"myself when young did eagerly frequent
doctor and saint, and heard great argument
about it and about, but evermore
came out by the same door wherein i went."
omar khayyam.
these pages, which have chronicled a variety of small incidents, have hitherto concerned themselves little with the great matters out of which those incidents have arisen. as an opening chapter should lead the reader to expect the considerations that the book contains, so the conclusion should express the opinion he might form from the perusal. when, at an earlier period, i refrained from discussing the question of frontier policy, i declared that its consideration was only postponed until a more propitious moment. that moment now presents itself. there will not be wanting those who will remind me, that in this matter my opinion is not supported by age or experience. to such i shall reply, that if what is written is false or foolish, neither age nor experience should fortify it; and if it is true, it needs no such support. the propositions of euclid would be no less indisputable were they propounded by an infant or an idiot.
the inquirer sees the vast question unfold itself with feelings like those with which the fisherman in the old story watched the genius he had unwittingly released, rise from the bottle in clouds of smoke, which overspread the whole sky. every moment the subject appears not only wider but deeper. when i reflect on the great number of diverse and often conflicting facts which may be assembled under every head—military, economic, political or moral—and consider the accumulations of specialised and technical knowledge necessary for their proper appreciation, i am convinced that to compass the whole is beyond the mind and memory of man. of such a question it is difficult to take broad views, and dangerous to generalise. still less is it possible, as many people appear to imagine, to settle it with a phrase or an epigram. a point is reached where all relation between detail and proportion is lost. it is a picture of such great size that to see it all, it is necessary to stand so far off that neither colours nor figures are distinguishable. by constantly changing the point of view, some true perspective is possible, and even then the conception must be twisted and distorted, by the imperfections of the mental mirror.
sensible of the magnitude of the task, and conscious of my own weakness, i propose to examine in a spirit of cautious inquiry and of tolerance the present "forward policy," and thence to approach the main question, to the answer of which that policy is only a guess.
i must revert to a period when the british power, having conquered the plains of india and subdued its sovereigns, paused at the foot of the himalayas and turned its tireless energy to internal progress and development. the "line of the mountains" formed a frontier as plain and intelligible as that which defines the limits of the sea. to the south lay the british empire in india; to the north were warlike tribes, barbarous, unapproachable, irreclaimable; and far beyond these, lay the other great power of asia.
it was long the wisdom of anglo-indian statesmen to preserve a situation which contained so many elements of finality, and so many guarantees of peace. when the northern savages, impelled by fanaticism or allured by plunder, descended from the mountains and invaded the plains, they were met by equal courage and superior discipline, and driven in disorder to their confines. but this was found to be an inadequate deterrent, and the purely defensive principle had to be modified in favor of that system of punitive expeditions which has been derided as the policy of "butcher and bolt."
gradually, as the circumstances altered, the methods of dealing with them changed. the punitive expeditions had awakened an intense hostility among the tribesmen. the intrigues of russia had for some time been watched with alarm by the indian government. as long as the border could remain a "no-man's land"—as it were a "great gulf fixed"—all was well; but if any power was to be supreme, that power must neither be russia nor afghanistan. ["we shall consider it from the first incumbent upon the government of india to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power."—letter from government of india to the secretary of state, no.49, 28th february, 1879.] the predominance of russian influence in these territories would give them the power to invade india at their discretion, with what chances of success need not be here discussed. the predominance of afghan influence would make the amir master of the situation, and enable him to blackmail the indian government indefinitely. a change of policy, a departure from the old frontier line, presented itself with increasing force to responsible men. to-day we see the evils that have resulted from that change. the dangers that inspired it have been modified.
for some years the opinion in favour of an advance grew steadily among those in power in india. in 1876 a decisive step was taken. roused by the efforts of the amir to obtain the suzerainty of the pathan tribes, lord lytton's government stretched a hand through cashmere towards chitral, and the mehtar of that state became the vassal, nominally of the maharaja of cashmere, but practically of the imperial government. the avowed object was to ultimately secure the effectual command of the passes of the hindu kush. [despatch no.17, 11th june, 1877.] the british ministry, the famous ministry of lord beaconsfield, approved the action and endorsed the policy. again, in 1879, the vice-regal government, in an official despatch, declared their intention of acquiring, "through the ruler of cashmere, the power of making such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the hindu kush." [despatch no.49, 28th february, 1879.] "if," so runs the despatch, "we *extend and by degrees consolidate our influence* [the italics are mine] over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains or within the drainage system of the indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier, which is distinct, intelligible and likely to be respected." [despatch no.49, 28th february, 1879.]
