armstrong’s—russian war-ship construction—arrival of “cimbria” at bar harbor—visit of wharton barker to shipyard—visit of captain semetschkin and commission to the yard—purchase of ships—newspaper accounts—captain gore-jones—mr. cramp’s account of operations—“europe,” “asia,” “africa,” and “zabiaca”—popoff and “livadia”—visit to grand duke constantine—anniversary banquet in st. petersburg of survivors of “cimbria” expedition—object of visit to russia—mr. dunn and japan—contract for “kasagi”—jubilee session of naval architects in london—visit to russia—correspondence with russian officials—visit to armstrong’s—japanese war-ship construction—“coming sea power”—correspondence with russian official—invited to russia—asked to bid for war-ships—our ministers abroad—construction of “retvizan” and “variag”—“maine”

the old latin poet horace introduces his first book of “sermons or satires” by addressing to his great patron, m?cenas, the question:

“qui fit, m?cenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem

seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit illa

contentus vivat? laudet diversa sequentes?”

(“how is it, m?cenas, that no one lives content with the lot that endeavor has given to him or that fortune has 209thrown in his way? but emulates those following other pursuits?”)

mr. cramp reached the condition described by horace early in the last decade of the nineteenth century. he had exhausted the opportunities of american ship-building, both for war and for commerce. a fleet, not only respectable in number but formidable in type and power,—a fleet embracing battleships, armored cruisers, and protected cruisers,—bore the impress of his art and heralded the distinction of his name. to this compact war-fleet he had added two ocean greyhounds, the first of their type built in the western hemisphere. in prosecution of all this advancement, if we take the decade from 1885 to 1895, he had multiplied the area of the shipyard by two, and its capacity alike in number and size of steamships and their machinery more than three. in 1889, some people—and among them his own associates in the ownership of the yard—were afraid to undertake the armored cruiser “new york.” mr. cramp met this obstruction with radical action, as was his wont in every emergency; and in four years from that time he had laid the keels of atlantic greyhounds whose register tonnage was more than two thousand tons greater than the total displacement of the “new york.”

210mr. cramp had long been emulous, some englishman might say envious, of the wonderful career of sir william armstrong and of his marvellous success in securing foreign contracts. on one occasion, returning from a visit to elswick with a party from the british institution of naval architects, of which he is a member, mr. cramp remarked that “armstrong and his establishment had ceased to be ship-builders in the ordinary acceptation of the term and had become navy-builders. they do not trouble themselves,” he said, “with isolated ships; to all intents and purposes they undertake to build whole navies in bulk for ambitious maritime states in south america and asia.” at the time of the visit referred to, with exceptions hardly worth mention, the navies of brazil, argentine republic, chile, japan, and china had been built, engined, armed, armored, munitioned, equipped, and outfitted at elswick; and every ship was ready for battle when she finally sailed from armstrong’s works. in addition to this, elswick had done a great deal of work for european states, having, at one time or another, contributed in some degree to every european navy, great or small, except those of france and russia.

to a man of mr. cramp’s untiring aspiration 211and restless ambition, this was a spectacle not to be supinely endured. he therefore determined to see what could be done, and he selected what seemed to him the most promising directions of effort,—russia and japan. in dealing with the russians he had initial advantages. the first was that russia never had a war-ship, except the nondescript “livadia,” built in england, though she had been a liberal patron of english engine-builders. the second point of advantage was that in 1878-79 a considerable volume of work had been done by cramp for the russian navy, involving conversion of three large merchant steamships into auxiliary cruisers and the construction of one small cruiser.

the history of this interesting event, an event of international importance, is as follows:

in the early part of the year 1878 the north german lloyd steamer “cimbria” appeared at bar harbor with about sixty russian officers and about eight hundred men. their presence at that place created a great sensation. visitors thronged there; and the officers were entertained at bangor and also in the neighboring towns. the common sailors, however, who were allowed to go ashore about one hundred and fifty at a time, were cruelly disappointed. 212they would go along the streets searching for vodka in vain. the maine law, which was in full force, was something beyond their comprehension. “there is everything in the world here but vodka,” they would say to one another, and even to their officers, when they returned to their ship from shore liberty.

almost at the same moment when the “cimbria” arrived in the waters of maine, mr. wharton barker visited cramps’ shipyard. the banking concern of barker brothers was at that time the representative of the barings, who were the financial agents of russia. mr. barker informed mr. cramp that he was delegated to arrange for the conversion and fitting out of a number of auxiliary cruisers for the russian navy, and that he had selected the cramp company as the professional and mechanical instrumentality for that purpose. he arranged for a visit of a number of russian officers to the office of the cramp company. these officers had come over independent of the “cimbria,” but arrived about the same time. they were the committee or board which had been appointed to decide on all questions that might arise in connection with the naval project mentioned. the head of this board was captain semetschkin, chief of staff of the grand duke constantine, who was 213then general admiral of the navy. besides captain semetschkin, the board consisted of captain grippenburg, captain avalan, captain alexeieff, captain loman, captain rodionoff, and naval constructor koutaneyoff. this was in 1879. at this writing (1903) captains semetschkin and loman have passed away; captain avalan is now vice-admiral and imperial minister of marine; captain alexeieff, now vice-admiral, is also viceroy of manchuria; captain rodionoff is an admiral; and naval constructor koutaneykoff is constructor-in-chief of the russian navy.

upon examination of cramps’ shipyard, they decided that mr. barker’s selection was well judged, and approved his recommendations that the work projected be done there.

the war between russia and turkey was still in progress, and there was every indication at that moment of british intervention. the purpose of the russians was to fit out a small fleet of auxiliary cruisers or commerce destroyers to cruise in the north atlantic in the route of the great british traffic between the united states and england. their idea was that the fitting out of such a fleet with its threatening attitude toward their north atlantic commerce might or would deter the 214british from armed intervention in behalf of the turks.

at first the russians made pretence of great secrecy as to their movements. “pretence of secrecy” is the only phrase that can adequately express their attitude. on the other hand, the appearance of the “cimbria” on the coast of maine at bar harbor, filled with russian naval officers and seamen, was not concealed, but on the other hand ostentatious. it of course instantly attracted the attention of the british ministry and excited their apprehension as to the possible outcome; apprehension which the stories that for the time being filled the papers of new york and new england certainly did nothing to abate. an examination of the files of the evening star and the north american at this time would be interesting reading. the evening star, may 1, 1878, has an account headed, “what brings the russian steamer to maine?” may 2: “suspicious craft.” may 6: “suspicious ‘cimbria’ to leave her station.” some accounts “to stir up the irish.” may 8: “an account of the ‘egg-eating’ incident.”

the north american, may 13, states that the captain of the “cimbria” “has said that russia is preparing to attack great britain by sea;” and refers to the disastrous effects on 215our commerce during the civil war by the work of the confederate cruisers which practically drove the american flag from the ocean.

captain gore-jones, the naval attaché of the british legation at washington, and others visited bar harbor at the time the “cimbria” was there. they made their visit incognito, as they imagined, and they located themselves daily on the landing pier near the bar harbor club house, where all the russian officers who were aboard the ship landed every day. it happened that one of the officers knew gore-jones notwithstanding his disguise. the british attaché was sitting upon the pier with a slouch hat on his head and a fishing-rod in his hand, intently watching and patiently waiting for a bite, and apparently oblivious to all that was going on except at the other end of his line. when this officer passed him on the pier, he said in very good english, “captain gore-jones, the fish do not seem to be anxious to make acquaintance with you!”

the visit of these officers to the shipyard of course was carried out with a great deal of real secrecy, and arrangements were made to buy three or four fine and up-to-date merchant ships and to transform them into cruisers, and also to build a small new cruiser.

mr. cramp first applied to the american 216line to buy three of their ships, but the president of the company was too much astonished to give him any satisfaction; or, at least, he was not prepared to act as promptly as the occasion required, and lost the chance of selling the ships, to the most profound disgust of mr. thomas a. scott, of the pennsylvania railroad, which corporation had a paramount interest in the ships and wanted to sell them!

