i. he that is unjust, is also impious. for the nature of the universe,

having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good; more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in nowise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. for the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred. she is also called truth and is the first cause of all truths. he therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lie, is impious in that he doth receive, and so commit injustice: but he that against his will, in that he disagreeth from the nature of the universe, and in that striving with the nature of the world he doth in his particular, violate the general order of the world. for he doth no better than strive and war against it, who contrary to his own nature applieth himself to that which is contrary to truth. for nature had before furnished him with instincts and opportunities sufficient for the attainment of it; which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to discern that which is false from that which is true. he also that pursues after pleasures, as that which is truly good and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil: is impious. for such a one must of necessity oftentimes accuse that common nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil, and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either: as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures; so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains. again, he that feareth pains and crosses in this world, feareth some of those things which some time or other must needs happen in the world. and that we have already showed to be impious. and he that pursueth after pleasures, will not spare, to compass his desires, to do that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious. now those things which unto nature are equally indifferent (for she had not created both, both pain and pleasure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent): they that will live according to nature, must in those things (as being of the same mind and disposition that she is) be as equally indifferent. whosoever therefore in either matter of pleasure and pain; death and life; honour and dishonour, (which things nature in the administration of the world, indifferently doth make use of), is not as indifferent, it is apparent that he is impious. when i say that common nature doth indifferently make use of them, my meaning is, that they happen indifferently in the ordinary course of things, which by a necessary consequence, whether as principal or accessory, come to pass in the world, according to that first and ancient deliberation of providence, by which she from some certain beginning, did resolve upon the creation of such a world, conceiving then in her womb as it were some certain rational generative seeds and faculties of things future, whether subjects, changes, successions; both such and such, and just so many.

ii. it were indeed more happy and comfortable, for a man to depart out

of this world, having lived all his life long clear from all falsehood, dissimulation, voluptuousness, and pride. but if this cannot be, yet it is some comfort for a man joyfully to depart as weary, and out of love with those; rather than to desire to live, and to continue long in those wicked courses. hath not yet experience taught thee to fly from the plague? for a far greater plague is the corruption of the mind, than any certain change and distemper of the common air can be. this is a plague of creatures, as they are living creatures; but that of men as they are men or reasonable.

iii. thou must not in matter of death carry thyself scornfully, but as

one that is well pleased with it, as being one of those things that nature hath appointed. for what thou dost conceive of these, of a boy to become a young man, to wax old, to grow, to ripen, to get teeth, or a beard, or grey hairs to beget, to bear, or to be delivered; or what other action soever it be, that is natural unto man according to the several seasons of his life; such a thing is it also to be dissolved. it is therefore the part of a wise man, in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself either violently, or proudly but patiently to wait for it, as one of nature's operations: that with the same mind as now thou dost expect when that which yet is but an embryo in thy wife's belly shall come forth, thou mayst expect also when thy soul shall fall off from that outward coat or skin: wherein as a child in the belly it lieth involved and shut up. but thou desirest a more popular, and though not so direct and philosophical, yet a very powerful and penetrative recipe against the fear of death, nothing can make they more willing to part with thy life, than if thou shalt consider, both what the subjects themselves are that thou shalt part with, and what manner of disposition thou shalt no more have to do with. true it is, that, offended with them thou must not be by no means, but take care of them, and meekly bear with them however, this thou mayst remember, that whensoever it happens that thou depart, it shall not be from men that held the same opinions that thou dost. for that indeed, (if it were so) is the only thing that might make thee averse from death, and willing to continue here, if it were thy hap to live with men that had obtained the same belief that thou hast. but now, what a toil it is for thee to live with men of different opinions, thou seest: so that thou hast rather occasion to say, hasten, i thee pray, o death; lest i also in time forget myself.

iv. he that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. he that is unjust, hurts

himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before. not he only that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.

