foreign commerce in 1865—the “clyde” and “george w. clyde,” and introduction of compound engines—commerce of 1870—merchant marine—lynch committee—mr. cramp and committee—lynch bill—american steamship company—visit to british shipyards—john elder—british methods—interchange of methods—merchant marine continued—dingley bill—defects—act of 1891, providing registry for foreign ships—“st. louis” and “st. paul”—extract from forum—remarks on article—committee of ship-builders and owners—new bill introduced by frye and dingley—north atlantic traffic association—new ship-yards—tactics of north atlantic traffic association—our navigation laws, north american review—mr. whitney—unfriendly legislation—mr. whitney’s letter—effects of letter—mr. cramp’s letter to committee of merchant marine—international mercantile marine.

the return of peace in 1865 found the country without sea-commerce either coastwise or foreign. such ships as had not been taken up by the government had, with the exception of a few whaling-vessels in the pacific ocean, been transferred to foreign flags to save them from the ravages of confederate pirates or cruisers which, to all intents and purposes, so far as construction, armament, equipment, 100and crews were concerned, were nothing but british privateers in disguise. in the mean time england had taken every advantage of the situation, and by 1865 had practically absorbed all the magnificent ocean-carrying trade which the united states enjoyed prior to 1860. american ship-building was at a stand-still. the government at once threw upon the market all the ships which it had taken up for gun-boats, auxiliary cruisers, transports, etc., during the war. they were sold for anything that they would bring, and they were bought up as a speculation by new companies unfamiliar with the shipping business, and as a consequence they all failed. the ships were obsolete or worn out and soon passed out of existence. certain coastwise lines continued to do a small business, but little or no attempt was made to restore our foreign trade; first, because none of the vessels which the government threw on the market were in a condition to undertake it; and, second, because, in consequence of the inflated prices of everything, any attempt to compete either in seafaring labor or material with england would have been absurd. besides this, the whole energy and capital of the country were immediately directed to an extraordinary expansion of railway systems, so that the attention of the people 101was entirely diverted from the sea and fixed upon the interior. for the next five or six years little or no ship-building of any description was done anywhere in the united states.

it was at this time that the cramp company considered it indispensable to attach engine building to the construction of hulls, as no satisfactory arrangement could be made to secure accurate performance that involved two independent and diverse handicrafts in the undertaking. they secured the services as engineer of mr. j. shields wilson, whose training in the i. p. morris company, and at neafie & levy’s works had demonstrated his fitness for the post, and as to whose methods they were familiar.

one of the first achievements of the new enterprise was the design and construction of the compound engines for the “george w. clyde,” finished in the spring of 1872, the first present accepted type of compound marine engines built in america. immediately following them in 1873 and 1874 were the four ships for the american line, the “pennsylvania,” “ohio,” “indiana,” and “illinois.”

the “george w. clyde” was built for thomas clyde, who was the first ship-owner to introduce screw propulsion in ocean commerce 102in the united states by building the twin-screw steamship, the “john s. mckim,” built in 1844, which he used in the trade of the gulf of mexico and as a transport when the war with mexico occurred.

having built the first screw steamship, the “john s. mckim,” and the first steamship with compound engines, the “george w. clyde,” mr. clyde responded with alacrity to the recommendations of mr. cramp in favor of the use of the triple-expansion engines by building the “cherokee.”

the “mascott” for mr. plant was built at the same time.

mr. clyde had formed the acquaintance of mr. ericsson soon after his arrival in this country in 1839, just before the “john s. mckim” was constructed, and became an early convert to his fascinations in exploiting the superior merits of screw propulsions over every other.

the “john s. mckim” and engines were designed by mr. ericsson, and built near front and brown streets, philadelphia.

mr. jacob neafie, of reaney, neafie & co., celebrated engine builders, who began business soon after by constructing propeller engines, had considerable practical experience in the construction of the “john s. mckim’s” engines 103before reaney, neafie & co. had started business.

mr. ericsson had early secured the friendship of commodore stockton, and had a boat built for towing purposes by the celebrated ship-builders lairds, of berkenhead, called the “r. f. stockton.” commodore stockton had been already biased in favor of screw propulsion on account of the invention of the screw propeller as it practically exists to-day by john stevens in 1803. mr. stevens was the head and front of the organization of the bay, river, and canal navigation between the two great cities of new york and philadelphia, of which commodore stockton was a member.

the successful introduction of screw propulsion in the united states was certainly owing to the combined efforts of stevens, ericsson, and clyde.

mr. clyde was always to the front where new improvements were to be made.

the cramp company, having taken the lead in these new departures in engine construction at the beginning, have continued to remain there. they have ceased to construct wooden vessels, sail or steam, since the construction of the “clyde,” of iron. this vessel was for mr. thomas clyde, and preceded the “g. w. clyde.”

104by 1870 the deplorable state of the american merchant marine attracted the attention of the administration and congress. the house of representatives organized a select committee to investigate the causes of its decline, with instructions to submit in its report suggestion or recommendation of remedy. this is known in congressional history as the “lynch committee,” from its chairman, the honorable john r. lynch, member of congress, of maine. this committee surveyed the situation exhaustively, taking the statements of a large number of ship-owners and ship-builders, and while there was considerable divergence of views as to the sum-total of causes, there was little or no diversity of opinion as to the most immediate and effective remedy.

this committee, after thorough investigation and mature deliberation, reported that, in view of the policy of foreign maritime nations, particularly great britain, in the way of subsidies and other methods of aiding and promoting their merchant marines, it would be impossible for american ship-owners to compete with them in the absence of similar expedients on the part of our own government. in other words, the lynch committee reported in effect that the primary requisite toward a resurrection of the american merchant marine 105would be the adoption of a policy of subvention, or, as it is commonly termed, subsidy.

however, while the lynch committee was logical in its suggestion or recommendation of remedy, its investigations, so far as the sum-total of the causes of decline were concerned, and its estimate of those causes were incomplete and inconclusive, because it started out with the dogma that the then existing depression of the merchant marine was due wholly to the ravages of the war; and it did not take into account the correlative or co-operative facts of the situation, which were much broader and deeper in their application and effect than the mere suspension or destruction of our merchant marine by the war itself. in other words, the lynch committee failed to grasp or appreciate the fact that, while the war was wrecking our sea-going commerce, foreign maritime powers, and particularly the english, were making the most gigantic efforts not only to take the place of our ruined trade, but also to provide for a perpetuity of the substitution, so that at any time between the close of the war and the investigations of the lynch committee it had become impossible for an american ship-owner to operate a ship or a line of ships in any route of ocean traffic. by means of liberal subsidies under the guise of 106mail pay, the british had in the interim covered every sea-road and appropriated every channel of ocean commerce. this fact the lynch committee seems to have ignored, although it was really the prime factor in the situation, as it stood in 1870. mr. cramp, in his statement before the lynch committee, went altogether out of the beaten path pursued by most of the other ship-builders or ship-owners who appeared. he said in effect that while the civil war had been an immediate cause of the destruction of our merchant marine as it existed at the beginning of that struggle, still that was purely a physical cause, and in the absence of other causes need not operate after the war ended.

he called attention to the fact that the war had now been ended five years, but that the condition of our merchant marine, particularly in foreign trade, remained as pitiable as it had been in the height of the struggle. this he said argued the existence of other and more lasting causes than the simple destruction by war, whether by the government taking up our merchant-ships for its own use, or by the transfer of a great many of them to foreign flags to get the benefit of neutrality, or by the actual depredations of anglo-confederate privateers.

