although many important events have happened since the establishment of the state inquisition, which have greatly affected the power, riches, and extent of dominion of this republic, yet the nature of the government has remained much the same. in what i have to add, therefore, i shall be very short and general.
i have already observed, that it was the usual policy of this republic to maintain a neutrality, as long as possible, in all the wars which took place among her neighbours; and when obliged, contrary to her inclinations, to declare for either party, she generally joined with that state whose distant situation rendered its power and prosperity the least dangerous of the two to venice.
[188]
this republic seems, however, to have too much neglected to form defensive alliances with other states, and by the continual jealousy she shewed of them, joined to her immense riches, at last became the object of the hatred and envy of all the powers in europe. this universal jealousy was roused, and brought into action, in the year 1508, by the intriguing genius of pope julius the second. a confederacy was secretly entered into at cambray, between julius, the emperor maximilian, lewis the twelfth, and ferdinand of arragon, against the republic of venice. a bare enumeration of the powers which composed this league, gives a very high idea of the importance of the state against which it was formed.
the duke of savoy, the duke of farrara, and the duke of mantua, acceded to this confederacy, and gave in claims to part of the dominions of venice. it was not difficult to form pretensions to the best[189] part of the dominions of a state, which originally possessed nothing but a few marshy islands at the bottom of the adriatic gulph. it was the general opinion of europe, that the league of cambray would reduce venice to her original possessions.
the venetians, finding themselves deprived of all hopes of foreign assistance, sought support from their own courage, and resolved to meet the danger which threatened them, with the spirit of a brave and independent people.
their general, count alviano, led an army against lewis, who, being prepared before the other confederates, had already entered italy. however great the magnanimity of the senate, and the skill of their general, the soldiery were by no means equal to the disciplined troops of france, led by a martial nobility, and headed by a gallant monarch. the army of alviano was defeated; new enemies poured on the republic from all sides; and she lost, in one[190] campaign, all the territories in italy which she had been ages in acquiring.
venice now found that she could no longer depend on her own strength and resources, and endeavoured to break, by policy, a combination which she had not force to resist. the venetian senate, knowing that julius was the soul of the confederacy, offered to deliver up the towns he claimed, and made every other submission that could gratify the pride, and avert the anger, of that ambitious pontiff; they also find means to separate ferdinand from the alliance. lewis and maximilian being now their only enemies, the venetians are able to sustain the war, till julius, bearing no longer any resentment against the republic, and seized with remorse at beholding his native country ravaged by french and german armies, unites with venice to drive the invaders out of italy; and this republic is saved, with the loss of a small part of her italian dominions, from a ruin[191] which all europe had considered as inevitable. the long and expensive wars between the different powers of europe, in which this state was obliged to take part, prove that her strength and resources were not exhausted.
in the year 1570, the venetians were forced into a ruinous war with the ottoman empire, at a time when the senate, sensible of the great need they stood in of repose, had, with much address and policy, kept clear of the quarrels which agitated the rest of europe. but solymon the second, upon the most frivolous pretext, demanded from them the island of cyprus.
it was evident to all the world, that he had no better foundation for this claim, than a strong desire, supported by a sufficient power, of conquering the island. this kind of right might not be thought complete in a court of equity; but, in the jurisprudence of monarchs, it has always been found preferable to every other.
[192]
the turks make a descent, with a great army, on cyprus; they invest famagousta, the capital; the garrison defends it with the most obstinate bravery; the turks are repulsed in repeated assaults; many thousands of them are slain; but the ranks are constantly supplied by reinforcements. antonio bragadino, the commander, having displayed proofs of the highest military skill, and the most heroic courage, his garrison being quite exhausted with fatigue, and greatly reduced in point of numbers, is obliged to capitulate.
the terms were, that the garrison should march out with their arms, baggage, and three pieces of cannon, and should be transported to candia in turkish vessels; that the citizens should not be pillaged, but allowed to retire with their effects.
mustapha, the turkish bashaw, no sooner had possession of the place, than he delivered it up to be pillaged by the janissaries; the garrison were put in chains, and[193] made slaves on board the turkish gallies. the principal officers were beheaded, and the gallant bragadino was tied to a pillar, and, in the bashaw’s presence, flayed alive.
we meet with events in the annals of mankind, that make us doubt the truth of the most authentic history. we cannot believe that such actions have ever been committed by the inhabitants of this globe, and by creatures of the same species with ourselves. we are tempted to think we are perusing the records of hell, whose inhabitants, according to the most authentic accounts, derive a constant pleasure from the tortures of each other, as well as of all foreigners.