no declaration of policy or intention could have been more explicit. the words to "extend and consolidate our influence" can, when applied to barbarous peoples, have no other meaning than ultimate annexation. thus the scheme of an advance from the plains of india into the mountain region, which had long been maturing in men's minds and which was shaped and outlined by many small emergencies and expedients, was clearly proclaimed. the forward movement had begun. a fresh and powerful impulse was imparted after the termination of lord ripon's viceroyalty. the open aggression which characterised the russian frontier policy of '84 and '85 had been met by a supine apathy and indifference to the interests of the state, which deserved, and which, had the issues been less important, might have received actual punishment. it was natural that his immediate successors should strive to dissociate themselves from the follies and the blunders of those years. the spirit of reaction led to the final abandonment of the venerable policy of non-intervention. instead of the "line of the mountains," it was now maintained that the passes through them must be held. this is the so-called "forward policy." it is a policy which aims at obtaining the frontier—gilgit, chitral, jelalabad, kandahar.
in pursuance of that policy we have been led to build many frontier forts, to construct roads, to annex territories, and to enter upon more intimate relations with the border tribes. the most marked incident in that policy has been the retention of chitral. this act was regarded by the tribesmen as a menace to their independence, and by the priesthood as the prelude to a general annexation. nor were they wrong, for such is the avowed aim of the "forward policy." the result of the retention of chitral has been, as i have already described, that the priesthood, knowing that their authority would be weakened by civilisation, have used their religious influence on the people to foment a general rising.
it is useless to discuss the chitral question independently. if the "forward policy" be justified, then the annexation of chitral, its logical outcome, is also justified. the bye and the main plots stand or fall together.
so far then we have advanced and have been resisted. the "forward policy" has brought an increase of territory, a nearer approach to what is presumably a better frontier line and—war. all this was to have been expected. it may be said of the present system that it precludes the possibility of peace. isolated posts have been formed in the midst of races notoriously passionate, reckless and warlike. they are challenges. when they are assailed by the tribesmen, relieving and punitive expeditions become necessary. all this is the outcome of a recognised policy, and was doubtless foreseen by those who initiated it. what may be called strange is that the forts should be badly constructed—cramped, as the malakand positions; commanded, like chakdara; without flank defences, as at saraghari; without proper garrisons, as in the khyber. this is a side issue and accidental. the rest of the situation has been deliberately created.
the possibility of a great combination among the border tribes was indeed not contemplated. separated by distance, and divided by faction, it was anticipated they could be dealt with in detail. on this point we have been undeceived.
that period of war and disturbance which was the inevitable first consequence of the "forward policy" must in any case have been disturbed and expensive. regarded from an economic standpoint, the trade of the frontier valleys will never pay a shilling in the pound on the military expenditure necessary to preserve order. morally, it is unfortunate for the tribesmen that our spheres of influence clash with their spheres of existence. even on the military question, a purely technical question, as to whether an advanced frontier line is desirable or not, opinion is divided. lord roberts says one thing; mr. morley another.
there is no lack of arguments against the "forward policy." there are many who opposed its initiation. there are many who oppose it now; who think that nothing should have lured the government of india beyond their natural frontier line, and who maintain that it would have been both practical and philosophic had they said: "over all the plains of india will we cast our rule. there we will place our governors and magistrates; our words shall be respected and our laws obeyed. but that region, where the land rises like the waves of a sea, shall serve us as a channel of stormy waters to divide us from our foes and rivals."
but it is futile to engage in the controversies of the past. there are sufficient in the present, and it is with the present we are concerned.
we have crossed the rubicon. in the opinion of all those who know most about the case, the forward movement is now beyond recall. indeed, when the intense hostility of the border tribes, the uncertain attitude of the amir, the possibilities of further russian aggression and the state of feeling in india are considered, it is difficult to dispute this judgment. successive indian administrations have urged, successive english cabinets have admitted, the necessity of finding a definite and a defensible frontier. the old line has been left, and between that line and an advanced line continuous with afghan territory, and south of which all shall be reduced to law and order, there does not appear to be any prospect of a peaceful and permanent settlement.
the responsibility of placing us in this position rests with those who first forsook the old frontier policy of holding the "line of the mountains." the historian of the future, with impartial pen and a more complete knowledge, must pronounce on the wisdom of their act. in the meantime it should be remembered of these great men, that they left their public offices amid the applause and admiration of their contemporaries, and, "in the full tide of successful experiment." nor can so much be said of all those who have assailed them. those who decided, have accepted the responsibility, and have defended their action. but i am inclined to think that the rulers of india, ten years ago or a hundred years ago, were as much the sport of circumstances as their successors are to-day.
let us return to the present and our own affairs. we have embarked on stormy and perilous waters. the strong current of events forbids return. the sooner the farther shore is reached, the sooner will the dangers and discomforts of the voyage be over. all are anxious to make the land. the suggestions as to the course are numerous. there are some, bad and nervous sailors perhaps, who insist upon returning, although they are told it is impossible, and who would sink the ship sooner than go on, were they not outnumbered by their shipmates. while they are delaying, the current bears us towards more disturbed waters and more rocky landing places.