107he explained that during our misfortune the english took every advantage in the way of appropriating to themselves and to their own ships the traffic which our ships had formerly carried; that when the war closed, they had absolute command of the ocean-carrying trade, our own as well as theirs.

he said that not only did the british government subsidize and otherwise aid their ships and ship-owners, but that they also brought to bear all the tremendous resources of their navy to help and encourage british ship-builders. notwithstanding her enormous and well-equipped public dock-yards, the english government built a very large percentage of its hull construction in private shipyards, and not only that, but all their marine-engine work was let out by contract to private engine-builders, mainly independent establishments.

he stated that the result of this policy had been to develop the industry of marine engine building in great britain to a degree unknown anywhere else in the world.

on the contrary, our own government had done little for its navy since the war, and what little it had done had been carried out entirely in navy-yards.

this not only deprived private ship-building of the kind of aid and encouragement which 108england lavished upon her private shipyards and engine-shops, but the navy-yards themselves were a constant menace to the good order and content of mechanics working in private shipyards.

moreover, he said that the same class of mechanics who, immediately prior to the war, worked for $1.75 a day, now (1870) demanded and received $3.00 to $3.50 a day; whereas ship-building wages remained the same in england as in 1860.

he warned the committee that the day of wooden ships, particularly steamships, was past, and that the iron ship had come to stay, not only in england but everywhere else in the world.

he said that to enable the business of building iron ships and heavy marine machinery to become firmly established in this country, a very large amount of manufacturing machinery must be supplied, and in view of the present outlook no one would invest any considerable amount of capital in that direction without assurance of some aid and encouragement from the government similar to that which england rendered to her ship-building industry.

he then dwelt at considerable length upon the demoralization among mechanics produced 109by the government’s policy in confining its naval construction to the navy-yards.

he reviewed briefly the struggle between the cunard and collins lines prior to 1858, and showed conclusively that the downfall of the american collins line was due to the persistent and constantly increasing subsidies lavished by the british government upon the cunard line, which our government in 1858 met by withdrawing the collins subsidy and giving them instead the sea and inland postage on mail matter actually carried. in this respect he said congress indirectly came to the aid of the cunard line and helped it to overthrow the collins line. he hoped that the committee would give these particular facts their earnest attention. he said that they did not require deep or intricate investigation, because they were matters of common notoriety, known to everybody who was at all conversant with the commercial history of the country.

the admission of material for building iron ships free of duty, he said, would be an advantage, of course, and many believed that if our ship-builders could be relieved from the tariff and get their material free they could compete successfully with foreign builders; but the difference in wages was too great to be entirely overcome by the mere admission 110of materials duty free. as for materials, he would always prefer american iron for the construction of ships to foreign iron, provided it could be got at the same, or very nearly the same, price. there were many inconveniences, he said, attendant upon sending abroad for iron plates. he informed the committee that it was necessary to get the form of every plate and have it sketched before it was ordered, and if, after doing that, we must send abroad to have them made, very great inconvenience and delay would result.

this statement of mr. cramp before the lynch committee, of which the foregoing is only a synopsis, was really the key-note to all subsequent argument in favor of government aid to american ship-building and ship-owning. it presented the matter in a new light, or a light which was new in 1870.

armored cruiser brooklyn

it might be remarked here, in referring to his statement that “the form of every plate must be sketched before it is ordered, etc.,” that mr. cramp himself was the originator of that system in this country, a system of ordering plates sheared to sizes at the mill. (see “american marine,” w. w. bates.) until he established this innovation, plates for building iron vessels had been rolled as nearly as possible to the sizes required and then sheared 111and trimmed at the shipyard. this itself was a very remarkable and striking innovation, and was immediately taken up by all iron ship-builders in the country, and is now the universal practice.

the legislative result of the first effort of congress to take cognizance of the condition of the merchant marine was the bill introduced by mr. lynch, february 17, 1870.

mr. lynch’s bill, although it may be described as the pioneer effort for the resurrection of the american merchant marine, proposed in concise form and plain, easily comprehensible terms, without any unnecessary verbiage or circumlocution, as practical and as sensible a system of subvention as has ever been put forward since. it was comprehensive in its scope, universal in its application, and liberal in its provisions. later bills, more elaborately framed and more diffuse in their verbiage, have hardly improved upon the simple matter of fact form in which mr. lynch embodied his proposed policy.

this was the beginning of a parliamentary war between american ship-owners on the one hand and the influence of foreign steamship companies on the other; a war which has at this writing lasted more than thirty years.

one subsidy was granted by congress at this 112early date, that of the pacific mail steamship company; but hardly had that subsidy begun to operate, when an exposure of certain methods by which it was procured brought about a great public scandal, which for the time-being put a peremptory end to the whole policy.

whether the charge that the pacific mail subsidy was obtained by corrupt methods was true or not, the means in obtaining it were no more corrupt than those which have been employed by foreign steamship interests to defeat legislation in congress favorable to american shipping from time to time ever since.

notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, a group of pennsylvania capitalists formed “the american steamship company,” and decided in 1871 to try the experiment of an american line to liverpool. they contracted with the cramp firm for four first-class steamships, to be superior in sea speed, comfort, and other desirable qualities to any foreign steamship then in service. these four ships were designed by mr. cramp, and built under his superintendence between 1871 and 1873 inclusive, and were put in service under the names of the “indiana,” “illinois,” “pennsylvania,” and “ohio,” now commonly known as the old american line. that these 113ships were designed with the highest degree of ability and constructed with the utmost skill is sufficiently attested by the fact that they are all in serviceable condition at this writing (1903), over thirty years old. these ships broke the record in speed which was held by the “city of brussels,” and consumed less than half of the coal in doing it.

as soon as the construction of these ships had been awarded to his company, mr. cramp determined to examine the conditions of marine-engine development abroad, and with that object in view sailed immediately for europe. his narrative of the trip and its results are as follows:

visit to british shipyards.

“when the organization of the company was perfected, the compound engine as developed by john elder had made its appearance, and a fierce opposition to its introduction was made by engine-builders in great britain generally.

“its advocates were among the ablest engineers in that country, foremost among whom was mr. macfarland gray, whose unassailable attitude in its favor in the columns of ‘engineering’ vindicated its claims and successfully established its introduction. while the idea was an old one and had been introduced before watt’s time, it failed, as most improvements do when they do not get into proper hands to be developed.

“to john elder belongs the credit of its permanent 114and practical introduction into ocean navigation, and but little improvement has been made in his work up to this time.

“mr. b. h. bartol, who occupied a high position for intelligence and sagacity in the business world and as a practical marine engineer of the highest attainments, was one of the directors of the new steamship company, and, desiring that the ships should be in advance of the times, he recommended that i should go to great britain and make an exhaustive examination of the compound-engine question.

“mr. j. shields wilson, who had been selected by me as the engineer of our company, which had recently added engine building as a department of its business, accompanied me. mr. wilson had already gone very deep into the investigation of the compound question, and had acquired a strong bias in its favor; and he had already designed the compound engines for the ‘george w. clyde.’

“mr. bartol recommended the steamship company to appropriate $10,000 to pay our expenses in the investigation, arguing that the money could not be spent in a better way, and that they could not get another party better equipped than we were to undertake it. he also stated that he would oppose the construction of any steamers until he became convinced that they would be of the most advanced type in everything that pertains to most modern requirements.

