49thus128 a world-wide convulsion marked the passing of the imperial power into new hands. meanwhile, after cremona, the behaviour of antonius primus was not so blameless as before. he had settled the war, he felt; the rest would be plain sailing. or, perhaps, in such a nature as his success only brought to light his greed and arrogance and all his other dormant vices. while harrying italy like a conquered country, he courted the goodwill of his troops and used every word and every action to pave his way to power. he allowed his men to appoint centurions themselves in place of those who had fallen, and thus gave them a taste for insubordination; for their choice fell on the most turbulent spirits. the generals no longer commanded the men, but were dragged at the heels of their caprices. this revolutionary system, utterly fatal to good discipline, was exploited by antonius for his own profit.129 of mucianus' approach he had no fears, and thus made a mistake even more fatal than despising vespasian.130
50his advance, however, continued. as winter was at hand131 and the po had inundated the meadows, his column marched unencumbered by heavy baggage.58 the main body of the victorious legions was left behind at verona, together with such of the soldiers as were incapacitated by wounds or old age, and many besides who were still in good condition. having already broken the back of the campaign, antonius felt strong enough with his auxiliary horse and foot and some picked detachments from the legions. the eleventh132 had voluntarily joined the advance. they had held back at first, but, seeing antonius' success, were distressed to think they had had no share in it. the column was also accompanied by a force of six thousand dalmatian troops, which had been recently raised. the ex-consul, pompeius silvanus,133 commanded the column, but the actual control was in the hands of a general named annius bassus. silvanus was quite ineffective as a general, and wasted every chance of action in talking about it. bassus, while showing all due respect, managed him completely, and was always ready with quiet efficiency to do anything that had to be done. their force was further increased by enlisting the best of the marines from the ravenna fleet, who were clamouring for service in the legions. the vacancies in the fleet were filled by dalmatians. the army and its generals halted at fanum fortunae,134 still hesitating what policy to adopt, for they had heard that the guards were on the move from rome, and supposed that the apennines were held by troops. and they had fears of their own. supplies 59were scarce in a district devastated by war. the men were mutinous and demanded 'shoe-money',135 as they called the donative, with alarming insistence. no provision had been made either for money or for stores. the precipitate greed of the soldiers made further difficulties, for they each looted what might have served for them all.
51i find among the best authorities evidence which shows how wickedly careless were the victorious army of all considerations of right and wrong. they tell how a trooper professed that he had killed his brother in the last battle, and demanded a reward from his generals. the dictates of humanity forbade them to remunerate such a murder, but in the interests of civil war they dared not punish it. they had put him off with the plea that they could not at the moment reward his service adequately. and there the story stops. however, a similar crime had occurred in earlier civil wars. in the battle which pompeius strabo fought against cinna at the janiculum,136 one of his soldiers killed his own brother and then, realizing what he had done, committed suicide. this is recorded by sisenna.137 our ancestors, it seems, had a livelier sense than we have both of the glory of good deeds 60and the shame of bad.138 these and other such instances from past history may be appropriately cited, whenever the subject seems to demand either an example of good conduct or some consolation for a crime.
52antonius and his fellow generals decided to send the cavalry ahead to explore the whole of umbria, and to see whether any of the apennines were accessible by a gentler route; to summon the eagles and standards139 and all the troops at verona,140 and to fill the po and the sea with provision ships. some of the generals continually suggested obstacles. antonius had grown too big for his place, and they had surer hopes of reward from mucianus. he was distressed that victory had come so soon, and felt that, if he was not present when rome was taken, he would lose his share in the war and its glory. so he kept on writing to antonius and varus in ambiguous terms, sometimes urging them to 'press forward on their path', sometimes expatiating on 'the manifold value of delay'. he thus managed to arrange that he could disclaim responsibility in case of a reverse, or acknowledge their policy as his own if it succeeded. to plotius grypus, whom vespasian had lately raised to senatorial rank and put in command of a legion, and to his other trusty friends he sent less ambiguous instructions, and they all wrote back criticizing the haste with which antonius and varus 61acted. this was just what mucianus wanted. he forwarded the letters to vespasian with the result that antonius' plans and exploits were not appreciated as highly as antonius had hoped. 53this he took very ill and threw the blame on mucianus, whose charges he conceived had cheapened his exploits. being little accustomed to control his tongue or to obey orders, he was most unguarded in his conversation and composed a letter to vespasian in presumptuous language which ill befitted a subject, making various covert charges against mucianus. 'it was i,' he wrote, 'who brought the legions of pannonia into the field:141 it was my stimulus which stirred up the officers in moesia:142 it was by my persistence that we broke through the alps, seized hold of italy and cut off the german and raetian auxiliaries.143 when vitellius' legions were all scattered and disunited, it was i who flung the cavalry on them like a whirlwind, and then pressed home the attack with the infantry all day and all night. that victory is my greatest achievement and it is entirely my own. as for the mishap at cremona, that was the fault of the war. in old days the civil wars cost the country far more damage and involved the destruction of more than one town. it is not with couriers and dispatches that i serve my master, but with my sword in my hand. nor can it be said that i have interfered with the glory of the men who have meanwhile settled 62matters in dacia.144 what peace in moesia is to them, the safety and welfare of italy are to me. it was my encouragement which brought the provinces of gaul and of spain, the strongest parts of the whole world, over to vespasian's side. but my labours will prove useless, if the reward for the dangers i have run is to fall to the man who was not there to share them.' all this reached the ears of mucianus and a serious quarrel resulted. antonius kept it up in a frank spirit of dislike, while mucianus showed a cunning which was far more implacable.