there are others who call out for "full steam ahead," and would accomplish the passage at once, whatever the risks. but alas! the ship is run out of coal and can only spread its sails to the varying breezes, take advantage of favorable tides, and must needs lie to when the waves are high.
but the sensible passenger may, though he knows the difficulties of the voyage and the dangers of the sea, fairly ask the man at the wheel to keep a true and constant course. he may with reason and justice insist that, whatever the delays which the storms or accidents may cause, the head of the vessel shall be consistently pointed towards the distant port, and that come what will she shall not be allowed to drift aimlessly hither and thither on the chance of fetching up somewhere some day.
the "full steam ahead" method would be undoubtedly the most desirable. this is the military view. mobilise, it is urged, a nice field force, and operate at leisure in the frontier valleys, until they are as safe and civilised as hyde park. nor need this course necessarily involve the extermination of the inhabitants. military rule is the rule best suited to the character and comprehension of the tribesmen. they will soon recognise the futility of resistance, and will gradually welcome the increase of wealth and comfort that will follow a stable government. besides this, we shall obtain a definite frontier almost immediately. only one real objection has been advanced against this plan. but it is a crushing one, and it constitutes the most serious argument against the whole "forward policy." it is this: we have neither the troops nor the money to carry it out.
the inevitable alternative is the present system, a system which the war has interrupted, but to which we must return at its close; a system of gradual advance, of political intrigue among the tribes, of subsidies and small expeditions.
though this policy is slow, painful and somewhat undignified, there is no reason that it should not be sure and strong. but it must be consistently pursued. dynamite in the hands of a child is not more dangerous than a strong policy weakly carried out. the reproach which may be justly laid upon the rulers of india, whether at home or abroad, is that while they recognise the facts, they shrink from the legitimate conclusions.
they know they cannot turn back. they fully intend to go on. yet they fear to admit the situation, to frankly lay their case before the country, and trust to the good sense and courage of an ancient democracy. the result is, that they tie their hands by ridiculous and unnecessary proclamations, such as that which preceded the chitral expedition of 1895. the political officers who watch the frontier tribes are expected to obtain authority by force of personal character, yet strictly according to regulations, and to combine individuality with uniformity. and sometimes this timidity leads to such dismal acts of folly as the desertion of the khyber forts.
but in spite of all obstacles and errors there is a steady advance, which may be accelerated, and made easier, by many small reforms. these questions of detail approach so near the province of the specialist, that i shall not attempt to enumerate or discuss them. it is suggested among other things that wider powers should be given to the political officers, in their ordinary duties of peace. others advocate occasional demonstrations of troops, to impress the tribesmen with the fact that those they see are not the full strength of the sirkar. bolder minds have hinted at transplanting young pathans, and educating them in india after the custom of the romans. but this last appears to be suitable to a classic rather than a christian age.
from a general survey of the people and the country, it would seem that silver makes a better weapon than steel. a system of subsidies must tend to improve our relations with the tribes, enlist their interests on the side of law and order, and by increasing their wealth, lessen their barbarism. in the matter of the supply of arms the government would find it cheaper to enter the market as a purchaser, and have agents to outbid the tribesmen, rather than to employ soldiers. as water finds its own level, so the laws of economics will infallibly bring commodities to the highest bidder. doubtless there are many other lessons which the present war will have taught. these may lighten a task which, though long and heavy, is not beyond the powers or pluck of the british people.
we are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasion of the end in sight. still this is no time to despair. i have often noticed in these afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirely surrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. but as the column has advanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. sometimes it is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must be forced, but i have never seen a valley that had not a way out. that way we shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent step of men who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise. in such a spirit i would leave the subject, with one farewell glance.
looking on the story of the great frontier war; at all that has been told, and all that others may tell, there must be many who to-day will only deplore the losses of brave soldiers and hard-earned money. but those who from some future age shall, by steady light of history, dispassionately review the whole situation, its causes, results and occasion, may find other reflections, as serious perhaps, but less mournful. the year 1897, in the annals of the british people, was marked by a declaration to the whole world of their faith in the higher destinies of their race. if a strong man, when the wine sparkles at the feast and the lights are bright, boasts of his prowess, it is well he should have an opportunity of showing in the cold and grey of the morning that he is no idle braggart. and unborn arbiters, with a wider knowledge, and more developed brains, may trace in recent events the influence of that mysterious power which, directing the progress of our species, and regulating the rise and fall of empires, has afforded that opportunity to a people, of whom at least it may be said, that they have added to the happiness, the learning and the liberties of mankind.
appendix.
extracts from official despatches.
the attack on the malakand.
26th july — 1st august, 1897.
from the despatch of brigadier-general w.h. meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g.
forwarded to the adjutant-general in india by sir bindon blood.