“the money was promptly appropriated, and with mr. wilson i took passage in the ‘italy,’ the first trans-atlantic steamer with compound engines of john elder’s make and type, whose reported performance in economical coal consumption was considered at that time marvellous.

“we soon made the acquaintance of the chief engineer of the ship, whose name also was wilson, and mr. wilson 115practically lived with him. he was permitted to take cards under varying conditions, and secured an accurate account of coal consumption and of all other matters likely to be of interest.

“when we arrived at liverpool, we visited the lairds’, being the first english shipyard that either of us had ever visited.

“we then visited every great marine engine and ship-building works on the thames and clyde, beginning with the thames, whose shipyards at that time stood higher in the art of ship-building and in the proficiency of marine-engine construction than the clyde shipyards. when we started on our tour we determined to adhere to a fixed policy and procedure wherever we went, which was to frankly praise whatever we thought deserving of it and to adversely criticise whatever we thought deserved such criticism; and particularly to make no secret of the principal object of our visit.

“our company was practically unknown then in great britain, and steamship building was supposed to be an unknown art in america; but we were received with much cordiality and frankness, probably from mere curiosity, if nothing else.

“fortunately for us, we visited the works of mr. zamuda first, where a capable engineer was delegated to show us around. it having been noticed that we had registered our names, one as ship-builder and constructor and the other as marine engineer, the superintendent was anxious to have our dimensions taken. there was no time wasted, and our questions and remarks covering everything in sight or in the field of ship-building methods were showered on him in a deluge. he had expected to get through with us in a very short time, thinking that a sort of perfunctory visit ‘in one door and out at the 116opposite’ would be sufficient; but finding that he had been mistaken, he sent a boy out with a note and soon received an answer. we spent the greater part of the morning there. when it became noon, he explained that he had sent a note out to mr. zamuda, stating that we were well up in everything pertaining to the business, etc. mr. zamuda’s reply was to send us in to him when we were through. he received us with much consideration and politeness, invited us to take luncheon with him, and devoted much time to questions as to wages of workmen, materials, and where they were secured, prices, character of output, etc.

“when he found that we were doing considerable in the way of iron ship-building, principally coastwise, he was much astonished to know that most of the workmen as well as mr. wilson and myself were native to the soil, and he had much to say on the subject.

“when he had finished with us, and after we had informed him of the purpose of our visit and that we wanted to see the principal shipyards in the country, he stated that he would facilitate our purpose by giving us letters to the superintendents of the principal places; explaining that they would take time to show us what was worth seeing, while, if we went to the office, we would only be hurried through in a careless manner.

“it was due to this act of kindness on his part that our visits afterward were so successful in the acquisition of valuable information, and as to the generous hospitalities that we received. we visited first the thames iron works, john penn & sons, mandsleys, and others. from the thames we went direct to the clyde, where we visited the thompsons, the lairds, tod and mcgregor, john inglis, elders, and some others.

“the consensus of opinion of the different shipyards on 117the subject of compound engines was, as a rule, unfavorable. we found that the opposition was principally due to the fact that the change from the old type to the new involved important and radical modifications in the constructions of boilers and of engines, so they hesitated to discard their old plans, patterns, and methods, the value of which they were sure of, and to grope into an unknown field of augmented costliness.

“of course, these arguments to us were not convincing, and as we advanced to the north we found ourselves quite biassed in favor of the new type. whatever doubts we may have had up to the time of our arrival at the fairfield works, they were forever removed when we visited their magnificent erecting shop. we saw there thirteen compound engines in various states of completion, with their various parts ready for assembling, some about ready for installation in the ship, the whole exhibiting everything in the way of finish and arrangement both in their various parts and in the whole erection. up to this time we had encountered engines of the oscillating type, the trunk, the plain vertical, and horizontal in every varying form and construction. it was the same old story,—an old one before we left home; and now, without any preparation whatever for it, this vision of thirteen actualities of the new departure burst upon our view. we spent the entire day there, the superintendent affording us every opportunity to examine the parts and discuss the subject. we found as much novelty in the boiler construction as in the engine.

“an old philadelphia boiler had made its appearance here as ‘the scotch boiler’; this differed from the old one only in the thickness of the plates, due to the necessities of the use of higher steam.

“after this there was nothing to be seen, and we 118hastened home, and in a very short time the elder type of compound engines was under construction for our new ships practically before any of the various shipyards in great britain other than john elders’ took hold of them.

“to john elder belongs the entire credit of introducing and perfecting the compound engine, and there has been but little improvement in his work up to this time. macfarland gray at that time was a persistent advocate of this engine, and his work on ‘engineering’ was of great value. he took especial pains to aid us in our investigations.

“this trip was a most useful one besides the investigation of compound engines; it gave us an opportunity of examining every method pertaining to hull construction and equipment there, and to discuss all of the problems and methods belonging to it.

“two great changes in mechanical method and practice in certain details of engine building took place in great britain as a result of our visit, and the arrival of the ‘pennsylvania,’ the first of the american line; although we took no active measures in that direction.

“we found during this trip that the art of flanging boiler-plates in great britain was entirely unknown, and that all british boiler-heads were secured to the side plates and to the furnace ends by means of angle bars in the corners, a crude and primitive method of construction. it was impossible for us to understand this backwardness or ignorance on the part of the british, as the flanging of boiler-heads had always prevailed here.

“we called the attention of the british builders generally to this superiority in boiler construction, but little or no attention was paid to what we said at that time; but when the four ships of the new line arrived in liverpool, draughtsmen from all quarters were sent to make sketches 119of the boiler work, and of many other devices new to them, besides the boiler construction, one of which was the use of white metal in bearings and journals. this feature in the engine construction the british had not taken up when we visited their works.

“we can claim to have introduced boiler flanging and the use of white metal in british ship construction on account of our recommendations, and the practical illustration of their utility on the arrival of the ships of the american line.

“the builders there, however, were very slow in the general adoption of these methods. at first boiler-heads were delivered at engine-works flanged by the mills that made the plates, and sampson fox added boiler flanging to his business of making corrugated furnaces. having seen a boiler furnished with corrugated furnaces by sampson fox in england, i introduced them in two yachts built for george osgood and charles osbourne, the first furnaces of the kind in america. these yachts were known as the ‘corsair’ and the ‘stranger.’”

the construction of the four pioneer ships went on as it had begun, without promise of aid from the government, which steadily maintained its attitude of neglect as to the national merchant marine, while hundreds upon hundreds of millions in the shape of guarantee bonds and public land grants were poured out by the congress in favor of western railroads, but not one dollar for the merchant marine.

still, notwithstanding these discouraging conditions, mr. cramp did not abate in the 120slightest degree his endeavors to keep the needs of the country in the direction of a national merchant marine before congress and the public. a compilation of the articles he published and of his statements before the committees of both houses of congress would, on the whole, fill several volumes like this one. it is therefore impracticable to reproduce here the actual text of his arguments and his expositions.

newspaper organs of the foreign steamship interests published in this country denounced him as a “subsidy beggar” and other like epithets, which was all that they had to offer in answer to his deductions and arguments; but even that did not disturb the even tenor of his way.

finally, in the forty-seventh congress, a joint select committee of three senators and six representatives was organized, of which nelson dingley, of maine, was chairman; and this organization led to the formation of a new standing committee of the house known as the committee on the merchant marine and fisheries. mr. dingley’s committee spent an entire summer in going from point to point on the sea-board and taking testimony and statements of all classes of business men interested in any way or informed to any responsible degree as 121to the condition of the merchant marine and as to the possible or probable means to bring about its resurrection.

