the trumpet call which summoned rupert and his friends to horse was, as he suspected, an indication that there was a general movement of the troops in front.
vendome had declined to attack the allies in the position they had taken up, but had moved by his right to braine le leude, a village close to the ground on which, more than a hundred years later, waterloo was fought, and whence he threatened alike louvain and brussels. marlborough moved his army on a parallel line to anderleet. no sooner had he arrived there, than he found that vendome was still moving towards his right--a proof that louvain was really the object of the attack. again the allied troops were set in motion, and all night, through torrents of rain, they tramped wearily along, until at daybreak they were in position at parc, covering the fortress of louvain. vendome, finding himself anticipated, fell back to braine le leude without firing a shot.
but though marlborough had so far foiled the enemy, it was clear that he was not in a condition to take the offensive before the arrival of prince eugene, who would, he trusted, be able to come to his assistance; and for weeks the armies watched each other without movement.
on the 4th of july, vendome suddenly marched from braine le leude, intending to capture the fortress of oudenarde. small bodies of troops were sent off at the same time to ghent and bruges, whose inhabitants rose and admitted the french. marlborough, seeing the danger which threatened the very important fortress of oudenarde, sent orders to lord chandos who commanded at ath, to collect all the small garrisons in the neighbourhood, and to throw himself into oudenarde. this was done before vendome could reach the place, which was thus secured against a coup de main. vendome invested the fortress, brought up his siege train from tournay, and moved towards lessines with his main army, to cover the siege.
the loss of ghent and bruges, the annoyances he suffered from party attacks at home, and the failure of the allies to furnish the promised contingents, so agitated marlborough that he was seized with an attack of fever.
fortunately, on the 7th of july prince eugene arrived. finding that his army could not be up in time, he had left them, and, accompanied only by his personal staff, had ridden on to join marlborough.
the arrival of this able general and congenial spirit did much to restore marlborough; and after a council with the prince, he determined to throw his army upon vendome's line of communications, and thus force him to fight with his face to paris.
at two in the morning of the 9th of july, the allies broke up their camp, and advanced in four great columns towards lessines and the french frontier. by noon the heads of the columns had reached herfelingen, fourteen miles from their starting point, and bridges were thrown across the dender, and the next morning the army crossed, and then stood between the french and their own frontier.
vendome, greatly disconcerted at finding that his plans had all been destroyed, ordered his army to fall back to gavre on the scheldt, intending to cross below oudenarde.
marlborough at once determined to press forward, so as to force on a battle, having the advantage of coming upon the enemy when engaged in a movement of retreat. accordingly, at daybreak on the 11th, colonel cadogan, with the advanced guard, consisting of the whole of the cavalry and twelve battalions of infantry, pushed forward, and marched with all speed to the scheldt, which they reached by seven o'clock. having thrown bridges across it, he marched to meet the enemy, his troops in battle array; the infantry opposite eynes, the cavalry extending to the left towards schaerken. advancing strongly down the river in this order, cadogan soon met the french advanced guard under biron, which was moving up from gavre. in the fighting the french had the advantage, retaining possession of eynes, and there awaiting the advance of the english.
meanwhile marlborough and eugene, with the main body of the army, had reached the river, and were engaged in getting the troops across the narrow bridges, but as yet but a small portion of the forces had crossed. seeing this, vendome determined to crush the british advanced guard with the whole weight of his army, and so halted his troops and formed order of battle.
the country in which the battle of oudenarde was about to be fought is undulating, and cut up by several streams, with hedgerows, fields, and enclosures, altogether admirably adapted for an army fighting a defensive battle. the village of eynes lies about a mile below oudenarde and a quarter of a mile from the scheldt. through it flows a stream formed by the junction of the two rivulets. at a distance of about a mile from the scheldt, and almost parallel with that river, runs the norken, a considerable stream, which falls into the scheldt below gavre. behind this river the ground rises into a high plateau, in which, at the commencement of the fight, the greater portion of the french army were posted.