43. all have done well, but i should like to bring before his excellency for favorable consideration the following names of officers and men:—
24th punjaub infantry.
lieut.-colonel j. lamb, who, on the first alarm being sounded on the night of the 26th july, had taken prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his regiment, and later was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central enclosure, till he was severely wounded.
captain h.f. holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number of the enemy out of the central enclosure, and was severely wounded in doing so.
i would especially wish to mention lieutenant s.h. climo, who commanded the 24th punjaub infantry after lieut.-colonel lamb and captain holland had been wounded. this officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of the highest order. he has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise, and shown a spirit and example which has been followed by all ranks. i trust his excellency will be pleased to favourably notice lieutenant climo, who has proved himself an officer who will do well in any position, and is well worthy of promotion.
lieutenant a.k. rawlins has behaved well all through. i would recommend him to his excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort on the 26th july to bring reinforcements, and again for the dash he showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of which lieutenant climo speaks most highly.
lieutenant e.w. costello, 22nd punjaub infantry, temporarily attached to the 24th punjaub infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is the subject of a separate recommendation.
31st punjaub infantry.
major m.i. gibbs, who commanded the regiment in the absence of major o'bryen, with skill and in every way to my satisfaction.
lieutenant h.b. ford, acting-adjutant, 31st punjaub infantry, rendered valuable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded sepoy during the withdrawal from north camp. he also behaved with courage in resisting an attack of the enemy on the night of the 28th, when he was severely wounded.
surgeon-lieutenant j.h. hugo, attached to 31st punjaub infantry, rendered valuable service on the night of the 28th in saving lieutenant h.b. ford from bleeding to death. lieutenant ford was wounded and a branch of an artery was cut. there were no means of securing the artery, and surgeon-lieutenant hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his fingers. had he not had the strength to do so, lieutenant ford must have died. early in the morning, thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance into camp, surgeon-lieutenant hugo picked up lieutenant ford with one arm, and, still holding the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried him to a place of safety.
45th (rattray's) sikhs.
colonel h.a. sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, but he returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment from lieut.-colonel mcrae, and from that time rendered me every assistance.
i would specially bring to the notice of his excellency the commander-in-chief the name of lieut.-colonel h.n. mcrae, who commanded the regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. his prompt action in seizing the gorge at the top of the buddhist road on the night of the 26th, and the gallant way in which he held it, undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that side. for this, and for the able way in which he commanded the regiment during the first three days of the fighting, i would commend him to his excellency's favorable consideration.
also lieutenant r.m. barff, officiating-adjutant of the regiment, who, lieut.-colonel mcrae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered him valuable assistance.
the guides.
i also wish to bring the name of lieut.-colonel r.b. adams of the guides to his excellency's notice. the prompt way in which the corps mobilised, and their grand march, reflect great credit on him and the corps. since arrival at the malakand on the 27th july and till the morning of the 1st august, lieut.-colonel adams was in command of the lower camp, i.e., that occupied by central and left position, and in the execution of this command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defenses, he gave me every satisfaction. i have also to express my appreciation of the way in which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1st august, on which occasion his horse was shot under him.
great credit is due to lieutenant p.c. eliott-lockhart, who was in command of the guides infantry, for bringing up the regiment from mardan to malakand in such good condition after their trying march.
captain g.m. baldwin, d.s.o., behaved with great courage and coolness during the reconnaissance of the 1st august, and though severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he remained on the ground and continued to lead his men.
lieutenant h.l.s. maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed an excellent example on the night of the 28th july, when he was severely wounded.
11th bengal lancers.
major s. beatson commanded the squadron, 11th bengal lancers, which arrived at malakand on the 29th, and led them with great skill and dash on the occasion of the reconnaissance on the 1st august.
no.8 bengal mountain battery.
lieutenant f.a. wynter was the only officer with no.8 bengal mountain battery from the 26th till the 30th july, and he commanded it during that time, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, with great ability, and has proved himself a good soldier. i should like especially to mention him for his excellency's consideration. the battery did excellent work all through.
no.5 company queen's own madras sappers and miners.
lieutenant a.r. winsloe, r.e., commanded the company from the 27th july till the 1st august to my entire satisfaction. his services in strengthening the defences were invaluable.
lieutenant f.w. watling, r.e., was in command of the company in the absence of captain johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until he was wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. after lieutenant watling was wounded the command of the company for the remainder of the night of the 26th, and till lieutenant winsloe returned on the 27th, devolved on lieutenant e.n. manley, r.e. he performed his duties with great credit, and afterwards was of great assistance, by his zeal and his exertions, to lieutenant winsloe.
medical staff.
brigade-surgeon-lieut.-colonel f.a. smyth was most zealous, and performed his duties to my satisfaction. he volunteered to perform the duties of provost marshal, and did so for a short time during the illness of lieutenant h.e. cotterill.
