the inhabitants of both these countries are mainly yusafzais—tarkanri or tarklanri yusafzais in bajaur, and akozai yusafzais in dir.
bajaur is bounded on the north by dir, and on the east by dir and swat, on the south-east and south by the utman khel country, on the south again for a short distance by the mohmands, and on the west by afghanistan. it is an extremely mountainous country, watered by the rud river, and including within its area the valleys of the rud, of babukarra, watelai and chaharmung.
the bajauris or tarkanris are sarbani pathans of the khakhai khel branch and representatives of the ancient gandhari, with whom they returned from kabul in the fifteenth century to the peshawar valley, and a hundred years later subjugated and dispossessed the gujars, then in occupation of bajaur. “in 1504,” we are reminded by oliver, “the emperor baber acquired the sovereignty of kabul and ghazni, and in the following year made an extensive frontier tour, coming by the khyber pass to peshawar, going 156along the whole border, and returning by the sakhi sarwar pass and the bori valley to ghazni. at this period the pathan settlers are described as pretty well established in laghman, peshawar, swat and bajaur; though some of the original occupants still struggled for independence under their hereditary chiefs. during the next twenty-five years the mogul baber undertook many forays—for most of them could not be called anything else—to punish the hill pathans, or to protect his own subjects, dispersing the men, carrying off the women and cattle; but, as a rule, the tribes were even then fully able to hold their own. guided by the dilazaks, he marched against bajaur, carried the fortress of the original sultan by escalade, using the new matchlocks, which greatly astonished the enemy, the net result being to extend the power of the tarklanris.”
the tarkanris have three main divisions:
1.
ismailzai.
2.
isozai.
3.
mamunds,
and of the different valleys into which bajaur is split up, the maidan valley is occupied by the ismailzai, the baraul and jandol valleys by the isozai, and the valleys of babukarra, chaharmung and watelai by the mamunds, who also own a good deal of land across the border in afghanistan. some six or seven alien tribes also live among the bajauris—chiefly in the jandol and maidan valleys. originally jandol belonged to bajaur, but it has within recent years come under the political control of dir, whose ruler, 157however, has little or no authority over the people of the jandol valley.
the valleys of bajaur
the maidan valley is about ten miles long, rich and fertile and well cultivated, watered by the maidan or kunai river. the jandol valley, whose northern and southern boundaries are the janbatai range and the rud river, has a total area of some 144 square miles, being about fourteen miles long, with a breadth ranging from six to ten miles, and is also rich and well cultivated. the baraul valley is divided into an upper and a lower, the upper including the janbatai district, and good crops are raised here, and iron of excellent quality is exported. the babukarra valley is about fifteen miles long, with an average width of five or six miles; the range of the hindu raj divides it from asmar on the north, on the east the takwara spur separates it from jandol, on the west is the mamund or watelai valley, while to the south, on the right bank of the bajaur river, is the country of the utman khel. the chaharmung valley lies between the mamund country on the north-east and the kamangara valley on the south-west. the watelai valley, occupied by the mamunds, the most important section of the tarkanris or bajauris, lies between the valleys of chaharmung and babukarra; it is about thirteen miles in length, with a maximum breadth of ten miles, and is well cultivated, but has no main river of any importance running through it, and the bed of the valley is much cut up by deep nullahs. the mamunds are probably the most warlike of the tarkanris, and can put 15812,000 men in the field, all well armed as frontier tribesmen go.
the position of the khan of nawagai requires some explanation. he is the hereditary chief of a branch of the salarzai sub-division of the mamunds, and also of all the tarkanris, but his authority has of late years very greatly diminished, although he is still by no means without influence, even far beyond the borders of his own khanate. his actual territory is an irregular tract of country on the left bank of the rud river, together with the district of surkamar; part of his country was encroached upon some years ago by the mohmands, and he has never been sufficiently powerful to regain permanent possession of it.