the investigation of the dingley committee led to the formulation of a comprehensive measure known as the “dingley shipping bill.” it was thoroughly and exhaustively discussed through three congresses, until finally, in the last hours of the short session of the congress ending march 4, 1891, a bill was passed providing for a meagre and wholly insufficient subsidy in the shape of special pay for carrying the ocean mails of the united states. this bill was not only meagre in its provisions, but it was not comprehensive in its application. it did not result in any immediate increase of foreign tonnage. the following year, however, mr. cramp, in a spirit of meeting the free-ship people half-way, agreed to a compromise which provided that certain ships of foreign (british) registry might be admitted to american registry, provided their owners would contract to build two ships of equal class and tonnage in the united states. this was the act by virtue of which the english steamships “new york” and “paris,” belonging to the international navigation company, an american corporation and owned by american capital, were brought under 122the american flag, and the “st. louis” and “st. paul” were contracted for and built to meet the condition imposed by this law.

the principal dimensions and qualities of these ships are as follows:

length between perpendiculars, 535 feet 8 inches.

length over all, 554 feet 2 inches.

extreme beam, 62 feet 9 inches.

depth from first deck to flat keel, 42 feet 4 inches.

depth of hold for tonnage amidships, 23 feet 2 inches.

height of bow above water-line at load draught, 39 feet.

number of decks, 5.

number of water-tight compartments exclusive of ballast tanks, 12.

gross register, 10,700 tons.

load displacement (about), 15,600 tons.

dimensions of main dining-saloon, 109 feet 4 inches by 46 feet.

dimensions of second cabin, 39 feet 6 inches by 56 feet.

seating capacity of main saloon, 322.

seating capacity of second cabin, 208.

berthing capacity of steerage (about), 900.

armored cruiser new york

the propelling machinery is a pair of vertical inverted quadruple-expansion engines, to carry a working steam-pressure of two hundred pounds and develop from 18,000 to 20,000 collective indicated horse-power. these are the largest and most powerful marine engines ever built in america, and, as the principle of quadruple expansion has never before been 123applied on so large a scale, its results in this case have been watched with interest by the entire profession of marine engineering.

structurally, the art of naval architecture has been exhausted in their design, and the skill of the best mechanics in the world was tried to the utmost in their construction. whatever may have been their performance as to speed and time of passage, nothing is hazarded in saying that in safety, seaworthiness, and comfort they are not surpassed by anything afloat.

in the general public or patriotic sense the chief element of interest in these ships is the fact that they represent the inception of an effort to restore the prestige of the united states as a maritime commercial power. the condition of affairs existing at the time the new american liners were projected was the culminating point of our feebleness on the ocean.

the act of 1891 was framed to expire by its own limitation in ten years from its date. taken in connection with the act of 1892, already referred to, it brought about the construction of two first-class american trans-atlantic greyhounds (the “st. louis” and “st. paul”). other companies or lines running to the west indies, mexico, and south 124america were also stimulated to build a few new ships, but, generally speaking, the effect of both these acts was limited, and produced no serious impression for the better on the american merchant marine in general.

this fact became evident very soon after these acts went into effect, and it became clear that a broader and more comprehensive policy must be adopted in the same direction if any great or lasting improvement of the condition of our merchant marine was to be expected.

this led to the framing of a new act, thoroughly comprehensive in its scope and universal in its application, on lines similar to those of the dingley bill of 1882, but broader.

prior to 1891, mr. cramp had confined the statements, deductions, and arguments based upon his experience and observation wholly to hearings before committees of congress, with now and then a newspaper interview, which in the nature of things must be transitory and soon forgotten. but in the fall of 1891 he determined to place his knowledge before the public in a more permanent form. this he began with a paper in the forum for november of that year. the limits of this memoir do not admit of the reproduction of this paper in its entirety. it filled sixteen pages of the forum. the summary of the conclusion, however, 125may be reproduced. after an exhaustive analysis of the existing conditions and their causes, together with a survey of the probable effects of the act approved the previous march (march 3, 1891), mr. cramp summed up as follows:

“the commercial disadvantages resulting from a monopoly of our ocean-carrying trade by foreign fleets attracted public attention many years ago. from the first there was practical unanimity as to the existence of these disadvantages, and a like concurrence in the opinion that ‘something ought to be done’ to improve the situation; but upon the question of remedy there have always been wide divergences of view. it having been generally conceded that the remedy must at least begin in national legislation, the dispute has been simply as to what the character of that legislation should be. a certain faction contended that nothing was required beyond a simple repeal of the navigation laws, to permit the free importation and registry of foreign-built vessels; and bills to that effect have been introduced, and in many cases discussed, in nearly every congress since 1870. in no case has a bill of this character passed both houses of congress, and but once has the measure received a majority in either house. that was in the forty-seventh congress, when a ‘free ship amendment’ was proposed by mr. candler, of massachusetts,—a bitter opponent of american ship-building,—to what was known as the ‘dingley shipping bill,’ and mr. candler’s amendment was attached to the bill by a small majority. the result of this amendment was to kill the bill. it is not my purpose to discuss the merits of this proposition, further than to say that whatever 126increase in american tonnage might accrue from it would be gained at the expense of the destruction of american ship-building. that may be set down as an axiom to be observed as a necessary factor in every discussion of the subject. as pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the ship-building industry in great britain has been developed to such enormous proportions, and the facilities of construction enlarged to such a scale, that our own comparatively few and feeble shipyards would be instantly overwhelmed in the competition the moment our market was thrown open to them to unload their old and worn-out wares on american ‘bargain-hunters.’

“this fact is now so well understood, that i think there is no hazard in saying that a large majority of the best minds of all parties are convinced that the experiment of trying to augment our merchant marine by a policy calculated to destroy our ship-building industry would not be conducive to the general public interests.

“the other mode of remedy advocated has been that of adopting, in behalf of our own shipping, a policy similar to the one which has produced such striking results elsewhere; that is to say, public encouragement to the ownership and operation of american-built vessels in the foreign trade. this subject has for many years claimed a large share of the attention of congress, commercial organizations, and the press. its discussion has taken a wide scope, involving several exhaustive inquiries by congressional committees, numerous petitions and resolutions from boards of trades and chambers of commerce, with almost innumerable papers in the public prints, and speeches in our public halls; the whole forming what may be called the ‘literature of our merchant marine.’ its volume is so vast, that but the barest reference to its details can be made here. suffice it to say, that it covers 127every conceivable point at issue; and it has been so universally published, that no person of ordinary intelligence and education can have excuse for ignorance or misinformation on the subject.

“the results of this agitation and discussion have been bills in congress from time to time, providing for a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of the government toward the national merchant marine. some of these bills proposed special compensations to particular lines for carrying the mails. such bills have failed in consequence of the objection that they involved the principle of special legislation. other measures proposed a general bounty based upon tonnage and distance actually travelled in foreign trade. this plan at the outset seemed more popular than any other, and there was at one time strong probability of its enactment into law. but it finally failed, partly on account of clashing of diverse interests, and partly by reason of ‘party exigencies,’ real or supposed, in the house of representatives. it is hardly pertinent at this time to point out the benefits that would have accrued, directly and incidentally, to every branch of our national life and industry, from a tonnage law properly administered. i have never hesitated, and do not now hesitate, to declare that ten years of its operation would result in placing our merchant marine in the foreign trade on a footing second only to that of great britain in amount, and vastly superior to it in character and quality of vessels. and i still hope to see such a policy adopted at no distant day.

