when you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing forward or by going backward. you must do one or other. you cannot just stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. the french government clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into the quagmire. so three more german cities have been occupied, more burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees issued; there are more depressions of french, belgian and italian exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in central europe—in a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid coal. the total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises of spa was only eight per cent.[pg 184] had it not been for this fatuous invasion, france during the past six or seven weeks would have already received from the ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. france has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. a swarm of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this ridiculous output. no doubt the amount will later on be increased by further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a long time ere france receives her spa quota minus eight per cent., and then there will be some months' arrears to make up.
no wonder that m. loucheur stated flatly in the french chamber that he did not approve of the ruhr enterprise. he has one distinct advantage over the ruhr plungers—he does know something about business. he can boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without significance when you consider his present attitude. he is an admirable judge of to-morrow's weather. that is a rare endowment amongst politicians. any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in these matters to forecast the direction[pg 185] of the wind to-morrow. m. loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. so he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to m. poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. i have read no declaration from any french statesman of eminence—with the doubtful exception of m. barthou—indicating a belief in the wisdom of the venture. and yet french courage, french pride, french loyalty, french patriotism—and maybe french blood and treasure—are committed irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible statesmen who led france by their wisdom through her great troubles regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension.
will the french government try to extricate themselves from the difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and europe? i fear not. heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs courage to get out. and when getting out involves an admission of blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. there are other reasons why the present government of france will flounder further into the quicksand. when [pg 186]governments make mistakes in england, the threat of a parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. the willesden, mitcham, and liverpool elections rescued the government from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has ever contrived to get its affairs. in similar circumstances in france a change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. but you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing to form the next. there are generally two or three outstanding men of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. the trouble to-day in france is that every alternative leader disapproves of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. on the other hand, there is no prominent figure in french politics prepared to take upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. it would always be said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new minister's cowardice and perfidy france would have emerged triumphantly out of all her[pg 187] financial worries. the drapeau would have been lowered and betrayed. no french statesmen dare face that deadly accusation. so the present french government is tied to the saddle of its charger and is forced to go on.
another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. the more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display in spurring the government further into its follies. in the previous article i gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for syndicating european resources under french control. the industries of europe controlled from paris—that is their magnificent dream. now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of versailles. boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns practically annexed, the ruhr coal is to be harnessed to lorraine coal, and germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. there has been nothing comparable to these ideas since the norman conquest, when the saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a condition of economic thraldom for the[pg 188] enrichment and glorification of their new masters. needless to say britain and america are not to be invited to attend this new peace conference. they are to be graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally established by french arms. the british empire, which raised millions of men to liberate french soil from the german invaders and which lost hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make possible. america, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. the french government are not committed by any overt declarations to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present action. up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the government or from any of his subordinates. the very vagueness of his published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. pledges for reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions.
the british government have just issued as a[pg 189] parliamentary paper a full report of the proceedings of the paris conference. it is an amazing document. as far as i can see no real endeavour was made by any of its members to prevent a break-up. at the first failure to secure agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought no alternatives. they agreed about nothing except that it was not worth while spending another day in trying to agree. even m. theunis, the resourceful belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. a blight of sterility seems to have swept over the conference. on this aspect of the fateful and fatal conference of paris i do not now propose to dwell. i wish to call attention to it for another purpose. i have perused the blue book with great care. i was anxious to find out exactly what m. poincaré proposed to demand of germany as a condition of submission to the french will. what was germany to do if she was anxious to avert the fall of the axe? i have read his speeches and annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. it is true he was never asked the question. that sounds incomprehensible. but every one engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have [pg 190]occurred to them to ask this essential question. and the party principally concerned was not represented. the result is that no one knows the terms upon which the french army is prepared to evacuate the ruhr. mr. bonar law could not explain when questioned in the house of commons. i am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. i am sure that by this time m. poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went into the ruhr. for that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there until something happens that will provide us with an answer.
most human tragedy is fortuitous.
london, march 10th, 1923.