the country known as dir comprises roughly the whole area drained by the panjkora river and its affluents, as far south as its junction with the rud river of bajaur. the upper panjkora valley is known as the panjkora kohistan, and is divided into two parts called bashkar and sheringal. the principal subsidiary valleys of dir are the kashkar or dir, the baraul and the maidan on the west, and the ushiri and talash valleys on the east. the northern limit of dir is the crest of the mountain range which divides it from chitral and yasin; the durand line is the boundary on the west; on the east it is bounded by kohistan, and on the south by the valley of upper swat and by bajaur. from the mass of mountains to the north three giant spurs or ranges run down towards the south. the easternmost of these, forming the watershed between the swat and the indus 159rivers, runs first due south and then west to the malakand. the central forms the watershed between the panjkora and swat. the westernmost range is a continuation of the hindu raj, runs south-westerly, and forms the watershed between the panjkora and rud rivers on the one side and the kunar on the other. the most important pass which crosses it is the lowari or laorai (10,250 feet), open for convoys from april to november; it carries the main road from india to chitral.
description of dir
the four sections of the malizai sub-division of the khwazozai-akozais resident in dir are:
1.
painda khel.
2.
sultan khel.
3.
nusrudin khel.
4.
ausa khel.
on the panjkora river, commencing from the north, in the kashkar valley, in which the village of dir is situated, is the akhund khel sub-section of the painda khel malizais, to which the khan of dir belongs. below these again, on the left bank of the river, are more of the painda khel, and on the right bank the sultan khel; and, still further down, the sultan khel, nusrudin khel and ausa khel on both banks of the river.
the route to chitral from the swat valley leads through this country. leaving the swat river at chakdara, the road turns abruptly to the west and enters the uch valley, passing by the katgola pass (3000 feet) into the talash valley, where, as bellew tells us and as later travellers have confirmed, there are extensive ruins of massive fortifications on the south side of the valley and nine or ten miles from 160the panjkora, covering the hills for a distance of several miles. from here the ascent is very steep to the summit of the kamrani pass, to the north-east of which, in a valley, lies mundah, the stronghold of mian gul jan, the quarrelsome younger brother of the khan of dir. the descent from the kotal to sado or khungai is very steep. turning to the right from sado, the road passes up the panjkora valley, the river being crossed on the fourth march from sado at chutiatun, whence, a few miles further along the right bank of the dir stream, dir itself is reached. “here,” writes enriquez, “situated on a low hill is the stronghold of the khan. the fort has three towers, each surmounted with a loop-holed fighting top.... the vale of dir is well cultivated and numbers of chenars are scattered about it, so that its greenness is refreshing after the wearying aridity of the panjkora. the little town of dir occupies a steep khud abreast of the fort. its crazy huts are built one above the other, so that the roof of one forms the promenade or front garden of the one above.” then on up the dir valley, via mirga, to the lowari pass and chitral. an alternative route, branching off from sado, runs westward for some way and then, turning northward again, ascends the bed of the jandol river to the janbatai pass (7212 feet); after crossing this the road leads along the baraul valley to chutiatun and dir, where it joins the first mentioned road.
the people of dir and bajaur are all sunni muhammadans, intensely bigoted, but superstitious rather 161than religious. their country is very much priest-ridden, and the people are unusually susceptible to the influence of the mullahs, who are able to excite them to fanaticism more easily and to a greater degree than among other pathans. the fighting men in dir and bajaur number probably not less than 80,000; they, and more particularly the men of dir, have a very strong sense of discipline; and in the event of a general fanatical rising the combination of tribes which could be formed would be by no means one to be despised, since they would probably receive material assistance, if not indeed open and active help, from swat, from the utman khels, and very possibly from the men of buner.
operations.
umra khan of jandol
it will be convenient here to give some account of umra khan of jandol, whose usurpations were responsible for the formation of the chitral relief expedition, the operations of which, in the countries of dir and bajaur, are about to be described.
