up to the year 1855 the orakzais, though occasionally committing petty depredations on the border, and known to be capable of mischief if so inclined, gave no positive trouble to the british authorities; but in the spring of that year many of the tribe were concerned in the demonstrations and attacks upon posts and parties in the miranzai valley, mention of which will be found in chapter xvi. divisions of the ismailzai clan had been especially aggressive; the akhel division had attacked a village (baliamin) in british territory and carried off 156 head of cattle; and on the 30th april of that year the orakzais, made up by afridis and zaimukhts to a strength of between 1500 and 2000 men, attacked our camp, but were driven off with heavy loss.

after the withdrawal of the troops, the orakzais continued to commit depredations upon the bangash living in the kohat district, making no fewer than fifteen raids, carrying off many hundred head of cattle and killing several british subjects. in these affairs the tribesmen of the two hamsaya clans, the 364sheikhan and the mishti, were concerned, but the rabia khel division of the ismailzai was also conspicuous; and finally, a feud having commenced between the orakzais and the people of hangu, a village in the neighbourhood was raided and 660 head of cattle were carried off. at this major j. coke, commanding the 1st punjab infantry, and also deputy-commissioner of kohat, reinforced hangu with two guns and 300 bayonets, and, the raids continuing, reported that he proposed to attack the rabia khel village of nasin,[129] assisted by bangash and other levies. coke’s proposals were, however, vetoed both by the brigadier-general commanding the punjab frontier force, and by mr. john lawrence, the chief commissioner—chiefly on the ground of the difficulty and danger of moving troops at that season of the year—july—and defensive measures only were for the present sanctioned. during the next few weeks the tribesmen became more unsettled; the rabia khel, mamazai and ali khel held a jirgah, at which it was agreed that, provided the ali khel and akhel would join, the combined four divisions should make an attack upon british territory somewhere about the date of the eed (the 25th august). there was, moreover, no doubt that the rest of the hill clans were in a most excited state, and were trying to foment a jehad. brigadier chamberlain, commanding the frontier force, had by this time arrived at kohat, reinforcements were called up, the border villages were put in a state of defence, communications were 365improved, supplies collected, and friendly chiefs were called upon to collect armed levies.

expedition of 1855

expedition against the rabia khel (ismailzai), 1855.—by the 25th august a force of nine guns, one regiment of cavalry, and three battalions of punjab infantry had been assembled at hangu, and on the 1st september arrangements were made to attack early the following morning the villages of nasin and sangar, the one on the summit, the other on the slopes of the samana range, and that of katsa on the northern side of the samana and on the left bank of the khanki river. the two first-named villages were so situated, both in regard to position and approach, that any attack, during daylight and with the tribesmen prepared to meet our troops, would have entailed serious loss of life. success depended almost entirely upon the simultaneous surprise of both nasin and sangar; and since any preliminary approach would have excited suspicion, it was necessary to start from hangu, thus involving a march of fourteen miles before the commencement of the ascent of the samana; while even if the range were ascended opposite camp, the same distance would have to be marched along the ridge before reaching sangar. it was determined to attack the villages both from above and below, and the following dispositions were made. the 1st punjab infantry and three companies of the 2nd punjab infantry were detailed, under major coke, to attack the village of sangar, leaving camp at 10 p.m., climbing the range near hangu, and, moving along 366the crest, to reach and rush sangar before daybreak.

the second column, composed of three companies of the 3rd punjab infantry, was to move at 9 p.m. on nasin, taking up such a position above and near the village as to command it. if in difficulties, this column was to be reinforced by major coke, who was further, after capturing and destroying sangar, to move the whole of his party down the hill to aid in the attack on nasin. katsa, with its rice crops and mills, and which was reported to be almost undefended, was to be attacked and destroyed by a party of levies, who were to move in rear of major coke’s column. the remainder of the force, under the brigadier, was to leave camp shortly after 10 p.m. and, climbing the same spur as the second party, was to move on nasin in readiness to support any one of the three columns. a reserve, with field guns, came behind the main body, timed to reach the foot of the spur by dawn, so as to cover the retirement.