the “state of california” was on the stocks at cramps about ready to launch. this board of officers inspected her. they also looked at the “columbus,” sailing between new york and havana, a ship that cramps had built for mr. clyde,—and the “saratoga,” a ship that had belonged to the ward line, built by mr. roach for that same trade, and were favorably impressed.

up to this time the presence of these gentlemen in philadelphia was not known or suspected; but when the purchases were made, mr. barker decided that, while the time had arrived when it was necessary to remove the veil of secrecy, the cramps should continue to maintain it as to the actual work and its progress.

mr. cramp arranged with mr. alexander mccleary with this end in view. mr. mccleary was at that time the principal reporter of the 217evening star, and a friend and member of the harrison literary association, to which mr. cramp belonged. the whole affair was managed by him most admirably. on may 16 the north american and evening star made the first announcement that indicated what the russians really intended to do. these papers gave an account of the sale of the “state of california,” and that $100,000 was paid on account to a. a. low & co., the agents of the pacific coast navigation company. may 16 was the day of the launch, and on the next day preparations were made to remove the joiner and cabin work, a full account of which appeared in the daily papers.

mr. cramp ultimately purchased in addition the steamships “columbus” and “saratoga.” these two and the “state of california,” after being converted into auxiliary cruisers, were named the “europe,” “asia,” and “africa.” then the russians contracted for a small cruiser which they called the “zabiaca” (mischief-maker). this ship was a regularly designed man-of-war of a special type, and at the time of her completion was the fastest cruiser in the world. the four ships were fitted out under the direction of their captains respectively. the commander of the “europe” was captain grippenburg; of the 218“asia,” captain avalan; of the “africa,” captain alexeieff; and the commander of the new cruiser “zabiaca” was captain loman.

the three ships purchased and converted into commerce destroyers were, so far as internal arrangement and outfit were concerned, altered altogether as to the respective ideas of their commanders, and they all differed very much. they embodied very complete and somewhat ornamental accommodations, and every modern convenience as understood at that time was included in their design.

during these operations the show of secrecy was maintained, but captain gore-jones still zealously endeavored to keep himself and his government au courant with everything that was going on. in pursuit of this duty, he managed on one occasion to get into the shipyard in the disguise of a workman and on the pass or ticket which was then issued for the admission of workingmen. he was, however, soon observed by captain avalan of the “asia,” who at once reported the fact of his presence to the office. captain gore-jones was then politely but firmly ushered out of the shipyard and requested not to enter it again.

american liner st. paul

this incident of captain gore-jones’s futile attempt to play detective attracted wide attention and much comment. among the newspaper 219articles on that subject was one in the columns of the washington sunday capital, a journal then having national reputation for wit and humor. the material part of it was as follows:

“among the ornaments of the diplomatic corps is a possible, though not altogether probable, successor of nelson. he appears in the congressional directory as captain gore-jones, naval attaché of h. b. m. legation. neither one of his two names, viewed separately, suggest aristocracy. both viewed together in normal condition are not calculated to excite suspicion of blue blood. still, gore-jones is an aristocrat. the hyphen is what does it. for the rest, gore-jones, being an english naval officer, is a welshman born in ireland.

“his duties are supposed to be the observing of things naval in this country. being unable to discover a navy, or anything resembling one, in possession of the united states, it occurred to him that perhaps he might find here a navy or part of one belonging to some other power. in fact, it was rumored in the corps diplomatique that gore-jones had been notified that he must either find a navy in this country somewhere and belonging to somebody or lose his job. naturally, his first quest would be at our navy-yards (so-called), but at none of these could he even detect symptoms of naval intention. all he could find was a few old hawse-holes. he was informed that these had been accumulated by that jolly old tar, the rotund robeson, with the intention of building wooden tubs around them whenever grant might happen to run for a third term. he was also informed that the present reform administration of the venerable richard 220w. thompson, of indiana, viewed these hawse-holes with suspicion. this was because they were hollow; whereas the venerable reformer believed that everything about a ship should be solid.

“despairing of the navy-yards, gore-jones turned his attention to places where merchant-ships were constructed. he heard that the cramps, of philadelphia, were building something that did not look merchant-like. he resolved to see it. incidentally, he had heard rumors that the queer craft at cramps’ was being paid for along by instalments of russian money.

“trouble was brewing between russia and england. aha! at last! gore-jones had struck it rich. let him unearth this foul conspiracy to imitate in 1879 the pious example england had set with the ‘alabama’ in 1863, and he would surely get a star. he might even get a garter.

“but how? cramp had views of his own as to private property. he was not under diplomatic jurisdiction, as were the navy-yards. in fact, the sign was out at cramps’, ‘no english need apply!’ this, however, was rather incentive than obstacle to gore-jones. he needn’t be english. nature had endowed him with an assortment of mental and bodily peculiarities, mostly bodily, that adapted him to almost any nationality. he resolved to be an irishman. he at once began an arduous practice of the brogue. first he had to get rid of the cockney drawl which is enjoined by regulation in the english navy. demosthenes is said to have overcome a tendency to stutter by orating with his mouth full of pebbles. gore-jones got rid of the regulation cockney drawl of the english navy by talking with his mouth full of irish whiskey.

221“finally, he considered all preliminary difficulties overcome, and began a siege of cramps’ shipyard by regular approaches. finding it impregnable to front attack, he resolved to flank it. this he accomplished by taking possession of an adjoining lumber yard in the night-time. early in the morning he entered the fortress by its sally-port. success was in his grasp,—almost. it glittered, then it glimmered, then it fizzled out. there was one peculiarity he couldn’t overcome. that was his remarkable resemblance in form and figure to ‘punch’s’ standard cartoon of ‘john bull.’ he could smoke a short, black pipe with the bowl turned down equal to the most corkonian irishman in fishtown. he could also fairly imitate that peculiar accent produced by filtering conversation through the teeth, commonly known as the brogue, particularly when the conversation was diluted with a mouthful of irish whiskey. but he couldn’t escape his shape. one of the russian officers on duty at cramps’, with that keenness characteristic of napoleon’s ‘scratched tartar,’ penetrated all his disguises. then he was ignominiously ejected by one of those decrepit men who, when they get too old to build ships, are usually employed by cramps’ as watchmen. sic transit gloria mundi. exit gore-jones. but he will remain with us. he will hold his job. he deserves to. he has done what no american has ever been able to do since the collapse of the rebellion. he has discovered a navy—an actual, real, live navy—in the united states. the fact that it is a russian navy and not an american one, humiliating as it may be to us, is a huge feather in the cap to him. we hasten to doff our editorial chapeau to gore-jones. we are confident he will get his star. we fervently hope he may get also the garter.”

222at this point mr. cramp’s own narrative of the subsequent proceedings will be more graphic and interesting than any other form of description could be:

“great activity marked the progress of alterations and fitting out of the vessels. the yard was filled with men, some working night and day, and the vessels were all fitted out at a very early date, considering what had to be done. they were more than rebuilt. each ship was fitted out for an admiral and the accommodations for officers and men were ample. they were full sparred and square-rigged.

“the indications that the english would join the sultan at any time still prevailed at the time the vessels were ready to go to sea. when the ‘europe,’ ‘asia,’ and ‘africa’ were ready to depart, they had to go without any guns, because all the loose guns that the russians could spare from the navy were mounted on forts, and none could be appropriated for these ships, so they had to depart without guns. they expected when they came here to be able to purchase guns in this country from some of the gun manufacturers, and they were very much amazed to find that our government had not permitted any gun factories to exist here. so they had to go without.

“the captains all showed great determination and pluck, but their going away was not under the conditions usually attending the departure of war vessels. they expected when they left that england would openly espouse the cause of turkey before they arrived at the other side, and they were all prepared to sink their ships rather than surrender. they felt that their case was particularly 223hard and that their hands were tied, and having no guns they were at the mercy of the enemy. they could not find much satisfaction of sinking with their own ships unless they had done some damage to the enemy, so under the circumstances their sailing was a very sad occasion.