v. if my present apprehension of the object be right, and my present

action charitable, and this, towards whatsoever doth proceed from god, be my present disposition, to be well pleased with it, it sufficeth.

vi. to wipe away fancy, to use deliberation, to quench concupiscence, to

keep the mind free to herself.

vii. of all unreasonable creatures, there is but one unreasonable soul;

and of all that are reasonable, but one reasonable soul, divided betwixt them all. as of all earthly things there is but one earth, and but one light that we see by; and but one air that we breathe in, as many as either breathe or see. now whatsoever partakes of some common thing, naturally affects and inclines unto that whereof it is part, being of one kind and nature with it. whatsoever is earthly, presseth downwards to the common earth. whatsoever is liquid, would flow together. and whatsoever is airy, would be together likewise. so that without some obstacle, and some kind of violence, they cannot well be kept asunder. whatsoever is fiery, doth not only by reason of the elementary fire tend upwards; but here also is so ready to join, and to burn together, that whatsoever doth want sufficient moisture to make resistance, is easily set on fire. whatsoever therefore is partaker of that reasonable common nature, naturally doth as much and more long after his own kind. for by how much in its own nature it excels all other things, by so much more is it desirous to be joined and united unto that, which is of its own nature. as for unreasonable creatures then, they had not long been, but presently begun among them swarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. for though but unreasonable, yet a kind of soul these had, and therefore was that natural desire of union more strong and intense in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or stones, or trees. but among reasonable creatures, begun commonwealths, friendships, families, public meetings, and even in their wars, conventions, and truces. now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the stars and planets, though by their nature far distant one from another, yet even among them began some mutual correspondency and unity. so proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect unity, as that even in things so far distant, it could operate unto a mutual sympathy. but now behold, what is now come to pass. those creatures that are reasonable, are now the only creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. among them alone of all other things that are of one kind, there is not to be found a general disposition to flow together. but though they fly from nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. do they what they can, nature doth prevail. and so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it. for sooner mayst thou find a thing earthly, where no earthly thing is, than find a man that naturally can live by himself alone.

viii. man, god, the world, every one in their kind, bear some fruits.

all things have their proper time to bear. though by custom, the word itself is in a manner become proper unto the vine, and the like, yet is it so nevertheless, as we have said. as for reason, that beareth both common fruit for the use of others; and peculiar, which itself doth enjoy. reason is of a diffusive nature, what itself is in itself, it begets in others, and so doth multiply.

ix. either teach them better if it be in thy power; or if it be not,

remember that for this use, to bear with them patiently, was mildness and goodness granted unto thee. the gods themselves are good unto such; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours: so good and gracious are they. and mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

x. labour not as one to whom it is appointed to be wretched, nor as one

that either would be pitied, or admired; but let this be thine only care and desire; so always and in all things to prosecute or to forbear, as the law of charity, or mutual society doth require.

xi. this day i did come out of all my trouble. nay i have cast out all

my trouble; it should rather be for that which troubled thee, whatsoever it was, was not without anywhere that thou shouldest come out of it, but within in thine own opinions, from whence it must be cast out, before thou canst truly and constantly be at ease.

xii. all those things, for matter of experience are usual and ordinary;

for their continuance but for a day; and for their matter, most base and filthy. as they were in the days of those whom we have buried, so are they now also, and no otherwise.

xiii. the things themselves that affect us, they stand without doors,

neither knowing anything themselves nor able to utter anything unto others concerning themselves. what then is it, that passeth verdict on them? the understanding.

xiv. as virtue and wickedness consist not in passion, but in action; so

neither doth the true good or evil of a reasonable charitable man consist in passion, but in operation and action.

xv. to the stone that is cast up, when it comes down it is no hurt unto

it; as neither benefit, when it doth ascend.

xvi. sift their minds and understandings, and behold what men they be,

whom thou dost stand in fear of what they shall judge of thee, what they themselves judge of themselves.

