free states, like all others, may possess dependencies, acquired either by conquest or by colonization, and our own is the greatest instance of the kind in modern history. it is a most important question how such dependencies ought to be governed.

it is unnecessary to discuss the case of small posts, like gibraltar, aden, or heligoland, which are held only as naval or military positions. the military or naval object is in this case paramount, and the inhabitants can not, consistently with it, be admitted to the government of the place, though they ought to be allowed all liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction, including the free management of municipal affairs, and, as a compensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience of the governing state, should be admitted to equal rights with its native subjects in all other parts of the empire.

outlying territories of some size and population, which are held as dependencies, that is, which are subject, more or less, to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country, without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its legislature, may be divided into two classes. some are composed of people of similar civilization to the ruling country, capable of, and ripe for, representative government, such as the british possessions in america and australia. others, like india, are still at a great distance from that state.

in the case of dependencies of the former class, this country has at length realized, in rare completeness, the true principle of government. england has always felt under a certain degree of obligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of her own blood and language, and on some who were not, representative institutions formed in imitation of her own; but, until the present generation, she has been on the same bad level with other countries as to the amount of self-government which she allowed them to exercise through the representative institutions that she conceded to them. she claimed to be the supreme arbiter even of their purely internal concerns, according to her own, not their ideas of how those concerns could be best regulated. this practice was a natural corollary from the vicious theory of colonial policy—once common to all europe, and not yet completely relinquished by any other people—which regarded colonies as valuable by affording markets for our commodities that could be kept entirely to ourselves; a privilege we valued so highly that we thought it worth purchasing by allowing to the colonies the same monopoly of our market for their own productions which we claimed for our commodities in theirs. this notable plan for enriching them and ourselves by making each pay enormous sums to the other, dropping the greatest part by the way, has been for some time abandoned. but the bad habit of meddling in the internal government of the colonies did not at once die out when we relinquished the idea of making any profit by it. we continued to torment them, not for any benefit to ourselves, but for that of a section or faction among the colonists; and this persistence in domineering cost us a canadian rebellion before we had the happy thought of giving it up. england was like an ill brought-up elder brother, who persists in tyrannizing over the younger ones from mere habit, till one of them, by a spirited resistance, though with unequal strength, gives him notice to desist. we were wise enough not to require a second warning. a new era in the colonial policy of nations began with lord durham's report; the imperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage, patriotism, and enlightened liberality, and of the intellect and practical sagacity of its joint authors, mr. wakefield and the lamented charles buller. [11]

it is now a fixed principle of the policy of great britain, professed in theory and faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of european race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government. they have been allowed to make their own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner they thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had given them. each is governed by its own legislature and executive, constituted on highly democratic principles. the veto of the crown and of parliament, though nominally reserved, is only exercised (and that very rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely the particular colony. how liberal a construction has been given to the distinction between imperial and colonial questions is shown by the fact that the whole of the unappropriated lands in the regions behind our american and australian colonies have been given up to the uncontrolled disposal of the colonial communities, though they might, without injustice, have been kept in the hands of the imperial government, to be administered for the greatest advantage of future emigrants from all parts of the empire. every colony has thus as full power over its own affairs as it could have if it were a member of even the loosest federation, and much fuller than would belong to it under the constitution of the united states, being free even to tax at its pleasure the commodities imported from the mother country. their union with great britain is the slightest kind of federal union; but not a strictly equal federation, the mother country retaining to itself the powers of a federal government, though reduced in practice to their very narrowest limits. this inequality is, of course, as far as it goes, a disadvantage to the dependencies, which have no voice in foreign policy, but are bound by the decisions of the superior country. they are compelled to join england in war without being in any way consulted previous to engaging in it.

those (now happily not a few) who think that justice is as binding on communities as it is on individuals, and that men are not warranted in doing to other countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they would not be justified in doing to other men for their own benefit, feel even this limited amount of constitutional subordination on the part of the colonies to be a violation of principle, and have often occupied themselves in looking out for means by which it may be avoided. with this view it has been proposed by some that the colonies should return representatives to the british legislature, and by others that the powers of our own, as well as of their parliaments, should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of great britain should be represented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as great britain itself. on this system there would be a perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer dependencies.