umra khan was a younger son of the khan of jandol, and a grandson of the chief of bajaur who took up arms against us during the ambela campaign. he quarrelled with his father and was expelled from the country; but returning in 1878 he killed his elder brother, and later, as the result of a year’s successful fighting, he made himself master of jandol, and eventually brought under his control a tract of country extending from the dir-chitral border in the north to the swat river in the south, and including 162the whole of dir, the greater part of bajaur and a portion of swat. in 1891 and 1892 the kabul government undertook certain operations, which were not particularly successful, to check umra khan’s aggressions, and up to the latter year he seems to have been friendly inclined towards the british. in 1892, however, when he was being somewhat pressed, both by the afghans from without and by rebels within his kingdom, an appeal which he made to the government of india for assistance in the form of arms and ammunition was refused; and in 1893, as a result of the durand mission to kabul, the territory of asmar, which he had coveted and seized, and whence he had been driven, was handed over to afghanistan. all this gave great offence to umra khan, and it was shortly after these events that he mixed himself in chitral affairs—described in their proper place—leading to the despatch of the chitral relief force in 1895 and the resultant operations in dir and bajaur.
detail of the force
chitral relief expedition, 1895.—it had been intended to mobilise the first division as being nearest to the scene of operations; but some of the units of which it was composed were then on service in waziristan, while the nature of the country to be operated in precluded the employment of others. the force was ultimately composed as hereunder detailed, was placed under the command of lieutenant-general sir r. low, k.c.b., and its base was fixed at nowshera.
163first brigade.
brigadier-general kinloch, c.b.
1st battalion bedfordshire regiment.
1st battalion king’s royal rifles.
15th sikhs.
37th dogras.
second brigade.
brigadier-general waterfield.
2nd battalion k.o.s. borderers.
1st battalion gordon highlanders.
4th sikhs.
guides infantry.
third brigade.
brigadier-general gatacre, d.s.o.
1st battalion the buffs.
2nd battalion seaforth highlanders.
25th punjab infantry.[70]
2nd battalion 4th gurkhas.
divisional troops.
11th bengal lancers.
guides cavalry.
13th bengal infantry.[71]
23rd pioneers.
15th field battery r.a.
no. 8 m.b. royal artillery.
4 guns, no. 2 derajat mountain battery.
no. 1 company bengal sappers and miners.
no. 4 company bengal sappers and miners.
no. 6 company bengal sappers and miners.
164reserve brigade.
major-general channer, v.c., c.b.
no. 7 bengal mountain battery.[72]
3rd battalion rifle brigade.
26th punjab infantry.[73]
2nd battalion 1st gurkhas.
2nd battalion 3rd gurkhas.
lines of communication troops.
1st battalion east lancashire regiment.
29th punjab infantry.[74]
30th punjab infantry.[75]
no. 4 hazara mountain battery.
moveable column (abbottabad).
no. 8 bengal mountain battery.
2nd battalion 2nd gurkhas.
2nd battalion 5th gurkhas.
railway concentration commenced on the 26th march, and in seven days the force was concentrated at hoti mardan and nowshera. a proclamation was published to the tribes through whose territory it would be necessary for the force to pass, announcing that the quarrel of the british government was only with umra khan of jandol, and stating that there was no intention of permanently occupying the tribal country, or of interfering with the independence of its inhabitants. in reply, the sam ranizais consented to our passage through their territory, while some of 165the headmen in lower swat tried to adopt an attitude of armed neutrality, and the upper swatis failed to combine against us. the khan of nawagai promised to do his best to keep bajaur quiet, and the maliks among the bunerwals, utman khels and mohmands seemed anxious to keep their people out of the quarrel.
the malakand pass
on the 1st april the first brigade moved to lundkwar, the second and third to jalala, the general intending to advance into swat by the shakot and malakand passes. during this day, however, the report of the friendly or neutral intentions of the border tribes was seriously discounted by the receipt of information that large bodies of tribesmen were holding not only these two passes, but also the morah, which, by reason of its propinquity to buner, there had been no intention of using. it appearing that of the three the malakand was the least strongly occupied, sir robert low decided to force the malakand, making a feint with his cavalry towards the shakot. he therefore concentrated all three brigades at dargai, at the southern foot of the malakand, early on the morning of the 2nd april.