the troops were warned only one hour before starting.

each of the three columns effected its purpose without loss, the enemy being completely surprised and making no stand; a large number of sheep and cattle was seized, the towers of the villages were blown up and the crops destroyed; but, on the retirement commencing, the enemy followed up with great determination, and, as the skirmishers of the 2nd punjab infantry evacuated a commanding position, they were attacked and driven back by a sudden rush of swordsmen, 367when a native doctor and seven men were hacked to pieces. the enemy did not leave the hill in pursuit, and the whole force reached the camp, one mile south-west of hangu, by sunset, having suffered a loss of eleven men killed and four wounded. the enemy sustained casualties to the number of twenty-four killed and wounded, among the former being four maliks. the troops had been under arms for over seventeen hours, had marched some twenty-eight miles, and had ascended and descended a rugged mountain nearly 4000 feet in height.

trouble in 1865–8

within a few days of the close of these operations the mishtis came to terms and gave hostages; the rabia khel then came in and submitted, bringing back many of the plundered cattle and promising payment for those not forthcoming; the sheikhans also made submission, and the force was back in kohat by the 7th october, when it was broken up.

after this the orakzais did not again trouble our border until 1868, when complications arose with the bizoti division of the daulatzais. this being a small and insignificant branch with its chief settlements in tirah, its members had hitherto been able to avoid punishment for any misdeeds of which they had been guilty. from the commencement of british rule beyond the indus, the bizotis were constantly engaged in cattle-lifting on our border, and had attacked and robbed travellers and others at every opportunity. in 1865–67 they continued to give trouble, plundered cattle, and made demonstrations against our police 368posts in the ublan pass, about six miles from kohat. the representatives of the offending divisions—bizotis, utman khels and sipaias (the last of the muhammad khel clan) were summoned to kohat, were informed that they were debarred from trade with british territory, and the bizotis were further deprived of certain allowances which had been granted them some years previously. finally, in march 1868, it was reported that the bizotis intended attacking the village of muhammadzai, at the southern foot of the ublan pass, and accordingly, during the night of the 10th and early morning of the 11th, lieutenant cavagnari, deputy-commissioner, occupied the hills on the left of the gorge with police and levies.

operations against the bizotis (daulatzai), 1868.—there appearing to be no doubt that a raid was intended, 100 bayonets were sent out from kohat to reinforce the levies at muhammadzai, and about 11.30 a.m. the enemy collected to the number of some 200 about the ublan kotal, beating drums, and occupying the right of the pass. major jones, 3rd punjab cavalry, commanding at kohat, now ordered out two guns, eighty sabres, and 480 infantry, and the enemy were at once driven from the positions they had first taken up, and fell back upon a high peak where they had erected a breastwork. three attempts to take this position were defeated, and as it was then 4.30 p.m., it was decided to retire, covered by the guns. our retirement was in no way pressed, from which it may be assumed that the enemy had suffered considerably, but our own casualties were not slight—eleven 369killed (one british officer), and forty-four wounded.

“a pathan surprise”

after this affair the blockade against the bizotis and other offending divisions was made more stringent, but this measure was comparatively ineffective, as these tribesmen soon departed to their summer quarters in tirah. as the time again approached when they would return to their winter settlements, it was determined to put pressure on the orakzais generally by extending the blockade so as to include the whole clan; there seemed some prospect of this measure resulting in the submission of the daulatzais, when, on the 13th february, 1869, a raiding party of the utman khel surprised our police post at the foot of the kohat kotal, killed one policeman and carried off three others. as it seemed certain that the well-disposed divisions did not possess the power necessary to coerce the offending parties, it was determined by lieutenant-colonel keyes, then commanding at kohat, and by lieutenant cavagnari, deputy-commissioner, to make a counter-raid into the territory of the bizotis and utman khels. this raid is admirably described in chapter xix., “a pathan surprise,” in oliver’s across the border, and appears, in all the preliminary arrangements and the actual conduct of the operations, to be a model of how a petty border expedition of this kind should be projected and carried out.