the feelings of equity and conceptions of public morality from which these suggestions emanate are worthy of all praise, but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker. countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or even members of one federation. if they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking council together. they are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. they neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct. let any englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which one third was british american, and another third south african and australian. yet to this it must come if there were any thing like fair or equal representation; and would not every one feel that the representatives of canada and australia, even in matters of an imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern for the interests, opinions, or wishes of english, irish, and scotch? even for strictly federative purposes the conditions do not exist which we have seen to be essential to a federation. england is sufficient for her own protection without the colonies, and would be in a much stronger, as well as more dignified position, if separated from them, than when reduced to be a single member of an american, african, and australian confederation. over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after separation, england derives little advantage, except in prestige, from her dependencies, and the little she does derive is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force, which, in case of war, or any real apprehension of it, requires to be double or treble what would be needed for the defense of this country alone.

but, though great britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though, on every principle of morality and justice, she ought to consent to their separation, should the time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they deliberately desire to be dissevered, there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party. it is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace and general friendly co-operation among nations. it renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities, and, moreover, hinders any of them from being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which might not always be so unambitious or so pacific as great britain. it at least keeps the markets of the different countries open to one another, and prevents that mutual exclusion by hostile tariffs which none of the great communities of mankind except england have yet outgrown. and in the case of the british possessions it has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence and weight in the councils of the world of the power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and, whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable. since, then, the union can only continue, while it does continue, on the footing of an unequal federation, it is important to consider by what means this small amount of inequality can be prevented from being either onerous or humiliating to the communities occupying the less exalted position.

the only inferiority necessarily inherent in the case is that the mother country decides, both for the colonies and for herself, on questions of peace and war. they gain, in return, the obligation on the mother country to repel aggressions directed against them; but, except when the minor community is so weak that the protection of a stronger power is indispensable to it, reciprocity of obligation is not a full equivalent for non-admission to a voice in the deliberations. it is essential, therefore, that in all wars, save those which, like the caffre or new zealand wars, are incurred for the sake of the particular colony, the colonists should not (without their own voluntary request) be called on to contribute any thing to the expense except what may be required for the specific local defense of their ports, shores, and frontiers against invasion. moreover, as the mother country claims the privilege, at her sole discretion, of taking measures or pursuing a policy which may expose them to attack, it is just that she should undertake a considerable portion of the cost of their military defense even in time of peace; the whole of it, so far as it depends upon a standing army.

but there is a means, still more effectual than these, by which, and in general by which alone, a full equivalent can be given to a smaller community for sinking its individuality, as a substantive power among nations, in the greater individuality of a wide and powerful empire. this one indispensable, and, at the same time, sufficient expedient, which meets at once the demands of justice and the growing exigencies of policy, is to open the service of government in all its departments, and in every part of the empire, on perfectly equal terms, to the inhabitants of the colonies. why does no one ever hear a breath of disloyalty from the islands in the british channel? by race, religion, and geographical position they belong less to england than to france; but, while they enjoy, like canada and new south wales, complete control over their internal affairs and their taxation, every office or dignity in the gift of the crown is freely open to the native of guernsey or jersey. generals, admirals, peers of the united kingdom are made, and there is nothing which hinders prime ministers to be made from those insignificant islands. the same system was commenced in reference to the colonies generally by an enlightened colonial secretary, too early lost, sir william molesworth, when he appointed mr. hinckes, a leading canadian politician, to a west indian government. it is a very shallow view of the springs of political action in a community which thinks such things unimportant because the number of those in a position actually to profit by the concession might not be very considerable. that limited number would be composed precisely of those who have most moral power over the rest; and men are not so destitute of the sense of collective degradation as not to feel the withholding of an advantage from even one person, because of a circumstance which they all have in common with him, an affront to all. if we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth to the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils of mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate ambition and to the just pride of the community to give them in return an equal chance of occupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and importance. were the whole service of the british crown opened to the natives of the ionian islands, we should hear no more of the desire for union with greece. such a union is not desirable for the people, to whom it would be a step backward in civilization; but it is no wonder if corfu, which has given a minister of european reputation to the russian empire, and a president to greece itself before the arrival of the bavarians, should feel it a grievance that its people are not admissable to the highest posts in some government or other.

thus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently advanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. this mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement. there are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization. there are others, in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no beneficial effect, the lessons which it teaches having already been only too completely learned, but in which, there being no spring of spontaneous improvement in the people themselves, their almost only hope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good despot. under a native despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident; but when the dominion they are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it constantly. the ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation. such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one. we need not expect to see that ideal realized; but, unless some approach to it is, the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a nation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers, on a par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind.