“the ‘zabiaca’ being a new vessel, it took longer to finish her, and by the time she was finished the war with turkey was over, and they managed to get guns to put aboard her.

“the fitting out of this small fleet of commerce destroyers had the effect that the russians originally intended it to have. it deterred the english from going in with the sultan. the merchant fleet of england is too great and too vulnerable to permit their country to go to war for a trifle. england would suffer more in a war than any other nation on account of the large number of merchant-men under her flag; and it was because of the great number of her ships and the danger and loss from their destruction that made the british government and its people labor so hard to have our navigation laws repealed, so that a fictitious sale could be made and the vessels of their merchant marine could be put under the protection of the american flag. as two of our statesmen said (henry c. carey and judge kelley), ‘as long as our navigation laws remain as they are, england will be under perpetual bonds of indemnity to keep the peace with all the small nations in the world, because their merchant-ships cannot fly to the protection of the american flag.’ in this case the english saw the scheme of the ‘alabama’ applied to themselves.

“these vessels went abroad, and most of them became flag-ships on foreign stations.

“the ‘europe’ and ‘africa’ became flag-ships, and the ‘asia’ was afterward taken by the grand duke alexis, 224who made a yacht of her, and a very handsome one she made. she remains the grand duke’s yacht to this day.

“the rest of the history of this transaction is generally known. the vessels were fitted out, went to sea, and made their way to russian ports without interruption, and a final treaty of peace was effected through the congress of european powers at berlin. i believe that the strongest argument the russian government could offer to persuade great britain against intervention was the fitting out of these vessels as commerce destroyers in our shipyard.

“the next year during a trip abroad i visited paris. i found there captain semetschkin, who told me that the grand duke constantine was in the city and would like to receive me. the captain arranged that i should call the next morning, and at the same time informed me that the grand duke had given a contract for a new ship, afterward called the ‘livadia,’ designed by admiral popoff and dr. zimmerman, to be built at the fairfield works at glasgow. admiral popoff was a notable example of that type of man to which, for example, de lesseps, and keely of motor fame, and eads belong. such men affect an almost celestial knowledge in everything they undertake, and that affectation, coupled with an apparent sincerity of manner, earnestness of purpose, and unflinching nerve, often enables them to captivate people of good information on general topics, but unacquainted with the technique of engineering problems; and who therefore are unable to detect the cunning charlatanry of such pretenders.

“admiral popoff had fascinated the grand duke constantine with his peculiar type of war-ship, which was a circular floating turret of large dimensions that could be revolved by means of her propellers, so that, porcupine-like, 225she could present her ‘bristles’ in every direction to an enemy.

“quite a number of the popoff type of floating batteries were built, and a dry-dock was constructed for their special accommodation when repairs might be necessary. the ‘livadia’ was the last production of admiral popoff, who, as i have already remarked, designed her with the assistance of dr. zimmerman, of holland. she was not circular like her predecessors, but was oval in shape, the transverse diameter being almost but not quite equal to the conjugate, and she was fitted with three screws entirely under the bottom. captain semetschkin informed me that the grand duke was much impressed with this new design, and that nothing could shake his belief in its success. being thus forewarned, i could avoid giving him an adverse criticism in case he brought the subject up by simply exercising a little diplomacy, as it was not my desire or intention to cross his predilections in any way. when i called on the grand duke at the russian legation, i found him reclining on a sofa, having severely injured his leg in a fall. he arose as i entered and invited me to take a seat in front of him. being full of the subject, he immediately asked me if i would visit glasgow soon, and when i stated that i intended to go there at an early date he gave me a letter to captain goulaieff, russian naval constructor, who he said had charge of the construction of the new ‘livadia,’ and that he had had prepared a working model fifteen feet long with engines complete as an experiment, and he wanted me to see it.

“i am sure he fully believed in the successful future of this type. he stated that he was confident that it would revolutionize merchant-ship as well as war-ship 226construction, and his enthusiasm was unbounded in the contemplation of it.

“when he had exhausted the subject, which took some time, in elegant english and with fascinating fluency of speech, he changed the subject, and i was subjected to one of the most severe examinations in naval construction, equipment, and technical practice that i ever encountered. of course, there was a change from my attitude of listener to that of a sort of principal in the conversation that followed.

“in referring in a complimentary way to the new fleet that we had turned out,—the outcome of the ‘cimbria’ expedition,—the grand duke stated that one quality in them that impressed him more than any other was the large coal carrying capabilities of the vessels, and he asked me how i explained it. i stated that the models of the ships were of the best american type with certain improvements of our own.

“expressing himself in a complimentary manner as to what we had done and as to what i said, he then put the question to me with much ‘empressement’ and sympathetic interest of manner: ‘mr. cramp, from what school of naval architecture did you graduate?’

“fully appreciating all that was involved in the question from his stand-point and what he considered of paramount importance,—the necessity of the technical school for naval officials—i was prepared for the question, and determined that my answer should be apropos; and that i would not permit myself and my profession to be disparaged, knowing that in russia and on the continent generally there were no great private shipyards, and that if a naval architect or ship-builder there did not graduate from a technical school, he was practically nowhere at that time. trained as i was in philadelphia in a first-class 227shipyard, surrounded by others of the same kind and in close contact with new york, which city occupied the head and front of the ship-building profession in the world, i felt myself doubly armed and more than confident when my answer came promptly after the question.

“i said: ‘your imperial highness! when i graduated from my father’s shipyard as a naval architect and ship-builder, there were no schools of naval architecture. i belong to that race which created them!’

“this unexpected answer, and the gravity of my manner, astonished for an instant the grand duke, who glanced at captain semetschkin, and rising to his feet he bowed profoundly to me and sat down.

“the history of the ‘livadia’ is well known,—encountering a storm in the bay of biscay she was somewhat battered up under the bottom forward. on account of her peculiar shape and light draught she did not respond quickly to the motions of a head sea; when her bow was lifted clear of the water, the following seas would strike the bottom very severely before she would come down.

“after serving at sebastopol somewhat under a cloud, she was laid up; the propeller engines were ultimately put in three new gun-boats.”

the departure of the “cimbria” from russia was a great event there, and all the officers who left russia on that expedition have continued ever since to meet yearly on march 28 (o. s.), that being the date of their departure from russia. on march 29, 1898, twenty years afterward, mr. cramp happened to be in russia arranging for the contract between his company and the russian government for the 228construction of the battleship “retvizan” and the cruiser “variag.” a committee of officers at the time called and invited him to be present at their annual banquet as a guest. this committee was composed of some of the younger officers who were on the “cimbria” expedition. they stated that no guest had ever been invited to one of these banquets, but they considered mr. cramp’s connection with the fitting out of that fleet entitled him to the distinction of being the only guest they ever had on one of those occasions. he found there vice-admiral avalan, the assistant of the minister of marine and now minister of marine,—he had been captain of the “asia;” admiral grippenburg, who had been captain of the “europe;” and also about thirty of the sixty officers who left on the “cimbria” on its first voyage. of those absent, a great many had died, and some, of course, were away. admiral alexeieff was in china.

mr. cramp had begun his overtures with a view to naval construction for russia as early as the fall of 1893. during that period the russian atlantic fleet was present in our waters to take part in celebrating the four hundredth anniversary of columbus’ discovery. the grand duke alexander was an officer in that squadron, which during its stay 229in our waters was at anchor for some time in the delaware, and its officers freely visited the shipyard, carefully inspecting and examining all the work then going on. the general result was that they became enthusiastic with regard to the development of the art in this country and with the character of work being done toward the rebuilding of our navy, and they were also profoundly impressed with the facilities of cramps’ shipyard which might be utilized for increase of the russian navy. they frankly said, however, that just at that moment it did not seem to be the policy of their government to have important work done for the russian navy in foreign shipyards. this was, of course, true, for at that time russia was not building any kind of naval construction more important than torpedo-boat destroyers outside of her own domain. during the following years (1894, 1895, 1896) certain correspondence passed between mr. cramp and high officials in the russian ministry of marine; though little progress was made during those years except to call the attention of the russians in a vivid and forceful manner to the capacities and facilities which he controlled, and to strengthen the entente cordiale which had so long existed between the russian naval authorities and himself.