the plan was to cross the ublan pass, and if not opposed at the village of gara to pass on to and destroy that of dana khula; if, however, opposed at 370gara, then no further advance was to be made, as the delay would preclude the surprise of dana khula, where the enemy would be able to make preparations, while to reach it the troops would have to fight their way for two miles. the jirgah of the kohat pass afridis happened then to be in kohat, and to prevent any information leaking out through them to the daulatzais, the jirgah was detained in kohat on some pretext while the troops were absent. it was clear that the complete success of the whole operation depended upon the sudden and surprise seizure of the ublan kotal, and, consequently, not even commanding officers were informed of what was in view until a few hours prior to a start being made. at midnight on the 24th february, the 4th punjab cavalry[130] moved out and formed a complete cordon round the town of kohat, so as to prevent anybody from entering, and, still more, from leaving it; police picquets were posted also at all places where a footman might seek to enter the hills. at the same hour the mountain guns were got ready for service, half an hour later the native gunners were warned, and the 1st and 4th punjab infantry were turned out; at 1 a.m. the 2nd punjab infantry was paraded, and at that hour two guns and two infantry battalions left kohat; all without bugle sound.

the kotal was found undefended, but the enemy made some stand at gara, which was taken with a loss on our side of one killed and nineteen wounded, and the surprise of dana khula was consequently impracticable. 371gara, however, was completely destroyed, cattle and other live stock were driven off, and the retirement commenced. the descent was steep and difficult, and the retreat, harassed by the enemy, was necessarily slow, but the troops were withdrawn from the hill with great coolness and steadiness, incurring, however, a further loss of two killed and fourteen wounded.

continued trouble

while these operations were being carried on from kohat, a strong column had moved out from peshawar, and had materially assisted the movements of colonel keyes’ force by distracting the attention of the utman khel orakzais and a division of the aka khel afridis.

the bizotis and their neighbours had learnt a lesson, and early in april the jirgahs of the bizotis, utman khels and sipaia (muhammad khel) divisions came into kohat, made submission, paid a fine of rs. 1200, and gave up nine of their principal headmen as hostages for their future good behaviour; the long-standing blockade was then removed.

for the next three years this part of our border remained tolerably quiet, but thereafter there was a constant succession of petty raids and disturbances—not individually, perhaps, of much account, but forming, in the aggregate, sufficient reason for undertaking at no distant date punitive measures against the orakzais as a whole. in 1873 the sipaia division of the muhammad khel gave trouble on the kohat border. in 1878 the massuzai and lashkarzai evinced hostility towards us, both in upper miranzai and in the kurram; during the afghan war emissaries from 372the amir, aided by the preachings of the mullahs, disquieted all the sunni orakzai clans; and although there was no concerted action undertaken by these tribesmen, the ali khels, and the alisherzai and mamuzai divisions of the lashkarzai, committed many outrages and raids between hangu and thal, attacking posts, carrying off cattle, cutting up unarmed parties and coolies, and increasing generally the difficulties of our communications between india and afghanistan. despite, too, the fact that only two clans of orakzais were actively engaged in these raids, the men appeared to have been accorded free passage through the country of the ismailzai and malla khel, both in proceeding to the scenes of their outrages, and when returning home with the plunder obtained. fines had been imposed by government, whose hands were at the time too full for embarking upon the military expedition necessary for their collection, and already by the end of 1880 the indebtedness of the orakzais in fines amounted to upwards of rs. 15,000.