“i have gone into detail to this extent because it seemed necessary to do so in order to show that, loud as has been the outcry of ‘subsidy’ raised against the act recently passed, it is still, as a matter of fact, less liberal than 128existing provisions of the british government for their own ships already in the trade to be competed for.

“thus far i have dealt with facts only; and i have been careful to avoid any matter susceptible of controversy. in conclusion, i will venture a few deductions of my own, based upon the foregoing statements of simple facts. i will assume at the start that our internal development of farms, workshops, mines, railways, coastwise, lake, and river commerce, etc., has reached a point at which capital has reached its zenith of profitable investment in them, and must look for some new field, not only for further original investment, but also for the protection or betterment of investments already made. in my judgment, our energy and enterprise during the last twenty-five years have exhausted all the large chances of fortune within the boundaries of the united states. our existing industries of every description represent an enormous volume of local ‘plant’ and productive organizations quite up to our local requirements for some time; hence it is necessary to seek outlets for an inevitable surplus of product, and, in default of such outlet, there must be a plethora of production which is bound to result in stagnation, or, in other words, national apoplexy. for this there can be but one preventive, ‘an ounce’ of which is said on traditional authority to be ‘worth a pound of cure,’ and that is in the development and retention of external market outlets. it is my opinion that we can never secure these until we can ourselves command the avenues to them. commerce has its ‘strategy’ no less than war. in war, strategy depends on lines of operation and communication. at this time we possess neither for either commerce or war. our great rival controls both in every sense of the word. to-day we could not even defend our own coasts against her obsolete iron-clads in war, and we cannot 129control our own foreign commerce as against the poorest and least seaworthy of her myriad of ‘ocean tramps.’ if, for any reason, she were to withdraw from our trade the vessels which, by virtue of our acquiescence, do all our trans-atlantic fetching and carrying for us, our peerless nation would be laid helpless under an embargo compared to which that of jefferson’s administration would be but a mere trifle of annoyance. it has seemed strange to me that so little attention is paid to this fact. what would our political independence be worth, if circumstances, likely to occur at any moment, should visit upon us the consequences of our commercial servitude to england? and in a less, though still important, degree to germany?

“this is a plain statement of fact that i do not think any reasonable person will have the temerity to dispute. for the present i have only to add, that we have done nothing as yet to lift this yoke from our necks. it cannot be done except by restoring our merchant marine and our naval power to their former status upon the high seas. the attempts thus far made in that direction are but feeble. i am not sanguine that they will be strong in our time, but i hope so. it may be that this result will not come until we have received a sterner lesson of our weakness and helplessness than any one now anticipates.

“this pitiable condition on the ocean is emphasized by the contrast of our unrivalled power, resource, and enterprise within our own borders. it seems, indeed, the strangest anomaly of modern civilization, that the most enlightened, most ambitious, most energetic, most productive, and internally most powerful nation on the globe should be externally among the weakest, most helpless, and least respected.

“the sole remedy for this situation is ships with seamen 130to handle them, whether for peace or for war; whether to carry our enormous exports, and bring our immense imports, and receive therefor the tremendous tolls which now flow into foreign coffers, or to vindicate the majesty and power of our flag abroad in the world to a degree befitting our status in the community of nations.

“there is no lack of raw material, no lack of skill to fashion it into the instruments of commerce. we have the iron and the steel; we have the men to work them into the finished forms of stately ships; we have the money to promote the most colossal of enterprises by sea. all we need is assurance of a steady national policy of liberal and enlightened encouragement, based upon a patriotic common consent, and elevated above the turmoils of politics or the squabbles of parties. one decade of such a policy would make us second only to great britain on the high seas, either for commerce or for defence; and two decades of it would bring us fairly into the twentieth century as the master maritime power of the globe.”

these observations, though written and printed in 1891, are as true and pertinent now as they were then; and they will remain true and pertinent indefinitely because they embody the practical logic of a situation; they point out the consequences it entails, and they suggest the only remedy that has been approved by the cumulative experience of other nations. the lines of fact are broad, plain, and unmistakable. no one disputes them.

131as before remarked, a quite brief experience demonstrated that the ocean mail pay act of march 3, 1891, was both inadequate in its scope of operation and insufficient in its volume of aid to produce any marked betterment of the condition of our foreign trade. the restricted nature of its application and the comparatively small amounts paid were not sufficient to encourage the establishment of new lines, the opening of new sea routes, or the construction of new and up-to-date vessels under the american flag. one result of this development was the formation of a committee, composed of the most prominent ship-builders and ship-owners in the country, known as the committee on the merchant marine. of this committee mr. cramp was one of the originators, and always among the most prominent and active members. its object was to concentrate the power of individuals in a concerted body for the purpose of furnishing facts and disseminating knowledge with regard to the condition of the merchant marine and its needs not only in congress, but also among the people throughout the country. hitherto the efforts of individuals had been exerted singly and often divergently; but it was hoped and believed that, by the organization of this committee and 132through the concerted action which would result from its deliberations and researches, a harmonious and uniform scheme might be brought forward which would ultimately command the public support of all men animated by a patriotic desire to see the american flag restored to its former proud rank on the high sea.

the first result of this policy was the formulation of a bill based upon tonnage and distance travelled. it was to some extent analogous to the system then prevailing in france commonly known as the tonnage bounty system.

when this bill was first brought forward, being introduced by mr. frye, of maine, in the senate, and by mr. dingley, in the house of representatives, the foreign steamship owners or their agents in this country at once became greatly alarmed. they had not offered a very vigorous resistance to the passage of the ocean mail pay act of 1891, because their knowledge of the business and their keen sense of the situation taught them that there was not much danger to their interests in that bill. they made a show of opposing it, of course, but they spent very little money or time and made no really determined effort to beat it. in fact, the foreign steamship owners and the 133managers of the foreign lines which were doing the ocean-carrying trade of the united states realized before that bill became a law what it took our people two or three years to find out. but when the tonnage bounty bill was brought forward, with the general applicability of its provisions to all kinds of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade, and proposing, as it did, a rate of bounty which would have gone far toward equalizing the difference in cost of seafaring labor and subsistence as between american and foreign ships, the owners and managers of the steamship lines[1] and tramps that were carrying the commerce of the united states determined 134that it must be beaten at all hazards and at any cost. this struggle began in 1894. the original tonnage bill passed the senate, but was smothered in the house. the owners and managers of the foreign steamship lines could not control the senate, but they appeared able to affect the action of the house of representatives negatively, at least, if not positively.