leaving dargai, the track took for some way a north-easterly direction up the gradually narrowing valley; it then turned north-west and, leaving the bed of the valley, zigzagged up to the crest, whence two paths led into the swat valley. the kotal itself is some 2850 feet above sea-level, but on the left of the position precipitous hills rise to a height of over 400 feet, while on the right the crest of the range slopes steeply up to three tall peaks. the whole of 166the ridge, with the heights on either flank, formed a position not less than two miles long and was held in strength.
the second brigade was sent forward early on the 3rd to force the pass, it being the intention of the general commanding that the position once taken, the first brigade, which alone was entirely supplied with mule transport, should then be pushed on to the swat river. of the second brigade, the 4th sikhs and guides infantry ascended parallel spurs on the west of the valley, intending to turn the position from this flank; while the remaining battalions, covered by the fire of three mountain batteries, advanced directly upon the pass. the infantry on the flank were, however, very stubbornly opposed, while the actual ascent was most difficult, and the general commanding the second brigade, seeing that the advance would be greatly delayed, sent forward his remaining battalions to the frontal attack, which the first brigade was now called upon to support. the infantry, during their advance, captured sangar after sangar, and moving forward very steadily, the position was finally carried, after some five hours’ fighting, at the point of the bayonet, the 4th sikhs and guides running in on the enemy’s right at the same time. two regiments of the first brigade pressed the pursuit of the retreating enemy as far as khar, where they bivouacked; the 4th sikhs occupied the vicinity of the crest; and the remainder of the second brigade withdrew to dargai.
it was estimated that we had been opposed by about 12,000 men, of whom probably a third possessed 167firearms; their losses, mainly by reason of their holding the position to the last, were heavy; our casualties were 11 killed and 51 wounded.
during the advance, our troops fortunately came upon the remains of an old disused buddhist road, well built and skilfully aligned, and which two days’ work rendered fit for camel transport, thus greatly facilitating the passage of supplies.
advance into swat
early on the afternoon of the 4th, the first brigade advanced into the swat valley, the second brigade taking its place on the malakand, and the third remaining at dargai. the leading brigade was opposed, and even attacked, with great boldness, by large numbers of tribesmen falling back from the shakot and morah passes, but these lost severely from the fire of our infantry and the sabres of the guides cavalry, who made a fine charge over bad ground.
the first brigade halted at khar, where that of general waterfield joined it, and whence reconnaissances moved up the swat valley. opportunity was further taken of the halt to open communications with the headmen of many of the neighbouring villages, and also with the former khan of dir, whom umra khan had dispossessed of his country; and by these measures our troops were assured an unopposed passage through the baraul and dir valleys, and of the neutrality of some of the more powerful of the clans of upper swat and bajaur.
on the 6th, it being reported that a large body of umra khan’s personal followers, under command of his brother, had occupied chakdara and the fort and 168village of ramora, about two miles further up the swat river, five squadrons of cavalry, supported by other arms from the second brigade, were ordered to cross the swat river early next morning and reconnoitre towards uch, opportunity being at the same time taken to destroy the fort at ramora. these parties, and another sent out to search for a suitable site for a bridge over the swat river, were opposed by some 4500 men who lost very severely, especially at the hands of the cavalry, who pursued as far as the katgola pass, about 7? miles distant. chakdara was then occupied and a bridge constructed.
it was now determined that the first brigade should remain in occupation of the swat valley, and it accordingly handed over all its mule transport to the two other brigades—the second taking up the lead and crossing the swat river, while the third advanced to khar; and on the same day, the 8th, the cavalry reconnoitred the talash valley as far as shamshikhan, and the adinzai valley up to the foot of the laram pass, which was reported impracticable for transport. on the 9th the cavalry reconnoitred up to sado on the panjkora river, which can be approached by two roads, that to the west by the shigu kas being just passable, while that by the kamrani pass (3300 feet) was unfit for transport. next day the advanced troops reached sado, and the cavalry reconnoitred for some distance up the rud river, being fired on near kotkai by a small body of the enemy; the second brigade marched to gumbat and part of the third closed up to uch.