from 1884 until the end of 1890 increased and increasing trouble was given by parties belonging to divisions of almost every clan of orakzais whose settlements are nearest to our frontier—ismailzai, sturi khel, mishtis and malla khel—fines remained unpaid, and new scores, though marked up, were ignored. the necessity for strong measures was urged by the deputy-commissioner again and again; one division committed forty-eight fresh offences in one year; the sturi khel made a partial payment of fines for past misconduct, and then commenced a fresh indebtedness 373by new outrages; the samana boundary line, acknowledged and acquiesced in since 1865, was repudiated in 1888. a new frontier post was established at shinawari, at the southern exit of the chagru defile, and was promptly attacked by a mixed band of malla khel and rabia khel; and on the main road between kai and hangu, a police guard was attacked in open day, prisoners were rescued, and arms carried off. this lawless condition of the border abated somewhat at the beginning of 1890, when a punitive expedition appeared to the tribe to be imminent, and a portion of the outstanding fines was paid up; but the rabia khel continued to be aggressive, and in december of this year sent an insolent message to the deputy-commissioner, that they had no intention whatever of paying up any of the heavy arrears of fines due from them—an example which was promptly followed by the sturi khel.

first miranzai expedition

first miranzai expedition, 1891.—the patience of the lieutenant-governor of the punjab and of the government of india was now exhausted, and an expedition was decided upon, having for its special object the punishment of the rabia khel (ismailzai), mamuzai (lashkarzai), sheikhan and mishti divisions and clans, and also of the sturi khel, should these not submit on the occupation by our troops of the khanki valley.

the expeditionary force, under command of brigadier-general sir william lockhart, k.c.b., c.s.i., was assembled at kohat by the 12th january, the advance being arranged for the 19th, and on the 374former date a proclamation was issued to the four samil clans, whose punishment was about to be undertaken, warning them not to resist, and to the remainder of the orakzais informing them that they would be in no way interfered with provided they did not oppose us. the force was composed of—

two squadrons of cavalry.

two mountain batteries.

one company bengal sappers and miners.

seven infantry battalions, each of a strength of 600.

no british troops formed part of the force, which was divided into three columns, rendezvousing respectively at shahu khel, togh and hangu. the start was delayed by heavy rain and snow, and the troops were not in position until the 21st january. on the advance commencing practically no opposition was experienced; the country of each one of the offending clans was visited by the different columns; and within a very short space of time each division had made its submission—the rabia khel standing out to the last. the khanki valley was traversed as far west as ghuzghor; a reconnaissance was pushed up the daradar valley through star khel to the kharai kotal overlooking the sheikhan country; dran was visited; and a column marched from shahu khel and reached the zera pass via bar marai, sending reconnaissances through the gudar defile to sultanzai and shirazgarhi on the lower mastura. the casualties were nil, but the troops suffered severely from the extreme cold. the following terms imposed were 375agreed upon: the establishment of three posts on the samana connected by mule road with each other, and with baliamin, darband and hangu; payment of outstanding fines; undesirables and outlaws not to be harboured by the tribes. the tribes had not agreed to the construction of the samana forts—at gulistan on the west, near sangar, and on the east at lakka—with an especially good grace, but their submission had been so complete that no further immediate trouble was anticipated.

trouble on the samana

the field force had barely broken up when it was rumoured that the clans concerned, egged on by the taunts of those tribesmen who had not been proceeded against, were trying to form a combination to prevent the construction of the samana posts, and that the rabia khel were particularly truculent. kohat was, as a precautionary measure, reinforced by a battery and a battalion, but nothing of the nature of an actual outbreak occurred until the 4th april. on this date an attack was made upon our working parties on the samana by men of the rabia khel, who, having been taken on as labourers on the road, suddenly turned upon the covering party, and were then at once reinforced by large numbers of tribesmen who had been awaiting events on the north side of the samana. our troops were obliged to abandon the crest of the range and to fall back upon baliamin, having suffered a loss of fourteen killed and seven wounded.

