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CHAPTER VIII INDIA IN 1803

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state of affairs in india in 1803—the mahratta confederacy—the peishwa—scindia—european adventurers in india—scindia’s disciplined forces—perron—quarrels among the mahratta chiefs—peishwa takes refuge in bombay—places himself under protection of the british—scindia’s hostility aroused—mahratta combination against the british—peishwa restored to poona—preparations for hostilities—summary of campaign that followed.

in order to understand the state of affairs existing in india at the beginning of 1803, a brief retrospect is necessary. the mogul empire had ceased to exist except in name. the old emperor shah alum, still occupied the palace at delhi, but only as a blind pensioner of the mahrattas. everywhere on the ruins of mahommedan rule new hindoo states had come into vigorous existence, and were even beginning to quarrel over the spoils. in the north the sikhs, and to the east the goorkhas, were fast forming powerful states. in the south, the short-lived kingdom of hyder ali and tippoo had been swept out of existence, while the power of the nizam was gradually growing weaker under the encroachment of his mahratta neighbours. in the great tract of country stretching from the sutlej to the kistna, and from the company’s territories in bengal to the bay of cambay, a tract measuring approximately a thousand miles from north to south, and from east to west, the supremacy of the mahratta chiefs was complete. calcutta, benares, bombay, hyderabad, and madras were all within easy striking distance of their predatory hordes. their principal chiefs were the rajah of satara, the peishwa with his seat of government at poona, the[126] scindia with his capital at oojain, the holkar whose capital was at indore, the gaekwar at baroda, the bhonslay of berar, whose capital was nagpore, and the rajah of kolapore. the nominal chiefship of the whole confederacy rested in the rajah of satara, the descendant of sivaji, the founder of the mahratta power. but the satara rajahs had long sunk into the grade of petty princes devoid of military or political influence. as the power of the satara rajahs declined, that of the peishwa, the hereditary prime minister, rose. ruling at first in the name of the satara chief, the peishwas had in time grown into independent princes, wielding the whole power of the mahratta confederacy. but the power of the peishwas in its turned waned, so that, in 1776, the peishwa rughonath rao was forced to seek asylum with the english in bombay. since then a partial revival of the peishwa’s power had taken place under the protection of scindia, who had become the foremost chief in the confederacy; and partly owing to the abilities of the peishwa’s minister, nana farnawis.

at the beginning of 1803, scindia was the most powerful chief in india. drawing great revenues from a vast area, he held delhi with its pensioner monarch in the north, received tribute from the rajpoot states in the centre, and had a predominant voice in the councils of the poona court in the deccan. the fiction of ruling in the name of the satara chief had long ceased to be maintained: government in the name of the peishwa was fast becoming a fiction. a cardinal point in the policy of nana farnawis was to promote friendship with the english government, in order to preserve some check on scindia’s predominance. one of the most important sources of scindia’s power was the large force maintained by him, disciplined and commanded by europeans. at that date, india swarmed with adventurers of every nationality, two-thirds of whom[127] were of french extraction. their presence in india was an important factor in the politics of the day. every chief, however unimportant he might be, had europeans to lead his troops. the first chief in india to thoroughly recognize the importance of european organization and discipline had been hyder ali of mysore. but his efforts had been directed rather to forming complete corps of european artillery, cavalry, and infantry, which never exceeded a few hundreds in number. he also had many europeans as leaders of his native troops, but little was done by him to discipline native troops on the european model. it was madho rao scindia who first developed the system of disciplining his native troops in european fashion under the celebrated de boigne, which quickly rendered him the most powerful chief in india. at the time of which we are treating, his nephew and successor, dowlut rao scindia, had in his service a force estimated at 43,650 men, with 464 guns, armed and disciplined in european fashion, and commanded by europeans. this formidable body of men had lived in a state of continuous warfare ever since it was first raised in 1784. at the head of scindia’s disciplined forces was the frenchman perron, who, had raised himself practically to an independent position. acting as scindia’s lieutenant in the north, he ruled over a great tract of country, extending from the jumna to the foot of the himalayas, and from the sutlej to the chumbul, and, owing to difficulties in which scindia had become recently involved in the deccan, he entertained dreams of independence. perron was known to be in correspondence with the french directory at paris, and the british government was again threatened with the possibility of the establishment of french power in india on the ruins of the native states in the north-west and the deccan. perron and the british governor general each recognised in the other his most formidable foe. next in importance[128] to scindia, among the mahratta chiefs, was holkar, whose military talents made him scindia’s most dangerous rival. his disciplined battalions, commanded by europeans, were second only in number and efficiency to scindia’s. fortunately the dissensions between these chiefs had reached a height that made co-operation between them out of the question.

