the need for the superman is, in its most imperative aspect, a political one. we have been driven to proletarian democracy by the failure of all the alternative systems; for these depended on the existence of supermen acting as despots or oligarchs; and not only were these supermen not always or even often forthcoming at the right moment and in an eligible social position, but when they were forthcoming they could not, except for a short time and by morally suicidal coercive methods, impose superhumanity on those whom they governed; so, by mere force of “human nature,” government by consent of the governed has supplanted the old plan of governing the citizen as a public-schoolboy is governed.

now we have yet to see the man who, having any practical experience of proletarian democracy, has any belief in its capacity for solving great political problems, or even for doing ordinary parochial work intelligently and economically. only under despotisms and oligarchies has the radical faith in “universal suffrage” as a political panacea arisen. it withers the moment it is exposed to practical trial, because democracy cannot rise above the level of the human material of which its voters are made. switzerland seems happy in comparison with russia; but if russia were as small as switzerland, and had her social problems simplified in the same way by impregnable natural fortifications and a population educated by the same variety and intimacy of international intercourse, there might be little to choose between them. at all events australia and canada, which are virtually protected democratic republics, and france and the united states, which are avowedly independent democratic republics, are neither healthy, wealthy, nor wise; and they would be worse instead of better if their popular ministers were not experts in the art of dodging popular enthusiasms and duping popular ignorance. the politician who once had to learn how to flatter kings has now to learn how to fascinate, amuse, coax, humbug, frighten, or otherwise strike the fancy of the electorate; and though in advanced modern states, where the artizan is better educated than the king, it takes a much bigger man to be a successful demagogue than to be a successful courtier, yet he who holds popular convictions with prodigious energy is the man for the mob, whilst the frailer sceptic who is cautiously feeling his way towards the next century has no chance unless he happens by accident to have the specific artistic talent of the mountebank as well, in which case it is as a mountebank that he catches votes, and not as a meliorist. consequently the demagogue, though he professes (and fails) to readjust matters in the interests of the majority of the electors, yet stereotypes mediocrity, organizes intolerance, disparages exhibitions of uncommon qualities, and glorifies conspicuous exhibitions of common ones. he manages a small job well: he muddles rhetorically through a large one. when a great political movement takes place, it is not consciously led nor organized: the unconscious self in mankind breaks its way through the problem as an elephant breaks through a jungle; and the politicians make speeches about whatever happens in the process, which, with the best intentions, they do all in their power to prevent. finally, when social aggregation arrives at a point demanding international organization before the demagogues and electorates have learnt how to manage even a country parish properly much less internationalize constantinople, the whole political business goes to smash; and presently we have ruins of empires, new zealanders sitting on a broken arch of london bridge, and so forth.

to that recurrent catastrophe we shall certainly come again unless we can have a democracy of supermen; and the production of such a democracy is the only change that is now hopeful enough to nerve us to the effort that revolution demands.