the appearance of colonel cadogan with his advanced guard completely astonished the french generals. the allies were known to have been fifteen miles away on the preceding evening, and that a great army should march that distance, cross a great river, and be in readiness to fight a great battle, was contrary to all their calculations of probabilities.
the duke of burgundy wished to continue the march to ghent. marshal vendome pointed out that it was too late, and that although a country so intersected with hedges was unfavourable ground for the army which possessed the larger masses of men, yet that a battle must be fought. this irresolution and dissension on the part of the french generals wasted time, and allowed the allies to push large bodies of troops across the river unmolested. as fast as they got over marlborough formed them up near bevere, a village a few hundred yards north of oudenarde. marlborough then prepared to take the offensive, and ordered colonel cadogan to retake eynes.
four english battalions, under colonel sabine, crossed the stream and attacked the french forces in the village, consisting of seven battalions under pfiffer, while the cavalry crossed the rivulets higher up, and came down on the flank of the village. the result was three french battalions were surrounded and made prisoners, and the other four routed and dispersed.
the french generals now saw that there was no longer a possibility of avoiding a general action. vendome would have stood on the defensive, which, as he had the norken with its steep and difficult ground in his front, was evidently the proper tactics to have pursued. he was, however, overruled by the duke of burgundy and the other generals, and the french accordingly descended from the plateau, crossed the norken, and advanced to the attack. the armies were of nearly equal strength, the french having slightly the advantage. the allies had 112 battalions and 180 squadrons, in all 80,000 men; the french, 121 battalions and 198 squadrons, in all 85,000 men.
the french again lost time, and fell into confusion as they advanced, owing to marshal vendome's orders being countermanded by the duke of burgundy, who had nominally the chief command, and who was jealous of vendome's reputation. marlborough divined the cause of the hesitation, and perceiving that the main attack would be made on his left, which was posted in front of the castle of bevere, half a mile from the village of the same name; ordered twelve battalions of infantry under cadogan to move from his right at eynes to reinforce his left.
he then lined all the hedges with infantry, and stationing twenty british battalions under argyle with four guns in reserve, awaited the attack. but few guns were employed on either side during the battle, for artillery in those days moved but slowly, and the rapid movements of both armies had left the guns far behind.
the french in their advance at once drew in four battalions, posted at groenvelde, in advance of eynes, and then bearing to their right, pressed forward with such vigour that they drove back the allied left. at this point were the dutch and hanoverian troops. marlborough now dispatched eugene to take command of the british on the right, directed count lottum to move from the centre with twenty battalions to reinforce that side of the fight, and went himself to restore the battle on the left.
eugene, with his british troops, were gradually but steadily, in spite of their obstinate resistance, being driven back, when lottum's reinforcements arrived, and with these eugene advanced at once, and drove back the enemy. as these were in disorder, general natzmer, at the head of the prussian cuirassiers, charged them and drove them back, until he himself was fallen upon by the french horse guards in reserve, while the infantry's fire from the hedgerows mowed down the cuirassiers. so dreadful was the fire that half the prussian cavalry were slain, and the rest escaped with difficulty, hotly pursued by the french household troops.
an even more desperate conflict was all this time raging on the left. here marlborough placed himself at the head of the dutch and hanoverian battalions, and led them back against the french, who were advancing with shouts of victory, and desperate struggles ensued. alison in his history says:
"the ground on which the hostile lines met was so broken, that the battle in that quarter turned almost into a series of partial conflicts and even personal encounters. every bridge, every ditch, every wood, every hamlet, every enclosure, was obstinately contested, and so incessant was the roll of musketry, and so intermingled did the hostile lines become, that the field, seen from a distance, appeared an unbroken line of flame. a warmer fire, a more desperate series of combats, was never witnessed in modern warfare. it was in great part conducted hand to hand, like the battles of antiquity, of which livy and homer have left such graphic descriptions. the cavalry could not act, from the multitude of hedges and copses which intersected the theatre of conflict. breast to breast, knee to knee, bayonet to bayonet, they maintained the fight on both sides with the most desperate resolution. if the resistance, however, was obstinate, the attack was no less vigorous, and at length the enthusiastic ardour of the french yielded to the steady valour of the germans. gradually they were driven back, literally at the bayonet's point; and at length, resisting at every point, they yielded all the ground they had won at the commencement of the action. so, gradually they were pushed back as far as the village of diepenbech, where so stubborn a stand was made that the allies could no longer advance."