from the conclusion of the treaty of salbye, 17th may 1782, to the end of 1802, no serious clash of interests had occurred between the british government and the mahratta chiefs. while scindia and holkar alternately extended their conquests at the expense of the mahommedan and rajpoot states, or strove together for supremacy at poonah, the british government preserved an attitude of neutrality, till events occurred that led scindia into direct collision with the british power.

in 1798, dissensions broke out between scindia and the widows of his late uncle madho rao scindia; in the following year, the ladies fled for protection to the rajah of kolapore, who was then at war with the peishwa. raising a large force, the kolapore chief advanced on poona, and severe fighting ensued. the peishwa and scindia were hard pressed, the flame spread, and the whole southern mahratta country was thrown into disorder. taking advantage of his rival’s difficulties, holkar took the field in malwa, and ravaged scindia’s territories. perron meanwhile was fully occupied in the north in preparations to resist a threatened afghan invasion, and could render no assistance to his master. at this juncture nana farnawis died (13th march 1800), and a fresh dispute over his property arose between scindia and the peishwa. fresh umbrage was taken by scindia at the permission granted by the peishwa for british troops to follow dhoondia wao into mahratta territory. in the midst of these embarrassments, scindia’s presence in malwa to oppose holkar[129] became imperatively necessary, and he left poona. his movements were, however, so slow and ill-considered that holkar was able to overwhelm in succession two of his disciplined brigades, under m‘intyre and hessing (july 1801), and plundered oojain. roused by this disaster, scindia quickly dealt a counterstroke on the 14th oct. 1801, when he signally defeated holkar in front of indore, and plundered that city. failing however to follow up the blow, his possessions in kandeish were devastated by holkar, who was soon in the field again, moving towards poona. scindia’s general, sadasheo bhow, interposed between holkar’s army and the capital; but holkar was not to be denied, and, on 25th oct. 1802, the combined armies of scindia and the peishwa were completely defeated at poona, after a sanguinary engagement which was fought under the eyes of the british resident. dismayed at this catastrophe, the peishwa fled to the coast, where he was received on board a british vessel, and conveyed to bassein, near bombay. there, on the 31st december, was signed the treaty of bassein, by which the peishwa formally placed himself under the protection and guidance of the british govt., with whom he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. it soon became evident that the peishwa’s treaty had aroused scindia’s hostility, and that he was preparing for war.

till recently, scindia had viewed the company’s power with comparative indifference. their undertakings had not always been successful; their resources, so far as he was able to judge, were greatly inferior to his own, and, with his disciplined battalions, he believed himself able to give a good account of any army the british government could bring into the field. his resentment was first awakened by the treaty concluded in september 1798 between the company and the nizam, on whom the mahratta chiefs conceived that they had claims. on the outbreak of the[130] war between tippoo and the english, scindia formed the project of attacking the nizam, but the fall of tippoo, before he could take the field, caused him to abandon the plan, and scindia became aware that the company’s power was more formidable than he had suspected. it was, however, no policy of wanton aggression on our part that brought about the wars waged by the marquis of wellesley. the real contest was between the british and french power in india. england and france were locked in a deadly struggle, which in india, on the french side, was fought out by native chiefs directed by french officers in correspondence with the french directory in paris. had it not been so, our policy would have been directed to smoothing over matters in india, while our whole weight was thrown into the scale elsewhere. but circumstances did not allow of this, and it was in pursuance of the policy forced on us, that, first, tippoo the centre of french influence in india was struck down; next, the french party at hyderabad were dispersed by our assuming protection of the nizam; and finally scindia, the rajah of berar and holkar were humbled by the defeat of their disciplined armies by lake and wellesley.