1. these managers of foreign lines proceeded systematically. whatever may have been the activity of their competition for the carrying trade of the united states, they were unanimous in their determination to prevent the growth of an american merchant marine. acting under the guise of a pretended business combine, which, for convenience, they termed “the north atlantic traffic association,” they raised funds, hired lobbyists,—among whom appeared ex-officials of positions as high as the cabinet,—and by every possible means known to modern ingenuity thwarted every effort of those favoring american interests, both in and out of congress. this combination has no reason for existence except that of organized and systematic lobbying against american interests in the corridors and committee rooms of the american congress.

a similar measure was brought forward again in the congress elected with president mckinley in 1896, and the bill passed the senate, again to meet the same fate as its predecessor in a republican house of representatives with a thorough working majority, notwithstanding that the policy of aid to american shipping had been a cardinal plank in the platform of that year, upon which that house had been elected. the defection was almost wholly among western republicans.

battleship new ironsides

during the contest over the bill in the congress under consideration, the tactics of the foreign steamship owners and managers, personally as well as through their hired agents, were a disgrace to the good name of american legislation. they threw off all disguise and openly lobbied on the floors and in the corridors and committee rooms of the house to prevent consideration of the bill. in that congress there was every prospect that if the senate bill 135could be brought up for consideration it would pass with some trifling amendments, which could easily be adjusted in conference committee. the whole strategy of the alien shipping interests was to prevent consideration, which they ultimately succeeded in doing by working upon the susceptibility or the apprehensions of certain republicans from the far western states.

in 1898, the tonnage bounty bill in a modified form was brought forward again; this time with a limitation of the amount to be expended under its provisions in any one fiscal year to nine millions of dollars, but it met the same kind of opposition that had beaten its two predecessors, and it shared their fate, passing the senate and being denied consideration in the house.

finally, in the congress elected in 1900 and assembling in 1901, a tonnage bill still further modified was brought forward and passed the senate. for a time it was believed that the alien ship-owners and managers would not be able to beat this bill as they had its predecessors, and strong hopes were indulged by its friends that it would receive consideration in the house. even up to the last few weeks of the closing session of the fifty-seventh congress which expired march 3, 1903, the chairman 136of the committee on merchant marine and other advocates and friends of the bill believed that they would be able to get a rule for its consideration even at the last moment. but that hope, like all the others, passed away.

to go back a little, it may be worth while to remark here that the national misfortune did not even end with the failure of these bills, and the consequent continued depression or paralysis of the american foreign carrying trade. there was from time to time sufficient prospect, or at least possibility, of the passage of a practical and effective law for the aid and encouragement of american shipping to induce the investment of a large amount of capital by sanguine persons in new ship-building plants of considerable magnitude, whereby the trade as it stood was not only greatly overdone, but the skilled ship-building labor of the country was overdrawn. there seemed to be a theory that plenty of money to invest in plant or to sink in unprofitable enterprises could be depended on to make up for the lack of experience in the management of shipyards and want of skill in ship-building labor. the result was disastrous not only to the investors in the stock and bonds of the new shipyards, but also to the entire ship-building industry, as it had 137been developed on a practical and legitimate basis.

with the final failure of all legislation to promote american commerce in the foreign carrying trade, there was no resource left for either the new shipyards or the old except such work as the coastwise trade might provide and the construction of naval vessels. as for the coastwise trade, it was already well provided with new and highly serviceable steamships likely to fill the demands of the traffic for several years to come, so that little or no new work could be expected from that quarter.

the naval programme did not in any year put forward as many ships as there were ship-yards. the government itself seemed to adopt the policy of fostering and promoting the new shipyards at the expense of the old, whereby the former were overloaded with work which they could not do, and they invariably became so hopelessly delinquent as to make the time clause of the contracts an utter farce. new shipyards, which had never completed a ship of any description, were loaded with 15,000 and 16,000-ton battleships of the most complex and difficult construction, requiring the highest skill and the most approved experience in every respect to carry on the work required for their completion.

138it is not necessary to particularize further on this point, except to say that very large and important vessels, awarded to new and inexperienced concerns with a contract time for completion of three years, could not by any possibility be finished inside of six or seven. so the question naturally has arisen as to whether, in the formulation of its ship-building programmes or in its output of awards to contractors, the government really desires to augment its naval force in the shortest possible time or to figure as a good samaritan toward new, inexperienced, unskilled, and needy shipyards, owners, and managers. such a policy is based upon the fundamental error that what is called “plant” makes a shipyard. the real shipyard is not merely ground, waterfront, buildings, and machinery, commonly called plant; but with a thoroughly organized personnel in staff and working-men; with a generation or more of training and experience behind them. that is a complete shipyard. so far as mere plant is concerned, the size of a new shipyard or the amount of money spent on it cannot create a range of capabilities. the indispensable and over-ruling requisite is the trained staff and trained men that are in it. the lay-out of land, buildings, and machinery is but a small factor in the operation of an 139effective shipyard. another thing to be primarily considered is that there are no enterprises of industrial, railroad, or mining interest that can be compared with a large modern shipyard for intricacy of professional and mechanical subdivisions in its organization.

every handicraft or mechanical pursuit is to be found in such a shipyard or closely correlated with and contributory to it. the grouping of these diverse elements into a harmonious working whole needs the hand not only of a master, but a master of long continuous training; and in the adjustment of the various parts of the group, it is time, experience, and knowledge of the men composing it which are indispensable.

returning now to the main theme, it seems proper to explain what the real bone of contention is in this struggle between the impulse of american patriotism and the greed of foreign ship-owners. it all goes back to the fundamental navigation laws of the united states which prohibit the registry of any foreign built ship under the american flag except in certain cases provided by law, which are not sufficiently numerous to be formidable.

in their warfare against government aid and encouragement to american shipping, the foreign 140ship-owners and ship-builders have not met the issue squarely or fairly face to face. they have invariably resorted to a subterfuge which is commonly known as the doctrine of free ships, the meaning and significance of which are not understood by the general public, and its consequences are realized most imperfectly, if at all.

the phrase viewed as a glittering generality is seductive, and it is regarded by many people as a mere proposition to enable american ship-owners to buy their ships where they can get them the cheapest, as the saying is. it is a curious fact that, with all the learning and the so-called logic of political economists, they have never yet, from adam smith down, clearly defined to us what really constitutes cheapness in all its elements, or what constitutes the reverse, or costliness. a mere difference in dollars and cents for a given thing to perform a certain work by no means expresses the difference. it may, and often does in fact, befog or confuse the mind. a bad or poorly constructed thing may be called cheap, and a good, well-constructed thing may be termed costly, measured by dollars and cents, and yet practically, in view of efficiency, durability, and all the other elements of desirability, the so-called costly thing may be actually cheaper 141than the so-called cheap thing, both being intended for the same purpose.

a free ship law, or the repeal of our existing navigation laws, would unquestionably load our registry with ships cheap in dollars and cents, but they would prove dear in everything else. in order to do what lay in his power to correct these misapprehensions and clear away this fog of ignorance on that particular subject, mr. cramp, in the north american review for april, 1894, printed a paper entitled “our navigation laws.”

in the course of this paper he called attention to certain facts of permanent historical value which there seemed a tendency to forget or ignore:

“at the time of the franco-german war of 1870-71, even so sturdy a patriot as general grant, then president, was persuaded for a time that it would be a good thing for our commerce, as a neutral nation, to permit american registry of foreign-built vessels, the theory being that many vessels of nations which might become involved in the struggle would seek the asylum of our flag.

“actuated by powerful new york influence, already conspicuously hostile to the american merchant marine, general grant, in a special message, recommended that congress enact legislation to that end. this proposition was antagonized by judge kelley, of pennsylvania,—always at the front when american interests were threatened,—in one of his most powerful efforts, couched in the 142vehement eloquence of which he was master, which impressed general grant so much that he abandoned that policy, and subsequently adhered to the existing system.

“i will not stop here to point out in detail the tremendous political and diplomatic advantage which england would enjoy when dealing with other maritime powers, if she could have always at hand an asylum for the lame ducks of her commercial fleet in time of war. her ocean greyhounds, that could either escape the enemy’s cruisers or be readily converted into cruisers themselves, might remain under her flag; but all her slow freighters, tramps, and obsolete passenger boats of past eras would be transferred by sham sales to our flag, under which they could pursue their traffic in safety during the war under peace rates of insurance, and without any material diversion of their earnings, which would of course be increased by war freight rates, returning to their former allegiance at the end of the war. the lack of such an asylum amounts to a perpetual bond to keep the peace.

