conspiracy in the army—brigantines launched—muster of forces—execution of xicotencatl—march of the army—beginning of the siege

1521

at the very time when cortés was occupied with reconnoitring the valley, preparatory to his siege of the capital, a busy faction in castile was laboring to subvert his authority and defeat his plans of conquest altogether. the fame of his brilliant exploits had spread not only through the isles, but to spain and many parts of europe, where a general admiration was felt for the invincible energy of the man who with his single arm, as it were, could so long maintain a contest with the powerful indian empire. the absence of the spanish monarch from his dominions, and the troubles of the country, can alone explain the supine indifference shown by the government to the prosecution of this great enterprise. to the same causes it may be ascribed that no action was had in regard to the suits of velasquez and narvaez, backed as they were by so potent an advocate as bishop fonseca, president of the council of the indies. the reins of government had fallen into

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adrian of utrecht (pope adrian vi.)

goupil & co. paris

{355}

the hands of adrian of utrecht, charles’s preceptor, and afterwards pope,—a man of learning, and not without sagacity, but slow and timid in his policy, and altogether incapable of that decisive action which suited the bold genius of his predecessor, cardinal ximenes.

in the spring of 1521, however, a number of ordinances passed the council of the indies, which threatened an important innovation in the affairs of new spain. it was decreed that the royal audience of hispaniola should abandon the proceedings already instituted against narvaez for his treatment of the commissioner ayllon; that that unfortunate commander should be released from his confinement at vera cruz; and that an arbitrator should be sent to mexico with authority to investigate the affairs and conduct of cortés, and to render ample justice to the governor of cuba. there were not wanting persons at court who looked with dissatisfaction on these proceedings, as an unworthy requital of the services of cortés, and who thought the present moment, at any rate, not the most suitable for taking measures which might discourage the general and perhaps render him desperate. but the arrogant temper of the bishop of burgos overruled all objections; and the ordinances, having been approved by the regency, were signed by that body, april 11, 1521. a person named tápia, one of the functionaries of the audience at st. domingo, was selected as the new commissioner to be despatched to vera cruz. fortunately, circumstances occurred which postponed the execution of the design for the present, and{356} permitted cortés to go forward unmolested in his career of conquest.[391]

but, while thus allowed to remain, for the present at least, in possession of authority, he was assailed by a danger nearer home, which menaced not only his authority, but his life. this was a conspiracy in the army, of a more dark and dangerous character than any hitherto formed there. it was set on foot by a common soldier, named antonio villafa?a, a native of old castile, of whom nothing is known but his share in this transaction. he was one of the troop of narvaez,—that leaven of disaffection, which had remained with the army, swelling with discontent on every light occasion, and ready at all times to rise into mutiny. they had voluntarily continued in the service after the secession of their comrades at tlascala; but it was from the same mercenary hopes with which they had originally embarked in the expedition,—and in these they were destined still to be disappointed. they had little of the true spirit of adventure which distinguished the old companions of cortés; and they found the barren laurels of victory but a sorry recompense for all their toils and sufferings.

with these men were joined others, who had causes of personal disgust with the general; and others, again, who looked with distrust on the result of the war. the gloomy fate of their countrymen who had fallen into the enemy’s hands filled them with dismay. they felt themselves the vic{357}tims of a chimerical spirit in their leader, who, with such inadequate means, was urging to extremity so ferocious and formidable a foe; and they shrank with something like apprehension from thus pursuing the enemy into his own haunts, where he would gather tenfold energy from despair.

these men would have willingly abandoned the enterprise and returned to cuba; but how could they do it? cortés had control over the whole route from the city to the sea-coast; and not a vessel could leave its port without his warrant. even if he were put out of the way, there were others, his principal officers, ready to step into his place and avenge the death of their commander. it was necessary to embrace these, also, in the scheme of destruction; and it was proposed, therefore, together with cortés, to assassinate sandoval, olid, alvarado, and two or three others most devoted to his interests. the conspirators would then raise the cry of liberty, and doubted not that they should be joined by the greater part of the army, or enough, at least, to enable them to work their own pleasure. they proposed to offer the command, on cortés’ death, to francisco verdugo, a brother-in-law of velasquez. he was an honorable cavalier, and not privy to their design. but they had little doubt that he would acquiesce in the command thus in a manner forced upon him, and this would secure them the protection of the governor of cuba, who, indeed, from his own hatred of cortés, would be disposed to look with a lenient eye on their proceedings.{358}

the conspirators even went so far as to appoint the subordinate officers, an alguacil mayor in place of sandoval, a quartermaster-general to succeed olid, and some others.[392] the time fixed for the execution of the plot was soon after the return of cortés from his expedition. a parcel, pretended to have come by a fresh arrival from castile, was to be presented to him while at table, and, when he was engaged in breaking open the letters, the conspirators were to fall on him and his officers and despatch them with their poniards. such was the iniquitous scheme devised for the destruction of cortés and the expedition. but a conspiracy, to be successful, especially when numbers are concerned, should allow but little time to elapse between its conception and its execution.