from subsequent enquiry it was elicited that the rabia khel had been joined in this outbreak by the 376mamuzai, sheikhans and mishtis, and the temporary success of the movement at once swelled the numbers of the enemy, until it was computed that many thousand men were under arms; these included not only all the orakzais of the khanki valley, but a certain number of afridis under one mir bashar, a malikdin khel, who, during the afghan war, had assumed the title of “king of tirah,” and had received a pension from the amir. mir bashar was reported to be preaching a jehad, aided by aka khel and mamuzai mullahs. it seemed evident that the work commenced on the samana posts, and on the roads connecting them, had aroused the suspicions of all the orakzais, and enlisted the sympathies of many of the more fanatical of the afridis. both from the kohat and the khyber side proclamations were issued, assuring the tribesmen that we had no designs on their independence, and that the posts on the samana were being erected purely as a defensive measure against the rabia khel; but in view of the threatening state of affairs in the district troops were at once pushed up to kohat, darband and baliamin. the tribesmen now forthwith commenced hostilities; on the 8th april they attacked a small party of the 1st punjab infantry at hangu, and two days later a lashkar of about 1000 men attacked our camp at darband, but was beaten off without loss to us. on this date a reply was received to the proclamation above mentioned, demanding our abandonment of the samana and the release of certain notoriously troublesome characters then in our custody.

second miranzai expedition

377second miranzai expedition, 1891.—the troops detailed for this, the second, miranzai expedition, consisted of six squadrons of cavalry, fifteen mountain and three heavy guns, one company of bengal sappers, and ten and a half battalions of infantry (one and a half british), and were divided into three columns, concentrating the one at hangu, the other two at darband. the whole numbered something under 8000 men, and sir william lockhart was again in command.

the enemy—mishtis, sheikhans, mamuzais, and rabia khel—were reported to be on the samana to the number of about a thousand men, while several thousand others were in support in the khanki valley.

the advance was made on the 17th april, no. 1 column moving up on to the samana, reaching lakka without opposition, and assaulting and carrying tsalai, gogra and sangar in succession, and with only trifling loss. meanwhile nos. 2 and 3 columns left darband, no. 2 advancing to the darband kotal, and thence, with some opposition, to gwada, and no. 3 from darband to sangar, where it joined no. 1 column. on the 18th no. 2 remained halted, while nos. 1 and 3 attacked sartop, and cleared and held the plateau between it and gulistan—at the western end of the range—leaving no. 3 column there in position. next day no. 2 moved up to sangar, joining there the first column; and throughout the whole of this day and the greater part of the 20th, no. 3 column was fired upon from three sides. having been reinforced 378after midday on the 20th, no. 3 column moved out, attacked and captured saragarhi and gustang, whence most of the fire was proceeding, burnt these villages and drove the orakzais off the mountain down into the khanki valley. on the 22nd no. 2 column advanced to the extreme western end of the samana, overlooking the chagru valley, where a large assemblage of armed men was visible. on these moving forward in a threatening manner they were attacked and driven back, as was also another body some 1500 strong, advancing from the khanki valley, and the british force retired to camp practically unmolested, although our picquets were threatened later on in the evening. on the same day another column had attacked and destroyed several villages of the rabia khel, experiencing but slight opposition. tribesmen again collecting in large numbers on the 23rd, no. 2 column moved out in full strength, dispersed them and then burnt the village of tsalai, where they appeared to have rendezvoused. from the 24th to 29th jirgahs began to come in with offers of submission; and while negotiations were in progress, the general officer commanding took the opportunity of visiting the sheikhans and of levelling their towers.