“from the end of the civil war to about 1880 there was but feeble effort to revive ship-building in this country. all our energies of capital and enterprise, as i have remarked elsewhere, were directed to the extension of railways in every direction, to the repair of the war ravages in the south, to the settlement of the vast territories of the west,—in a word, to purely domestic development, pending which england was by common consent left to enjoy her ocean monopoly.

“such was the state of affairs in 1883-85, when the adoption of the policy of naval reconstruction offered to american ship-building the first encouragement it had seen in a quarter of a century.

“when we began to build the new navy, every english 143journal, from the london times down, pooh-poohed the idea that a modern man-of-war could be built in an american yard, modern high-powered engines in an american machine-shop, or modern breech-loading cannon in an american forge. many of the english ship-builders rubbed their hands in actual anticipation of orders from this government for the ships and guns needed; and they blandly assured us that they would give us quite as favorable terms as were accorded to china, japan, and chile. and, to their shame be it said, there were officers of our navy who not only adopted this view, but did all they could to commit our government to the pernicious policy.

“in 1885, when secretary whitney took control of the navy department, the efforts of english ship-builders to secure at least a share of the work were renewed. by this time the english were willing to admit that the hulls of modern ships could be built in the united states; but they were satisfied that our best policy would be to buy the necessary engines, cannon, and armor from them. secretary whitney, however, promptly decided that the only article of foreign production which the new navy needed was the plans of vessels for comparison. this was wise, because it placed in the hands of our builders the results of the most mature experience abroad, at comparatively small cost. but one of the earliest and firmest decisions of mr. whitney was that our naval vessels, machinery and all, must be built at home and of domestic material.

“the efforts of the english builders to get the engine-work for our new navy were much more serious and formidable than is generally known. a prominent member of the house committee on naval affairs proposed an amendment to a pending naval bill empowering the secretary at his discretion to contract abroad for the construction 144of propelling machinery for our naval ships. the language was, of course, general, but every one knows that the term ‘abroad’ in this sense would be synonymous with great britain, and nothing more.

“mr. whitney promptly met this proposition with a protest in the shape of a letter to the naval committee dated february 27, 1886. he said that, so far as he was concerned, he would not avail himself of such a power if granted. there was no occasion for such power; and it could have no effect except to keep american builders in suspense, and thereby augment the difficulty of obtaining capital for the enlargement of their facilities to meet the national requirements. mr. whitney’s protest was so vigorous that the proposition died from its effects in the committee and has been well-nigh forgotten. the proposer himself became satisfied that he had been misled by the representations of naval officers who were under english influence, and did not press his amendment.

“i have brought these facts forward for the purpose of emphasizing my declaration that the promotive influence behind every movement against our navigation laws is of british origin, and whenever you put a pin through a free-ship bill you prick an englishman.

“the portion of mr. whitney’s letter referring to the proposed free-engine clause in the naval bill of 1886 was as follows:

“‘i think our true policy is to borrow the ideas of our neighbors as far as they are thought to be in advance of ours, give them to our ship-builders in the shape of plans; and, having this object in view, i have been anxious to acquire detailed drawings of the latest machinery in use abroad, and should feel at liberty to spend more in the same way in getting hold of the latest things as far as possible for the purpose of utilizing them. we 145have made important accumulations in this line during the last six months. i think i ought to say to the committee that i have placed myself in communication with some of the principal marine-engine builders of the country within the last three months for the purpose of conferring with them upon this subject. i detailed two officers of the navy,—a chief engineer and a line officer,—who, under my directions, visited the principal establishments in the east. they recognize that in the matter of engines for naval ships we are quite inexperienced as compared with some other countries. it is this fact, doubtless, which the committee has in view in authorizing the purchase and importation of engines for one of the vessels authorized to be constructed under this act. if the committee will permit me to make the suggestion, i find myself quite satisfied, after consultation with people engaged in the industry in this country, that it would not be necessary for me to avail myself of that discretionary power in order to produce machines of the most advanced character. our marine-engine builders in general express their inability at the present moment to design the latest and most approved type of engines for naval vessels,—an inability arising from the fact that they have not been called upon to do anything of importance in that line. at the same time, they state that if they are given the necessary time, and are asked to offer designs in competition, they would acquaint themselves with the state of the art abroad and here, and would prepare to offer to the government designs embodying the latest improvements in the art. and they are ready to construct at the present time anything that can be built anywhere else if the plans are furnished. as i find no great difficulty in the way of purchasing plans (in fact, there is an entire readiness to sell to us on the part of the engine-builders abroad), i 146think the solution of the question will be not very difficult, although it may require some time and a little delay.’”

at this writing (1903), only eighteen years have elapsed since the date of secretary whitney’s letter. the wisdom of his policy needs no eulogy beyond the history of the development of steam-engineering in the united states during that brief period. in fact, no other eulogy could be a tenth part as eloquent as that history is.

the policy of secretary whitney was in fact an echo of the sturdy patriotism that framed the act of december 31, 1792, dictated by the same impulse of national independence and conceived in the same aspiration of patriotic pride.

battleship iowa

and now, in the face of this record so fresh and recent, the same old demand for english free ships is heard again in our midst, promoted by the same old lobby and pressed on the same old lines. are we never to hear the last of it? is there to be a perennial supply of american legislators willing to promote a british industry by destroying an american one? to all history, to all logic, they oppose a single phrase: “let us buy ships where they are cheapest.” well, if national independence is valueless, and if everything is to be subordinated to cheapness, why not get our laws 147made in the house of commons? the members of the house of commons legislate for nothing. senators and representatives charge $5000 a year for their services, besides stationery allowance and mileage. the house of commons makes laws cheaper than our congress does. our ships and our capacity to create them are as much a symbol of independence as our laws are; and if it is good policy to get the former where they are cheapest, why not get the latter on the same terms?

british warfare against american ships and shipping by no means stopped at extravagant subsidies to her own ships; did not stop at determined, and thus far successful, efforts to defeat american legislation of a similar character; did not even stop at vigorous and often corrupt attacks upon our navigation laws through the lobbies of our own congress.

of course, all these considerations at this writing (1903) have become ancient history. the iron ship has not only completely dominated british naval architecture, but that of all other european countries, and has established itself on an equally permanent and secure footing in the united states. a few wooden ships are still built in this country, but they are mostly schooners for the coastwise trade, and really cut little or no figure in commercial conditions 148outside of our own coast. yet, although it be ancient history, viewed in the light of the enormous changes that have occurred in thirty or thirty-five years, still, it is instructive to know the springs and motives of the public statecraft and the private commercial strategy which forced the iron ship in and the wooden ship out. that this was bound to come in the nature of things does not admit of doubt; but it is equally clear that the policy of interested parties forced the situation in favor of british shipping interests, and at the time adversely to those of the united states both as to ship-owning and as to ship-building, which are inseparably interdependent.

in 1897, mr. cramp, being prevented by other business from attending a hearing before the committee on the merchant marine on the day set for his appearance, addressed to it a letter, in which, after briefly reviewing the conditions and causes already set forth, he said:

“the interests of ship-owning and ship-building are identical, because no nation can successfully own ships that cannot successfully build them.

