democracy
he who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted. it seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded, and the prince and the sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak, no more than a government without government.
it is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote it to particular objects. nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint. in such a case, the state being altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible. a people that would never misuse governmental powers would never misuse independence; a people that would always govern well would not need to be governed.
if we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be. it is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. it is unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their time to public affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose without the form of administration being changed.
in fact, i can confidently lay down as a principle that, when the functions of government are shared by several tribunals, the less numerous sooner or later acquire the greatest authority, if only because they are in a position to expedite affairs, and power thus naturally comes into their hands.
besides, how many conditions that are difficult to unite does such a government presuppose! first, a very small state, where the people can readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the rest; secondly, great simplicity of manners, to prevent business from multiplying and raising thorny problems; next, a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist; lastly, little or no luxury—for luxury either comes of riches or makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor, the rich by possession and the poor by covetousness; it sells the country to softness and vanity, and takes away from the state all its citizens, to make them slaves one to another, and one and all to public opinion.
this is why a famous writer has made virtue the fundamental principle of republics; for all these conditions could not exist without virtue. but, for want of the necessary distinctions, that great thinker was often inexact, and sometimes obscure, and did not see that, the sovereign authority being everywhere the same, the same principle should be found in every well-constituted state, in a greater or less degree, it is true, according to the form of the government.
it may be added that there is no government so subject to civil wars and intestine agitations as democratic or popular government, because there is none which has so strong and continual a tendency to change to another form, or which demands more vigilance and courage for its maintenance as it is. under such a constitution above all, the citizen should arm himself with strength and constancy, and say, every day of his life, what a virtuous count palatine[1] said in the diet of poland: malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium.
were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. so perfect a government is not for men.
[1] the palatine of posen, father of the king of poland, duke of lorraine. i prefer liberty with danger to peace with slavery.