by the beginning of may most of the opposing divisions had come in and had submitted, but were told that all stolen government property must be restored before negotiations could really be opened. with the rabia khel, akhel and sheikhan, matters were speedily settled, but it was felt that a special punishment must be meted out to the mishtis, who 379had been equally troublesome with the others, but whose villages, lying at a considerable distance from our frontier, had not suffered to anything like the same extent as those of other tribesmen, who had taken a no more prominent part in the recent disturbances. it was, therefore, decided to destroy the towers of the large villages about kandi mishti, in the khanki valley, and lying at the foot of the sampagha pass. sir william lockhart, then, taking no. 2 column, marched from gulistan on the samana by the tsalai spur and the chagru kotal to kharappa, blew up three of the kandi mishti towers in the presence of the jirgahs, and from kharappa marched through the country of some of the more westerly clans, sections of which had been concerned in the risings, and who had hitherto imagined that their position rendered them inaccessible. the khanki valley was, therefore, traversed from end to end, and the kharmana valley was overlooked and overawed.

occupation of the samana

the result of these operations was that all the clans concerned agreed to our occupation of the samana; adequate punishment had been dealt out to offenders; practically the whole of the orakzai country had now been traversed by our troops; and for the next six years this part of the border was at peace.

our casualties in this expedition amounted to twenty-eight killed and seventy-three wounded.

from the date of the conclusion of these operations up to the general “pathan revolt” of 1897, the 380behaviour of the orakzais as a tribe may almost be described as irreproachable—although, of course, isolated cases of misbehaviour were not uncommon. it was known, too, that our actual presence in occupation of posts on the samana range rankled in the minds of the tribesmen. although the crest of the samana had for more than thirty years been acknowledged as our boundary, and had been assessed as such, the outward and visible sign of our occupation appeared to be a source of continual offence, and early in 1892 a deputation of the orakzais asked the assistance of the amir of afghanistan in inducing us to abandon the range. the amir, however, very properly replied that he did not see his way to take any action in the matter.

in may 1897 the orakzais appear, in conjunction with the afridis, to have again solicited the intervention of the amir, and it was felt that the situation on the frontier generally, and particularly on this section of it, was becoming serious. the actual causes which may be said to have led to the outbreak along four hundred miles of border have been given at more length in chapter xiii., and it is not proposed here to recapitulate them; it is sufficient to state that the first definite news of unrest amongst the afridis and orakzais was contained in a telegram from the deputy-commissioner of kohat, stating that the mullah saiyid akbar, aka khel, had succeeded in persuading the orakzais to unite against the british government, and was in tirah trying to persuade the afridis to do the same. this information appears, however, 381to have been discredited by the commissioner of peshawar (sir richard udny), even when followed by another telegram from kohat announcing the actual assembly of hostile tribesmen; and all that was done—so far as precautionary measures against the orakzais were concerned—was the reinforcement of kohat on 20th august by a force of the three arms—the 9th field battery, 18th bengal lancers, and 15th sikhs.

beginning of trouble

information was now received that the tribal jirgahs had decided that, of the orakzais, the massuzais, assisted by the chamkannis, should move against the kurram, the daulatzais against kohat, and the remainder of the tribe against the forts on the samana; whereupon the following measures were taken for the security of the district generally by major-general yeatman-biggs, who had now, on the 21st august, assumed command of the troops on the kohat-kurram border.

a flying column—four mountain guns, six squadrons cavalry, and one battalion infantry, under colonel richardson—was formed for action in the kurram, and moved out to hangu; kohat was reinforced by the 3rd gurkhas and four companies royal scots fusiliers, while rifles were issued to friendly villagers on the border. on the 25th colonel richardson was able to put supplies and ammunition, bringing up the number of rounds per rifle to 400, into the samana posts; and that this was accomplished none too soon was made clear by the news which now came in, that 12,000 tribesmen were concentrating at kharappa in 382the khanki valley—chiefly ali khels, malla khels, and the alisherzai and mamuzai divisions of the lashkarzai. so far it was reported that neither mishtis nor akhels (ismailzai) had joined the gathering, but at the same time their headmen sent in to say that public opinion and tribal pressure would oblige them, sooner or later, to take the field also. a force, composed of fighting men from all three divisions of the daulatzai, had occupied the ublan pass, whence they sent into kohat a statement of the terms upon which they would be willing to vacate it and disperse; and in the kurram valley, too, matters looked threatening, and anxiety was felt in regard to the posts at sadda and parachinar, which could not be relieved from hangu until some, at least, of the orakzai lashkars had been driven off.