the assumption of the protectorate of the peishwa, was regarded by scindia as a challenge for the mastery of india. a defensive alliance was offered to him by the british, which he rejected, and his apprehensions were worked on by the bhonslay rajah of berar, who was the prime mover in the war that followed. the quarrel with holkar was patched up, and an alliance was formed between scindia, holkar and the bhonslay to be directed against the peishwa, the nizam, and the east india company. an able and comprehensive plan for simultaneous action was devised by perron, by which one hundred and fifteen thousand predatory horse and ninety-four battalions would have at once carried fire and sword[131] into the company’s and the nizam’s territories, and would have prevented any co-operation between the three powers thus assailed. but the plan came to nothing. perron’s intrigues had aroused the distrust of scindia, while the long existing animosity between scindia and holkar was too recent and too bitter to allow of prompt co-operation. the mahratta chiefs calculated on the british forces not moving till after the rainy season, and expected no active hostilities before october. holkar’s forces were so tardily set in motion, that they were still on the nerbudda when the battle of assaye was fought. on receipt of the news he withdrew his troops to indore, and avoided compromising himself farther.

scindia, having suspended all operations against holkar, had marched southwards to burhanpore, towards the end of february, where he was joined by the nagpore rajah. their joint forces then advanced towards the nizam’s frontier where they encamped.

as soon as scindia’s hostile intentions became known, a force of nearly 20,000 men was assembled at hurryhur, on the north-west frontier of mysore, under major general the hon. a. wellesley. the restoration of the peishwa to his capital was the first thing to be done. on the 9th march, wellesley marched for poona with 10,617 men, among whom were the 19th light dragoons, drawing 412 sabres. the remainder of the force was commanded by colonel stevenson, acting in concert with wellesley. on the 20th april, wellesley reached poona, the last sixty miles being covered in 32 hours by the cavalry, who had been pushed on ahead to save the city from being plundered.[43] holkar’s forces withdrew on his approach, and, on the 13th may, the peishwa arrived from bassein escorted by british troops. wellesley then advanced to walkee, six miles from[132] ahmednuggur, while negotiations with the confederated mahratta chiefs continued. by the end of july all hope of preserving peace had disappeared. the british resident with scindia was therefore directed to withdraw, which he did on the 3rd august.

the campaign that ensued was remarkable, not only for its complete success, but for the extended nature of the operations carried on simultaneously by a number of bodies of troops, acting to a great extent in complete independence of each other, after the signal for hostilities had been given. no better lesson in the art of war could be studied than in the dispositions made by the marquis of wellesley to bring matters to a successful issue, when the maintenance of peace was no longer possible. a brief resumé of them here will not be out of place. as the negotiations with scindia made the warlike intentions of that chief more and more evident, troops were assembled at various points, so that, on the outbreak of hostilities, the distribution of forces on both sides was as follows.

the combined mahratta chiefs, without holkar, could dispose of 87 battalions of infantry, 500 guns, and over 80,000 cavalry. in the north, perron had his head quarters at alyghur, a fortress on which much dependence was placed. he had over 16,000 regular infantry, about 5000 regular cavalry, and a great number of irregular troops. en route to join him from the deccan were 25,000 men, under a french officer, dudrenec, of whom nearly 8000 were regular infantry. with scindia, in the deccan, were over 16,000 infantry and upwards of 50,000 mahratta cavalry. in bundelcund, under shumshere bahadoor, were about 3000 regular infantry, 20 guns, and 10,000 cavalry. all fortresses and fortified towns were strongly held, and there were many detached corps of considerable strength in cuttack and elsewhere.

[133]

on the british side, a force under the commander-in-chief, general lake, consisting of 10,500 men, was assembled at cawnpore, destined to act against perron. at allahabad, a force of 3500 men, under lt. colonel powell, was assembled to operate in bundelcund. at chunar and mirzapore, 2000 men were stationed under major general deare, to cover benares and act on the defensive. from the saone, near sasseram, to pachet on the damodar river, a similar force was so disposed, under lt. colonel broughton, as to cover the company’s territories in that region. this force was afterwards reinforced, and took the offensive in the eastern provinces of berar. farther to the south east, at midnapore, a force of 1300 men, under colonel fenwick, was posted to cover the frontier and threaten cuttack. at ganjam, a force of 3540 men was ready, under lt. colonel campbell, to operate in cuttack, supported by 500 men at balasore, under captain morgan, and 854 men under lt. colonel ferguson, at jalasore. the cuttack operations were however carried out by lieut. colonel harcourt, in consequence of the serious illness of lt. colonel campbell at the very commencement of field operations.