as it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations to be either held in direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy, there are in this age of the world few more important problems than how to organize this rule, so as to make it a good instead of an evil to the subject people, providing them with the best attainable present government, and with the conditions most favorable to future permanent improvement. but the mode of fitting the government for this purpose is by no means so well understood as the conditions of good government in a people capable of governing themselves. we may even say that it is not understood at all.

the thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers. if india (for example) is not fit to govern itself, all that seems to them required is that there should be a minister to govern it, and that this minister, like all other british ministers, should be responsible to the british parliament. unfortunately this, though the simplest mode of attempting to govern a dependency, is about the worst, and betrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the conditions of good government. to govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another, are two very different things. what makes the excellence of the first is, that freedom is preferable to despotism: but the last is despotism. the only choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms, and it is not certain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better than that of a few or of one; but it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about their subjects, has many chances of being worse than that of those who do. it is not usually thought that the immediate agents of authority govern better because they govern in the name of an absent master, and of one who has a thousand more pressing interests to attend to. the master may hold them to a strict responsibility, enforced by heavy penalties, but it is very questionable if those penalties will often fall in the right place.

it is always under great difficulties, and very imperfectly, that a country can be governed by foreigners, even when there is no extreme disparity in habits and ideas between the rulers and the ruled. foreigners do not feel with the people. they can not judge, by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population. what a native of the country, of average practical ability, knows as it were by instinct, they have to learn slowly, and, after all, imperfectly, by study and experience. the laws, the customs, the social relations for which they have to legislate, instead of being familiar to them from childhood, are all strange to them. for most of their detailed knowledge they must depend on the information of natives, and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust. they are feared, suspected, probably disliked by the population; seldom sought by them except for interested purposes; and they are prone to think that the servilely submissive are the trustworthy. their danger is of despising the natives; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the strangers do can be intended for their good. these are but a part of the difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with, who honestly attempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners. to overcome these difficulties in any degree will always be a work of much labor, requiring a very superior degree of capacity in the chief administrators, and a high average among the subordinates; and the best organization of such a government is that which will best insure the labor, develop the capacity, and place the highest specimens of it in the situations of greatest trust. responsibility to an authority which has gone through none of the labor, acquired none of the capacity, and for the most part is not even aware that either, in any peculiar degree, is required, can not be regarded as a very effectual expedient for accomplishing these ends.

the government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality, but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and can not exist. one people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human-cattle farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants; but if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it. the utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it, to whom the opinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the performance of their duty, nor a competent judge of the mode in which it has been performed. let any one consider how the english themselves would be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs than they know and care about the affairs of the hindoos. even this comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case; for a people thus indifferent to politics altogether would probably be simply acquiescent, and let the government alone; whereas in the case of india, a politically active people like the english, amid habitual acquiescence, are every now and then interfering, and almost always in the wrong place. the real causes which determine the prosperity or wretchedness, the improvement or deterioration of the hindoos, are too far off to be within their ken. they have not the knowledge necessary for suspecting the existence of those causes, much less for judging of their operation. the most essential interests of the country may be well administered without obtaining any of their approbation, or mismanaged to almost any excess without attracting their notice. the purposes for which they are principally tempted to interfere, and control the proceedings of their delegates, are of two kinds. one is to force english ideas down the throats of the natives; for instance, by measures of proselytism, or acts intentionally or unintentionally offensive to the religious feelings of the people. this misdirection of opinion in the ruling country is instructively exemplified (the more so, because nothing is meant but justice and fairness, and as much impartiality as can be expected from persons really convinced) by the demand now so general in england for having the bible taught, at the option of pupils or of their parents, in the government schools. from the european point of view nothing can wear a fairer aspect, or seem less open to objection on the score of religious freedom. to asiatic eyes it is quite another thing. no asiatic people ever believes that a government puts its paid officers and official machinery into motion unless it is bent upon an object; and when bent on an object, no asiatic believes that any government, except a feeble and contemptible one, pursues it by halves. if government schools and schoolmasters taught christianity, whatever pledges might be given of teaching it only to those who spontaneously sought it, no amount of evidence would ever persuade the parents that improper means were not used to make their children christians, or, at all events, outcasts from hindooism. if they could, in the end, be convinced of the contrary, it would only be by the entire failure of the schools, so conducted, to make any converts. if the teaching had the smallest effect in promoting its object, it would compromise not only the utility and even existence of the government education, but perhaps the safety of the government itself. an english protestant would not be easily induced, by disclaimers of proselytism, to place his children in a roman catholic seminary; irish catholics will not send their children to schools in which they can be made protestants; and we expect that hindoos, who believe that the privileges of hindooism can be forfeited by a merely physical act, will expose theirs to the danger of being made christians!