xvii. all things that are in the world, are always in the estate

of alteration. thou also art in a perpetual change, yea and under corruption too, in some part: and so is the whole world.

xviii. it is not thine, but another man's sin. why should it trouble

thee? let him look to it, whose sin it is.

xix. of an operation and of a purpose there is an ending, or of an

action and of a purpose we say commonly, that it is at an end: from opinion also there is an absolute cessation, which is as it were the death of it. in all this there is no hurt. apply this now to a man's age, as first, a child; then a youth, then a young man, then an old man; every change from one age to another is a kind of death and all this while here no matter of grief yet. pass now unto that life first, that which thou livedst under thy grandfather, then under thy mother, then under thy father. and thus when through the whole course of thy life hitherto thou hast found and observed many alterations, many changes, many kinds of endings and cessations, put this question to thyself what matter of grief or sorrow dost thou find in any of these? or what doest thou suffer through any of these? if in none of these, then neither in the ending and consummation of thy whole life, which is also but a cessation and change.

xx. as occasion shall require, either to thine own understanding, or to

that of the universe, or to his, whom thou hast now to do with, let thy refuge be with all speed. to thine own, that it resolve upon nothing against justice. to that of the universe, that thou mayest remember, part of whom thou art. of his, that thou mayest consider whether in the estate of ignorance, or of knowledge. and then also must thou call to mind, that he is thy kinsman.

xxi. as thou thyself, whoever thou art, were made for the perfection and

consummation, being a member of it, of a common society; so must every action of thine tend to the perfection and consummation of a life that is truly sociable. what action soever of thine therefore that either immediately or afar off, hath not reference to the common good, that is an exorbitant and disorderly action; yea it is seditious; as one among the people who from such and such a consent and unity, should factiously divide and separate himself.

xxii. children's anger, mere babels; wretched souls bearing up dead

bodies, that they may not have their fall so soon: even as it is in that common dirge song.

xxiii. go to the quality of the cause from which the effect doth

proceed. behold it by itself bare and naked, separated from all that is material. then consider the utmost bounds of time that that cause, thus and thus qualified, can subsist and abide.

xxiv. infinite are the troubles and miseries, that thou hast already

been put to, by reason of this only, because that for all happiness it did not suffice thee, or, that thou didst not account it sufficient happiness, that thy understanding did operate according to its natural constitution.

xxv. when any shall either impeach thee with false accusations, or

hatefully reproach thee, or shall use any such carriage towards thee, get thee presently to their minds and understandings, and look in them, and behold what manner of men they be. thou shalt see, that there is no such occasion why it should trouble thee, what such as they are think of thee. yet must thou love them still, for by nature they are thy friends. and the gods themselves, in those things that they seek from them as matters of great moment, are well content, all manner of ways, as by dreams and oracles, to help them as well as others.

xxvi. up and down, from one age to another, go the ordinary things of

the world; being still the same. and either of everything in particular before it come to pass, the mind of the universe doth consider with itself and deliberate: and if so, then submit for shame unto the determination of such an excellent understanding: or once for all it did resolve upon all things in general; and since that whatsoever happens, happens by a necessary consequence, and all things indivisibly in a manner and inseparably hold one of another. in sum, either there is a god, and then all is well; or if all things go by chance and fortune, yet mayest thou use thine own providence in those things that concern thee properly; and then art thou well.

xxvii. within a while the earth shall cover us all, and then she herself

shall have her change. and then the course will be, from one period of eternity unto another, and so a perpetual eternity. now can any man that shall consider with himself in his mind the several rollings or successions of so many changes and alterations, and the swiftness of all these rulings; can he otherwise but contemn in his heart and despise all worldly things? the cause of the universe is as it were a strong torrent, it carrieth all away.

