"therese," rodin said to me several days later, "i am going to install you near my daughter; in this way, you will avoid all frictions with the other two women, and i intend to give you three hundred pounds wages."

such a post was, in my situation, a kind of godsend; inflamed by the desire to restore rosalie to righteousness, and perhaps even her father too were i able to attain some influence over him, i repented not of what i had just done... rodin, having had me dress myself, conducted me at once to where his daughter was; rosalie received me with effusions of joy, and i was promptly established.

ere a week was gone by i had begun to labor at the conversions after which i thirsted, but rodin's intransigence defeated all my efforts.

"do not believe," was the response he made to my wise counsels, "that the kind of deference i showed to the virtue in you proves that i either esteem virtue or have the desire to favor it over vice. think nothing of the sort, therese, 'twould be to deceive yourself; on the basis of what i have done in your regard, anyone who was to maintain, as consequential to my behavior, the importance or the necessity of virtue would fall into the very largest error, and sorry i would be were you to fancy that such is my fashion of thinking. the rustic hovel to which i repair for shelter when, during the hunt, the excessive heat of the sun's rays falls perpendicularly upon me, that hut is certainly not to be mistaken for a superior building: its worth is merely circumstantial: i am exposed to some sort of danger, i find something which affords protection, i use it, but is this something the grander on that account? can it be the less contemptible? in a totally vicious society, virtue would be totally worthless; our societies not being entirely of this species, one must absolutely either play with virtue or make use of it so as to have less to dread from its faithful followers. if no one adopts the virtuous way, it becomes useless; i am then not mistaken when i affirm that it owes its necessity to naught but opinion or circumstances; virtue is not some kind of mode whose value is incontestable, it is simply a scheme of conduct, a way of getting along, which varies according to accidents of geography and climate and which, consequently, has no reality, the which alone exhibits its futility. only what is constant is really good; what changes perpetually cannot claim that characterization: that is why they have declared that immutability belongs to the ranks of the eternal's perfections; but virtue is completely without this quality: there is not, upon the entire globe, two races which are virtuous in the same manner; hence, virtue is not in any sense real, nor in any wise intrinsically good and in no sort deserves our reverence. how is it to be employed? as a prop, as a device: it is politic to adopt the virtue of the country one inhabits, so that those who practice it, either because they have a taste for it or who have to cultivate it because of their station, will leave you in peace, and so that this virtue which happens to be respected in your area will guarantee you, by its conventional preponderance, against the assaults delivered by them who profess vice. but, once again, all that is at the dictation of variable circumstances, and nothing in all that assigns a real merit to virtue. there are, furthermore, such virtues as are impossible to certain men; now, how are you going to persuade me that a virtue in conflict or in contradiction with the passions is to be found in nature? and if it is not in nature and natural; how can it be good? in those men we are speaking of there will certainly be vices opposed to these virtues, and these vices will be preferred by these men, since they will be the only modes... the only schemes of being which will be thoroughly agreeable to their peculiar physical constitutions or to their uncommon organs; in this hypothesis, there would then be some very useful vices: well, how can virtue be useful if you demonstrate to me that what is contrary to virtue is useful? in reply to that, one hears that virtue is useful to others, and that in this sense it is good; for if it is posited that i must do only what is good to others, in my turn i will receive only good. and this argument is pure sophistry: in return for the small amount of good i receive at the hands of others thanks to the virtue they practice, my obligation to practice virtue in my turn causes me to make a million sacrifices for which i am in no wise compensated. receiving less than i give, i hence conclude a very disadvantageous bargain, i experience much more ill from the privations i endure in order to be virtuous, than i experience good from those who do it to me; the arrangement being not at all equitable, i therefore must not submit to it, and certain, by being virtuous, not to cause others as much pleasure as i receive pain by compelling myself to be good, would it not be better to give up procuring them a happiness which must cost me so much distress? there now remains the harm i may do others by being vicious and the evil i myself would suffer were everyone to resemble me. were we to acknowledge an efficient circulation of vices, i am certainly running a grave danger, i concede it; but the grief experienced by what i risk is offset by the pleasure i receive from causing others to be menaced: and there! you see, equality is re-established: and everyone is more or less equally happy: which is not the case and cannot be the case in a society where some are good and others are bad, because, from this mixture, perpetual pitfalls result! and no pitfalls exist in the other instance. in the heterogeneous society, all interests are unalike: there you have the source of an infinite number of miseries; in the contrary association, all interests are identical, each individual composing it is furnished with the same proclivities, the same penchants, each one marches together with all the others and to the same goal; they are all happy. but, idiots complain to you, evil does not make for happiness. no, not when everyone has agreed to idolise good; but merely cease to prize, instead deflate, heap abuse upon what you call good, and you will no longer revere anything but what formerly you had the idiocy to call evil; and every man will have the pleasure of committing it not at all because it will be permitted (that might be, upon occasion, a reason for the diminishment of its appeal), but because the law will no longer punish it, and it is the law, through the fear it inspires, which lessens the pleasure nature has seen to it we take in crime. i visualize a society where it will be generally admitted that incest (let us include this offense together with all the others), that incest, i say, is criminal: those who commit incest will be unhappy, because opinion, laws, beliefs, everything will concert to chill their pleasure; those who desist from doing this evil, those who, because of these restraints, will not dare, will be equally unhappy: thus, the law that proscribes incest will have done nothing but cause wretchedness. now, i visualize another society neighboring the first; in this one incest is no crime at all: those who do not desist will not be unhappy, and those who desire it will be happy. hence, the society which permits this act will be better suited to mankind than the one in which the act is represented as a crime; the same pertains to all other deeds clumsily denominated criminal; regard them from this point of view, and you create crowds of unhappy persons; permit them, and not a complaint is to be heard; for he who cherishes this act, whatever it happens to be, goes about performing it in peace and quiet, and he who does not care for it either remains in a kind of neutral indifference toward it, which is certainly not painful, or finds restitution for the hurt he may have sustained by resorting to a host of other injuries wherewith in his turn he belabors whosoever has aggrieved him: thus everyone in a criminal society is either very happy indeed, or else in a paradise of unconcern; consequently, there's nothing good, nothing respectable, nothing that can bring about happiness in what they call virtue. let those who follow the virtuous track be not boastingly proud of the concessions wrung from us by the structural peculiarities of our society; 'tis purely a matter of circumstance, an accident of convention that the homages demanded of us take a virtuous form; but in fact, this worship is a hallucination, and the virtue which obtains a little pious attention for a moment is not on that account the more noble."

