at this time clemenceau, owing to his apparently resolute determination not to take office, no matter how many ministries he might successfully bring to naught, had got into a back-water. he had become permanently senator for the department of the var in 1902, a startling, almost incomprehensible move when his continued furious opposition to that body is remembered. however, having thus made unto himself friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, he found their “eternal habitations” a not unpleasing dwelling-place. his position as publicist and journalist was assured and nothing could shake it; his criticisms by speech and pen were as telling and vigorous as ever. but at sixty-five years of age he was still a free-lance, a force which all parties were obliged to consider but with which no ministry could come to terms. it was a strange position. so his countrymen thought. those who most admired his ability and his career saw no outlet for his marvellous energy that would be permanently beneficial to the country in a constructive sense. perhaps no politician of any nation ever so persistently refused to “range himself” as did clemenceau for thirty-five years of stormy public life. he revelled in opposition: he rejoiced in overthrow. he was on the side of the people, but he would not help them to realise their aspirations in practical life. he was a political philosopher compact of incompatibilities. as an individualist he was a stalwart champion of individual freedom: as a man of affairs he advocated the use of state power to limit the anarchic domination of personal power.
there was no understanding such a man. he would remain[172] a brilliant frenchman of whom all were proud until the end, when he would be buried with public honours as the champion ishmaelite of his age. “when i saw he doubted about everything, i decided that i needed nobody to keep me ignorant,” wrote voltaire. much the same idea prevailed about clemenceau. he was the universal sceptic: the man whose sole intellectual enjoyment was to point out the limitless incapacity of others with epigrammatic zeal. i myself, who had watched him closely, was afraid that he would allow all opportunities for displaying his really great faculties in a ministerial capacity to slip by and leave to his friends only the mournful task of writing his epitaph: “here lies clemenceau the destroyer who could have been a creator.”
but this was all nonsense. “ce jeune homme“—clemenceau will die young—”d’un si beau passé” had also before him un bel avenir. nothing is certain with clemenceau but the unforeseen. at the very time when people had made up their minds that he was a back number, he had a brand-new volume of his adventures ready for the press. after a few conversations with m. rouvier and then with m. sarrien, he became minister of the interior in the latter’s cabinet. he took office for the first time on march 12th, 1906, at a very stirring epoch.
it is difficult to exaggerate the impression produced by this step on the part of m. clemenceau. his accession to m. sarrien’s cabinet eclipsed in interest every other political event. here was the great political leader and organiser of opposition, the radical of radicals, the man who had declined the challenge alike of friends and of enemies to take office, time after time, at last seated in a ministerial chair. all his past rose up around him. the destroyer of opportunism: the guy earl of warwick of ministries: the universal critic; the immolator of jules perry and many another statesman; the one frenchman who had maintained the ideals of the french revolution against all comers—this terrible champion of democracy à outrance now placed himself in the official hierarchy, whence he had so often ousted others. his victims of[173] yesterday could be his critics of to-day. how would this terrible upsetter of cabinets act as a minister himself? that was what all the world waited with impatience to see. they had not days, but only hours to wait.
that was the time when, m. delcassé having been forced to resign from the foreign office, almost, it may be said, at the dictation of germany, the morocco affair was still in a very dangerous condition, threatening the peace of france and of europe. but even the critical negotiations at algeciras were for the moment overshadowed by a terrific colliery disaster in the courrières-lens district, causing the death of more miners than had ever been killed before by a similar catastrophe. this horrible incident occurred but a few days before clemenceau became minister of the interior, and it fell within the immediate sphere of his official duties.
the mines where the accident occurred had long been regarded as very dangerous, fire-damp being known to pervade them from time to time, and the miners throughout the coal regions had long held that the owners had never taken proper precautions to ensure the safety of the men. they went down the pits day after day, not only to work on very difficult and narrow seams, but at the hourly risk of their lives. owing to the great social and political influence of the mine-owners it was practically impossible to get anything done, and the general treatment of the men employed was worse than is usual even in those districts in our own and other countries where coal magnates are masters. the pitmen under such conditions were less cared for and more harshly treated than animals, probably because they were less costly and could be more easily replaced.
three days before the main explosion there had been an outburst of fire-damp at a small adjacent mine, whose workings were in direct communication with the larger pits. this alone ought to have been taken as a serious warning to the engineers in control. but markets were good, coal was in great demand, the “hands” were there to take risks. so this minor difficulty[174] was dealt with in a cheap and convenient way, and the extraction of coal went on upon a large scale from the imperilled shafts as it did before. meanwhile the dangerous gases were all the time oozing in from the smaller pit to the larger ones. for three days this went steadily on, and nothing whatever was done, either in the way of taking further precautions where the original danger began, or of testing the character of the air in the bigger mines to which the other pit had access.
on saturday, march 10th, no fewer than 1,800 men went down the shafts into the mines. a full account of what actually took place could never be given. all that was learned from the survivors was that the miners working with bare lights in these dangerous pits suddenly encountered an influx of fire-damp. explosion after explosion took place. the unfortunate men below, threatened at once with suffocation or being burned alive, rushed in headlong disorder for the cages which would lift them to the surface. horrible scenes inevitably took place. those in front were pressed on by those behind, who, as one of them expressed it, were breathing burning air. for the majority there was and there could be no hope. out of the 1,800 miners who went down in the morning, more than 1,150 were either stifled by the gas or burnt alive. the heroism displayed by the pitmen themselves, in their partially successful endeavours to rescue their entombed comrades, was the only bright feature in the whole of this frightful disaster. some of these fine fellows went down to what seemed certain death, and others worked at excavation until almost dead themselves in their efforts to save a few from the general fate. no wonder that the feeling throughout the neighbourhood was desperately bitter.