overkirk had now got the rear of the army across the river, and the duke, seeing that the hill of oycke, which flanked the enemy's position, was unoccupied by them, directed the veteran general with his twenty dutch and danish battalions to advance and occupy it. arrived there, he swung round the left of his line, and so pressed the french right, which was advanced beyond their outer bounds into the little plain of diepenbech. the duke commanded overkirk to press round still further to his left by the passes of mullem and the mill of royeghem, by which the french sustained their communication with the force still on the plateau beyond the norken; and prince eugene to further extend his right so as to encompass the mass of french crowded in the plain of diepenbech.
the night was falling now, and the progress of the allies on either flank could be seen by the flashes of fire. vendome, seeing the immense danger in which his right and centre were placed, endeavoured to bring up his left, hitherto intact; but the increasing darkness, the thick enclosures, and the determined resistance of eugene's troops, prevented him from carrying out his intention. so far were the british wings extended round the plain of diepenbech, that they completely enclosed it, and eugene's and overkirk's men meeting fought fiercely, each believing the other to be french. the mistake was discovered, and to prevent any further mishap of this kind in the darkness, the whole army was ordered to halt where it was and wait till morning. had the daylight lasted two hours longer, the whole of the french army would have been slain or taken prisoners; as it was, the greater portion made their way through the intervals of the allied army around them, and fled to ghent. nevertheless, they lost 6,000 killed and wounded, and 9,000 prisoners, while many thousands of the fugitives made for the french frontier. thus the total loss to vendome exceeded 20,000 men, while the allies lost in all 5000.
when morning broke, marlborough dispatched forty squadrons of horse in pursuit of the fugitives towards ghent, sent off count lottum with thirty battalions and fifty squadrons to carry the strong lines which the enemy had constructed between ypres and warneton, and employed the rest of his force in collecting and tending the wounded of both armies.
a few days later the two armies, that of eugene and that of the duke of berwick, which had been marching with all speed parallel to each other, came up and joined those of marlborough and vendome respectively. the duke of berwick's corps was the more powerful, numbering thirty-four battalions and fifty-five squadrons, and this raised the duke de vendome's army to over 110,000, and placed him again fairly on an equality with the allies. marlborough, having by his masterly movement forced vendome to fight with his face to paris, and in his retreat to retire still farther from the frontier, now had france open to him, and his counsel was that the whole army should at once march for paris, disregarding the fortresses just as wellington and blucher did after waterloo.
he was however, overruled, even eugene considering such an attempt to be altogether too dangerous, with vendome's army, 110,000 strong, in the rear; and it must be admitted it would certainly have been a march altogether without a parallel.
finding that his colleagues would not consent to so daring and adventurous a march, marlborough determined to enter france, and lay siege to the immensely strong fortress of lille. this was in itself a tremendous undertaking, for the fortifications of the town were considered the most formidable ever designed by vauban. the citadel within the town was still stronger, and the garrison of 15,000 picked troops were commanded by marshal boufflers, one of the most skillful generals in the french army. to lay siege to such a fortress as this, while vendome, with this army of 110,000 men, lay ready to advance to its assistance, was an undertaking of the greatest magnitude.
in most cases the proper course to have taken would have been to advance against and defeat vendome before undertaking the siege of lille; but the french general had entrenched his position with such skill that he could not be attacked; while he had, moreover, the advantage, that if the allies stood between him and france, he stood between them and their base, commanded the scheldt and the canals from holland, and was therefore in position to interfere greatly with the onerous operation of bringing up stores for the british army, and with the passage to the front of the immense siege train requisite for an operation of such magnitude as was now about to be undertaken, and for whose transport alone 16,000 horses were required.