on the day previous to that appointed for the perpetration of the deed, one of the party, feeling a natural compunction at the commission of the crime, went to the general’s quarters and solicited a private interview with him. he threw himself at his commander’s feet, and revealed all the particulars relating to the conspiracy, adding that in villafa?a’s possession a paper would be found, containing the names of his accomplices. cortés, thunderstruck at the disclosure, lost not a moment in profiting by it. he sent for alvarado, sandoval, and one or two other officers marked out by the conspirator, and, after communicating the affair to them, went at once with{359} them to villafa?a’s quarters, attended by four alguacils.

they found him in conference with three or four friends, who were instantly taken from the apartment and placed in custody. villafa?a, confounded at this sudden apparition of his commander, had barely time to snatch a paper, containing the signatures of the confederates, from his bosom, and attempt to swallow it. but cortés arrested his arm, and seized the paper. as he glanced his eye rapidly over the fatal list, he was much moved at finding there the names of more than one who had some claim to consideration in the army. he tore the scroll in pieces, and ordered villafa?a to be taken into custody. he was immediately tried by a military court hastily got together, at which the general himself presided. there seems to have been no doubt of the man’s guilt. he was condemned to death, and, after allowing him time for confession and absolution, the sentence was executed by hanging him from the window of his own quarters.[393]

those ignorant of the affair were astonished at the spectacle; and the remaining conspirators were filled with consternation when they saw that their plot was detected, and anticipated a similar fate for themselves. but they were mistaken. cortés pursued the matter no further. a little reflection convinced him that to do so would involve him in the most disagreeable, and even dangerous, per{360}plexities. and, however much the parties implicated in so foul a deed might deserve death, he could ill afford the loss even of the guilty, with his present limited numbers. he resolved, therefore, to content himself with the punishment of the ringleader.

he called his troops together, and briefly explained to them the nature of the crime for which villafa?a had suffered. he had made no confession, he said, and the guilty secret had perished with him. he then expressed his sorrow that any should have been found in their ranks capable of so base an act, and stated his own unconsciousness of having wronged any individual among them; but, if he had done so, he invited them frankly to declare it, as he was most anxious to afford them all the redress in his power.[394] but there was no one of his audience, whatever might be his grievances, who cared to enter his complaint at such a moment; least of all were the conspirators willing to do so, for they were too happy at having, as they fancied, escaped detection, to stand forward now in the ranks of the malecontents. the affair passed off, therefore, without further consequences.

the conduct of cortés in this delicate conjuncture shows great coolness, and knowledge of human nature. had he suffered his detection, or even his suspicion, of the guilty parties to take air, it would have placed him in hostile relations with them for the rest of his life. it was a disclosure of this kind, in the early part of louis the elevent{361}h’s reign, to which many of the troubles of his later years were attributed.[395] the mask once torn away, there is no longer occasion to consult even appearances. the door seems to be closed against reform. the alienation, which might have been changed by circumstances or conciliated by kindness, settles into a deep and deadly rancor. and cortés would have been surrounded by enemies in his own camp more implacable than those in the camp of the aztecs.

as it was, the guilty soldiers had suffered too serious apprehensions to place their lives hastily in a similar jeopardy. they strove, on the contrary, by demonstrations of loyalty, and the assiduous discharge of their duties, to turn away suspicion from themselves. cortes, on his part, was careful to preserve his natural demeanor, equally removed from distrust and—what was perhaps more difficult—that studied courtesy which intimates, quite as plainly, suspicion of the party who is the object of it. to do this required no little address. yet he did not forget the past. he had, it is true, destroyed the scroll containing the list of the conspirators. but the man that has once learned the names of those who have conspired against his life has no need of a written record to keep them fresh in his memory. cortés kept his eye on all their movements, and took care to place them in no{362} situation, afterwards, where they could do him injury.[396]

this attempt on the life of their commander excited a strong sensation in the army, with whom his many dazzling qualities and brilliant military talents had made him a general favorite. they were anxious to testify their reprobation of so foul a deed, coming from their own body, and they felt the necessity of taking some effectual measures for watching over the safety of one with whom their own destinies, as well as the fate of the enterprise, were so intimately connected. it was arranged, therefore, that he should be provided with a guard of soldiers, who were placed under the direction of a trusty cavalier named antonio de qui?ones. they constituted the general’s body-guard during the rest of the campaign, watching over him day and night, and protecting him from domestic treason no less than from the sword of the enemy.

as was stated at the close of the last chapter, the spaniards, on their return to quarters, found the construction of the brigantines completed, and that they were fully rigged, equipped, and ready for service. the canal, also, after having occupied eight thousand men for nearly two months, was finished.

it was a work of great labor; for it extended half a league in length, was twelve feet wide, and as many deep. the sides were strengthened by palisades of wood, or solid masonry. at intervals, dams and locks were constructed, and part of the{363} opening was through the hard rock. by this avenue the brigantines might now be safely introduced on the lake.[397]

cortés was resolved that so auspicious an event should be celebrated with due solemnity. on the 28th of april, the troops were drawn up under arms, and the whole population of tezcuco assembled to witness the ceremony. mass was performed, and every man in the army, together with the general, confessed and received the sacrament. prayers were offered up by father olmedo, and a benediction invoked on the little navy, the first—worthy of the name—ever launched on american waters.[398] the signal was given by the firing of a cannon, when the vessels, dropping down the canal, one after another, reached the lake in good order; and, as they emerged on its ample bosom, with music sounding, and the royal ensign of castile proudly floating from their masts, a shout of admiration arose from the countless multitudes of spectators, which mingled with the roar of artillery and musketry from the vessels and the shore![399] it was a novel spectacle to the simple{364} natives; and they gazed with wonder on the gallant ships, which, fluttering like sea-birds on their snowy pinions, bounded lightly over the waters, as if rejoicing in their element. it touched the stern hearts of the conquerors with a glow of rapture, and, as they felt that heaven had blessed their undertaking, they broke forth, by general accord, into the noble anthem of the te deum. but there was no one of that vast multitude for whom the sight had deeper interest than their commander. for he looked on it as the work, in a manner, of his own hands; and his bosom swelled with exultation, as he felt he was now possessed of a power strong enough to command the lake, and to shake the haughty towers of tenochtitlan.[400]

the general’s next step was to muster his forces in the great square of the capital. he found they amounted to eighty-seven horse, and eight hundred and eighteen foot, of which one hundred and eighteen were arquebusiers and crossbowmen. he had three large field-pieces of iron, and fifteen lighter guns or falconets of brass.[401] the heavier{365} cannon had been transported from vera cruz to tezcuco, a little while before, by the faithful tlascalans. he was well supplied with shot and balls, with about ten hundred-weight of powder, and fifty thousand copper-headed arrows, made after a pattern furnished by him to the natives.[402] the number and appointments of the army much exceeded what they had been at any time since the flight from mexico, and showed the good effects of the late arrivals from the islands. indeed, taking the fleet into the account, cortés had never before been in so good a condition for carrying on his operations. three hundred of the men were sent to man the vessels, thirteen, or rather twelve, in number, one of the smallest having been found, on trial, too dull a sailer to be of service. half of the crews were required to navigate the ships. there was some difficulty in finding hands for this, as the men were averse to the employment. cortés selected those who came from palos, moguer, and other maritime towns, and, notwithstanding their frequent claims of exemption, as hidalgos, from this menial occupation, he pressed them into the service.[403] each vessel mounted a piece of heavy ordnance, and was placed under an officer of respectability, to whom cortés gave a general code of in{366}structions for the government of the little navy, of which he proposed to take the command in person.

he had already sent to his indian confederates, announcing his purpose of immediately laying siege to mexico, and called on them to furnish their promised levies within the space of ten days at furthest. the tlascalans he ordered to join him in tezcuco; the others were to assemble at chalco, a more convenient place of rendezvous for the operations in the southern quarter of the valley. the tlascalans arrived within the time prescribed, led by the younger xicotencatl, supported by chichemecatl, the same doughty warrior who had convoyed the brigantines to tezcuco. they came fifty thousand strong, according to cortés,[404] making a brilliant show with their military finery, and marching proudly forward under the great national banner, emblazoned with a spread eagle, the arms of the republic.[405] with as blithe and manly a step as if they were going to the battle-ground, they defiled through the gates of the capital, making its walls ring with the friendly shouts of “castile and tlascala.{367}”

the observations which cortes had made in his late tour of reconnoissance had determined him to begin the siege by distributing his forces into three separate camps, which he proposed to establish at the extremities of the principal causeways. by this arrangement the troops would be enabled to move in concert on the capital, and be in the best position to intercept its supplies from the surrounding country. the first of these points was tacuba, commanding the fatal causeway of the noche triste. this was assigned to pedro de alvarado, with a force consisting, according to cortés’ own statement, of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-eight spanish infantry, and five-and-twenty thousand tlascalans. cristóval de olid had command of the second army, of much the same magnitude, which was to take up its position at cojohuacan, the city, it will be remembered, overlooking the short causeway connected with that of iztapalapan. gonzalo de sandoval had charge of the third division, of equal strength with each of the two preceding, but which was to draw its indian levies from the forces assembled at chalco. this officer was to march on iztapalapan and complete the destruction of that city, begun by cortés soon after his entrance into the valley. it was too formidable a post to remain in the rear of the army. the general intended to support the attack with his brigantines, after which the subsequent movements of sandoval would be determined by circumstances.[406]{368}

having announced his intended dispositions to his officers, the spanish commander called his troops together, and made one of those brief and stirring harangues with which he was wont on great occasions to kindle the hearts of his soldiery. “i have taken the last step,” he said; “i have brought you to the goal for which you have so long panted. a few days will place you before the gates of mexico,—the capital from which you were driven with so much ignominy. but we now go forward under the smiles of providence. does any one doubt it? let him but compare our present condition with that in which we found ourselves not twelve months since, when, broken and dispirited, we sought shelter within the walls of tlascala; nay, with that in which we were but a few months since, when we took up our quarters in tezcuco.[407] since that time our strength has been nearly doubled. we are fighting the battles of the faith, fighting for our honor, for riches, for revenge. i have brought you face to face with your foe. it is for you to do the rest.”[408]

the address of the bold chief was answered by{369} the thundering acclamations of his followers, who declared that every man would do his duty under such a leader; and they only asked to be led against the enemy.[409] cortés then caused the regulations for the army, published at tlascala, to be read again to the troops, with the assurance that they should be enforced to the letter.

it was arranged that the indian forces should precede the spanish by a day’s march, and should halt for their confederates on the borders of the tezcucan territory. a circumstance occurred soon after their departure which gave bad augury for the future. a quarrel had arisen in the camp at tezcuco between a spanish soldier and a tlascalan chief, in which the latter was badly hurt. he was sent back to tlascala, and the matter was hushed up, that it might not reach the ears of the general, who, it was known, would not pass it over lightly. xicotencatl was a near relative of the injured party, and on the first day’s halt he took the opportunity to leave the army, with a number of his followers, and set off for tlascala. other causes are assigned for his desertion.[410] it is certain that from the first he had looked on the expedition with{370} an evil eye, and had predicted that no good would come of it. he came into it with reluctance, as, indeed, he detested the spaniards in his heart.

his partner in the command instantly sent information of the affair to the spanish general, still encamped at tezcuco. cortés, who saw at once the mischievous consequences of this defection at such a time, detached a party of tlascalans and tezcucan indians after the fugitive, with instructions to prevail on him, if possible, to return to his duty. they overtook him on the road, and remonstrated with him on his conduct, contrasting it with that of his countrymen generally, and of his own father in particular, the steady friend of the white men. “so much the worse,” replied the chieftain: “if they had taken my counsel, they would never have become the dupes of the perfidious strangers.”[411] finding their remonstrances received only with anger or contemptuous taunts, the emissaries returned without accomplishing their object.

cortés did not hesitate on the course he was to pursue. “xicotencatl,” he said, “had always been the enemy of the spaniards, first in the field, and since in the council-chamber; openly, or in secret, still the same,—their implacable enemy. there was no use in parleying with the false-hearted indian.” he instantly despatched a small body of horse with an alguacil to arrest the chief wherever{371} he might be found, even though it were in the streets of tlascala, and to bring him back to tezcuco. at the same time, he sent information of xicotencatl’s proceedings to the tlascalan senate, adding that desertion among the spaniards was punished with death.

the emissaries of cortés punctually fulfilled his orders. they arrested the fugitive chief,—whether in tlascala or in its neighborhood is uncertain,—and brought him a prisoner to tezcuco, where a high gallows, erected in the great square, was prepared for his reception. he was instantly led to the place of execution; his sentence and the cause for which he suffered were publicly proclaimed, and the unfortunate cacique expiated his offence by the vile death of a malefactor. his ample property, consisting of lands, slaves, and some gold, was all confiscated to the castilian crown.[412]

thus perished xicotencatl, in the flower of his age,—as dauntless a warrior as ever led an indian{372} army to battle. he was the first chief who successfully resisted the arms of the invaders; and, had the natives of anahuac, generally, been animated with a spirit like his, cortés would probably never have set foot in the capital of montezuma. he was gifted with a clearer insight into the future than his countrymen; for he saw that the european was an enemy far more to be dreaded than the aztec. yet, when he consented to fight under the banner of the white men, he had no right to desert it, and he incurred the penalty prescribed by the code of savage as well as of civilized nations. it is said, indeed, that the tlascalan senate aided in apprehending him, having previously answered cortés that his crime was punishable with death by their own laws.[413] it was a bold act, however, thus to execute him in the midst of his people. for he was a powerful chief, heir to one of the four seigniories of the republic. his chivalrous qualities made him popular, especially with the younger part of his countrymen; and his garments were torn into shreds at his death and distributed as sacred relics among them. still, no resistance was offered to the execution of the sentence, and no commotion followed it. he was the only tlascalan who ever swerved from his loyalty to the spaniards.

according to the plan of operations settled by cortés, sandoval, with his division, was to take a southern direction, while alvarado and olid would make the northern circuit of the lakes. these two{373} cavaliers, after getting possession of tacuba, were to advance to chapoltepec and demolish the great aqueduct there, which supplied mexico with water. on the tenth of may they commenced their march; but at acolman, where they halted for the night, a dispute arose between the soldiers of the two divisions, respecting their quarters. from words they came to blows, and a defiance was even exchanged between the leaders, who entered into the angry feelings of their followers.[414] intelligence of this was soon communicated to cortés, who sent at once to the fiery chiefs, imploring them, by their regard for him and the common cause, to lay aside their differences, which must end in their own ruin and that of the expedition. his remonstrance prevailed, at least, so far as to establish a show of reconciliation between the parties. but olid was not a man to forget, or easily to forgive; and alvarado, though frank and liberal, had an impatient temper much more easily excited than appeased. they were never afterwards friends.[415]

the spaniards met with no opposition on their march. the principal towns were all abandoned{374} by the inhabitants, who had gone to strengthen the garrison of mexico, or taken refuge with their families among the mountains. tacuba was in like manner deserted, and the troops once more established themselves in their old quarters in the lordly city of the tepanecs.[416]

their first undertaking was to cut off the pipes that conducted the water from the royal streams of chapoltepec to feed the numerous tanks and fountains which sparkled in the court-yards of the capital. the aqueduct, partly constructed of brickwork and partly of stone and mortar, was raised on a strong though narrow dike, which transported it across an arm of the lake; and the whole work was one of the most pleasing monuments of mexican civilization. the indians, well aware of its importance, had stationed a large body of troops for its protection. a battle followed, in which both sides suffered considerably, but the spaniards were victorious. a part of the aqueduct was demolished, and during the siege no water found its way again to the capital through this channel.

on the following day the combined forces descended on the fatal causeway, to make themselves masters, if possible, of the nearest bridge. they{375} found the dike covered with a swarm of warriors, as numerous as on the night of their disaster, while the surface of the lake was dark with the multitude of canoes. the intrepid christians strove to advance under a perfect hurricane of missiles from the water and the land, but they made slow progress. barricades thrown across the causeway embarrassed the cavalry and rendered it nearly useless. the sides of the indian boats were fortified with bulwarks, which shielded the crews from the arquebuses and cross-bows; and, when the warriors on the dike were hard pushed by the pikemen, they threw themselves fearlessly into the water, as if it were their native element, and, reappearing along the sides of the dike, shot off their arrows and javelins with fatal execution. after a long and obstinate struggle, the christians were compelled to fall back on their own quarters with disgrace, and—including the allies—with nearly as much damage as they had inflicted on the enemy. olid, disgusted with the result of the engagement, inveighed against his companion as having involved them in it by his wanton temerity, and drew off his forces the next morning to his own station at cojohuacan.

the camps, separated by only two leagues, maintained an easy communication with each other. they found abundant employment in foraging the neighboring country for provisions, and in repelling the active sallies of the enemy; on whom they took their revenge by cutting off his supplies. but their own position was precarious, and they looked with impatience for the arrival of the brigantines{376} under cortés. it was in the latter part of may that olid took up his quarters at cojohuacan; and from that time may be dated the commencement of the siege of mexico.