the conquest of the island of cyprus is said to have cost the turks fifty thousand lives. at this time, not venice only, but all christendom, had reason to dread the progress of the turkish arms. the state of venice solicited assistance from all the catholic[194] states; but france was, at that time, in alliance with the turks; maximilian dreaded their power; the crown of portugal was possessed by a child, and poland was exhausted by her wars with russia. the venetians, on this pressing occasion, received assistance from rome, whose power they had so often resisted, and from spain, their late enemy.
pope pius the fifth, and philip the second, joined their fleets with that of the republic. the confederate fleet assembled at messina. the celebrated don john of austria, natural son to charles the fifth, was generalissimo; mark antonio colonna commanded the pope’s division, and sebastian veniero the venetian. the turkish fleet was greatly superior in the number of vessels.
the two fleets meet in the gulph of lapanta: it is said, that the turkish gallies were entirely worked by christian slaves, and the gallies of the christians by turkish;[195] a shocking proof of the barbarous manner in which prisoners of war were treated in that age; and, in this instance, as absurd as it was barbarous; for a cartel for an exchange of prisoners would have given freedom to the greater number of those unhappy men, without diminishing the strength of either navy. the fleets engage, and the turks are entirely defeated. historians assert, that twenty thousand turks were killed in the engagement, and one half of their fleet destroyed. this is a prodigious number to be killed on one side, and in a sea fight; it ought to be remembered, that there is no turkish writer on the subject.
pius the fifth died soon after the battle of lapanta. upon his death the war languished on the side of the allies; philip became tired of the expence, and the venetians were obliged to purchase a peace, by yielding the island of cyprus to the turks, and agreeing to pay them, for three[196] years, an annual tribute of one hundred thousand ducats. those circumstances have no tendency to confirm the accounts which christian writers have given, of the immense loss which the turks met with at the battle of lapanta.
in the beginning of the seventeenth century, the republic had a dispute with the pope, which, in that age, was thought a matter of importance, and engaged the attention of all christendom.
paul the fifth shewed as eager a disposition as any of his predecessors, to extend the papal authority. he had an inveterate prejudice against the venetian republic, on account of her having, on every occasion, resisted all ecclesiastical encroachments.
he sought, with impatience, an opportunity of manifesting his hatred, and expected that he should be assisted by the pious princes of europe, in bringing this refractory[197] child of the church to reason. he began by demanding a sum of money, for the purpose of carrying on the war against the turks in hungary; he complained of certain decrees of the senate, relating to the internal government of the republic, particularly one which forbad the building of any more new churches, without the permission of that assembly, and which, he said, smelt strongly of heresy; and above all, he exclaimed against the council of ten, for having imprisoned an ecclesiastic, and prepared to bring him to a public trial. this reverend person, for whom his holiness interested himself so warmly, was accused of having poisoned five people, one of whom was his own father. he was also accused of having caused another to be assassinated; and, to prevent a discovery, had afterwards poisoned the assassin.
the senate refused the money, confirmed their decree against the building of[198] churches, and applauded the conduct of the council of ten, in prosecuting the ecclesiastic.
the authors of the age arranged themselves on the one side, or the other, and this became a war of controversy; in which, though there was no blood shed, yet it appeared, by the writings of the partisans, that a considerable number of understandings were greatly injured. those who supported the pope’s cause insisted, that the temporal power of princes is subordinate to his; that he has a right to deprive them of their dominions, and release their subjects from their oaths of fidelity, as often as this shall be for the glory of god, and for the good of the church; of which nobody could be so good a judge as the pope, since all the world knew he was infallible; that ecclesiastics were not subjected to the civil power; that an ecclesiastical court, or the pope, only, had authority over that body of men; and nothing[199] could be more abominable, than to continue a prosecution against a prisoner, whatever his crimes might be, after the father of the church, who had the undoubted power of absolving sinners, had interfered in his favour.
the senate, in their answers, acknowledged, that the pope was supreme head of the church, and that, in all subjects of religious belief, his power was unbounded; for which reason they remained implicit and submissive believers; that they were far from disputing the infallibility of his holiness in ecclesiastical matters, particularly within his own dominions; but, with regard to the government of their subjects, they would certainly take the whole trouble of that on themselves, and would administer as impartial justice to ecclesiastics, as to those of other professions. they imagined also, that they were competent judges when, and for what purposes, they ought to levy money upon their own[200] subjects, and whether it would be necessary to build any new churches in venice, or not. finally, they flattered themselves, that the prosecuting a murderer was no way inconsistent with the glory of god.
the greater number of the princes of christendom seemed to think the senate were in the right. the pope was disappointed in his expectations; and finding himself unsupported, was glad to shelter his pride under the mediation of henry the fourth of france, who endeavoured to give his holiness’s defeat the appearance of victory.