169at this period, in view of the possibility of trouble in the buner and mohmand countries, the reserve brigade was moved up to mardan from rawal pindi, and a second reserve brigade was mobilised, but the units composing it were not required to leave their garrisons; they were no. 1 mountain battery r.a., 2nd battalion oxfordshire light infantry, 28th punjab infantry, and 39th garhwal rifles.
bridging the panjkora
the panjkora river had been rising every day, and by the 11th april had become quite unfordable, and, while bridging materials were being collected, the second brigade was closed up to sado and khungai, the third being distributed between gumbat and chakdara. by the night of the 12th the bridge was ready for foot traffic, the river showed no signs of further rising, and six companies of the guides crossed to the right bank, where they formed an entrenched position to serve as a bridge-head, commanded at short range from the high ground of the left bank. here the guides were conveniently placed to carry out the orders they were to execute on the following morning, viz. to march down the right bank of the river and destroy certain villages whence the convoys had been persistently annoyed. it had been intended to support the guides by passing over other troops, and another company of the guides was later able to cross; but during the night of the 12th–13th the river suddenly rose, bringing down large masses of timber and practically breaking up the newly-completed bridge.
at 6 a.m. lieutenant-colonel battye took five 170companies up the rud river, leaving two companies to hold the bridge-head, and marched up the left bank to subhan killa, whence parties were detached to the east to burn three villages. re-concentrating then at subhan killa, the rud or jandol river was crossed and the heights on the right bank of the panjkora were ascended, from whence other villages were destroyed. about noon large parties of the enemy appeared to be advancing, and on colonel battye signalling this information to headquarters at sado, he was directed to fall back on the bridge-head, where the high bank was lined by troops of the second brigade to cover the retirement. as usual on the frontier, the retirement had no sooner commenced than it was hotly pressed, and it was perhaps not begun quite so soon as it might have been, or as was under the circumstances advisable, owing to the fact that it was impossible for the commander with the main body of the guides infantry to be certain whether the detached parties had, or had not, complied with the order to fall back. the conduct of the retirement, made practically under the eyes of the whole of the second brigade, was, as recorded by general low and as endorsed by all who saw it, “a splendid performance.” very deliberately the different companies retired, fiercely assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of command, and relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position only to take up another a few yards back. twice did the guides fix bayonets to meet the onrush, expected but never actually made. shortly before recrossing the jandol 171river near its junction with the panjkora, colonel battye fell mortally wounded, the command devolving on captain campbell.
across the river
the bridge-head was reached just before dark, and the enemy kept up a fire till nearly 11 a.m. the guides were reinforced by two maxims and a company of the 4th sikhs sent across the river on rafts, while support was also afforded by five companies of infantry on the left bank and a mountain battery, whose firing of star shell probably prevented any attempt to rush the post. by early morning of the 14th the tribal gathering—chiefly utman khels and men from mundah—had dispersed, having experienced very heavy losses. on this day the third brigade moved up to sado, and six more companies of the 4th sikhs were sent over on rafts to the guides entrenchment; but the continued rapid rise of the river made bridge construction at this spot impossible, and eventually a suspension bridge was thrown across a gorge two miles lower down the river, being completed by the evening of the 16th.
on this date the rain, which had been falling heavily for some days, ceased, and the river began to subside. the third brigade was now ordered to lead, and crossed to the right bank on the 17th, the second brigade moving over next day. general gatacre advanced up the jandol valley, experiencing some opposition about manugai, and finally bivouacked at ghobani, where early next morning the second brigade joined him. an hour later the combined force advanced on mundah and miankilai, which were 172found deserted, and the cavalry pushed a reconnaissance to the foot of the janbatai pass, finding the people generally friendly.