230at this point it becomes necessary to take up a new branch of the general subject, which is that of foreign work.

medi-j-ieh launching—turkish

copyright, 1904, by john w. dawson

while the correspondence with the authorities of the russian government above referred to was going on, our minister at tokio, mr. dunn, called the attention of the japanese government to the fact that their expenditure of vast sums of money on a new navy in england principally, and also in france and germany on a smaller scale, was well known; and in a diplomatic way he suggested that some of that kind of patronage bestowed upon the ship-building interests in the united states would be extremely gratifying to the american people. he also thought that the popularity of such a project in this country would be made universal if part of the proposed patronage should be awarded to the atlantic and part to the pacific coast. minister dunn’s suggestion was taken up by the american trading company in the orient, and their joint advocacy of the scheme was crowned with success. acting upon intimation of such a suggestion, the cramp company and the union iron works of san francisco sent agents to japan, and when they returned, contracts were made with the japanese minister toru hoshi, representing the imperial government, and the two 231ship-building companies above mentioned. the ship built by cramp is now known in the japanese navy list as the “kasagi,” and that built by the union iron works of san francisco as the “chitose.”

up to that time the japanese navy had been built almost exclusively in england, and with unimportant exceptions wholly by armstrong. of the vessels which won the naval battles on the yellow sea in the chino-japanese war of 1894 almost all, with the exception of a few torpedo craft, were built by armstrong & company at elswick.

there was, however, one difficulty in the way of japanese patronage of american shipyards in the construction of naval vessels. this difficulty soon came to the surface, but was averted by the urgency of diplomatic considerations. it grew out of the fact that the money which japan was using to augment her navy was that which she realized from the chinese indemnity paid under the provisions of the treaty of shimonoseki. this indemnity had been furnished by russia and financed in england or by english capitalists; and it appeared that there was a sort of tacit, if not express, understanding that most of it was to be spent in naval construction, and that the ships which it was to pay for should be built in english 232shipyards. however, the japanese naval authorities were extremely desirous of adding one or more american-built ships to their fleet; their idea, from the professional point of view, being that, as they were then about prepared, or had been for some time engaged in preparing, to build ships at home in their own dock-yards, the possession of one or more american-built ships would be of value as samples, models, or object lessons. finally, after considerable negotiation carried on partly with or through the japanese minister at washington, and partly at head-quarters in tokio, the japanese government awarded a contract to cramp for the construction of a first-class protected cruiser of the highest attainable speed. this contract was signed by mr. cramp on behalf of the company and by toru hoshi, the minister, on behalf of his majesty, the emperor of japan. the vessel, the “kasagi,” was originally designed to be of about 5000 tons displacement, but was modified to a displacement of about 5500 tons. the guaranty was 17,000 indicated horse-power and twenty-two and one-half (22?) knots speed, to be determined by four runs, two each way over a measured course ten knots long. upon her completion the ship was taken in charge by the 233japanese captain and crew, and upon her arrival home immediately took a conspicuous place in the japanese navy. although this vessel gave the most profound satisfaction in every respect, and although she had been built in the united states at a cost that compared quite favorably with relative contract prices elsewhere, the japanese did not repeat the experiment for reasons already intimated. in fact, all the influence of british diplomacy upon the policy of japan was successfully employed in securing the maintenance of the british alliance in opposition to the advance of the russians in the direction of the pacific and to retain the monopoly that english ship-builders, principally armstrong, had previously enjoyed, and to prevent or prohibit the construction of any more vessels of war in the united states or in american shipyards.

mr. cramp continued his active correspondence with the russian authorities with constantly increasing prospects of success. so promising had the situation become in the summer of 1897, that mr. cramp, who had gone to europe to attend the jubilee session of the british institution of naval architects and marine engineers, concluded to make a flying visit to st. petersburg before the meeting. his stay there was not long, only about a week. 234his object was to survey the ground and to ascertain definitely what prospect there was for the then rumored intention of the russian government to put forth a large and formidable naval programme during the ensuing winter.

mr. cramp returned to england from st. petersburg, and took part in the many meetings of the jubilee session referred to. one of the events of that occasion was a visit to the great elswick shipyards and ordnance works of armstrong & company, which mr. cramp himself describes in a private letter as follows:

visit to the armstrong works.

“the officers of the society of naval architects and marine engineers of the united states with certain officers of the american navy were invited to meet the representative naval architects and marine engineers of foreign nations and participate in the meetings of the international congress of these bodies in london during the month of july, 1897.

“after various entertainments under the auspices of the institute and a visit to and reception by the queen at windsor castle, the party went to scotland; after visiting glasgow and stopping at edinburgh, where sir andrew noble and philip watt, of the armstrong works, met them; they were to be escorted to the works in the afternoon. feeling sure that a visit of that kind to such a shipyard with a great crowd and in such limited time would be very unsatisfactory, and its results necessarily 235incomplete, i concluded to go on to newcastle the night before and make an exhaustive visit to the works there before the arrival of the large crowd. this being the greatest shipyard in the world, i desired to examine its new constructions in progress, with regard to their novelties in device and design, in my own way and my own time, without being carried along by a great crowd as in a ‘personally conducted’ tour. i therefore went on to newcastle the night previous to the projected visit. when i arrived at the hotel in newcastle, i found a russian naval architect, mr. tchernigovsky, in the act of registering, and had gone there for the same reasons that i had, and we concluded to go to the works together. when we arrived at the armstrong works and had registered our names and had asked to be conducted through the works, we found that all the principals had gone to edinburgh, to return with visitors, and, after some hesitation on the part of the official in charge, we were escorted through the works by one of the clerks.

“we found that there were eighteen war vessels on the stocks! a list of which was found in the programme of the visit given us in the afternoon. the destination of the majority of the ships was known, but not indicated in the programme. before we left newcastle, i was enabled to locate all of the ships.

“we had not gone far in the shipyard before i saw a 7-inch armor plate suspended on slings ready for hoisting in its place on what appeared at first to be a high-speed, large protected cruiser, but on ascending the brow stage we found it to be an armored cruiser of advanced type and speed and with very heavy armor for that type of vessel.

“when we asked the young man as to the nationality of the ship he could not tell, but stated that was one of 236the ships building on account of the firm. this was as interesting to mr. tchernigovsky as it was to me, and our examination was rather prolonged, no objection being made by the young man who escorted us, who not being a mechanic was indifferent as to our actions. we found before we left the works that there were two or three battleships of advanced type and superior model and three or four armored cruisers, whose destination was unknown to the people at the works outside of the office. there was one thing that we were sure of, that these ships were not building by the company for sale, and that there was an important mystery to be solved.

“by the time we returned to the office, we found that the edinburgh crowd had arrived, ready for luncheon, after which the whole party went through the works; there was but little time to see what was going on, and the character and the existence of these important ships entirely escaped the notice of the visitors. there were a number of japanese and chinese officers present with the visitors.

“we had for some time before this visit secured possession in china of copies of certain plans and specifications for an advanced type of armored cruiser, and after an examination we found that they were proposals of the thames iron works for raising a loan and for building a fleet for the chinese navy.

“the resemblance between the armored cruisers building and the chinese plans was so great, that i am sure the japanese ships were made from copies of the thames iron works drawings. the whole scheme of the thames iron works was excellent and feasible, and the chinese lost a fine navy by not accepting the offer.