in the deccan, to operate against scindia, 8900 men, under major general the honourable arthur wellesley, were encamped at walkee near ahmednuggur. farther to the eastward, and north of the godavery, was colonel stevenson with the hyderabad subsidiary force, consisting of 7900 men and the nizam’s own troops, acting as a separate corps in co-operation with wellesley. in guzerat, 7350 men under colonel murray, acting under the orders of wellesley, furnished a corps of 2187 men north of the nerbudda, covering baroda, and a second corps of 2094 men, south of the tapti between songhur and surat: the remainder being employed to garrison surat, cambay, and baroda, thus effectually cutting off[134] scindia’s access to the coast. in addition to these, garrisons of 1600 men and 2000 men were posted at poona and hyderabad respectively, to ensure tranquillity and protect those capitals, while a reserve of 4032 men, under major general campbell, was stationed at moodgul, south of the kistna.

that the strain on the company’s resources was very great is evident from the fact that the governor general sent his body guard into the field, though he himself remained in calcutta. the truest policy demanded that the war should be actively prosecuted and brought to a decisive termination as soon as possible, before further complications should arise; not the least of which was the expected arrival of a french squadron from europe. how clearly this policy was recognised and adopted, and how splendidly it was carried out may be seen from the mere record of achievements. the rapidity with which blow after blow was struck, will be best gathered from the following table:—

7th august general lake commenced his advance towards delhi.

8th the fortified town of ahmednuggur taken by assault, by major general wellesley.

10th fort of ahmednuggur capitulated: taken possession of on 12th.

26th general lake encamped on the frontier; received authority to commence hostilities.

29th perron’s camp outside alyghur captured by general lake: perron flies to agra.

broach, in guzerat, taken by assault, by lt. colonel woodington.

4th september alyghur taken by storm by general lake; 281 guns captured.

6th lt. colonel powell leaves allahabad, and advances on bundelcund, which he enters 14th.

7th perron surrenders to general lake.

8th ganjam force advances.

[135]11th september battle of delhi: total defeat of bourquien, perron’s lieutenant, by general lake: 68 guns captured. general lake enters delhi.

14th manikpatam, in cuttack, occupied by lieut. colonel harcourt.

17th champaneer taken by assault, by lt. colonel woodington: pawaghur surrenders.

18th juggernaut occupied by lt. colonel harcourt.

21st balasore taken by captain morgan.

23rd scindia and the berar rajah defeated at assaye, by major general wellesley: 102 guns captured.

3rd october soorong, in cuttack, occupied by captain morgan.

8th agra invested by general lake.

10th shumshere bahadoor defeated, near capsah, by lt. colonel powell.

force outside agra defeated by general lake: 26 guns captured: town occupied.

12th force of 2500 men outside agra, forced to capitulate to general lake.

14th barabuttee, in cuttack, taken by assault by lt. colonel harcourt.

16th burhanpore occupied by colonel stevenson.

18th fort of agra capitulates to general lake: 164 guns captured.

21st asseerghur, attacked on 18th, surrenders to colonel stevenson.

1st november the last of perron’s forces totally defeated at laswaree, by general lake: 72 guns captured.

2nd defiles from cuttack into berar occupied by lt. colonel harcourt.

29th scindia and the berar rajah totally defeated at argaum, by major general wellesley: 38 guns taken.

4th december calpee surrendered to lt. colonel powell.

15th gawilghur taken by assault by colonel stevenson: 52 guns captured.

17th peace signed by the rajah of berar in wellesley’s camp.

30th reserve, under major general campbell, defeats a large body of 10,000 pindarees, at moodianoor.

[136]30th december peace signed by scindia in wellesley’s camp.

4th february 1804 gwalior, which had been surrendered by treaty on 21st december to lt. colonel powell, capitulates; having been besieged by that officer since 27th december, in consequence of the refusal of the garrison to surrender the fortress.

our interest is, however, mainly with the forces commanded by major general wellesley.

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