such is one of the modes in which the opinion of the dominant country tends to act more injuriously than beneficially on the conduct of its deputed governors. in other respects, its interference is likely to be oftenest exercised where it will be most pertinaciously demanded, and that is, on behalf of some interest of the english settlers. english settlers have friends at home, have organs, have access to the public; they have a common language, and common ideas with their countrymen; any complaint by an englishman is more sympathetically heard, even if no unjust preference is intentionally accorded to it. now if there be a fact to which all experience testifies, it is that, when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes are of all others those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. they are always one of the chief difficulties of the government. armed with the prestige and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, they have the feelings inspired by absolute power without its sense of responsibility. among a people like that of india, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for the effectual protection of the weak against the strong; and of all the strong, the european settlers are the strongest. wherever the demoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable degree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet: it seems to them monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest pretensions; the simplest act of protection to the inhabitants against any act of power on their part which they may consider useful to their commercial objects they denounce, and sincerely regard as an injury. so natural is this state of feeling in a situation like theirs, that, even under the discouragement which it has hitherto met with from the ruling authorities, it is impossible that more or less of the spirit should not perpetually break out. the government, itself free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently to keep it down in the young and raw even of its own civil and military officers, over whom it has so much more control than over the independent residents. as it is with the english in india, so, according to trustworthy testimony, it is with the french in algiers; so with the americans in the countries conquered from mexico; so it seems to be with the europeans in china, and already even in japan: there is no necessity to recall how it was with the spaniards in south america. in all these cases, the government to which these private adventurers are subject is better than they, and does the most it can to protect the natives against them. even the spanish government did this, sincerely and earnestly, though ineffectually, as is known to every reader of mr. helps' instructive history. had the spanish government been directly accountable to spanish opinion, we may question if it would have made the attempt, for the spaniards, doubtless, would have taken part with their christian friends and relations rather than with pagans. the settlers, not the natives, have the ear of the public at home; it is they whose representations are likely to pass for truth, because they alone have both the means and the motive to press them perseveringly upon the inattentive and uninterested public mind. the distrustful criticism with which englishmen, more than any other people, are in the habit of scanning the conduct of their country towards foreigners, they usually reserve for the proceedings of the public authorities. in all questions between a government and an individual, the presumption in every englishman's mind is that the government is in the wrong. and when the resident english bring the batteries of english political action to bear upon any of the bulwarks erected to protect the natives against their encroachments, the executive, with their real but faint velleities of something better, generally find it safer to their parliamentary interest, and, at any rate, less troublesome, to give up the disputed position than to defend it.

what makes matters worse is that, when the public mind is invoked (as, to its credit, the english mind is extremely open to be) in the name of justice and philanthropy in behalf of the subject community or race, there is the same probability of its missing the mark; for in the subject community also there are oppressors and oppressed—powerful individuals or classes, and slaves prostrate before them; and it is the former, not the latter, who have the means of access to the english public. a tyrant or sensualist who has been deprived of the power he had abused, and, instead of punishment, is supported in as great wealth and splendor as he ever enjoyed; a knot of privileged landholders, who demand that the state should relinquish to them its reserved right to a rent from their lands, or who resent as a wrong any attempt to protect the masses from their extortion—these have no difficulty in procuring interested or sentimental advocacy in the british parliament and press. the silent myriads obtain none.

the preceding observations exemplify the operation of a principle—which might be called an obvious one, were it not that scarcely anybody seems to be aware of it—that, while responsibility to the governed is the greatest of all securities for good government, responsibility to somebody else not only has no such tendency, but is as likely to produce evil as good. the responsibility of the british rulers of india to the british nation is chiefly useful because, when any acts of the government are called in question, it insures publicity and discussion; the utility of which does not require that the public at large should comprehend the point at issue, provided there are any individuals among them who do; for a merely moral responsibility not being responsibility to the collective people, but to every separate person among them who forms a judgment, opinions may be weighed as well as counted, and the approbation or disapprobation of one person well versed in the subject may outweigh that of thousands who know nothing about it at all. it is doubtless a useful restraint upon the immediate rulers that they can be put upon their defense, and that one or two of the jury will form an opinion worth having about their conduct, though that of the remainder will probably be several degrees worse than none. such as it is, this is the amount of benefit to india from the control exercised over the indian government by the british parliament and people.