from here it was decided to despatch a small flying column to chitral, and a mountain battery, with two infantry battalions and half a company of sappers from the third brigade, marched on that afternoon to barwa and on the 19th to the janbatai pass.
bandai was reached by general gatacre’s advance column on the 20th, and here he received news that the chitral garrison was in great straits, and therefore he proposed to general low that he should be permitted to push on with 500 men; this suggestion was approved, and, pressing forward, general gatacre was in dir on the 22nd.
in the meantime the situation had undergone some change. umra khan had fled to the asmar border, and thence to kabul, leaving the resettlement of his territory to the british; the left flank of our line of advance was in a measure menaced by the presence of the utman khel, nawagai and mamund tribesmen; while intelligence, received on the 21st, that the siege of chitral had been abandoned, obviated the need for any forced march to its relief such as had been arranged.
from dir to ashreth in chitral territory via the lowari pass was twenty-three miles, and the whole of general gatacre’s column, in spite of the extraordinary difficulties of the road, was concentrated at ashreth by the 30th april, and was ordered to halt there for the present. on the 10th may the 1st battalion 173the buffs, the derajat mountain battery, and the 4th company bengal sappers and miners were led by general gatacre to chitral, where the gilgit column had arrived on the 20th april, and with this the object of the expedition may be said to have been accomplished; umra khan, who had actually originated all the trouble, had fled the country, while on the 27th april sher afzul, the late claimant to the mehtarship of chitral, had been brought into our camp at dir, having been captured in bashkar by some of the khan of dir’s levies.
withdrawal of the force
on the 10th may the troops hitherto serving on the lines of communication were formed into a fourth brigade of the chitral relief force, under brigadier-general hammond, v.c., c.b., d.s.o., a.d.c., and it was not until the middle of august that some of the troops—mostly of the fourth brigade—commenced their return march to india. on the 4th september the third brigade ceased to exist; on the 28th general low’s headquarters demobilised at nowshera; and about the same date brigadier-general waterfield assumed command of the malakand brigade and of all troops remaining beyond the frontier.
on the final withdrawal of the force it was found that while regular troops must continue to be maintained on the malakand pass, at chakdara, and in chitral territory, it would be possible to keep open the nowshera-chitral road by peaceful means, its security from the swat river to the borders of chitral territory being maintained by levies, and the route adopted being via panjkora and dir.
174during this expedition the troops under lieutenant-general sir robert low had sustained a loss in action of twenty-one killed and 101 wounded; but in addition, and in consequence of fanatical attacks, further casualties were experienced, altogether two soldiers and forty-nine followers having been killed, and three soldiers and forty-seven followers wounded, between the middle of april and the date of the final withdrawal of the force.
after our troops had returned to india the condition of affairs in bajaur and dir was generally satisfactory, and the arrangements for the maintenance of the road promised to work well. there was a certain amount of local unrest, as was only perhaps to be expected; but both in 1896 and 1897 the chitral reliefs marched by the malakand-chitral road without experiencing any interference whatever on the part of the tribesmen. at various times both the khan of dir and the khan of nawagai attempted to extend their influence by force of arms, the one in jandol, the other in the babukarra valley, but both showed themselves ready to yield to the pacificatory influence of the political agent for dir and swat. there were rumours also that umra khan contemplated revisiting this part of the frontier, but he ultimately decided to return to kabul.
the whole country had been so recently pacified that it was hardly to be hoped that it would remain quiescent during the disturbances of the year 1897. the mullahs, always opposed to the establishment of any civilising influence tending to weaken or destroy 175their supremacy over their peoples, had been busy preaching against the british, and it was known that they were doing their utmost to form a hostile combination of the clans against us; while other outside influences, which need not here be particularly specified, were also known to be in action. the khans of dir and nawagai behaved very well under difficult circumstances, and seem to have done their best to check and stifle sedition, but proved in the end unable altogether to restrain the fanaticism of their followers. when the “mad mullah” actually arrived in swat from buner in july, 1897, the khan of dir was away in kohistan, but even had he been present it seems improbable that he would have had sufficient influence or power to stem the outbreak, culminating in the attacks upon the malakand and chakdara positions described in chapter v. but on his return to swat, and when the tide had turned in our favour, both he and the khan of nawagai did what in them lay to assist the british government, by reopening communications and by holding the important river crossings on the chitral road.