“i thought that the construction of such an advanced type of war vessel under the conditions was of sufficient 237importance to inform lieutenant colwell, our naval attaché at the united states embassy. when i called on him, he seemed surprised to find that i had made the ‘discovery;’ and he stated that he had wired a cipher despatch to washington describing the ships, and that they were for the japanese, and that he had been informed of it by the chinese naval attaché, who was a very bright man and whose knowledge of the fact was from an absolutely correct source. mr. colwell stated that no one but the chinese attaché and himself was aware of it outside of the armstrong’s and the british government. of course, the last persons to be suspected of knowing anything about the matter were the japanese. mr. colwell was well posted as to the object of the great enterprise.

“it was easy for armstrong’s to keep a matter of this kind quiet, as they had built so many war vessels for various countries, and with eighteen on the stocks they would not be noticed; and, besides, they were never without one or two vessels under construction for sale.

“the character of the vessels and the information that i gathered from mr. colwell and the chinese attaché, and the fact that london was filled with foreign naval officers, diplomats, and others in attendance on the festivities, gave me opportunities to secure much important information as to what was going on behind the scenes. the japanese in numbers and importance exceeded the delegates of the other nationalities that participated in the naval architects’ ceremonies, and they were treated in the most obsequious and deferential manner by all of the british dignitaries, ship-builders, ordnance and armor makers, dealers in supplies, and the english people generally.

“soon after the armstrong visit i met a japanese nobleman, marquis ito, or iendo, at the lord mayor’s 238reception. he was the head and front of the japanese contingent, judging from the amount of adulation that prominent british dignitaries and ship-builders accorded him. desiring to be sure of the facts in relation to the japanese ships at the armstrong works i accosted him with an air of knowing all about it and as if there was no use of his denying it,—hurrying along with my description in elaborate detail, giving him no opportunity to reply,—i said: ‘oh, marquis ito! i have just examined your very fine ships at the armstrong works. they are superior to anything in any navy, british or any other, and with the speed of twenty knots and 7-inch armor and excellent model, etc.;’ running along without giving him time to reply until i got out of breath and stopped.

“during my talk his face was a study. it was impossible to note or guess at his impressions, and i was extremely doubtful as to the result; but the fact that we were then building a japanese war vessel, the ‘kasagi,’ led him to believe that i knew something, particularly as my elaborate description in detail of the qualities of the ships under construction was correct; so, being sure that i was thoroughly posted, he made no denial, but bowed smilingly and with an air of approval. i had no opportunity of discussing the new fleet with mr. tchernigovsky after we left the armstrong works, but from information i subsequently received i was satisfied that his early visit to newcastle was not accidental.

“the discovery of the construction of this fleet was the origin of my article on ‘the coming sea power’ in the north american review of october, 1897.

“i ascertained while in london, from additional sources not to be mentioned here, that the construction of these ships was undertaken in consequence of a secret alliance 239between great britain and japan to prevent the united states from securing possession of the sandwich islands and to head off the russians in the pacific, etc.

“the great engineering strike in great britain during this time delayed the delivery of the japanese vessels and the construction of the great fleet of british ships then under way for two or three years, and the whole thing fell through because the favorable opportunity had passed. the delay gave them time to think it over. and, besides, we were beginning to make a show of naval power. it was also at this time that the germans were beginning to show their practical aspirations in the direction of ‘sea power.’

“the construction of the ships and their object was known also to captain gregorovitch, russian naval attaché in london, and that probably accounted for the visit of mr. tchernigovsky.

“one interesting circumstance in connection with this strike and its consequences was the fact that under the operations of the strike a very large number of the best english shipyard workmen and engineers went to germany, and became permanently located there in the shipyards; and while their absence crippled great britain, they more than any other cause advanced the construction of the german navy; so that while the leaders of the strike in england gained nothing by it there for the engineers but disaster to themselves and their country, they were conspicuously instrumental in assisting the most powerful rival of england.

“it would be an interesting subject for reflection or discussion as to what might have been the consequences if the strike had not occurred and the japanese and british fleets had been finished two years before they were.

“at the time these fleets were started there existed 240throughout the naval world a lull in war-vessel output, particularly so in russia and the united states, until some time after the announcement of the japanese policy. the germans had, however, been much in advance in the way of waking up and realizing the real situation.”

the programme of the visit to the armstrong works embraced the following list of war vessels then building there. this programme did not indicate the destination of any of these ships, so far as they were being built for foreign account, and that designation included all of them except one third-class cruiser of 2800 tons displacement building there for the english navy. therefore the destinations of all war-ships then building at the armstrong works which are noted in the margin of the programme are those dropped from other sources of information, all of which turned out to be absolutely true. it should be explained here that the policy of the armstrong company in building vessels of war for foreign navies always was to keep their destination secret as long as possible. and here it may be added that brassey’s “naval annual,” the most comprehensive work of its kind that ever existed, did not in its issue for the year 1897 contain the destination of any of these ships building at armstrong’s for foreign account, and that the same 241work for the next year did give their destinations based upon the disclosures made by mr. cramp in connection with commander colwell, our naval attaché in london, and the naval attaché of the chinese legation there. with this explanation, we present a copy of the programme of the visit, with mr. cramp’s annotations as noted above.

through new smith’s shop to

elswick shipyard.

sir w. g. armstrong, whitworth & co., limited, have now under construction the following vessels of war:

tons. speed in knots. for

one armored-clad battleship 14,800 18 (japan.)

one armored-clad battleship 12,200 18 (japan.)

two first-class armored cruisers, each of 9,600 20 (japan.)

one first-class armored cruiser 8,500 20 chile.

two fast protected cruisers 4,500 24 china.

two fast protected cruisers 4,300 22? (japan.) portugal.

one fast protected cruiser 4,250 21 chile.

two armor-clads 3,800 17 norway.

three fast protected cruisers, each of 3,450 20 brazil.

one third-class cruiser 2,800 18 england.

one training ship 2,500 14

one torpedo-boat destroyer 300 30

two first-class armored cruisers, contracted for besides mercantile vessels at their shipyard at walker. 9,750 20 (japan.)

by the end of the year 1897, or rather during this year, besides the ships enumerated above 242for japan there were in course of construction elsewhere:

one battleship (“fuji”), in commission.

one battleship, 14,800 tons, building at thames iron works.

one battleship, 14,800 tons, building at thompson’s.

one battleship, 10,000 tons, under consideration, the armstrong works (contract not signed).

one armored cruiser, 9600 tons, ordered at vulcan works.

one armored cruiser, 9600 tons, ordered at st. nazaire.

four torpedo-boat destroyers of 30 knots, similar to british destroyers of 30 knots, building at yarrow.

four torpedo-boat destroyers of 30 knots, similar to british destroyers of 30 knots, building at thornycroft.

one torpedo-boat destroyer of 30 knots (?), similar to british destroyers of 30 knots, building at schichau.

eight torpedo boats of 90 tons, schichau.

four torpedo boats of 90 tons, normand.

the japanese battleships are named “yashima,” “hatzure,” “mikasa,” “asahi,” and “shikisima.”

medi-j-ieh in commission

copyright, 1904, by john w. dawson

the first-class armored cruisers with seven-inch 243side armor at armstrong’s were the “asama,” “idzumo,” “iwate,” and “takima;” at st. nazaire, france, “azuma;” and at the vulcan iron works, stettin, germany, the “yakumo.” five battleships, 6 armored cruisers, and 21 torpedo boats under construction in 1897, in addition to the ships in their own yards.

soon after his return to america, mr. cramp decided that the results of his visits to the armstrong works should be given to the public, as there were no obligations of secrecy imposed on him, and particularly as he thought that the united states was, or should be, interested in the matter; besides, he desired to extend the field of the operations of their ship-building works abroad and secure a small portion of the construction of war-ships which england, france, and germany had monopolized, and for that purpose he prepared a paper, which was printed in the november number of the north american review for 1897. this paper added a considerable scope of discussion applying directly to the relative naval activity of russia and japan, and drawing, or rather pointedly leaving for inference, the conclusion that russia was not keeping pace with the development 244of her already great and rapidly growing rival in the oriental pacific.

this paper was as follows:

“the coming sea power.”