the orakzais now themselves began to take the offensive. the daulatzais descended from the ublan pass and attacked and captured the old police post, held by twenty-five border police, at muhammadzai. against them the major-general moved out on the 27th august with a field battery, a squadron, two companies royal scots fusiliers, and 487 rifles of the 2nd punjab infantry, drove the enemy from the pass and towards the bara valley. our casualties were only two killed and nine wounded, but the heat was intense, twenty british soldiers were prostrated with sunstroke, of whom one died, and eighty-six of the fusiliers had to be carried back to kohat in ambulance tongas.

on the same day the orakzais had been active all 383along the samana range. the levy-posts at lakka and saifaldara, further west, had been surrounded and attacked, but colonel richardson sent out a force under lieutenant-colonel abbott (two mountain guns, half a squadron of cavalry, one and a half battalions), and the garrisons were successfully relieved and withdrawn, the posts being burnt by the enemy the same evening. the eastern end of the samana about gulistan was threatened by large gatherings; the border police post at shinawari was attacked three nights running, and finally captured and destroyed on the night of the 28th august; and on the night following the tribesmen, intoxicated with their success, raided down into the valley south of shinawari, plundered mariab and kai, and fired into the camp at hangu.

orakzai raids

by this time, however, troops had been pushed up to kohat from rawal pindi, and from peshawar through the kohat pass, and the advanced force at hangu had now been strengthened. lieutenant-colonel abbott was sent on from hangu to doaba, twenty-two miles further west, with two mountain guns, a squadron of cavalry, the 15th sikhs, and half a company bombay sappers; and on the 31st major-general yeatman-biggs left kohat for hangu, and formed the troops there into two brigades. one of these, now commanded by colonel richardson, was ordered to proceed at once to the relief of the posts at sadda and parachinar—distant seventy and ninety-two miles respectively—which expected to be attacked in force on the 3rd september. the rapid advance of 384this brigade—sadda was reached on the night of the 3rd—staved off actual attack; but thal had been fired into, torawari post had been burnt, while balish khel, a post on the border three miles from sadda, had been fiercely attacked, and its defence by twenty men of the kurram militia, under an afridi havildar, was particularly fine. its relief was effected by the arrival of some fifty armed turi villagers from sadda, and 200 militia from hasan ali. with the appearance in the neighbourhood of colonel richardson’s brigade, matters quieted down for a time, but on the 16th a determined attack was made upon the camp about 10.30 p.m. by 2000 of the massuzais, who were not finally beaten off until 1 a.m.

while these operations were in progress in the kurram desperate fighting had taken place on the samana.

the posts of lakka and saifaldara, at the western end of the range, had, as we have seen, been abandoned, and thereupon destroyed, and in addition two other small police posts, gogra and tsalai, had been evacuated and burnt. there remained on the hill two large posts—fort lockhart, on the centre of the range, and gulistan (fort cavagnari), at the western end overlooking the chagru kotal—and several smaller ones—saraghari, the crag picquet, the sangar picquet, sartop and dhar. each of the two larger posts was capable of accommodating two companies, though at gulistan one company had to be placed in a small hornwork to the west, while the smaller posts could hold from twenty-five to fifty 385rifles. of these small posts, saraghari was by reason of its situation the most important, being on high ground and in signalling communication with the different posts on the range.

on the nights of the 3rd and 4th september gulistan was attacked in force, and the enemy came on so determinedly that they succeeded in setting fire to the abatis outside the hornwork, but the fire was extinguished by volunteers rushing out from the fort. in these attacks the orakzais lost so heavily that they withdrew entirely from the samana for some days, and indeed made up their minds to leave the posts alone unless the afridis should come to their assistance. raids continued, however, but as the tirah expeditionary force was now being assembled, government refused to permit of any reprisals against the orakzais on a large scale; but the mishtis, who were easily accessible in the lower khanki valley, were proceeded against, several of their fortified villages being destroyed by a small column sent out from hangu.