operations of 1897
operations of the malakand field force in dir and bajaur in 1897.—the attacks on the malakand and on the chakdara post, with the composition and early operations of the malakand field force, under major-general sir bindon blood, have already been described in chapter v. these operations commenced with the subjection and punishment of the people of lower and upper swat. it had been proposed to deal next with the utman khels, but more 176important events then transpiring, obliged the postponement of the coercion of this tribe; and the news that the forces of the hadda mullah, signally defeated on the 9th august by the troops from peshawar, were advancing into dir, caused the recall of general blood’s second brigade from utman khel territory, and the move of his third brigade to uch in the adinzai valley. the mullah’s gathering now dispersed, and general blood was directed to co-operate with general elles in the punishment of the mohmands, by moving with two brigades through bajaur via sado and nawagai. at nawagai our troops would be in rear of the mohmands, who had never before been attacked from the north, and from this place a caravan route leads due south to the peshawar border, passing lokerai in the bohai valley, where are many mohmand villages.
on the 4th and 5th september general wodehouse moved his brigade—now somewhat reconstructed—hurriedly from uch to sado, and was only just in time to prevent the seizure of the panjkora bridge by the bajauris and utman khels, who had now made up their minds to oppose us. the first brigade (meiklejohn) was now left to hold the swat valley and our communications up to sado; the second (jeffreys) marched from chakdara, via sarai, the panjkora and kotkai to ghosam, where it arrived on the 9th; while by the 11th the third brigade (wodehouse) was concentrated at shakrata, equidistant from mundah and barwa, cavalry reconnaissances being pushed forward to the batai and 177shinai passes. on the 12th the second brigade was at khar,[76] and the third at shamshak in the watelai valley, where the camp was fired into during the night.
sir bindon blood had now intended to co-operate with general elles, and for this purpose he himself moved on the 14th with the third brigade to nawagai, while general jeffreys seized the rambat pass, bivouacking on the chaharmung stream near inayat kila, an utman khel village. here a determined attack was made upon the second brigade camp at night by mamunds and utman khels, who were unusually well armed and, creeping along the broken ground, were able to gain positions near the camp from which they maintained a very galling fire for nearly six hours, almost without intermission. our casualties were seven killed (three british officers) and ten wounded, and the losses among the transport were serious, amounting to nearly a hundred. when daylight appeared the cavalry were sent after the retreating enemy and accounted for many of them.
the mamund country
the idea of joining the third brigade at nawagai had now to be given up in favour of punitive operations in the mamund country, and co-operation with general elles was for the present impossible; the first brigade was therefore ordered to move up to the panjkora, the third remaining entrenched at nawagai. here, on the night of the 19th and 20th determined attacks were made upon the camp, 178chiefly by the hadda mullah’s men from the bedmanai pass; they were beaten off without much difficulty, but some of them were shot down within ten yards of the entrenchment; we had one man killed and thirty-one wounded, among the latter being general wodehouse. on the 22nd sir bindon blood proceeded to the mamund valley to rejoin general jeffreys; the third brigade on the same date being attached to the force under general elles for completion of the operations against the mohmands.