it is not by attempting to rule directly a country like india, but by giving it good rulers, that the english people can do their duty to that country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one than an english cabinet minister, who is thinking of english, not indian politics; who does not remains long enough in office to acquire an intelligent interest in so complicated a subject; upon whom the factitious public opinion got up in parliament, consisting of two or three fluent speakers, acts with as much force as if it were genuine; while he is under none of the influences of training and position which would lead or qualify him to form an honest opinion of his own. a free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably fail. the only mode which has any chance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character, allowing only a right of inspection and a negative voice to the changeable administration of the state. such a body did exist in the case of india; and i fear that both india and england will pay a severe penalty for the shortsighted policy by which this intermediate instrument of government was done away with.

it is of no avail to say that such a delegated body can not have all the requisites of good government; above all, can not have that complete and over-operative identity of interest with the governed which it is so difficult to obtain even where the people to be ruled are in some degree qualified to look after their own affairs. real good government is not compatible with the conditions of the case. there is but a choice of imperfections. the problem is, so to construct the governing body that, under the difficulties of the position, it shall have as much interest as possible in good government, and as little in bad. now these conditions are best found in an intermediate body. a delegated administration has always this advantage over a direct one, that it has, at all events, no duty to perform except to the governed. it has no interests to consider except theirs. its own power of deriving profit from misgovernment may be reduced—in the latest constitution of the east india company it was reduced—to a singularly small amount; and it can be kept entirely clear of bias from the individual or class interests of any one else. when the home government and parliament are swayed by such partial influences in the exercise of the power reserved to them in the last resort, the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency before the imperial tribunal. the intermediate body, moreover, is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their country's concerns; who have been trained to it in the place itself, and have made its administration the main occupation of their lives. furnished with these qualifications, and not being liable to lose their office from the accidents of home politics, they identify their character and consideration with their special trust, and have a much more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer, than a member of a cabinet under a representative constitution can possibly have in the good government of any country except the one which he serves. so far as the choice of those who carry on the management on the spot devolves upon this body, their appointment is kept out of the vortex of party and parliamentary jobbing, and freed from the influence of those motives to the abuse of patronage for the reward of adherents, or to buy off those who would otherwise be opponents, which are always stronger with statesmen of average honesty than a conscientious sense of the duty of appointing the fittest man. to put this one class of appointments as far as possible out of harm's way is of more consequence than the worst which can happen to all other offices in the state; for, in every other department, if the officer is unqualified, the general opinion of the community directs him in a certain degree what to do; but in the position of the administrators of a dependency where the people are not fit to have the control in their own hands, the character of the government entirely depends on the qualifications, moral and intellectual, of the individual functionaries.

it can not be too often repeated that, in a country like india, every thing depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the agents of government. this truth is the cardinal principle of indian administration. the day when it comes to be thought that the appointment of persons to situations of trust from motives of convenience, already so criminal in england, can be practiced with impunity in india, will be the beginning of the decline and fall of our empire there. even with a sincere intention of preferring the best candidate, it will not do to rely on chance for supplying fit persons. the system must be calculated to form them. it has done this hitherto; and because it has done so, our rule in india has lasted, and been one of constant, if not very rapid improvement in prosperity and good administration. as much bitterness is now manifested against this system, and as much eagerness displayed to overthrow it, as if educating and training the officers of government for their work were a thing utterly unreasonable and indefensible, an unjustifiable interference with the rights of ignorance and inexperience. there is a tacit conspiracy between those who would like to job in first-rate indian offices for their connections here, and those who, being already in india, claim to be promoted from the indigo factory or the attorney's office to administer justice or fix the payments due to government from millions of people. the "monopoly" of the civil service, so much inveighed against, is like the monopoly of judicial offices by the bar; and its abolition would be like opening the bench in westminster hall to the first comer whose friends certify that he has now and then looked into blackstone. were the course ever adopted of sending men from this country, or encouraging them in going out, to get themselves put into high appointments without having learned their business by passing through the lower ones, the most important offices would be thrown to scotch cousins and adventurers, connected by no professional feeling with the country or the work, held to no previous knowledge, and eager only to make money rapidly and return home. the safety of the country is, that those by whom it is administered be sent out in youth, as candidates only, to begin at the bottom of the ladder, and ascend higher or not, as, after a proper interval, they are proved qualified. the defect of the east india company's system was that, though the best men were carefully sought out for the most important posts, yet, if an officer remained in the service, promotion, though it might be delayed, came at last in some shape or other, to the least as well as to the most competent. even the inferior in qualifications among such a corps of functionaries consisted, it must be remembered, of men who had been brought up to their duties, and had fulfilled them for many years, at lowest without disgrace, under the eye and authority of a superior. but, though this diminished the evil, it was nevertheless considerable. a man who never becomes fit for more than an assistant's duty should remain an assistant all his life, and his juniors should be promoted over him. with this exception, i am not aware of any real defect in the old system of indian appointments. it had already received the greatest other improvement it was susceptible of, the choice of the original candidates by competitive examination, which, besides the advantage of recruiting from a higher grade of industry and capacity, has the recommendation that under it, unless by accident, there are no personal ties between the candidates for offices and those who have a voice in conferring them.

