresponsible at the time of committing the crime should not be made contingent upon the defence of insanity having been specifically pleaded either at the time of his arraignment or later by substitution for or in conjunction with the plea of "not guilty." this would deprive him of no constitutional right whatever. there is no legal necessity of permitting an accused to prove insanity under a general answer of "not guilty." then upon his own plea that he had been insane he could instantly be committed to some place of observation where a permanent medical board of[pg 374] inquiry could be given full opportunity to examine him and study his case with a view to determining his present and past mental condition. he would still have in prospect his regular jury trial, but if this board found him at the present time insane, the court could immediately commit him to an asylum pending recovery, precisely as under the present procedure, while if they found him sane at the present time, but reported that, in their opinion (whatever test, "medical" or "legal," they might have applied), he was irresponsible at the time he committed the crime, it is unlikely that any prosecutor would bring him to trial. if, however, they reported that he was not only sane, but had been sane at the time of his crime, it is probable that any proposed defence of insanity would be abandoned, while if it was still urged by the accused, the opinion of such a board would carry far greater weight at the ultimate trial of the case than the individual opinions of experts retained and paid by either side for that particular occasion only, and having had only a comparatively limited opportunity for examination. at any rate, if the court called in the services of such a board of medical judges to assist as amici curi? in determining the defendant's condition, while their opinion would not be conclusive upon the jury, it would at least do away with the present lamentable necessity of learned men answering "yes" or "no" to a hypothetical question fifty thousand words long, when the most superficial personal examination of the accused would settle the matter definitely in their minds. such a procedure is in general use in germany and other continental countries, and is likewise substan[pg 375]tially followed in massachusetts, maine, vermont, and new hampshire.[55]
there is good reason to hope that we may soon see in all the states adequate provision for preliminary examination upon the plea of insanity, and a new test of criminal responsibility consistent with humanity and modern medical knowledge. even then, although murderers who indulge in popular crime will probably be acquitted on the ground of insanity, we shall at least be spared the melancholy spectacle of juries arbitrarily committing feeble-minded persons charged with homicide to imprisonment at hard labor for life, and in a large measure do away with the present unedifying exhibition of two groups of hostile experts, each interpreting an archaic and inadequate test of criminal responsibility in his own particular way, and each conscientiously able to reach a diametrically opposite conclusion upon precisely the same facts.