the war, sad to say, has much modified our general conception of the value of human life, even when unnecessarily thrown away. but sacrifices for a great cause on the battlefield or on the ocean, however serious, are made as a rule for high ideals. they differ widely from the loss of life deliberately occasioned by capitalist neglect or greed. thus a mining accident on a[175] large scale, or a conflagration in a peaceful city, produces a stronger impression on the public mind than the loss of ten or twenty times the number of soldiers or sailors in a world-wide struggle. among the widows and children and relations and comrades of the victims on the spot the exasperation against the employers was still greater. class hatred and personal hatred were excited to a very high pitch.
this was the more natural for two reasons. first, the company on whose property the immolation of so many pitmen had occurred, and to whose mismanagement and cold-blooded indifference the avoidable explosions were due, had made enormous, almost incredible profits. from dividends of fifty per cent. in 1863 their returns had risen to profits of 1,000 per cent. in 1905. yet they could not spare the comparatively small sum necessary to safeguard the lives of the men who obtained this wealth for the shareholders. secondly, the germans, who rendered assistance in the attempts to rescue the frenchmen still in the workings below, openly proclaimed that it was quite impossible—as indeed was the truth—that such an accident on such a scale should have occurred in germany. that the empire in germany should be far more careful of the lives and limbs of the miners than the republic in france, and that huge profits should have been made still huger by the refusal of the french coal-owners to adopt the ordinary precautions enforced by law on the other side of the frontier—these considerations, driven home by the results of the great catastrophe, rendered the situation exceedingly perilous from every point of view. a strike for increased wages seemed a very poor outcome of the horrors inflicted upon the actual producers of the coal under such conditions.
clemenceau was perhaps the best man in the country to deal with the miners at such a juncture. a socialist of mining experience would possibly have taken more decidedly the side of the men, but he would not have been able to carry with him to the same extent the support of the chambers. and clemenceau had gone very far already on collectivist lines. not many[176] years before, in an article on “the right to strike,” he had put the case of the men very strongly indeed. in a vehement protest against the theory of supply and demand, as applied to the human beings compelled to sell labour power as a commodity, and the political economy of the profiteers based upon subsistence wages for the workers—all being for the best in the best of possible worlds—clemenceau set forth how the system worked in practice:—
“the state gives to some sleek, well-set-up bourgeois immense coal-fields below ground. these fine fellows turn to men less well dressed than themselves, but who are men all the same, men with the same wants, the same feelings, the same capacity for enjoyment and suffering, and say: ‘we will grant you subsistence; sink us some pits in the earth; go below and bring us up coal, which we will sell at a good price.’
“agreed. the pits are sunk, the coal comes out of the earth.
“but, observe, those comfortable bourgeois for their outlay of five hundred francs (￡20) have now a bit of paper which is worth forty thousand francs (￡1,600).
“the miners, who watch what is going on, think this a good deal, and, as they have got nothing by way of profit, they protest and ask for a share.
“‘that, my friend, is impossible. the price of coal has fallen this year, the price of man must come down in proportion. all i could do for you is to reduce your wages. you object to that. all right; down the shaft you go: don’t let us talk about it any more.’
“but the men won’t go down.
“‘you don’t make money this year. all right. but when you made huge profits, did you give us even the crumbs from your banquet?’
“‘i wasn’t a shareholder then; it was my father.’
“‘my father, like myself, was a miner. he died of consumption, his lungs choked with coal-dust. now it is my turn to cough and spit black. and my wife, looking at her babes,[177] asks herself whether i shall live long enough for them to be old enough, before my death, to go down into the mine which will kill them in turn. if i crack up too soon, misery, ruin, beggary, wholesale wretchedness for wife and children.’
“they don’t come to terms. the strike begins.
“economists argue, to begin with, that the state has no right to interfere in the relations between miners and mine-owners. the mine-owner is at home on his own property. certain securities for life and limb may be demanded, nothing more. but no sooner does a strike begin than the state, which five minutes ago had no right to interfere, is called upon to bring in horse, foot and artillery on the side of the coal-owners. then the miners have no rights left, and the judges decide against them on shameless pretexts and condemn them to prison, when they cannot bear false witness in support of the police and military.”
such were clemenceau’s views on the right to strike and the grievances of the men, before he accepted the post of minister of the interior and began to deal with the troublous state of things at courrières-lens, where the terrible accident had occurred and a strike had been entered upon, while the entire district was in a state of mind bordering upon anarchist revolt.
the first step he took was as bold and as remarkable an act as any in the whole of his adventurous life. he went down at once to lens himself. arrived there, he walked straight off, without any escort whatever, to meet and confer with the committee of the miners themselves. courageous and honourable as this was, it failed at first to impress the strike committee. this was natural enough. they were lamenting the wholesale butchery of their comrades and were incensed against the employers who, with hundreds upon hundreds of dead pitmen below, would not deal fairly with the survivors. clemenceau therefore met with a very cool reception. but he was nothing daunted, and began to address them. gradually, he convinced the committee that he meant fairly by the men, and that he had not come down, alone and unarmed as he was, with any[178] intention of suppressing the strike, but, so far as he could, to see that they had the fairest of fair play, according to their rights under the law.
thereupon, the committee agreed that clemenceau should go with them to speak to a mass meeting of the miners. it was a doubtful venture, but clemenceau went. in the course of his speech he reassured the men upon the attitude of the government as represented by himself. he told them plainly: “you are entitled to strike. you will be protected by the law in doing all which the law permits. your rights are equal to the rights of president or ministers. but the rights of others must not be attacked. the mines must not be destroyed. for the first time, you will see no soldiers in the street during the strike. true, soldiers have been placed in the mines, but solely to protect them, not in any way to injure you. on the other hand, you must not resort to violence yourselves. the strike can be carried on peacefully and without interference. respect the mines upon which you depend for your livelihood.”