xxviii. and these your professed politicians, the only true practical

philosophers of the world, (as they think of themselves) so full of affected gravity, or such professed lovers of virtue and honesty, what wretches be they in very deed; how vile and contemptible in themselves? o man! what ado doest thou keep? do what thy nature doth now require. resolve upon it, if thou mayest: and take no thought, whether anybody shall know it or no. yea, but sayest thou, i must not expect a plato's commonwealth. if they profit though never so little, i must be content; and think much even of that little progress. doth then any of them forsake their former false opinions that i should think they profit? for without a change of opinions, alas! what is all that ostentation, but mere wretchedness of slavish minds, that groan privately, and yet would make a show of obedience to reason, and truth? go too now and tell me of alexander and philippus, and demetrius phalereus. whether they understood what the common nature requireth, and could rule themselves or no, they know best themselves. but if they kept a life, and swaggered; i (god be thanked) am not bound to imitate them. the effect of true philosophy is, unaffected simplicity and modesty. persuade me not to ostentation and vainglory.

xxix. from some high place as it were to look down, and to behold

here flocks, and there sacrifices, without number; and all kind of navigation; some in a rough and stormy sea, and some in a calm: the general differences, or different estates of things, some, that are now first upon being; the several and mutual relations of those things that are together; and some other things that are at their last. their lives also, who were long ago, and theirs who shall be hereafter, and the present estate and life of those many nations of barbarians that are now in the world, thou must likewise consider in thy mind. and how many there be, who never so much as heard of thy name, how many that will soon forget it; how many who but even now did commend thee, within a very little while perchance will speak ill of thee. so that neither fame, nor honour, nor anything else that this world doth afford, is worth the while. the sum then of all; whatsoever doth happen unto thee, whereof god is the cause, to accept it contentedly: whatsoever thou doest, whereof thou thyself art the cause, to do it justly: which will be, if both in thy resolution and in thy action thou have no further end, than to do good unto others, as being that, which by thy natural constitution, as a man, thou art bound unto.

xxx. many of those things that trouble and straiten thee, it is in thy

power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion; and then thou shalt have room enough.

xxxi. to comprehend the whole world together in thy mind, and the whole

course of this present age to represent it unto thyself, and to fix thy thoughts upon the sudden change of every particular object. how short the time is from the generation of anything, unto the dissolution of the same; but how immense and infinite both that which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be. all things that thou seest, will soon be perished, and they that see their corruptions, will soon vanish away themselves. he that dieth a hundred years old, and he that dieth young, shall come all to one.

xxxii. what are their minds and understandings; and what the things that

they apply themselves unto: what do they love, and what do they hate for? fancy to thyself the estate of their souls openly to be seen. when they think they hurt them shrewdly, whom they speak ill of; and when they think they do them a very good turn, whom they commend and extol: o how full are they then of conceit, and opinion!

xxxiii. loss and corruption, is in very deed nothing else but change and

alteration; and that is it, which the nature of the universe doth most delight in, by which, and according to which, whatsoever is done, is well done. for that was the estate of worldly things from the beginning, and so shall it ever be. or wouldest thou rather say, that all things in the world have gone ill from the beginning for so many ages, and shall ever go ill? and then among so many deities, could no divine power be found all this while, that could rectify the things of the world? or is the world, to incessant woes and miseries, for ever condemned?

xxxiv. how base and putrid, every common matter is! water, dust, and

from the mixture of these bones, and all that loathsome stuff that our bodies do consist of: so subject to be infected, and corrupted. and again those other things that are so much prized and admired, as marble stones, what are they, but as it were the kernels of the earth? gold and silver, what are they, but as the more gross faeces of the earth? thy most royal apparel, for matter, it is but as it were the hair of a silly sheep, and for colour, the very blood of a shell-fish; of this nature are all other things. thy life itself, is some such thing too; a mere exhalation of blood: and it also, apt to be changed into some other common thing.