the arrangements made by surgeon-major s. hassand, senior medical officer, 38th native field hospital, and the indefatigable attention and care with which he devoted himself to the wounded, deserve great praise. the list of casualties is large, and surgeon-major hassand has been untiring in his exertions for their relief. i hope his excellency will think fit to consider his services favourably.
surgeon-captain t.a.o. langston, 38th native field hospital, rendered valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved with courage and devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances. surgeon-lieutenant w. carr has worked night and day in the hospitals, in trying to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, and has most ably and efficiently aided surgeon-major hassand.
brigade staff.
major l. herbert, my deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing next to me in the enclosure of the sappers and miners' camp on the night of the 26th. since being wounded, he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. i would wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favorable consideration of the commander-in-chief.
although major h.a. deane is in no way under my authority, i feel i am under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at my disposal with the object of carrying on the active duties of deputy assistant adjutant-general, when major herbert was wounded. he was indefatigable in assisting me in every way he could, and i am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation of the services he rendered me.
44. the above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but i would point out that the fighting was almost constant for a week, and was of such a close nature as to demand incessant exertion from every officer in the force, and to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be overlooked.
45. i would not like to close this despatch without paying a tribute to the memory of a fine soldier, and charming companion whose death the whole force deplores.
major w.w. taylor had behaved with the greatest gallantry and dash in meeting the enemy's first charge with lieut.-colonel mcrae, and, had he lived, he would undoubtedly distinguished himself in his career. his loss in a heavy one to his regiment, and to the service, and there is no one in the brigade who does not mourn him as a friend.
i have also to deplore the death of honorary-lieutenant l. manley, who as my commissariat officer had rendered me great assistance, and who died fighting manfully. his loss is a very serious one to the brigade.
46. i attach separately, for favorable consideration, a list of native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, who have done especially good service; some of whom i have therein recommended for the order of merit.
i trust these recommendations will meet with the favorable consideration of his excellency the commander-in-chief.
the relief of chakdara
2nd august, 1897
from the despatch of major-general
sir bindon blood, k.c.b.
19. i have the honour to invite the special attention of his excellency the commander-in-chief in india to the good services of the following officers during the operations described above, namely:—
brigadier-general w.h. meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g., carried out his duties in command of the force which relieved chakdara fort with great gallantry and judgment.
colonel a.j.f. reid, officiating colonel on the staff, malakand brigade, afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the rearrangement of the defensive posts at the malakand on the 1st august, after the relieving force had been drawn from them, and in making the preparations for colonel t.h. goldney's attack on the 2nd.
colonel t.h. goldney, 35th sikhs, disposed and led the troops on the morning of the 2nd in the successful attack on the hill, since named after him, in a most judicious and satisfactory manner.
major e.a.p. hobday, r.a., was most energetic and indefatigable in assisting colonel a.j.f. reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work which had to be done at the malakand, and in the swat valley on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd.
brigadier-general meiklejohn reports favourably on the following officers who were under his command during the operations above detailed, viz:—
captain g.f.h. dillon, 40th pathans, who acted as staff officer to the relieving force, showed great readiness and resource, and his assistance was of the utmost value.
lieutenants c.r. gaunt, 4th dragoon guards, orderly officer, and e. christian, royal scots fusiliers, signalling officer, carried out their duties most satisfactorily.
lieut.-colonel r.b. adams, queen's own corps of guides, commanded the cavalry (four squadrons) with the relieving force in the most gallant and judicious manner.
the following officers commanding units and detachments of the reliving force are stated by brigidier-general meiklejohn to have carried out their duties in a thoroughly capable and satisfactory manner, viz.:—
colonel h.a. sawyer, 45th sikhs.
major stuart beatson, 11th bengal lancers.
captain a.h.c. birch, r.a. (8th bengal mountain battery).
lieutenant g. de h. smith, 2nd regiment, central india horse, attached to queen's own corps of guides (cavalry).
lieutenant a.r. winsloe, r.e. (no.5 company queen's own sapper's and miners).
lieutenant p.c. eliott-lockhart, queen's own corps of guides (infantry).
surgeon-general h.f. whitchurch, v.c., attended to the wounded under fire throughout the fighting.
the following officers under colonel t.h. goldney's command led their detachments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, viz.:—
lieut.-colonel l.j.e. bradshaw, 35th sikhs.
captain l.c.h. stainforth, 38th dogras.
jemader nawab, who commanded two guns of no.8 bengal mountain battery in support of colonel goldney's attack, attracted my favorable notice by his smartness, quickness and thorough knowledge of his work.
i would also wish to bring to his excellency's notice the good work done by major h. burney, gordon highlanders, assistant adjutant-general; major h. burney, gordon highlanders, assistant adjutant-general; major h. wharry, d.s.o., chief commissariat officer, and captain a.b. dunsterville, 1st battalion east surrey regiment, my aide-de-camp; the only officers of the divisional staff of my force who had arrived at the malakand on the 2nd august. these officers worked very hard and were of great use to me.