this was quite plain, and clemenceau adhered to his own programme as he had formulated it. but the difficulty was apparent from the first, and it is a difficulty which must always recur when a great strike is organised. if the state claims the right to intervene, in order to protect the laws and liberties of those who wish to work for the employers, in spite of the strike and the decisions of the strikers, antagonism to such action is practically certain beforehand. for, in this case, as the strikers say, the state is using the forces of the military and the police in order to protect “blacklegs” who, by offering their labour to the employers at such a time of acute class war, act in the interests of the coal-owners and against the mass of the workers. socialists argue that the strikers are sound in their contention, and that by assuring to non-strikers the right to work the government practically nullifies the right to strike. when, therefore, in this typical courrières case, the strikers as a whole remained out, notwithstanding certain insufficient offers by the coal-owners, and a minority of non-strikers claimed the[179] help of the law, with support of the state army, to weaken by their surrender the position of the majority of their fellow-workers in the same industry, then the ethics of the dispute between sections of the miners could not be so easily determined as m. clemenceau from his individualist training assumed.
if the employers were in the wrong, as it appears they were, then to call out the military to protect those miners who showed themselves ready to make immediate terms with injustice was, however good the intention, to take sides against the main body of the men. so it seemed to these latter. when, therefore, the soldiers defended the non-strikers, the strikers assailed the military, who had not attacked them. clemenceau accordingly decided that the strikers had broken the law, as undoubtedly they had, by stoning and injuring the servants of the state, who were upholding the law as it stood. the truth is that, so long as these antagonistic sections exist among the working class, and persist in fighting one another, it is practically impossible for the state not to intervene in order to keep the peace. there may be no sympathy with blacklegs, but the minister of the interior could scarcely be blamed for protecting them against an infuriated mob, which would probably have killed them, or for insisting upon the release of those whom the strikers had seized. that the temper of the crowd had become highly dangerous was apparent a little later, when the socialist mayor was knocked down as he was trying to calm them.
all this rendered m. clemenceau’s second and third visits to the scene of class warfare far more stormy than the first. owing to the horror and hatred created by the avoidable holocaust in the courrières mines, and the further discovery that engineers appointed by the state had played into the hands of the employers, the situation got worse from day to day. the strike itself was not only an effort to get more wages, but a declaration of hostility to the mine-owners, and those of the miners’ own class who showed any tenderness towards them, or were ready to take work under them. their own leaders[180] and representatives had no longer any influence with the men or control over them. m. basly, the deputy who acted throughout for the miners, had as little power over the strikers as anybody else. the whole movement was taking an anarchist turn. also, agents were at work among them both from the reactionary and the revolutionary side whose main object, for very different reasons, was to foster disturbance and influence passion. foreign emissaries likewise were said to be at work.
clemenceau’s task was therefore an exceedingly hard one. he had ever in mind the old eighteenth-century watchword which, from his point of view, is the foundation of the french republic—liberty, equality and fraternity. and the greatest of these is liberty! he throughout forgot, or overlooked, that, even according to his own pronouncements, liberty in any real sense is impossible for the weaker—the majority who own no property—against the stronger—“les plus forts,” the minority who own all the property. this triune fetish clemenceau, with all his keenness of criticism, might be said to worship: yet to worship in a more or less reasonable way. he could not shut his eyes to the truth that, for men and women whose livelihood was at the mercy of capitalists, there could be no real liberty, dominated as the workers were by their daily compulsion to obtain the wherewithal for the necessaries of life. the only way by which even partial justice could be secured, under the system of payment of wages, was combination among the wage-earners. hence he recognises the liberty to strike. but he was equally determined, as he puts it, to defend the liberty of those who would not strike. it was logical: it was in harmony with the law; but it was a virtual help to the employers none the less.
on the occasion of his second visit he enforced his view in his usual emphatic way. three miners who would not join the strike were being paraded through the town by the strikers with an insulting placard hung around their necks: “nous sommes des poires cuites; des faux frères.” clemenceau insisted that they should be released, and succeeded in freeing them.[181] the very fact, however, that it was possible for the strikers to act in this way, without protest, showed how small was the minority and how strong the feeling against these claimants of the liberty of taking the other side. clemenceau likewise acted with vigour against all who were guilty of any violence. but the strikes still spread.
speaking at lyons on may 3rd, he explained the difficulties of the situation:—“my position is between the political demagogues of the church, the clericals and the reactionaries on one side, who tried hard to hound on the troops i was forced to call in to fire upon the strikers, who greatly provoked them. this the ecclesiastics and restorationists did with the hope of fomenting a revolt against the republic—a revolt supported by certain military chiefs, inspired by the clericals and their shameless lack of discipline.” the separation of church and state was being decided while all this was going on. “their object was to bring about a massacre in the interest of the catholic church and the monarchy. this plot was frustrated. butchery was avoided.
“on the other side, i am accused by the revolutionary socialists of indulging in brutal military oppression because i suppress anarchist rioting. this though no striker was killed or wounded. i acted for tranquillity, while the monarchists fostered disturbances. they wanted a government of the republic which should rely for support solely on the right. the anarchists helped the monarchists, who had agents throughout the perturbed districts, by denouncing the republic and excusing mob violence. yet how stood the case? was it i who organised a campaign of panic? was it i who was responsible for the original explosion and strike? was it i who brought about the state of things which resulted in general disturbance and might have tended towards another coup d’état? nothing of the sort. i was suddenly called upon to deal with unexpected troubles. i acted for the maintenance of the republic, and kept the peace under the law.”
by taking office at the time when he did it was at once[182] apparent that clemenceau had brought himself into the full whirlpool of strike difficulties which then arose. he was called upon to solve in everyday life, as a man committed to a policy of justice to the workers, problems which, at critical moments, are almost insoluble under the capitalist system of wage-earning and production for profit. has any section of the community the right to hold up the life of a nation or a great city in order to secure advantages for itself? at first sight the answer would undoubtedly be “no.” but if the conditions of existence for those who act in this way are admittedly such as ought not to continue in any civilised country, it is not possible to reply so confidently in the negative. neither can the “no” be repeated with certainty when employers, or the state itself, are guilty of a direct breach of faith towards the workers, unless, by ceasing to carry out their duties, they actually imperil the welfare of the entire collectivity of which they form a part. in short, all depends upon the circumstances, which have to be considered most carefully in each case. it fell to clemenceau’s lot to decide in what might almost be taken as the test incident—the strike of the electrical engineers and workers of paris.