such was the infernal logic of rodin's wretched passions; but rosalie, gentle and less corrupt, rosalie, detesting the horrors to which she was submitted, was a more docile auditor and more receptive to my opinions. i had the most ardent desire to bring her to discharge her primary religious duties; but we would have been obliged to confide in a priest, and rodin would not have one in the house; he beheld them, and the beliefs they professed, with horror: nothing in the world would have induced him to suffer one to come near his daughter; to lead the girl to a confessor was equally impossible: rodin never allowed rosalie to go abroad unless he accompanied her. we were therefore constrained to bide our time until some occasion might present itself; and while we waited i instructed the young person; by giving her a taste for virtue, i inspired in her another for religion, i revealed to her its sacred dogmas and its sublime mysteries, and i so intimately attached these two sentiments to her youthful heart that i rendered them indispensable to her life's happiness.

"o mademoiselle," i said one day, my eyes welling with tears at her compunction, "can man blind himself to the point of believing that he is not destined to some better end? is not the fact he has been endowed with the capacity of consciousness of his god sufficient evidence that this blessing has not been accorded him save to meet the responsibilities it imposes? well, what may be the foundation of the veneration we owe the eternal, if it is not that virtue of which he is the example? can the creator of so many wonders have other than good laws? and can our hearts be pleasing unto him if their element is not good? it seems to me that, for sensitive spirits, the only valid motives for loving that supreme being must be those gratitude inspires. is it not a favor thus to have caused us to enjoy the beauties of this universe ? and do we not owe him some gratitude in return for such a blessing? but a yet stronger reason establishes, confirms the universal chain of our duties; why should we refuse to fulfill those required by his decrees, since they are the very same which consolidate our happiness amongst mortals? is it not sweet to feel that one renders oneself worthy of the supreme being simply by practicing those virtues which must bring about our contentment on earth, and that the means which render us worthy to live amongst our brethren are the identical ones which give us the assurance of a rebirth, in the life still to come, close by the throne of god! ah, rosalie! how blind are they who would strive to ravish away this our hope! mistaken, benighted, seduced by their wretched passions, they prefer to deny eternal verities rather than abandon what may render them deserving of them. they would rather say, 'these people deceive us,' than admit they deceive themselves; the lingering thought of what they are preparing themselves to lose troubles them in their low riot and sport; it seems to them less dreadful to annihilate hope of heaven, than to be deprived of what would acquire it for them! but when those tyrannical passions finally weaken and fade in them, when the veil is torn away, when there is no longer anything left in their disease-eaten hearts to counter the imperious voice of that god their delirium disregardingly misprized, oh rosalie! what must it be, this cruel awakening i and how much its accompanying remorse must inflate the price to be paid for the instant's error that blinded them i such is the condition wherein man has got to be in order to construe his proper conduct: 'tis neither when in drunkenness, nor when in the transport produced by a burning fever, he ought to be believed or his sayings marked, but when his reason is calmed and enjoys its full lucid energy he must seek after the truth, 'tis then he divines and sees it. 'tis then with all our being we yearn after that sacred one of whom we were once so neglectful; we implore him, he becomes our whole solace; we pray to him, he hears our entreaties. ah, why then should i deny him, why should i be unheeding of this object so necessary to happiness? why should i prefer to say with the misguided man, there is no god, while the heart of the reasoning part of human- kind every instant offers me proofs of this divine being's existence? is it then better to dream amongst the mad than rightly to think with the wise? all derives nevertheless from this initial principle: immediately there exists a god, this god deserves to be worshiped, and the primary basis of this worship indisputably is virtue."