“most well-informed people have a pretty clear general idea that the present is an era of unexampled naval activity throughout the civilized world; that great fleets are building everywhere; that the ships composing them are of new types, representing the highest development of naval architecture and the most exquisite refinement of the art of naval armament. doubtless, a much smaller number of persons are aware that a new factor of imposing proportions has come into the general situation; that the newest member of the family of civilization is with rapid strides reaching a status of actual and potential sea power with which the older nations must henceforth reckon most seriously.

“it is, however, questionable whether any one not intimately conversant with the current history of modern ship-building, or not qualified to estimate properly the relative values of actual armaments, can adequately conceive the vast significance of the prodigious efforts which this youngest of civilized nations was then, and still is, successfully putting forth toward the quick and sure attainment of commanding power on the sea.

“in order to estimate accurately the significance of the current naval activity of japan, it is requisite to trace briefly her prior development as a maritime power.

“the foundation of the japanese navy was laid by the purchase of the confederate ram ‘stonewall,’ built in france in 1864, surrendered to the united states in 1865, and shortly afterward sold or given to japan. this ship was soon followed by another of somewhat similar 245type, built at the thames iron works in 1864-65, now borne on the japanese navy list as the ‘riojo,’ and used as a gunnery and training ship.

“from that time to the period of the chinese war the naval growth of japan was steady, and, considering her very recent adoption of western methods, rapid.

“at the beginning of that war, japan, though possessing a very respectable force of cruisers and gunboats, mostly of modern types and advanced design, had no armored ships worthy of the name. the old ‘stonewall’ had been broken up, the ‘fu-so,’ the ‘riojo,’ the ‘heiyei,’ and the ‘kon-go,’ built from 1865 to 1877, were obsolete, and the ‘chiyoda,’ the only one of modern design and armament, was a small armored cruiser of 2450 tons, with a 4?-inch belt, and no guns larger than 4.7-inch caliber.

“the unarmored fleet, however, on which she had to rely, was for its total displacement equal to any in the world. it embraced three of the ‘hoshidate’ class, 4277 tons and 5400 horse-power; two of the ‘naniwa’ class, 3650 tons and 7000 horse-power, which had been considered by our navy department worth copying in the ‘charleston;’ the ‘yoshino,’ 4150 tons and 15,000 horse-power, and about fifteen serviceable gun-vessels from 615 to 1700 tons. all of the cruisers had been built in europe, but most of the gun-vessels were of japanese build, and represented the first efforts of the japanese people in modern naval construction.

“among the results of the war was the addition of several chinese vessels to the japanese navy, including the battleship ‘chen yuen,’ of 7400 tons and 6200 horse-power, and the ‘ping yuen,’ armored coast defence ship, which had been captured by the unarmored cruisers of the mikado.

“at the end of the war japan had forty-three sea-going 246vessels, displacing in the aggregate 79,000 tons, of which seven serviceable ships, with total displacement of 15,000 tons, were prizes.

“the navy of japan in commission at that time (1897) embraced forty-eight sea-going ships, of 111,000 tons displacement, and twenty-six torpedo boats. the five sea-going vessels, of 32,000 tons total displacement, which had been added since the war, represented the most advanced types of modern naval architecture, and included two first-class battleships of 12,800 tons each, the ‘fuji’ and ‘yashima.’

“the ship-building programme then in progress of actual construction was calculated to produce by the year 1903 a total effective force of sixty-seven sea-going ships, twelve torpedo-catchers, and seventy-five torpedo boats, with an aggregate displacement of more than 200,000 tons.

“to the navy in commission or available for instant service, already described, japan now adds, in plain sight under actual construction in various stages of forwardness, a new fleet vastly superior to it in power and efficiency.

“here i desire to say that the word ‘progress,’ in its conventional sense, does not adequately indicate the naval activity of japan. the word implies continuity, by more or less even pace, in one of two directions, or in both; one direction is an increase in tonnage, with but little or no improvement in efficiency; and the other is a marked advance of new ships in all the elements of offence, defence, staying power, and economy.

“the first condition of progress is represented by the present activity of most nations who are sailing along evenly and with self-approval in fancied superiority. the second condition is represented by japan, who suddenly 247appears as a cyclone in a smooth sea of commonplace progress.

“japan is not only building more ships than any other power except england, but she is building better ships in english shipyards than england herself is constructing for her own navy. while other nations proceed by steps, japan proceeds by leaps and bounds. what other nations are doing may be described as progress, but what japan is doing must be termed a phenomenon. she is building:

“(1) three 14,800-ton battleships, which are well advanced at the armstrong works, thompson’s, and thames iron works, respectively.

“(2) one battleship of about 10,000 tons, commencing at the armstrong works.

“(3) four first-class armored cruisers of 9750 tons displacement and twenty knots speed at the armstrong works; one at the vulcan works, stettin, germany, and one in france.

“(4) two 5000-ton protected cruisers of about twenty-three knots speed; one at san francisco and one at philadelphia.

“(5) one protected cruiser of 4300 tons and about twenty-three knots speed, at the armstrong works.

“(6) four thirty-knot torpedo-boat destroyers at yarrow’s.

“(7) four more of similar type at thompson’s.

“(8) eight 90-ton torpedo boats at the schichau works, elbing, germany.

“(9) four more of similar type at the normand works, france.

“(10) three 3000-ton protected cruisers of twenty knots, three torpedo gunboats and a despatch vessel, at the imperial dock-yard, yokosuka, japan.

“(11) the programme for the current year embraces 248a fifth armored cruiser of the type previously described (9600 tons and twenty knots), to be built also at yokosuka.

“this is japan’s naval increase actually in sight. excepting the ships building at yokosuka, the whole programme has come under my personal observation.

“comparison with the current progress of other powers discloses the fact that japan is second only to england in naval activity, being ahead of france, much in advance of germany, and vastly in the lead of russia and the united states. it must also be borne in mind that the new japanese fleet comprises throughout the very latest and highest types of naval architecture in every respect of force, economy, and efficiency.

“the spectacle of japan surpassing france and closely following england herself in naval activity is startling. considering the shortness of the time which has elapsed since japan entered the family of nations or aspired to any rank whatever as a power, it is little short of miraculous. yet it is a fact, and to my mind it is the most significant single fact of our time. nations do not display such energy or undertake such expenditure without a purpose.

“it can hardly be maintained that japan aims her vast preparations at the united states; at least, not primarily. the pending hawaiian affair has given rise to some irritation, but its importance has been systematically exaggerated by the english press. it cannot, in any event, go beyond the stage of diplomatic exchanges. japan will, doubtless, receive from the united states sufficient assurance that the rights of her subjects in hawaii will be protected in case of annexation, and thus far she has asked no more than that. she is certainly entitled to no less.

249“the object of the english in encouraging japan to make a bold front against the united states was and is, like all their objects, purely commercial. they hoped to stir up in the japanese mind an ill-feeling that would prevent the award of any more contracts to american shipyards, and even this characteristic stratagem is not likely to have more than a temporary effect. thus i think it may be assumed that japan’s immense naval preparation is not made with the united states in hostile view; certainly not mainly.

“assuming these conditions to be beyond dispute, and considering that the completion of the trans-siberian railway will at once make russia a great pacific power, politically and commercially, her naval situation in those seas must become a matter of prime importance; perhaps not of equal importance with that of the united states now, but at once sufficient to challenge the best efforts of her statesmen.

“having all these facts in view, and being in a position to judge with some accuracy of the significance and value of preparations which came under my own observation during a recent tour of europe in my professional capacity, i could not help remarking the vast difference between the naval activity of japan and that of the other two first-rate pacific powers, russia and the united states. the existing situation in russia and the united states, relatively speaking, can hardly be called more than the merest perfunctory progress, whereas the activity of japan is really marvellous. if she were simply meditating another attack on china alone or unsupported, no such fleet as japan is now building would be needed; certainly not the enormous battleships and the great armored cruisers. it must therefore be assumed that japan’s purpose is the general one of predominant sea power in the orient.