“no nation can either own or build ships when, unprotected and unencouraged, if it is brought in competition with other nations that are protected and encouraged.

“this is the existing condition of the ship-owning and ship-building interests of the united states.

149“the resulting fact is that the enormous revenue represented by the freight and passenger tolls on our commerce and travel is constantly drained out of this country into british, german, and french pockets, in the order named, but mainly british; while the vast industrial increment represented by the necessary ship-building inures almost wholly to great britain.

“for this drain there is no recompense. it is sheer loss. it is the principal cause of our existing financial condition.

“so long as this drain continues, no tariff and no monetary policy can restore the national prosperity.

“until we make some provision to keep at home some part at least of the three hundred and odd millions annually sucked out of this country by foreign ship-owners and ship-builders, no other legislation can bring good times back again.

“it is a constant stream of gold always flowing out.

“the foreign ship-owner who carries our over-sea commerce makes us pay the freight both ways.

“for our exports we get the foreign market price less the freight.

“for our imports we pay the foreign market price plus the freight.

“no fine-spun theory of any cloistered or collegiate doctrinaire can wipe out these facts.

“the fact that so long as the freight is paid to a foreign ship-owner, so long will it be a foreign profit on a foreign product, is fundamental and unanswerable.

“the english steamship is a foreign product, and its earnings, which we pay, are a foreign profit.

“no sane man will argue that a foreign profit on a foreign product can be of domestic benefit.

“add to this the fact, equally important, that the carrier of commerce controls its exchanges, and the condition 150of commercial, financial, and industrial subjugation is complete. such is our condition to-day.

“great britain has many outlying colonies and dependencies.

“the greatest two are india and the united states.

“she holds india by force of arms, whereby her control of that country costs her something. she has to pay something for her financial and commercial drainage of india.

“she holds the united states by the folly of its own people, whereby her control of this country costs her nothing. she has to pay nothing for her financial and commercial drainage of the united states.

“but the amount of her annual drainage of gold from the united states far exceeds that from india.

“therefore the united states is by far the most valuable of all the dependencies of great britain.

“in the relation of india to england there is something pitiable, because india is helpless.

“in the relation of the united states to england there is nothing that is not contemptible, because it is the willing servitude of a nation that could help herself if she would.

“england is wide awake to those conditions, and keenly appreciates their priceless value to her.

“the united states blinks at them, half dazed, half asleep, insensible of their tremendous damage to her.

“england, clearly seeing that in this age more than ever before ocean empire is world empire, strains every nerve to perpetuate her sea power and exhausts her resources to double-rivet the fetters which it fastens upon mankind.

“though in 1885 england already had a navy superior to those of any two and equal to those of any three other 151powers, if not to all others, she has since that date built a new navy which, with what remains most available of the old one, overshadows the world, and makes the sea as much british territory as the county of middlesex.”

while this contest was going on between american ship-owners and ship-builders on the one hand and the alien combinations who control our ocean commerce on the other, a vast amount of american capital was gradually invested in shipping under the british flag, and at least an equal amount awaited any reasonable encouragement to build ships in this country to sail under the american flag. of course, it would have been folly for the men who controlled this capital to invest it in american ships with a clear handicap of at least 15 to 20 per cent. against them in operating expenses, ton for ton, in competition with the aided, fostered, and subsidized fleets of england, germany, and france. for a long time this mass of capital was held in hope of the adoption of a policy by our government that would tend to lift the handicap and equalize as far as possible the burdens of operating american ships as compared with others. but when congress adjourned march 4, 1901, leaving the shipping question where it had been ever since the civil war, and offering, if possible, less hope than ever before, the mass 152of american capital that had been held back was let loose. soon rumors that a great merger of british steamship lines with the international navigation company was in progress filled the air. it soon appeared that there was plenty of american capital to invest in ships under foreign flags, but none under the american flag so long as the existing situation might last. the ship-owners may have been patriotic, but their patriotism was not enthusiastic enough to make them willing to pay a penalty of 15 to 20 per cent. for the sake of it. this movement soon took shape in the organization of the international mercantile marine company, in which was merged the control and management of the international, the white star, the leyland, and the atlantic transport lines; the whole forming by far the greatest aggregation of vessels and tonnage ever grouped under one control. this control was american,[2] but the ships were of british registry except six, built by the cramps and several others,—the “st. louis,” “st. paul,” “kroonland,” and “finland,” american built, and the “new york” and “philadelphia” (formerly the “paris”), british built, 153but admitted to american registry by the special act of 1892.

2. since this was written, the whole ownership of the line is british.

the americans were determined to own and operate ships. they would have preferred to run them under the american flag, but congress—or rather a fraction in the house of representatives—compelled them to use the british ensign! the commercial and financial effect of this was that the american investors got the benefit of the lower wages and cheaper subsistence of foreign seafaring labor. the vessels were american as to ownership only. no american officer or seaman or engineer or fireman was employed in them. they added nothing to the sea power of the country; they did nothing toward forming a nursery of american sailors to be in readiness for an emergency. on the contrary, they were a constant school for the naval reserve of a power that might become as hostile politically as she has been industrially and commercially from the beginning of our existence as an independent nation. none of these great facts appealed to the narrow and demagogic faction in the house. they could see in it nothing but “a trust,” and their parrot-cry resounded from the banks of the wabash to the foot-hills of the rocky mountains.

many men, hitherto hopeful, believe that any 154further effort to restore our foreign carrying trade under the american flag must be in vain. they argue that, if the houses of representatives elected in 1898 and 1900 would not pass a shipping bill, none can ever be chosen that will. if foreign influences and alien doctrines could prevent consideration in those two houses of bills that had already passed the senate in each congress, those influences and those doctrines are likely to maintain their potency indefinitely. if this be true, the american flag in the foreign trade is doomed to utter extinction within a few years on the atlantic ocean, and its survival in the pacific is a matter of extreme doubt.

a strange feature of this contest in its later stages was the fact that the confederated trades-unions of the country arranged themselves unanimously against the american and in favor of the alien policy. trades-unionism is founded upon a doctrine or dogma of protection more sweeping and more drastic than any other ever known. they cheerfully maintain and sometimes exultantly proclaim that, when nothing else will serve to accomplish their ends, violence and crime become logical and legitimate instrumentalities for enforcement of their protective doctrine. they take no account of the fact that the enactment of a 155favorable shipping law would open new and wide avenues of remunerative employment for american mechanics that are now closed. their motive in opposing such legislation seems to be a sort of blind, groping revenge against a few ship-builders and ship-owners who have resisted their unreasonable and ruinous demands. it is a remarkable fact that the leaders and managers of the confederated trades-unions are all foreigners.

naturally, such organizations, so led, fall easy dupes to the wiles of the alien ship-owners, who have never left any stone unturned or any expedient untried to defeat or smother in our own congress legislation calculated to promote and extend our merchant marine.

whatever the distant future may bring forth, there seems to be at this time and for the near future as little prospect of the development of a new and purely american merchant marine in the foreign trade as there has been at any time since the old one was destroyed.

whatever may be the fate of the american merchant marine, it cannot be said that during the campaign for its resurrection, lasting almost continuously for over thirty years, mr. cramp has ever withheld from its advocacy 156any part of his knowledge, study, observation, and experience; and if, partly through the feebleness of our own patriotism in legislation and administration, and partly through the superior and more aggressive patriotism of foreign ship-owners and ship-builders, the american merchant marine should become extinct, it will not be his fault.