the samana forts

between the 7th and 12th september major-general yeatman-biggs was able to throw a month’s supplies into the samana forts, and on the last-named date his column came in contact with the combined force of the enemy, estimated at a total of 10,000 men, for the afridis had now thrown in their lot with the orakzais. as the column was, however, short both of water and supplies, it was unable to remain on the hill, and was forced to descend to hangu, when the whole strength of the tribesmen 386was pitted against the samana forts, held by the 36th sikhs, distributed as follows:

fort lockhart (headquarters), 168, and 2 british officers.

crag picquet, 22.

sartop, 21.

sangar, 44.

dhar, 38.

saraghari, 21.

gulistan, 175, and 4 british officers.

on the night of the 11–12th september the post of sangar was first attacked, but being well situated and with no cover in the vicinity, the enemy were repulsed without serious difficulty. they then, on the morning of the 12th, vigorously assailed saraghari, one of the smallest posts in regard to garrison, and being further weakly constructed and badly placed for prolonged resistance to overwhelming numbers. the whole course of the attack could be seen from both fort lockhart and gulistan, whence no effective assistance could be rendered, for these garrisons were themselves small, the villages between fort lockhart and saraghari were full of the enemy, and gulistan was itself being vigorously attacked. none the less two attempts were made from fort lockhart to effect relief, but they were unsuccessful. during one of the rushes upon the post, some men established themselves under the wall where there was a dead angle, and managed there to effect a breach, when the enemy rushed in in overwhelming numbers, and the garrison, fighting manfully to the last, were killed to a man. 387the twenty-one heroes had, however, inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, who owned to a death-roll of 180; the last of the sikhs killed twenty men before he was overpowered. truly of these twenty-one men of the 36th sikhs may be said, as was recorded of the guides at kabul: “by their deeds they have conferred undying honour, not only on the regiment to which they belong, but on the whole british army.”

gulistan had been closely invested since noon, all was over at saraghari by 4 p.m., and the tribesmen now put out their whole strength against the first-named post. the attack was pressed throughout the whole of the night, a hot fire being maintained upon the post from the closest quarters. when the morning of the 13th dawned the enemy were found to be entrenched within twenty yards of the walls, but the sikhs under major des v?ux, not only maintained their ground throughout the day and the night that followed, but carried out two most successful sorties, capturing three standards and striking terror into the tribesmen as much as they heartened themselves.

relief of gulistan

at midnight on the 13th general yeatman-biggs had moved out from hangu with a relieving force.[131] advancing up the samana via lakka, the column met and drove off a body of the enemy, estimated at 4000, holding gogra hill and the ruined tsalai post; and, continuing its progress, put to a hurried flight into the khanki valley a second force, numbering several thousand, entrenched on the saraghari ridge. 388continuing westward, gulistan was seen to be surrounded by swarms of tribesmen, but, declining attack, these also drew off hurriedly into the khanki valley, and by 1 p.m. gulistan was relieved. our losses were: saraghari, twenty-one killed; gulistan, two killed, thirty-nine wounded; relieving force, one killed, six wounded; while the total losses of the enemy on the samana were found later to have amounted to about 400 killed and 600 seriously wounded.

the subsequent operations of this year, wherein the orakzais were concerned, will be found described in chapter xiii., “afridis: operations,” and in chapter xvi., “chamkannis,” but the moral effect of the heavy losses incurred in the attacks on the samana forts was undoubtedly responsible for the feeble character of the resistance thereafter offered to us by the orakzais, and for the readiness they evinced in coming to terms, and making a complete and unconditional submission.

since 1897 the orakzais, as a tribe, have given us no trouble.