250“japan may, and probably does, meditate a renewal of her efforts to establish a footing on the asiatic mainland. possibly, she may have in view the ultimate acquisition of the philippine islands! (this was written the year before the spanish war.) but, whatever may be her territorial ambitions for the future, it is as plain as an open book that she intends, before she moves again, to place herself in a position to disregard and defy any external interference. this may be the true meaning of japan’s extreme activity in naval preparation at this time.

“i may say without violation of confidence that a japanese gentleman of distinction, a civilian, not long ago remarked in conversation on this subject that ‘while japan was forced by circumstances to yield much at shimonoseki that she had fairly conquered, she still secured indemnity enough to build a navy that would enable her to do better next time!’

“in view of all these facts, the question at once arises: are russia and the united states prepared or are they preparing to meet such conditions, and to maintain their proper naval status as pacific powers? my answer to that question, based on observations of japan’s naval strength already in sight and on what i know of her intended programme for further increase in the immediate future, as compared with the relative conditions of russia and this country, would be in the negative.

“just now russia is trying the experiment of reliance on her own imperial dock-yards, including two semi-private shipyards under government control; while the united states has halted completely. the russian dock-yards are efficient, as far as they go, and turn out good work, judging from such specimens as i have seen. but their capacity is not adequate to the task that is presented by the situation which i have delineated. no other nation relies wholly on its own public dock-yards for new naval 251constructions. england, with public dock-yards almost equal in capacity to those of the rest of the world combined, builds over 65 per cent. of her displacement and 97 per cent. of her horse-power by contract with private shipyards and machine-shops. france, with very great dock-yard facilities, builds a large proportion of her hulls and machinery by contract. the same is true of germany, italy, and the united states. but russia has no great private ship-building facilities, and there are no visible signs of the immediate development of resources of that description.

“japan, on the contrary, though she has some facilities of her own, is drawing upon the very best resources elsewhere to be found; she is drawing on the ship-building power at once of england, france, germany, and the united states. not only that, but more than that; the vessels japan is building in the shipyards of england, france, and germany are superior to any vessels those nations are building for themselves, class for class.

“hence, viewing the situation from any point at will, the conclusion of any one qualified to judge must be that, in the race for naval supremacy in the pacific, japan is gaining, while russia and the united states are losing ground.

“it requires little prescience to discern that the issue which is to settle that question of supremacy as between the powers may not be long deferred.

“though japan’s naval activity is primarily significant of a purpose to secure general predominance in oriental seas, and though, as i have suggested, there is no immediate reason for, or prospect of, trouble between japan and the united states involving naval armaments; yet, in the broad general sense of dignity on the sea, our country can by no means safely ignore or be inattentive 252to the progress of our oriental neighbor toward the rank of a first-class sea power in the pacific ocean. the completion of her fleet now building will, inside of three years, give japan that rank, and the future programme already laid out will accentuate it. the superior quality of japan’s new navy is even more significant than its enormous quantity. she has no useless ships, none obsolete; all are up to date.

“meantime, the attitude of the united states seems quite as supine as that of russia. it is not necessary to go into minute detail on this point. suffice it to say that, taking russia, japan, and the united states as the three maritime powers most directly concerned in the pacific ocean, and whose interests are most immediately affected by its command, japan at her present rate of naval progress, viewed with relation to the lack of progress of the other two, must in three years be able to dominate the pacific against either, and in less than ten years, against both.

“i have heard the question raised as to the character and quality of the japanese personnel; i have heard the suggestion that, magnificent as their material may be, their officers and men are not up to the european or american standard. it is not my intention to discuss this phase of the matter. but it is worth while to observe that, if the japanese officers with whom we are in daily contact as inspectors of work we are doing for their government are average samples, they have no odds to ask of the officers of any other navy whatsoever as to professional ability, practical application, and capacity to profit by experience. and it should also be borne in mind that they have had more and later experience in actual warfare than the officers of any other navy, or of all other navies. while all other navies have been wrestling with 253the theoretical problems of war colleges, or encountering the hypothetical conditions of squadron evolutions, fleet man?uvres, and sham battles, the japanese have been sinking or taking the ships, bombarding the towns, and forcing the harbors of their enemy. i do not know how others may view this sort of disparity in experience, but in my opinion it is the most portentous fact in the whole situation, and because of it no navy that has not done any fighting at all has the slightest license to question in any respect the quality of the personnel of the japanese navy that has done a good deal of extremely successful fighting.

“on the whole, the attitude of japan among the powers is in the last degree admirable. her aspirations are exaltedly patriotic, and her movements to realize them are planned with a consummate wisdom, and executed with a systematic skill, which nations far older in the arts of western civilization would do well to emulate.”

in this paper, it need hardly be said, mr. cramp hewed to the line. he did not flatter the russians nor did he omit to advise them of the full extent and unquestionable consequences of their procrastination and supineness. when the paper was prepared and had been finally revised, mr. cramp still hesitated about publishing it in that form. “the russians,” he said, “are extremely sensitive; they know their weakness, or the best minds among them know it quite as well as i have pointed it out in this paper. of course, i intend it as an appeal to their patriotism and to their sense of their country’s needs; but i am afraid that 254it will hurt the sensibilities of some of them.” however, after further consideration, mr. cramp determined to print the paper as it stood, and it was done. probably no article appearing in an american magazine in many years, if ever, received as widespread or as earnest attention in europe as did mr. cramp’s paper on “the coming sea power.” as soon as the north american review arrived in europe, the paper was translated and printed in russian and german and a copious synopsis of it in french, in the naval periodicals of the respective countries. it was also extensively discussed and criticised in the english press, both in the service papers and in the regular daily journals. in st. petersburg, besides being translated and printed in the principal russian magazine and discussed in the newspapers, it was made the basis of an address by one of the most eminent admirals in the russian navy. mr. cramp’s cautious apprehension, already referred to, that it might touch the susceptibilities of russian officers proved groundless; and it has been openly admitted by high officials of the russian ministry of marine that the arguments and considerations so vigorously advanced by mr. cramp had an effect of no little potency in turning the scale of russian policy, which a 255few months later found expression in the great naval programme of 1898.

early in the following spring mr. cramp received advices from st. petersburg that the ministry of marine would be glad to entertain plans and proposals from him for the construction of at least two first-class battleships, two first-class protected cruisers of the highest speed, and thirty torpedo boats, under the new programme which had then, february, 1898, been finally authorized by the ministry and approved by the emperor nicholas ii.

upon receipt of this information or suggestion, mr. cramp lost no time in preparing for the voyage. although the time of year, early in march, was the most inclement season for a visit to the great northern capital, he cheerfully accepted the situation. so far as the general scheme and outline plans were concerned, he had substantially worked them out in anticipation, and not much delay was caused on that account. early in march, 1898, mr. cramp sailed on the american line steamship “st. paul,” bound for st. petersburg by the way of southampton. upon his arrival at the russian capital, he was immediately turned over to the tender mercies of what is known as the technical board. this in russian naval administration is a board composed of officers 256representing all the branches of the service,—line, construction, engineering and ordnance, or the artillery branch, as they call it. the membership of this board is considerable in number. for several weeks they subjected mr. cramp to a species of inquisition which might well have appalled a man of less resources, less determination, or less confidence in his own ultimate mastery of the situation. it is not worth while, even did our limits of space admit, to go into detail of mr. cramp’s discussion of his proposed designs and plans with the members of the technical board. suffice to say, that after some weeks of consideration, taking the widest possible range, a general agreement was reached, leaving but few questions open for subsequent determination, none of which were of vital importance. the sequel of the whole transaction was that on the 23d of april, 1898, contracts were signed by mr. cramp on behalf of the company, and by vice-admiral v. verhovskoy, chief of the department of construction and supply, on behalf of the emperor, for the construction of two vessels, one first-class battleship, now known as the “retvizan,” and one first-class protected cruiser of the highest practicable speed, known as the “variag.”