there seems to be something in m. clemenceau’s horoscope which has decreed that his career shall be diversified and rendered interesting by a series of dramatic events. this strike of the electricians of paris was certainly one of them.
scene: cabinet of the minister of the interior. the minister, m. clemenceau, at work at his desk and dictating to his secretary. everything going on quite nicely. no sign of more than ordinary pressure. electric light functioning as usual for the benefit of the radical leader as well as for parisians of every degree. hey presto! darkness falls upon the bureau of the minister. very provoking. what is the matter? corridors and other bureaux suffering the like eclipse. evidently something wrong at the main. candles obtained, lamps got out from dusty cupboards, oil hunted up. ancient forms of illumination applied. darkness thus made visible. telephones set going. all paris obscured. a city of two or three[183] millions of inhabitants suddenly deprived of light. what has happened? the entire electrical service disorganised until to-morrow by the sudden and unexpected strike of the whole of the skilled men in the electrical supply department. lovers of darkness because their deeds are evil likely to have a good time. business arrested, fathers and mothers of families perturbed. dangers of every sort threatened. apaches and other cut-throats preparing for action in the to them providential enactment of endless gloom.
such is the baleful news borne over the telephone wires to the much troubled minister of the interior, with his wax tapers and old-world lamps glimmering around him. how preserve his paris, his ville lumière, from the depredations of the miscreants engendered by the social system of the day, when light fails to disclose their approach? how protect the savings of the conscientious bourgeois and the diamonds of the high-placed horizontale from removal and conveyance under cover of the night? to surrender to the strikers is to admit their right as a few to blackmail the many. it is to sanctify the action of the despoiling minority above by giving way to the organised minority below. immediate decision is essential. night is upon us, when no man can work, save the man who communises movable property to his own use. light is a necessary of security for property, nay, even for life. the state must come in to fulfil the functions which the creator neglected to provide for when he divided the night from the day. the sapper is the man to supplement the deficiencies of providence and to mitigate the social revolution by electrical engineers. rien n’est sacré pour un sapeur! no sooner thought of but acted upon. m. clemenceau, as minister of the interior and trustee for the well-being of the citizens of paris, calls upon the state engineers under military control to light up paris afresh. the thing is done. paris sees more clearly and breathes more freely. society itself has the right to live.
but stay a moment: here is m. jaurès. he has a word to say. what are you doing, m. clemenceau? you are out[184]raging all your own principles. you are interfering with that very right to strike which you yourself have declared to be sacred. you are using the military discipline of the comrades of the men out on strike against the electrical companies, to render their protest nugatory, by employing the sappers against them. you have, in fact, called out the powers of the state to crush the workers in a particular industry. if you were true to yourself, you would convert the electrical supply of paris now in the hands of greedy monopolists into a public service, and give the strikers every satisfaction. that is the only real solution of social anarchy.
to him clemenceau: “but this was not merely a strike or a limited liability class war against employers. it was a bitter fight between two irreconcilable antagonists against inoffensive passers-by. the people of paris, for whom i am concerned, had nothing to do with the matter. i myself knew nothing about the decision to strike till my own work was rendered impossible by the sudden infliction of darkness upon me by these resuscitated joshuas. not only was the general security threatened, as i have declared, but the lives of your own clients, jaurès, were threatened by immersion in a flood below ground. the inundation of the metropolitan (the underground railway) had already begun. the workers of paris who used that means of communication in order to return to their work would most certainty have been drowned owing to the suspension of electrical pumps and lifts, had not the sappers and the firemen, both of them sets of public functionaries, rushed at once to the rescue. were the workmen of paris engaged in other departments to be allowed to perish, with the state standing by, wringing its hands in hopeless ineptitude, while the electrical engineers got the better of their masters in a dispute about wages? this was a practical question which i had to decide at once. i decided in favour of the inoffensive people of paris and against the electrical engineers on strike.”
taking a wide view of the whole question, i hold jaurès’s[185] opinion to be the right one. but clemenceau had to deal with an immediate practical difficulty of a very serious kind indeed. the lights went out at six o’clock. night was coming on. no time could be lost in negotiating with the engineers. still less was nightfall the period when a public service could be instituted in hot haste. the matter was settled in that form and for that occasion. but none the less the real point at issue was not thus easily disposed of. clemenceau was right in preventing paris from being left all night in darkness. jaurès was right in claiming that the state should have a more definite and consistent policy than that of dealing with differences between wage-earners and employers by such hand-to-mouth methods.
it was just at this point that, notwithstanding all adverse criticisms in regard to the instability of ministries, and the scenes of apparent disorder which sometimes arise, the french national assembly displayed its immense superiority to the parliaments of other countries when serious matters of principle were involved. the desire to get to the bottom of a really dangerous question, to hear the arguments on both sides taken, as far as possible, out of the narrow limits of personal or party politics, puts the french assembly on a very high level. from the point of view of economic development france is far behind great britain, america and germany. the great factory industry and the legislation growing out of it are not nearly so far advanced. but, in the wish and endeavour to investigate the principles upon which the future regulation of society must proceed, france gives the lead.
this openness of mind and anxiety to let both views have fair play have grown under the republic in a wonderful way. where else in the world would men of all parties and all sections allow the two chief orators of the left—jaurès, the socialist leader of the opposition, clemenceau, the individualist minister—to debate out at length, in two long sittings, the issues between genuine socialism and that nondescript reformist collectivism which goes by the name of socialistic[186] radicalism: the latter really meaning, to socialists, capitalism palliated by state bureaucracy.
