elections
in the elections of the prince and the magistrates, which are, as i have said, complex acts, there are two possible methods of procedure, choice and lot. both have been employed in various republics, and a highly complicated mixture of the two still survives in the election of the doge at venice.
"election by lot," says montesquieu, "is democratic in nature." i agree that it is so; but in what sense? "the lot," he goes on, "is a way of making choice that is unfair to nobody; it leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country." these are not reasons.
if we bear in mind that the election of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty, we shall see why the lot is the method more natural to democracy, in which the administration is better in proportion as the number of its acts is small.
in every real democracy, magistracy is not an advantage, but a burdensome charge which cannot justly be imposed on one individual rather than another. the law alone can lay the charge on him on whom the lot falls. for, the conditions being then the same for all, and the choice not depending on any human will, there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law.
in an aristocracy, the prince chooses the prince, the government is preserved by itself, and voting is rightly ordered.
the instance of the election of the doge of venice confirms, instead of destroying, this distinction; the mixed form suits a mixed government. for it is an error to take the government of venice for a real aristocracy. if the people has no share in the government, the nobility is itself the people. a host of poor barnabotes never gets near any magistracy, and its nobility consists merely in the empty title of excellency, and in the right to sit in the great council. as this great council is as numerous as our general council at geneva, its illustrious members have no more privileges than our plain citizens. it is indisputable that, apart from the extreme disparity between the two republics, the bourgeoisie of geneva is exactly equivalent to the patriciate of venice; our natives and inhabitants correspond to the townsmen and the people of venice; our peasants correspond to the subjects on the mainland; and, however that republic be regarded, if its size be left out of account, its government is no more aristocratic than our own. the whole difference is that, having no life-ruler, we do not, like venice, need to use the lot.
election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference who was chosen. but i have already said that a real democracy is only an ideal.
when choice and lot are combined, positions that require special talents, such as military posts, should be filled by the former; the latter does for cases, such as judicial offices, in which good sense, justice, and integrity are enough, because in a state that is well constituted, these qualities are common to all the citizens.
neither lot nor vote has any place in monarchical government. the monarch being by right sole prince and only magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to none but him. when the abbé de saint-pierre proposed that the councils of the king of france should be multiplied, and their members elected by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government.
i should now speak of the methods of giving and counting opinions in the assembly of the people; but perhaps an account of this aspect of the roman constitution will more forcibly illustrate all the rules i could lay down. it is worth the while of a judicious reader to follow in some detail the working of public and private affairs in a council consisting of two hundred thousand men.