in his operations at st. petersburg leading 257up to these important contracts, which aggregated nearly seven millions of dollars, including extra work ordered during construction, mr. cramp encountered powerful and persistent opposition from three widely diverse sources. first, there was an element strongly intrenched in the ministry of marine, who opposed the award of contracts to foreign builders other than the french. this element of opposition was powerfully represented on the technical board, and its influences were shown particularly in the ordnance installation and in the engineering section, who wanted everything done in russia. it proved factious and troublesome, though not otherwise formidable, because the decision to have some of the ships in the programme of 1898 built abroad had already been reached in higher quarters. in fact, though not definitely so announced by the russian government, it was known by the middle of march, 1898, at least by those intending to bid, that the ministry of marine had decided to award contracts for the construction of two first-class battle-ships, one armored cruiser, and three first-class protected cruisers of the highest speed in foreign shipyards, and a large number of torpedo boats.

the french and german shipyards were 258represented not only by their own agents and experts, but they were backed, and their claims to consideration urged, with all the power and influence their respective embassies and banking houses could command at the court of st. petersburg.

however, this situation was not at all unforeseen or unexpected by mr. cramp. to encounter opposition from the agents of the foreign banking houses and diplomats was a normal condition of this kind of business. fortunately for mr. cramp, or, rather, fortunately for american industrial interests at large, we also had an ambassador at st. petersburg in 1898. he was not of the common run of american diplomatic representatives “near” foreign courts. he was different. almost from the foundation of our government, a rule—amounting to unwritten law—had prevailed which forbade american diplomatic representatives abroad to do or say anything in aid or furtherance of commercial or industrial enterprises of american citizens in the country to which they were accredited.

object lessons were before them. during polk’s administration, james buchanan, then secretary of state, had removed, or rather transferred to another post, a united states minister to one of the south american republics 259on the pacific slope. this minister had committed the, in united states “diplomacy,” unpardonable offence of indorsing the drafts of certain whale-ship captains upon their owners in new bedford and nantucket. the ships of these captains were in distress, having been dismasted in tempestuous passages around cape horn, and they had made their voyage to valparaiso under jury-masts. arrived there, they needed money to repair and refit their battered and storm-beaten ships. our minister to chile used his good offices to help them get their drafts cashed so they could repair their vessels and pursue their voyages. this, from the view-point of primitive united states “diplomacy,” was of course a crime, and the minister was made to suffer for it! ultimately this unwritten law or tacit doctrine found expression on the floor of the senate, in a debate on the consular and diplomatic appropriation, from the lips of thomas f. bayard:

“the purity and dignity of our foreign representation,” he said, “must be preserved! the law now recognized, though unwritten, should be made statutory! if an american minister abroad should use any of the influence or employ any of the prestige or credit which he may derive from his status as a representative of this country to aid or further or promote any scheme or project of 260american citizens in that country, having private gain in view, he should be held answerable for official misdemeanor!”

buchanan and bayard have already found their proper levels in american history, and need not be discussed here, even if their memories were worth discussion. but the theory they applied to our diplomatic representation was for many years the rule. the result was that our “diplomatic service” (so-called) down to, we may say, the end of cleveland’s last administration, had become little else than a hospital for political cripples, or a sanitarium for over-worked old lawyers and nervously prostrated college professors. it was the laughing-stock of foreigners and the object of cynical, albeit good-natured, contempt on the part of our own people. it had become a symposium of urbane uselessness and solemn stupidity.

all this was changed in our representation at st. petersburg in 1898. our ambassador there was the hon. ethan allen hitchcock, of missouri. he was neither a political cripple, nor an overworked old lawyer, nor a college president needing a gilt-edged vacation.

he was a great and successful manufacturer, a man of broad and keen business instincts, and he thought that any scheme calculated to 261disburse about seven million dollars among the workingmen and steel mills of the united states was well worthy the earnest attention and the best officers of the most dignified ambassador. imbued with such ideas, mr. hitchcock helped mr. cramp all he could. he may not have been as noisy about it as the german ambassador or as strenuously in evidence as the french ambassador, but he was none the less active or effective in his efforts to subserve and promote the interests of his country and her citizens. the maw-worm doctrine of buchanan and the raven-like croaking of bayard were lost upon such a man. taking the situation altogether, it is safe to say, so far as diplomatic representation was concerned, the commercial and industrial interests of the united states and of american citizens in the russian empire were quite as well guarded in 1898 as were those of france and germany.

the third element of opposition which mr. cramp had to encounter and overcome was of a purely technical or mechanical character. his plans involved installation of water-tube boilers of the niclausse type. but up to that moment, ever since the adoption of the water-tube system by the russian navy, the belleville type of boiler had held undisputed sway there. the enormous wealth of the belleville 262people, their straightway, open-handed mode of doing business with naval officials, not only in russia but in england as well, and their aptness in placing valuable things where they would do the most good, were all notorious. they had for some time admitted that the niclausse system was their most formidable rival, and naturally they were ready to exhaust their resources to prevent its introduction into the russian navy, where their monopoly, up to that time, had been perfect and invulnerable. this discussion was, of course, carried on wholly between mr. cramp and the russian technical authorities. it was a subject that could not be touched by diplomacy or by personal influence; a contest to be fought out wholly on the mechanical merits of the respective systems and decided entirely by skilled judgment. in this kind of contest mr. cramp was at home, and he won. his staple argument was that for any naval power to surrender itself to a single type of proprietary boiler, thereby creating a monopoly against itself, could not be else than unwise; that the era of water-tube boilers was still in the experimental stage, that perfection was yet to be developed, and was doubtless a long way off. exhaustive trials already made had demonstrated a wide range of efficiency and consequent 263merit in the niclausse system, and while it was no part of his contention to decry or depreciate the rival type, comparative performances of official record beyond dispute argued that sound marine engineering policy would forbid the exclusion of the niclausse system. by the weight of these arguments mr. cramp carried all his points. the ultimate result of a six weeks’ campaign was the award of contracts for construction of six vessels in foreign shipyards: one first-class battleship and one armored cruiser to the forges et chantiers, of france; one first-class battleship and one large protected cruiser of the highest attainable speed to mr. cramp, and two protected cruisers of type similar to the last-named to germany yards, the “germania” of kiel and the “vulcan” of stettin.

upon these awards, mr. cramp came home and began construction at once. indeed, while still in st. petersburg, he had placed orders for important parts of the material required, and had contracted for the necessary armor. at the outset some delay occurred, due to the extreme deliberation observed by the russian inspectors in approving detail plans and specifications, and to some changes made in the character and quality of material for protective decks after the contract was signed. 264but notwithstanding these delays, mr. cramp completed and delivered both his ships long in advance of either the french or german builders, and such time penalties as had accrued by reason of the initial delays already referred to were remitted by direction of the emperor nicholas ii himself.

the trial conditions imposed upon these ships were the most drastic and crucial ever known; they being required to develop their maximum speed for twelve hours continuously, as against four-hour or measured mile trials in other navies.

upon the completion and delivery of these ships, mr. cramp had achieved the distinction of having done the greatest volume and highest value of ship-building for foreign accounts ever performed in an american shipyard. on their arrival at st. petersburg, both ships were personally inspected by the emperor, who was so pleased with the “variag” that he ordered her detailed as escort to the imperial yacht in a trip to cherbourg.

it is worthy of remark that in the fall of 1898 our navy department advertised for proposals to construct three battleships, now known as the “maine” class. the plan put forth by the department was a modified and slightly enlarged “alabama,” with a speed 265requirement of seventeen knots as against sixteen in the original type. mr. cramp offered to build an eighteen-knot ship within the statutory limit prescribed for one of seventeen knots, and used his russian battleship as a basis of design. his proposition was accepted, and the other bidders—newport news and the union iron works, to each of whom one ship was awarded—were required to adopt mr. cramp’s conditions of dimension and performance. in this manner the american navy as well as the russian profited by mr. cramp’s interesting and remarkable “campaign of 1898.”