this was indeed a great oratorical duel, and those who contend that oratory has lost its significance and virtue in modern times would have to admit that they were wrong, not only in this particular case, but in regard to other speeches delivered by the two chief disputants afterwards. the debate itself was a contrast between styles just as it was a conflict of principles. jaurès was an orator of great power and wonderful capacity for stirring the emotions. his voice, his face, his gestures, his method of argument and fusing of forcible contentions into one compact whole made so great an impression that he could capture a large audience with the same ease, even on subjects remote from the immediate matter of his address—as once he held the assembly entranced by a long digression on music in the course of a fine speech on the tendencies of the time.
if it might be urged that he occasionally used too many words to express his meaning, this was easily forgiven by his countrymen, on account of his admirable turn of phrase and his understanding use of the modulations of the french language. however prejudiced his hearers might be against him (and his personal appearance was not such as to disarm an opponent), they had only to listen to jaurès for ten minutes to feel interested in what he had to say. from this to admiration and excitement was no long step. short, stout and somewhat cumbrous in figure, wearing trousers nearly halfway up his calves, with a broad, humorous, rather coarse face, his eyes full of expression and not wanting in fun, troubled with a curious twitching on the right cheek which affected his eye with a sort of wink, jaurès was certainly not the personality anyone would have fixed upon as the greatest master of idealist and economic socialist oratory in france, and perhaps in europe. but his sincerity, his eloquence soon overcame these drawbacks on the platform and in the tribune, just as his bonhomie and good-fellowship did in private life. he had[187] been a professor of literature in the university of toulouse, and was a man of wide cultivation. but his learning never made him pedantic, nor did his great success turn his head. gifted with extraordinary vitality, his powers of work were quite phenomenal. to say that he “toiled like a galley-slave,” for the cause to which he devoted himself, was no exaggeration. yet he was always fresh, always in good spirits, always ready to contribute wit and vivacity to any company in which he found himself. add to this much practical good sense in the conduct of his party and the affairs of the world, and all must admit that in jaurès the socialist party of france had a worthy chief and clemenceau a worthy antagonist. the galleries, like the assembly itself, were always crowded when either orator was expected to address the house.
jaurès dealt with the development of society from the chaos of conflicting classes and mutual antagonisms to the co-ordination of common effort for the common good. this can and should be a peaceful social evolution. property for all means a universal share, not only in politics, but in the production and the distribution of wealth. this could not be obtained under the conditions of to-day, where those who possessed no property but the labour in their bodies were at the mercy of the classes who possessed all else; where only by strikes in which the state took the side of the employers could the wage-earners obtain an infinitesimal portion of their rights. by collectivism, leading up to socialism and general co-operation, every individual would have a direct interest in and be benefited by the general social increase of wealth, due to the growing powers of man to produce what is useful and beneficial to all.
socialism substitutes order for anarchy, joint action of every member of society for the mutual antagonism which is now the rule. legal expropriation with compensation will gradually put the community in control of its own resources. our task is to convince the small proprietor and the small bourgeoisie that they will benefit by the coming transformation. incessant social reform on socialist lines would lead to the[188] realisation of socialist ideals in a practical shape. such strikes as that at courrières, followed by the military intervention of the state, at m. clemenceau’s direction, and repression of the strikers, displayed the injustice of the existing system and proclaimed the necessity for accepting the higher view of social duty by which all would benefit and none would suffer.
the speech thus briefly summarised was delivered at two sittings of the chamber, and was listened to with profound attention by those present, the great majority of whom were directly opposed to socialist views. no higher tribute could have been paid.
clemenceau rose to reply to the socialist leader a few days later. twenty years had passed over his head since i last described his personal appearance, his vigorous individuality and his incisive, clear-cut, witty conversation and oratory. time had affected him little. he was still the same energetic and determined but ordinarily cool political fighter that he had shown himself in the eighties of the last century. his head was now bald, and his moustache grey, but his eyes looked out from under the heavy white eyebrows with all the old fire, and the alertness of his frame was apparent in his every movement. though many years older than his socialist challenger, there was nothing to choose between them in regard to physical and mental vigour. jaurès had been eloquent and persuasive; he brought in the ideals and the strategy of the future to illuminate the sad truths of the present. he relied upon the history of the past and the hopes of humanity ahead to constitute a policy of preparation for coming generations of frenchmen, while applying the principles he advocated, as far as possible, to the events of the day. clemenceau confined his answer, which also extended over two sittings of the chamber, to the matters immediately in hand and the criticisms on his method of dealing with them. this sense of practicality, not devoid of sympathy with the disinherited classes of our day, gave the minister of the interior a great advantage and pre[189]cisely suited his style. the interval between the two speeches also told in favour of clemenceau. the ring of jaurès’s fine sentences had died down in the meantime. his glorious aspirations were discounted hour by hour by the continuance of the conflict, whose existence he himself could not but admit, which formed, in fact, part of his case, and in a way strengthened his indictment. yet this had to be dealt with all the same.
clemenceau began his oration with a glowing tribute to jaurès’s passion for social justice. but his magnificent eloquence has eliminated the whole of the bad side of life. he rises to the empyrean, whence he surveys creation through a roseate atmosphere which is raised far above plain facts. “for myself, i am compelled to remain in the valley where all the events which jaurès leaves out of his picture are actually taking place. that accounts for the difference in our perspective. i am accused of attacking the workers and of doing worse than other governments. i have never attacked the workers, i have never done them wrong. the duty of the government is to maintain tranquillity. this i have done without injury to the toilers, though i had to face 85,000 strikers in the pas de calais and 115,000 in paris—the largest number ever known on strike at the same time in france. i went down to courrières to ensure liberty. we have all of us here to go through our education in liberty. education is not a matter of words, but of deeds. those deeds form part of the education. the working classes become worthy of taking over the responsibility of government for themselves when their own deeds are in accordance with the law. if speeches alone could teach administration, the sermon on the mount would have dictated practical politics for centuries.
“in these disturbances my orders, issued through the highest police authorities, were precise. maintain, i said, liberty to strike, liberty to work. soldiers to be called in only in case of actual violence. but the miners themselves infringed the liberties of others. they indulged in the anarchical wrecking of houses belonging to men of their own class. i have here[190] photographs of the destruction wrought. were monsieur jaurès minister of the interior—misfortune comes so suddenly—he himself would send down troops to stop wholesale pillage. yet, if he did, he would in turn be denounced, by the anarchist heads of the general confederation of labour, as the enemy of the class whose cause he now champions. i challenge m. jaurès to say what he would do under such circumstances as i have had to face”—the orator pauses and waits. there is dead silence. no answer. “by not replying, you have replied. there have, i repeat, been no dead or wounded among the working class. on may 1st, when general disorders were openly threatened, i took precautions against organised outbreak. no trouble arose.”
the republic, he continued, was a rule of freedom for the individual, so far as it could be secured under existing conditions. those conditions and the law itself might work injustice, but it was then the duty of the state, and the minister who had to translate its functions into action, to mitigate such harshness by protecting the weaker side. soldiers had been sent down to courrières not to attack the strikers—no attack had been made upon them—but to prevent the strikers themselves from destroying the mines and inflicting illegal punishments upon those of their class who did not agree with them. when this was done, the strikers molested the soldiers, who never fired a shot. the lieutenant in command was assailed, though his sabre remained all the time in its sheath. the right of men to work on terms they themselves are willing to accept could not be contested as the law now stood. “but, says m. jaurès, by assuring non-strikers the right to work, i myself am violating the right to strike, which i have declared to be the inalienable privilege of the wage-earners. but then, i ask, what are the non-strikers to do? they also have wives and children who demand to be fed. what law justifies me in preventing them from working? republicanism means the right of the individual to combine with others to resist oppression and obtain advantages. this freedom is admitted. it[191] does not include the freedom to oppress others, still less to assault servants of the state, who are acting in order to safeguard the law as it stands. when the socialists of m. jaurès’s school begin to deal with facts, and not with ideals at present all in the air, what sort of programme do they formulate?
“here we have it. an eight-hours working day for all trades. the right of state employees to form trade unions and to strike. proportional representation. a progressive income tax, and so on. a nice little programme, but a bourgeois programme all the same. no idealism, no socialism there! m. jaurès, however, claims the immediate nationalisation and socialisation of all departments of industry, including the land. but such unification of society is in reality the catholicisation of society. there is a definite programme of radical reforms, nevertheless, constituting an advance towards a socialist policy. they are formulated by the bourgeoisie, but socialists threaten to vote against the budget, which is necessary in order to carry out some of their own proposals. take old age pensions. these need money. the socialists refuse the required funds. yet socialists are for the republic. so far we cordially agree. so far i, of necessity, work with them. but if they at the same time denounce republicans as the enemies of the workers and secure a majority of votes in that sense, then that is to vote for the defeat of the republic. if socialists would work with the radicals, in order to attain the ends they have in common, none would be more glad than i. but if such common action is impossible, then let each work on in their own way.”
it was said at the time that at the close of the debate, when clemenceau was leaving the assembly, he remarked to jaurès, “after all, jaurès, you are not the good god.” to which jaurès replied: “and you are not even the devil.”
i have dealt with this famous controversy at some length, without attempting to give the speeches in full, because, although the discussion led to no decision at the moment, it certainly brought before the public of france and even the[192] public opinion of europe the direct theoretical and practical difference between socialism and well-meaning radicalism, in an intelligible manner, as nothing else would. the effect upon french politics within the next few months, in spite of further desperate outbreaks in 1907, was also remarkable. jaurès’s speech did much to consolidate the socialist party as a unified section of the chamber; and clemenceau himself was so far influenced by it and by the trend of events that, as will be seen, it affected his policy as prime minister in the formation of his own cabinet shortly afterwards. looking at the matter from the socialist point of view, therefore, jaurès was building better than his opponents in the chamber knew, and socialists had no reason to regret the apparent victory of his formidable antagonist at the time. in fact, as bernard shaw said in regard to a very different debate under widely different circumstances in london more than thirty years before: “the socialist was playing at longer bowls than you know.”
it is this power of detachment, this recognition that theory and sentiment play a great part in the moulding of public character and public opinion, even in the practical affairs of everyday life, that renders france—independent, idealist, revolutionist, conservative and thrifty france—so essential a factor in the discussion of the world-problems of to-day. france alone among the nations rises above the smoke of class warfare; and though her own social and economic conditions are not themselves ready for the definite solution of social problems, she indicates the route which may be most safely followed by countries more economically advanced. both jaurès and clemenceau, therefore, rendered good service to mankind when they used their utmost efforts to place before the peoples and the students of all nations the views of the socialist, with his outlook on the future, and the radical, with his policy of the present based on the traditions of the past. jaurès, in the prime of his manhood and the fullness of his fame, was torn from the useful and noble work which lay well within[193] his power and his intelligence by the murderous revolver of a reactionary assassin: a loss indeed to his party, his country, and the world at large! his antagonist, clemenceau, still works on as nearly an octogenarian, with all the vigour and energy of his fiery youth, on behalf of that france, who, to-day, as for many a long year past, has been the mistress and the goddess of the materialist democrat and radical champion of the people.
on october 23rd, after six months of service as minister of the interior, clemenceau was called back from carlsbad, whither he went every year before the war to conjure attacks of gout (which might at least, in all reason, have spared a lifelong teetotaller), in order to form a cabinet of his own in place of m. sarrien. that cabinet was remarkable from many points of view. comments upon its constitution and significance may be reserved for a wider survey. suffice it to say here that clemenceau himself, in addition to holding the presidency of the council as prime minister, remained minister of the interior, thus declaring his intention not to shirk any of the responsibility he had taken upon himself or the animosity he had incurred in his dealings with strikes and other social questions.
france was passing through a very difficult period. whatever view a thoroughgoing socialist may take as to the need for a wider general policy than that adopted by clemenceau, it is not easy to see how, the french people being unprepared to accept a purely labour or socialist government, the republic could have been peacefully maintained, but for the cool determination of the radical republican at the head of affairs. scarcely a day passed without some fresh economic and social conflicts that called for prompt action. these, however, arose in provinces and cities and under conditions where the antagonism between wage-earners and employers, between capital and labour, in the ordinary way offered no exceptional features for the statesman. but in the spring and summer of 1907 a more complicated and dangerous uprising, which developed into little short of an attempt at an[194] anarchist-communist, anti-republican revolution, broke out in the south of france among the wine-growers.
the peasants of the districts round narbonne and montpellier, together with many of the inhabitants of those towns, who were themselves dependent upon the wine industry, made, in fact, a desperate local attack upon the existing government of france. disaffection had been growing for a long time and was due to a series of economic and agricultural troubles among the wine-growers, which successive ministries had not understood, far less attempted to cope with. it had its direct origin in a natural cause. this cause was the appearance in the bordeaux country of the deadly enemy of all vignerons, large and small—the much-dreaded phylloxera. the vineyards of the gironde were devastated and the famous clarets shipped from bordeaux ceased to be the product of bordeaux grapes. thereupon the inferior vintages of the midi came into abnormal demand. but the wine-producers of the west were not wholly defeated, even while the phylloxera continued his ravages and no method of checking the mischief had been discovered. there are ways and means of meeting even such a calamity.
“would your lordship like madeira served with that course?” said a butler to a well-known bishop who was giving a dinner, in days long before the war, to a number of his clergy. “madeira!” was the reply, in great surprise. “why, i have not a single bottle in my cellar.” “oh, yes, my lord, you have. monseigneur oublie peut-être que je suis de cette.” madeira, so the story goes, was duly served. but cette is not the only town in france where the art of blending and refining wine for foreign and even home palates has been brought to a high pitch. at any rate, during the phylloxera period, australian, algerian, spanish and other wines, which previously had been regarded contemptuously by foreign and french consumers of claret, were, it was alleged, imported at bordeaux in great quantity and came out again with the old familiar bordeaux labels and duly impressed corks.
thus adulteration, which john bright declared was a[195] legitimate form of competition, made its appearance in a widely different industry from his own, to the detriment, even thus early in the struggle, of the legitimate growers of more acid but more genuine beverages in the south. adulteration became a war-cry among the peasants, who felt themselves defrauded. republicans of great commercial reputation and high standing in finance were accused, rightly or wrongly, of being deeply and profitably concerned in this nefarious traffic. that was all bad enough. but, at last, a remedy for the vineyard plague was discovered and widely used, with the aid of the government, partly by chemical applications to the vines, partly by bringing in new stocks from without. then followed exceptionally good vintages in the bordeaux country, while the adulteration, falsification, manipulation of other wines with sugar and the like continued. hence an abnormal glut of wine of every degree, with a corresponding fall in price.
the peasants, whose views of the admirable law of supply and demand were very crude, only discovered that the more wine they produced the less money could they get for it! to produce for the consumer, at a loss to themselves, at once struck them as an unfair dispensation in the order of the market, since it affected the sales of their wines. obviously, they said, the government was to blame. how could they pay taxes when wine was fetching a derisory price? why should they borrow to pay taxes when wine was fetching a derisory price? let government take short order with the adulterators and big producers out there in the west, who were preventing the hard-working toilers on the soil in the south from disposing of their sole saleable product at a profit. a republic which couldn’t protect the backbone of the nation, the southern wine-growers, to wit, was of no use to them. and the people of the south, as m. clemenceau knows very well, for he is senator for the var, are a vivacious and an excitable folk. but their vivacity and excitement had already been worked up to a high pitch by gradual exasperation before m. clemen[196]ceau himself took office. it was his hard fate to meet the full fury of the storm as premier of france.
no trifling storm it was. the whole countryside, in the late spring and summer, was aflame. commune after commune, district after district, took part in the agitation. peasants and prolétaires made common cause against the authorities. taxes should not be paid. tax-gatherers should appear at their peril. the government was an unjust government, and should be defied. and it was so. meetings were held in every town and village. capable representatives and leaders, of whom a m. albert was the chief, were chosen by the men themselves. attempts to confer with the people as a whole resulted in failure. the old story was told again. the reactionaries of the right took the side of the people, and shouted against “adulteration,” because they were victims of a chaotic economic system, because also they objected to the use of troops, who belonged to and were paid by the whole people, in order to maintain that system in full vigour. what was to be done? things got worse and worse. the minister of the interior felt obliged to call out the troops in order to prevent downright ruin being wrought in narbonne, montpellier and st. béziers. there were killed and wounded on both sides. hence a serious ministerial crisis was threatened which, as matters stood, could scarcely fail to tell in favour of reaction and against the only republic then possible.
the facts were beyond dispute. in consequence of the causes and results summarised, the temper of the people became unmanageable. there were terrible riots of a wholly anarchist character. the doors of public buildings were soaked with kerosene and then set on fire. at narbonne, montpellier and st. béziers attacks were made on peaceful citizens at dead of night by uncontrolled mobs of armed men recruited from the worst members of the population. soldiers on the spot refused to fire in reply to revolver shots aimed at them. the provocations to the troops, who were brought in solely to maintain order, were almost intolerable, but they were borne with heroic[197] calm. at first they fired in the air. then they fired in earnest, and there were killed and wounded on both sides. hence there was the greatest excitement in the chamber and unrest throughout paris, where the wildest rumours were spread.
everything pointed to a serious political upset when clemenceau rose to give an account of the circumstances and to defend the action of the government. this is, in brief, what he said: “i did my best to avoid sending troops, and directed that they should not be used except in case of absolute necessity. but can a government allow a wine-growers’ committee to forbid the villagers to pay taxes? can it quietly permit tax-collectors to be molested when they arrive in the communes? can it look on with indifference while 300 mayors of communes declare a general strike and hold up the entire business of the community? everywhere the committees of the wine-growers took upon themselves to give their orders in place of the constituted authority, and were obeyed. soldiers who mutinied against their officers were applauded and a large sum was raised for their compensation. no government could stand that. citizens were bound to pay their taxes. no minister can deny that. i could have resigned. i do not want office. but i felt it my duty to remain when the troops were attacked.”