in the watelai valley
in the meantime the second brigade under general jeffreys had been engaged in further fighting. on the 16th the troops marched up the watelai valley in three small columns, directed respectively on badalai, badan and agra, and experienced in the operations which resulted the heaviest loss which british troops have suffered in frontier warfare, in a single day’s fighting, since the ambela campaign. the right column destroyed some villages and then, finding a considerable force of the enemy occupying a strong position from which it seemed impossible to dislodge them without guns, returned to camp. the remaining two columns moved up the valley, the enemy retiring before them; when, however, it became necessary for the troops to halt to await the return of a party which had been detached, the enemy began to press forward in considerable numbers, inflicting some loss upon two companies of the 35th sikhs, which were falling back upon their supports. the pressure was, however, temporarily relieved by an opportune charge of a squadron of the 17911th bengal lancers under captain cole. the two columns commenced their withdrawal to camp at inayat kila about 3 p.m. a flanking party of two companies of the 35th sikhs had not received the order to retire, but when the party commenced to do so, it withdrew in a direction rather diverging from the general line of retreat. these companies were assailed by the enemy on all sides, and did not extricate themselves, assisted finally by the guides, until they had suffered over forty casualties. as the whole force continued its retirement darkness came on, accompanied by a heavy thunderstorm, and the general, considering it would be difficult to reach camp that night and anxious about his flanking parties, decided to occupy some villages till morning. the orders failed, however, to reach all the units; some pushed on to camp; but about dusk general jeffreys found himself with no troops at his immediate disposal, except four guns of no. 8 bengal mountain battery, a small party of sappers, and a few men of the buffs and 35th sikhs, who had become separated from their companies in the dark. with these the general decided to occupy a hamlet called bilot, about 3? miles from camp. part of this village was burning and half was in possession of the enemy, who had been following up closely, and the party with the general was only able to occupy and entrench one angle of the hamlet. fighting was kept up at the closest possible quarters, and with heavy losses on both sides, until the arrival, about midnight, of four companies of the 35th sikhs, with 180whose assistance the enemy were easily driven off, the rest of the night passing quietly.
the casualties during this day’s fighting amounted to 38 killed and 116 wounded, including three followers.
during the next few days the second brigade was busily employed in destroying villages and removing grain stores—always under fire, while the retirement to camp was invariably closely pressed. on the 23rd the mamunds professed to be disheartened at their losses and anxious to make terms; but it seems probable that all they wished was to gain breathing time, for the negotiations came to nothing, and operations were accordingly resumed on the 29th september when many towers were demolished. the wounded were sent down to the panjkora, and the heavy casualties in transport animals were made good.
on the 30th september the brigade attacked the villages of agra and gat, and severe fighting ensued, the enemy in great numbers occupying a position of considerable strength. more than once the mamunds had to be driven from their sangars at the point of the bayonet, and, although the object of the operations was effected and the retirement was satisfactorily carried out, the want of more troops—for the brigade was by now greatly weakened—was much felt; on this day the casualties numbered twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, while throughout the losses in officers had been out of all proportion. sir bindon blood now reinforced the troops in the mamund 181country by bringing up another squadron of the guides cavalry, the 10th field battery, no. 8 bengal mountain battery, the 2nd battalion highland light infantry, four companies of the 24th punjab infantry, and no. 5 company madras sappers and miners.
close of the operations
on the 3rd october the second brigade, with two mountain batteries, attacked and destroyed the village of badalai, experiencing small opposition until the retirement commenced, when the enemy came on with great boldness, and to the number of between two and three thousand.
there was now a very large body of troops at inayat kila, and the mamunds began clearly to recognise the hopelessness of prolonging the resistance. they accordingly opened negotiations through the khan of nawagai, their jirgah finally coming in on the 11th october and agreeing to all our terms. the operations against the mamunds, who had shown fighting qualities of a high order, now came to an end, and the troops were withdrawn from the watelai valley. during the period from the 14th september to the 11th october, our casualties totalled 61 killed and 218 wounded.
on his way back to the malakand, sir bindon blood halted in the salarzai valley and easily forced that section of the tarkanris to submit, while the babukarra valley was thoroughly explored. the last of the troops crossed the panjkora on the 23rd, and four days later the whole force returned to the swat valley.
since the conclusion of the operations just described, 182the clans of dir and bajaur have given no trouble to the british government; but the efforts which the ambitions of the local khans cause them to make in order to add to their territories, and the constant intrigues of pretenders and other claimants, combine with the natural pugnacity of the pathan to cause some occasional anxiety as to the continued security of our communications with chitral.