20. major h.a. deane, c.s.i., political agent, dir and swat, was not in any way under my orders during the operations above described, but notwithstanding, i hope i may be permitted to express the obligations under which i lie to him for valuable information and general assistance which he gave me.
the defence of chakdara.
26th july—2nd august, 1897.
from the despatch of major-general
sir bindon blood, k.c.b.
15. during the fighting above described, the conduct of the whole of the garrison, whether fighting men, departmental details, or followers, is reported to have been most gallant. not the least marked display of courage and constancy was that made by the small detachment in the signal tower, who were without water for the last eighteen hours of the siege. the signallers, under no.2729, lance-naik vir singh, 45th sikhs, who set a brilliant example, behaved throughout in a most courageous manner; one of them, no.2829, sepoy prem singh, climbing several times out of a window in the tower with a heliograph, and signaling outside to the malakand under a hot fire from sungars in every direction.
16. i would beg to recommend all the british and native officers who took part in the defence i have described for the favorable consideration of his excellency the commander-in-chief as under, viz.:—
captain h. wright, 11th bengal lancers, who, with his detachment of forty sabres of his regiment, made the gallant ride through the enemy from the malakand to chakdara fort, on the morning of the 27th july, and commanded the garrison from that morning till its relief on the 2nd august.
captain d. baker, 2nd bombay infantry, who rode to chakdara fort with captain wright, and made himself most useful. lieutenant h.b. rattray, 45th sikhs, who commanded the garrison from the commencement of the attack on the 26th july till the arrival of captain wright the next day, and is reported by that officer to have been the life and soul of the defence. 2nd lieutenant j.l. wheatley, 45th sikhs, had charge of the gun and maxim detachments, and it was largely owing to his care and judgment that these weapons were so effective in the defence.
lieutenant a.b. minchin, 25th punjaub infantry, assistant political agent, was in the fort throughout the siege, and was most useful.
ressaidar tilok singh, 11th bengal lancers, accompanied captain wright in his ride of the 27th july, and is very favorably mentioned by that officer.
jemadar sudama commanded the detachment of the 21st bengal lancers who were at chakdara fort on the 26th july, and was present throughout the siege, and is also very favorably reported on.
subadar jwala singh, 45th sikhs, was present throughout the siege, and showed great intelligence and readiness of resource, as well as courage and coolness, under fire.
jemadar ala singh, 45th sikhs, had command of the sections on the parapet of the river fort, and showed conspicuous courage and coolness under heavy fire.
lieutenant rattray reports that no.522 hospital assistant piara singh, 11th bengal lancers, rendered valuable assistance, not only in the sortie on the 2nd, and at other times in bringing up ammunition, etc., to the men on the parapets under fire.
17. i shall further have the honor, in a separate communication, to submit, for the favorable consideration of his excellency the commander-in-chief, the names of several non-commissioned officers and men who distinguished themselves during the siege of chakdara fort, in view of their being granted the order of merit, should his excellency think them deserving of that distinction.
from major-general sir b. blood, k.c.b., commanding the malakand
field force, to the adjutant-general in india,—no.5, "despatches,
malakand field force,"—dated 27th october, 1897.
i regret to find that in my report, "despatches, malakand field force," no.3, of the 20th august, 1897, i omitted to include the name of surgeon-captain e.v. hugo, indian medical service, amongst those of the officers recommended to the favorable consideration of his excellency the commander-in-chief for their services during the recent defence of chakdara fort. i now have great pleasure in stating that surgeon-general hugo served with distinction throughout the defence in question, and in recommending him for favorable consideration accordingly.
action of landakai and expedition
into upper swat.
august, 1987.
from the despatches of major-general
sir bindon blood, k.c.b.