xxxv. will this querulousness, this murmuring, this complaining and

dissembling never be at an end? what then is it, that troubleth thee? doth any new thing happen unto thee? what doest thou so wonder at? at the cause, or the matter? behold either by itself, is either of that weight and moment indeed? and besides these, there is not anything. but thy duty towards the gods also, it is time thou shouldst acquit thyself of it with more goodness and simplicity.

xxxvi. it is all one to see these things for a hundred of years together

or but for three years.

xxxvii. if he have sinned, his is the harm, not mine. but perchance he

hath not.

xxxviii. either all things by the providence of reason happen unto every

particular, as a part of one general body; and then it is against reason that a part should complain of anything that happens for the good of the whole; or if, according to epicurus, atoms be the cause of all things and that life be nothing else but an accidentary confusion of things, and death nothing else, but a mere dispersion and so of all other things: what doest thou trouble thyself for?

xxxix. sayest thou unto that rational part, thou art dead; corruption

hath taken hold on thee? doth it then also void excrements? doth it like either oxen, or sheep, graze or feed; that it also should be mortal, as well as the body?

xl. either the gods can do nothing for us at all, or they can still and

allay all the distractions and distempers of thy mind. if they can do nothing, why doest thou pray? if they can, why wouldst not thou rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayst neither fear, nor lust after any of those worldly things which cause these distractions and distempers of it? why not rather, that thou mayst not at either their absence or presence, be grieved and discontented: than either that thou mayst obtain them, or that thou mayst avoid them? for certainly it must needs be, that if the gods can help us in anything, they may in this kind also. but thou wilt say perchance, 'in those things the gods have given me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to do what i will.' but if thou mayst use this liberty, rather to set thy mind at true liberty, than wilfully with baseness and servility of mind to affect those things, which either to compass or to avoid is not in thy power, wert not thou better? and as for the gods, who hath told thee, that they may not help us up even in those things that they have put in our own power? whether it be so or no, thou shalt soon perceive, if thou wilt but try thyself and pray. one prayeth that he may compass his desire, to lie with such or such a one, pray thou that thou mayst not lust to lie with her. another how he may be rid of such a one; pray thou that thou mayst so patiently bear with him, as that thou have no such need to be rid of him. another, that he may not lose his child. pray thou that thou mayst not fear to lose him. to this end and purpose, let all thy prayer be, and see what will be the event.

xli. 'in my sickness' (saith epicurus of himself:) 'my discourses were

not concerning the nature of my disease, neither was that, to them that came to visit me, the subject of my talk; but in the consideration and contemplation of that, which was of especial weight and moment, was all my time bestowed and spent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind, by a natural and unavoidable sympathy partaking in some sort with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep herself free from trouble, and in present possession of her own proper happiness. neither did i leave the ordering of my body to the physicians altogether to do with me what they would, as though i expected any great matter from them, or as though i thought it a matter of such great consequence, by their means to recover my health: for my present estate, methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content.' whether therefore in sickness (if thou chance to sicken) or in what other kind of extremity soever, endeavour thou also to be in thy mind so affected, as he doth report of himself: not to depart from thy philosophy for anything that can befall thee, nor to give ear to the discourses of silly people, and mere naturalists.

xlii. it is common to all trades and professions to mind and intend that

only, which now they are about, and the instrument whereby they work.

xliii. when at any time thou art offended with any one's impudency, put

presently this question to thyself: 'what? is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world! certainly it is not possible.' desire not then that which is impossible. for this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without. so of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself. for whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular. this also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice, or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind. as for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty. and generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error? for whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived, and again, what art thou the worse for his sin? for thou shalt not find that any one of these, against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was. and what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned, do the deeds of one that is unlearned? should not thou rather blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be. but then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself. for without all question, thou thyself art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee: or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end; nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done. for what wouldst thou have more? unto him that is a man, thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee? what thy nature required, that hast thou done. must thou be rewarded for it? as if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction. for as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more, than that they may work according to their natural constitution: so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error; or though but in middle things, as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like, doth help to further their desires he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.