it is in no way unjust that public officers thus selected and trained should be exclusively eligible to offices which require specially indian knowledge and experience. if any door to the higher appointments, without passing through the lower, be opened even for occasional use, there will be such incessant knocking at it by persons of influence that it will be impossible ever to keep it closed. the only excepted appointment should be the highest one of all. the viceroy of british india should be a person selected from all englishmen for his great general capacity for government. if he have this, he will be able to distinguish in others, and turn to his own use, that special knowledge and judgment in local affairs which he has not himself had the opportunity of acquiring. there are good reasons why the viceroy should not be a member of the regular service. all services have, more or less, their class prejudices, from which the supreme ruler ought to be exempt. neither are men, however able and experienced, who have passed their lives in asia, so likely to possess the most advanced european ideas in general statesmanship, which the chief ruler should carry out with him, and blend with the results of indian experience. again, being of a different class, and especially if chosen by a different authority, he will seldom have any personal partialities to warp his appointments to office. this great security for honest bestowal of patronage existed in rare perfection under the mixed government of the crown and the east india company. the supreme dispensers of office—the governor general and governors—were appointed, in fact though not formally, by the crown, that is, by the general government, not by the intermediate body, and a great officer of the crown probably had not a single personal or political connection in the local service, while the delegated body, most of whom had themselves served in the country, had, and were likely to have, such connections. this guaranty for impartiality would be much impaired if the civil servants of government, even though sent out in boyhood as mere candidates for employment, should come to be furnished, in any considerable proportion, by the class of society which supplies viceroys and governors. even the initiatory competitive examination would then be an insufficient security. it would exclude mere ignorance and incapacity; it would compel youths of family to start in the race with the same amount of instruction and ability as other people; the stupidest son could not be put into the indian service, as he can be into the church; but there would be nothing to prevent undue preference afterwards. no longer, all equally unknown and unheard of by the arbiter of their lot, a portion of the service would be personally, and a still greater number politically, in close relation with him. members of certain families, and of the higher classes and influential connections generally, would rise more rapidly than their competitors, and be often kept in situations for which they were unfit, or placed in those for which others were fitter. the same influences would be brought into play which affect promotions in the army; and those alone, if such miracles of simplicity there be, who believe that these are impartial, would expect impartiality in those of india. this evil is, i fear, irremediable by any general measures which can be taken under the present system. no such will afford a degree of security comparable to that which once flowed spontaneously from the so-called double government.

what is accounted so great an advantage in the case of the english system of government at home has been its misfortune in india—that it grew up of itself, not from preconceived design, but by successive expedients, and by the adaptation of machinery originally created for a different purpose. as the country on which its maintenance depended was not the one out of whose necessities it grew, its practical benefits did not come home to the mind of that country, and it would have required theoretic recommendations to render it acceptable. unfortunately, these were exactly what it seemed to be destitute of; and undoubtedly the common theories of government did not furnish it with such, framed as those theories have been for states of circumstances differing in all the most important features from the case concerned. but in government as in other departments of human agency, almost all principles which have been durable were first suggested by observation of some particular case, in which the general laws of nature acted in some new or previously unnoticed combination of circumstances. the institutions of great britain, and those of the united states, have the distinction of suggesting most of the theories of government which, through good and evil fortune, are now, in the course of generations, reawakening political life in the nations of europe. it has been the destiny of the government of the east india company to suggest the true theory of the government of a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized country, and after having done this, to perish. it would be a singular fortune if, at the end of two or three more generations, this speculative result should be the only remaining fruit of our ascendancy in india; if posterity should say of us that, having stumbled accidentally upon better arrangements than our wisdom would ever have devised, the first use we made of our awakened reason was to destroy them, and allow the good which had been in course of being realized to fall through and be lost from ignorance of the principles on which it depended. d? meliora; but if a fate so disgraceful to england and to civilization can be averted, it must be through far wider political conceptions than merely english or european practice can supply, and through a much more profound study of indian experience and of the conditions of indian government than either english politicians, or those who supply the english public with opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake.