54after the crushing defeat at cremona vitellius stupidly suppressed the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but only his precautions against it. had he admitted the facts and sought advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that all went well only made matters worse. he was himself extraordinarily silent about the war, and in rome all discussion of the subject was forbidden. this only increased the number of people who, if permitted, would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread grossly exaggerated rumours. nor were the flavian leaders slow to foster these rumours. whenever they captured vitellian spies they escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning army, and sent them back 63again. vitellius cross-examined each of them in private and then had them murdered. a centurion named julius agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to fire vitellius' courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the emperor to send him to inspect the enemy's forces and discover what had really happened at cremona. he made no attempt to deceive antonius by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the emperor's instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown everything. he was given guides, who showed him the field of battle, the ruins of cremona and the captured legions. back went agrestis to vitellius. finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even suggested that he had been bribed, he said, 'you want some certain evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or dead, i will give you evidence that you can believe.' and he was as good as his word. he went straight from the emperor's presence and committed suicide. some say he was killed by order of vitellius, but they give the same account of his heroic devotion.145
55vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. he dispatched julius priscus and alfenus varus146 with fourteen cohorts of guards and all his available cavalry to hold the apennines. a legion levied from 64the marines147 was sent after them. this large army of picked men and horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to have even taken the offensive. his other cohorts148 were given to his brother, lucius vitellius, for the protection of the city. the emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated consuls for several years in advance. he lavished special charters149 on allied communities and extended latin rights150 to foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. in fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple the empire. however, the mob accepted these munificent grants with open mouths. fools paid money for them, but wise men held them invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a revolution. at last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined the camp at mevania,151 where they had taken up their position. a long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but most by their fears. here he 65was still undecided and at the mercy of treacherous advice.
56during one of his speeches a portent occurred. a cloud of ill-omened birds152 flew over his head and its density obscured the daylight. to this was added another omen of disaster. a bull broke from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed according to the proper ritual. but the chief portent was vitellius himself. he was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed forward or protracted. he always had to ask some one else. at every fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. and then he would get drunk. at last he found camp life too tedious, and on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at misenum153 he returned to rome. every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed insensible. for it was open to him to cross the apennines and with his full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out with cold and hunger. but by breaking up his forces he sent his keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken prisoner. the more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted. but the emperor's intimates refused 66them admittance. he had, indeed, formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run fatal.
57in civil war individual enterprise counts for much. the mutiny of the fleet at misenum had been engineered by claudius faventinus, a centurion whom galba had dismissed in disgrace. to obtain his object he had forged a letter from vespasian promising rewards for treachery. the admiral, claudius apollinaris,154 was neither a staunch loyalist nor an enthusiastic traitor. accordingly apinius tiro, an ex-praetor, who happened to be at minturnae,155 offered to take the lead of the rebels. they proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns. puteoli in particular was strong for vespasian, while capua remained loyal to vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the civil war. to pacify the excited troops vitellius chose claudius julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at misenum and had allowed lax discipline. to support him he was given one cohort of the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under him. the two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not long before julianus came over to vespasian's side. they then joined forces and occupied tarracina,156 which owed its strength more to 67its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.
58when news of this reached vitellius, he left part of his force at narnia157 with the prefects of the guard,158 and sent his brother lucius with six regiments of guards and five hundred horse to cope with the threatened outbreak in campania. his own nervous depression was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. for he dignified this poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by the specious titles of 'the army' or 'his legions'. his friends were all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who gave their names. as their numbers were too great, he gave the task of selection to the two consuls. from each of the senators he levied a fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. the knights offered money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar assistance. indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had gradually changed into real sympathy. people began to feel pity, not perhaps so much for vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes. he himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands upon their compassion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when they are frightened, beyond all limits. he had hitherto 68refused the title of caesar,159 but he now expressed a wish for it. he had a superstitious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. however, while a rash and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it always begins to flag. gradually the senators and knights deserted him. at first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. at last vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them from the services which they refused to render.