32. in concluding this part of my report, i would wish to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks of the special force which i led into upper swat. they fought the action at landakai in a brilliant manner, working over high hills, under a burning sun, with the greatest alacrity, and showing everywhere the greatest keenness to close with the enemy. they carried out admirably the trying duties necessitated by marching in hot weather with a transport train of more than 2000 mules, and they endured with perfect cheerfulness the discomforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. the officers of the divisional staff and of by personal staff who were with me, [major h.h. burney, assistant adjutant-general (gordon highlanders); lieut.-colonel a. masters, assistant quartermaster-general (2nd regiment central india horse); captain h.e. stanton, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, intelligence branch (royal artillery); colonel w. aitken, colonel on the staff, royal artillery; captain h.d. grier, adjutant, r.a.; major e. blunt, senior officer of royal engineers; captain e.w.m. norie, superintendent, army signalling (middlesex regiment); captain c.g.f. edwards, provost marshal (5th punjaub cavalry); captain a.b. dunsterville, a.d.c. (1st battalion east surrey regiment); captain a.r. dick, orderly officer. brigade staff.—major e.a.p. hobday, deputy assistant adjutant-general (royal artillery); captain g.f.h. dillon, deputy assistant quartermaster-general (40th bengal infantry); captain c.h. beville, commissariat transport department; captain j.m. camilleri, in charge of transport (13th bengal infantry); surgeon-lieut.-colonel j.t.b. bookey, i.m.s.; lieutenant c.r. gaunt, orderly officer, 4th dragoon guards. commanding officers of divisional troops.—lieut.-colonel r.b. adams, queen's own corps of guides; major c.a. anderson, 10th field battery, royal artillery; major m.f. fegan, no.7 mountain battery, royal artillery; captain a.h.c. birch, no.8 bengal mountain battery; captain e.p. johnson, no.5 company queen's own sappers and miners.] brigadier-general w.h. meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g., and his staff, and the several heads of departments and commanding officers of divisional troops, all carried out their duties in an entirely satisfactory manner.
major h.a. deane, political agent, and his assistant, lieutenant a.b. minchin, gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies.
33. while the operations above described were in progress, a diversion was made towards the southern border of the buner country from mardan by the 1st reserve brigade, which, on its headquarters leaving mardan, came under my command as the 3rd brigade, malakand field force.
34. a force [1st battalion highland light infantry, under lieut.-colonel r.d.b. rutherford; 39th garhwal rifles, under lieut.-colonel b.c. greaves; no.3 company bombay sappers and miners, under captain c.e. baddeley, r.e.; one squadron 10th bengal lancers, under captain w.l. maxwell; two guns no.1 mountain battery, royal artillery, under lieutenant h.l.n. beynon, r.a.] under brigadier-general j. wodehouse, c.b., c.m.g., was concentrated on the 17th august at rustum, eighteen miles north-east of mardan, and about four miles from the buner border, with the object of acting as a containing force, and so preventing the sections of the bunerwhals who had not already committed themselves against us from joining in opposition to our advance into upper swat.
35. the presence of this force had the desired effect, and brigadier-general wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at rustum in acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighborhood.
36. brigadier-general wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his force, which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heat and rain, the spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. he makes special mention of the work of no.3 company bombay sappers and miners, under captain c.e. baddeley, r.e. he also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by lieutenant c.p. down, assistant commissioner, and has expressed to me a high opinion of that officer's abilities and acquirements, particularly of his proficiency in the local vernacular.
the action of 16th september.
from sir bindon blood's despatch
containing the summary of brigadier-general jeffrey's
report of the action
27. the behavior of the troops throughout this trying day was very good. the steadiness and discipline shown by the 1st battalion of the buffs, under lieu.-colonel ommnanney, were admirable, while brigadier-general jeffreys has specially commended the gallantry with which the guides infantry, under major campbell, brought off captain ryder's detachment of the 35th sikhs, carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavy fire. he has further strongly endorsed major campbell's favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by captain g.b. hodson, and lieutenant h.w. codrington, of the guides, who commanded the companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; the gallantry of surgeon-captain j. fisher, indian medical service, who made a most determined, though unsuccessful, attempt to take medical aid to the wounded of captain ryder's detachment through a hot fire; of surgeon-lieutenant e.l. perry, indian medical service; of jemadar sikander khan of the guides, and of several non-commissioned officers and sepoys of the same corps, regarding whom i have had the honour to make a separate communication.
28. brigadier-general jeffreys has also described in very favorable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by captain cole and his squadron of the 11th bengal lancers. he has commended the conduct of captain w.i. ryder and lieutenant o.g. gunning, 35th sikhs, who were both wounded, and of jemadar narayan singh, havildar ram singh and sepoy karram singh [this man's case has formed the subject of a separate communication.] of the same regiment. he has also brought to notice a gallant act of captain a.h.c. birch, r.a., commanding no.8 bengal mountain battery, and his trumpeter, jiwan, in rescuing a wounded sepoy of the 35th sikhs, as well as the distinguished gallantry of jemadars nawab and ishar singh and several non-commissioned officers and men of the same battery, in regard to which i have made separate communications to you.
29. brigadier-general jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of commendation to the gallant conduct of lieutenants t.c. watson [twice wounded in attempting to clear the village] and j.m.c. colvin, r.e., and of the handful of men of the buffs and no.4 company bengal sappers and miners, who spent the night of the 16th-17th with him in the village of bilot. the conduct of these officers and men [of whom six were killed and eighteen wounded on this occasion, out of a total of fifty-four] in entering the village several times in the dark in face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters, seems deserving of the highest recognition, and i have consequently made a special communication to you on the subject. brigadier-general jeffreys has also commended the gallant conduct of his deputy assistant adjutant-general, [the remainder of brigadier-general jeffrey's staff was with the main body when it got separated from them.] major e.o.f. hamilton, 1st battalion the queen's royal west surrey regiment; and finally, he has praised the courage and resolution of lieutenant w.l.s. churchill, 4th hussars, the correspondent of the pioneer newspaper with the force, who made himself useful at a critical moment.
operations of the malakand field force
from the concluding despatch of
major-general sir bindon blood, k.c.b.
58. the commissariat arrangements under major h. wharry, d.s.o., were most successful. the rations were always abundant, and of uniformly good quality; and i may here observe that in five previous campaigns i have never seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good, as it has been throughout the operations of the malakand field force. no doubt the excellence of the commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the good state of health of the troops, which i have remarked upon.
59. the transport was most efficient throughout the operations under reference, and its management, under the direction of captain c.g.r. thackwell, divisional transport officer, who was most ably and energetically assisted by veterinary-captain h.t.w. mann, senior veterinary officer, was most successful. in proof of this i will cite a report just made to me by brigadier-general jeffreys, commanding the 2nd brigade of my force, that this morning, on inspecting 1265 mules attached his brigade, which have just returned from seven weeks in the field, he found fourteen sore backs, and four animals otherwise unfit for work, or a total of only eighteen disabled animals in all.
60. the medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. some difficulties arose on the transfer of officers and material to the tirah expeditionary force on its formation, especially as large convoys of sick and wounded were on the line of this force at the time, but these difficulties were successfully overcome by colonel a.j.f. reid, commanding the malakand brigade, who was in charge of the line, and matters were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of surgeon-colonel j.c.g. carmichael, indian medical service, who is now principal medical officer of the force.
61. the telegraph arrangements were well carried out by lieutenant w. robertson, r.e., under the direction of mr. c.e. pitman, c.i.e. the postal service under mr. h.c. sheridan was also satisfactory.
62. the working of the several departments of the headquarters' staff was most satisfactory and successful. the heads of departments were:—
major h.h. burney, gordon highlanders, assistant adjutant-general.
lieutenant-colonel a. masters, 2nd regiment central india horse, assistant quartermaster-general.
captain h.e. stanton, d.s.o., r.a., deputy assistant quartermaster-general (intelligence).
captain e.w.m. norie, middlesex regiment, superintendent, army signalling.
surgeon-colonel j.c.g. carmichael, indian medical service, principal medical officer.
lieutenant-colonel w. aitken, c.b., r.a., commanding royal artillery.
colonel j.e. broadbent, r.e., commanding royal engineers—relieved early in october by lieutenant-colonel w. peacocke, c.m.g., r.e.
captain w.e. banbury, 25th madras infantry, field treasure chest officer.
captain w.w. cookson, r.a., ordnance officer.
major h. wharry, d.s.o., staff corps, chief commissariat officer.
veterinary-captain h.t.w. mann, [wounded in action, 20th september, 1897.] army veterinary department, senior veterinary officer.
captain c.l. robertson, r.e., survey officer.
captain c.g.f. edwards, 5th punjaub cavalry, provost marshal.
the rev. l. klogh, chaplain.
lieutenant w. robertson, r.e., in charge of telegraphs.
63. i am under great obligations to my personal staff—captain a.b. dunsterville, 1st battalion east surrey regiment, aide-de-camp; captain a.r. dick, 2nd punjaub cavalry, and lieutenant viscount fincastle, 16th (the queen's) lancers.
64. it will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three brigades of the force were ably commanded by brigadier-generals w.h. meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g., 1st brigade; p.d. jeffreys, [wounded in action, 16th september, 1897.] c.b., 2nd brigade, and j.h. wodehouse, c.b., c.m.g., [wounded in action, 20th september, 1897.] 3rd brigade, who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. the line of communications and the base were also most efficiently managed by colonel a.j.f. reid, commanding the malakand brigade, and by lieut.-colonel a.v. schalch, 11th bengal infantry, the base commandant, and their respective staffs.
65. in my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the force, i shall have the honour to bring the services of the officers above briefly referred to more fully to the notice of his excellency the commander-in-chief.
66. major h.a. deane, c.s.i., political agent, dur, chitral and swat, was in separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with the operations i have described, as far as nawagai. he accompanied my headquarters to ghosam, where i left him on the 12th september, and rejoined me at inayat kila on the 4th october. he gave much assistance in arranging for the collection of local supplies.
67. mr. w.s. davis was my political officer throughout the operations beyond nawagai, and in the mamund valley prior to major deane's return to my headquarters on the 4th october. he carried out his duties to my complete satisfaction. his native assistant, khan bahadur ibrahim kham, also made himself very useful.