after this speech the ministerial crisis ended. the difficulties on the spot slowly calmed down, owing largely to the good sense and loyalty to the republic of m. albert and other leaders of the men. but the socialists have never forgiven m. clemenceau for calling in the military at courrières and narbonne, and particularly for the bloodshed at the latter town. this has been a great misfortune for both sides, the rather that both could plead justification for the course they took. the socialists contended that the troubles arose in the north and in the south from causes whose development the government ought to have watched and whose results it should have foreseen. the state ought to have made ready, and introduced adequate legislation to encounter and overcome these troubles by peaceful methods, which all governments have, or ought to[198] have, at their command. clemenceau could and did answer that he was in no wise to be held responsible personally for outbreaks which had arisen from circumstances over which he had no control, and that all he had to do was to prevent any mistakes that had been made from leading to violent action that must harm innocent persons and injure the republic. the split between radicals and socialists remains unbridged to this day.
yet in the senate on more than one occasion in 1906 clemenceau, interrupting a speaker, declared: “i claim to be a socialist!” and again, “when i accepted the offer to form a government i conceived the idea of governing in a socialist sense. years ago i offered to co-operate with m. jules guesde to carry socialist measures on which we mutually agreed.” this has never been denied. it ought to have been possible to come to terms on palliative measures at least.
for the strike difficulties did not end in 1906 and 1907, nor did clemenceau change his policy in dealing with them. non-strikers were always to be protected against strikers: anything in the shape of violence on the part of strikers, no matter how great the provocation, was to be repressed by the forces of the state. also civil servants, being the servants of the state, were not to be allowed to combine in trade unions against the state as employer. still less could clemenceau allow them the right to strike against the state. they then became, as he expressed it, “rebellious bureaucrats,” allied with those who would like to destroy “la patrie.” to them the amnesty granted to the rebellious wine-growers and rural anarchists of the south must be denied. civil servants in revolt and the bigots of anti-militarism—hervé was at this time an ardent peace-at-any-price man and fanatical anti-militarist—were guilty of a crime against their country; and with such criminals the government was engaged in battle.
once more an actual strike close to paris gave point to all these declarations, and put clemenceau and his government again at variance with the socialists by the acute difference[199] of principle which was then accentuated in practice. this was at vigneux, when there was a strike of the workers in the sand-pits. clemenceau, who was still minister of the interior as well as prime minister, used the gendarmes to protect the non-strikers or blacklegs still working in the pits. as a result, there was open conflict between the two sides. two of the men on strike were killed, and several of the gendarmes were injured. this aroused great indignation against the government among the organised workers. they felt that the right to strike became illusory, if, at any moment, the ministry could turn the scale against the strikers, no matter how great their grievances or how just their claims might be, by bringing in the state to uphold the minority of the men in standing by the masters.
in practice, as has often been found in england, such intervention on behalf of the blacklegs means that the strike may be broken in the interest of the capitalists. the deputies of the places where the strikes took place interviewed clemenceau on the matter. it is clear that the antagonism went very deep. in answer to a bitter attack clemenceau again defended his action in the chamber. the question was one not of mere opinion, but of justice. “when the workers are in the wrong they must be told the truth about it. the government will never approve of anarchy.” (“you are anarchy enthroned yourself,” cried jaurès.) “my programme is social reform under the law against grievances, and social order under the law against the revolutionists.” finally, the national assembly passed a vote of confidence in clemenceau as against the socialists. that, of course, was to be expected.
i have given a fairly detailed account of these affrays—they were no less—between clemenceau and the socialists because they are of great importance, not only as explaining the vehement hostility which has since existed between them, but because the points at issue affect every civilised country to a greater or less degree. capital and labour, capitalists and wage-earners, are at variance everywhere. their antagonism can no more be averted or bridged over than could the class struggle[200] between land and slave-owners and their chattel slaves, or the nobles and their serfs. only the slow process of social evolution leading up to revolution can solve the problem. meanwhile, combination on the one side is met by combination on the other. outside political action, which is ineffective until the workers themselves understand how to use it, there is no weapon for the wage-earners or wage-slaves but the strike. they suffer, even when they win, far more than the capitalists or employers, who are only deprived of the right to make profits out of their hands, while those same hands are undergoing the pangs of hunger and every sort of privation, not only for themselves but for their wives and children.
arbitration, when the social conditions have reached the stage where this is feasible, may postpone the crucial battle and smooth over the matter temporarily; but it can do no more than that. a step towards this arbitration was made under m. millerand’s measure declaring strikes illegal unless decreed by a majority of the employees upon a referendum, and the enactment of an arbitration clause. but when strikes actually take place and the men’s blood is up, then comes the real tug-of-war.
should the state—obviously the capitalist state to-day—interfere to keep order and maintain the right to work for non-strikers, or should it refrain from interference altogether? when jaurès and the socialists were challenged to say what they would do under the circumstances, they failed to answer, as already recorded. this put them in a weak position. an opposition must have a policy which it would be prepared to act upon if it took office. socialism, however desirable, could not be realised all at once. but it was open to clemenceau, as to any other minister entrusted with full powers by the state, to bring at least as much pressure to bear upon the capitalists and employers as upon the strikers, and to insist that they should yield to the demands of the men and continue to work the mines, out of which, by the purchase of the labour-power of the pitmen, they had derived such huge profits. this course[201] was not adopted by the minister of the interior, nor does it seem to have been demanded by jaurès. the troubles in the wine districts arose from different economic causes, and had to be dealt with in a different way. but the truth is that, in periods of transition, no government can go right. it was clemenceau’s lot to have to govern at such a period of transition.
