commercial law is a general term used to cover the legal rules which relate most directly to everyday commercial transactions. it is a term of no exact boundary, but most commercial law is based in one way or another on the law of contracts, which is one of the largest subjects in the law. bills and notes, for instance, are special forms of contracts. in order to understand business law at all, therefore, it is necessary at the outset to have some knowledge of the fundamental principles of the law of contracts.
definition of contracts.—what is a contract? simply a promise or set of promises which the law enforces as binding. any promise, if it is binding, is a contract or part of a contract. so the law of contracts in their formation resolves itself into this: what promises are binding? a man may make all sorts of promises, but when has he a right legally to say "i have changed my mind, i am not going to do what i said i would," and when will he be liable in damages if he fails to do as he agreed?
contract terms explained.—there are certain terms in contracts which the student will find repeatedly mentioned and with which he should be familiar at the outset. for example, contracts are spoken of as express contracts, and implied contracts. by an express contract we mean a contract the terms of which are fully set forth. implied contracts are[pg 25] contracts the terms of which are not fully stated by the parties. there is a mutual agreement and promise, but the agreement and promise have not been expressly put in words. if i say to a man, "i will buy your horse, dobbin, for $100" and he replies, "i will sell you the horse at that price," there is an express contract. i step into a taxi and simply say to the driver, "take me to the union station." the driver says nothing, but takes me there. here is an implied contract. by my conduct i impliedly agree to pay him the legal rate for the distance carried.
formal and informal contracts.—contracts are sometimes also divided into formal contracts, and simple or parol contracts. there are three kinds of formal contracts recognized in our system of law: (1) promises under seal. (2) contracts of record, such as judgments and recognizances. (3) negotiable instruments. of the three, it may be most difficult to understand why a judgment is included as a form of contract, because a judgment is simply a judicial termination of a fact entered in the office of the county clerk, and generally a lien on the real property owned by the judgment debtor. the sole reason, apparently, for calling a judgment a contract, is that an action of debt may be brought in a court of law upon such a judgment. sealed contracts and negotiable paper will be taken up in a later chapter. simple, or parol contracts, are those not embraced in the three previous classifications which constitute the formal contracts. the term parol is a little ambiguous, as it is sometimes used as opposed to a written[pg 26] contract, meaning simply an oral one, and at other times it is used as opposed to the three previous formal contracts.
unilateral and bilateral contracts.—contracts are also divided into unilateral and bilateral contracts. in a unilateral contract, the contract imposes obligations on one party only. a promissory note is an example of a unilateral contract. in a bilateral contract, obligation is imposed on both parties. john and mary become engaged to each other. this is a bilateral contract, and either may sue the other for a breach. most important results flow from the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts. this we shall consider later.
void, voidable and unenforceable contracts.—contracts are also divided into void, voidable and unenforceable contracts. strictly speaking, a void contract is no contract at all. some statutes provide that no action shall be brought on certain contracts, and declare them absolutely void. a voidable contract is one which is good until the option of avoiding it is availed of by the party who has the option. for example, an infant with an income of $2000 a year contracts for the delivery of a packard automobile on june 1. the car, being a luxury, makes the contract with the infant voidable on his part, and he may, before june 1, repudiate the contract and not be liable in a suit for breach of contract, or he may, if he choses, abide by the contract, take the car, and pay the purchase price when it is delivered. an unenforceable contract is one which in itself is perfectly[pg 27] good as a contract, but because of some rule of law cannot be enforced. for example, a agrees, orally, with the owner of 1 broadway, to buy that property for $1,000,000. the terms of the contract are understood by both parties. this contract is not enforceable, because, as we shall see later, the statute of frauds requires every contract for the sale of real property to be in writing.
contracts under seal.—there are two ways of making promises binding, and unless the promisor fulfils the requisites of one or the other of these two ways his promise will not be binding. the first of these ways relates to the form in which the promise is made; the second relates to the substance of the transaction, irrespective of the form. the way to make a promise binding by virtue of its form is to put it in writing and attach a seal to the writing. it is often thought that written promises are binding in any event, or that a promise that is not written is not binding in any event. neither of these propositions, however, is true. a promise is not binding merely because it is in writing; it is necessary that something more shall be done. not only must it be written, but a seal must be attached in order to make the promise binding by virtue of its form. everyone is familiar with the common ending in written contracts—"witness my hand and seal," that is, my signature and seal.
what is a seal?—a seal may be—and was originally—made with sealing wax stamped with a crest, initial or what not. this is still a sufficient seal,[pg 28] but the common kind of seal is simply a wafer attached by mucilage to the writing. another kind of seal, in use by corporations and notaries especially, consists simply of an impression made on paper without attaching any foreign substance whatever. any of these methods of sealing a promise is good. in most states a written or printed scroll with the letters "l. s." written or printed within, or the word "seal" written or printed may also be a seal if so intended. it may seem a ridiculous formality for the law to attach importance to this lapping a wafer and attaching it to the end of a writing. in a way it is ridiculous, but it is desirable to have some method by which a promise may be made binding. one method, as an original question, may be as good as another so long as it is an easy method, and attaching a seal is an easy method, and one which makes it possible to make a promise binding whenever you wish.
change by statute of the law as to sealed contracts.—there has been in this country a certain hostility to the law of sealed instruments. it has been thought, with reason, that some of the rules governing contracts under seal have by their technicality promoted injustice. this has certainly been true of an old rule that contracts under seal could not be altered or discharged by any agreement not itself under seal. the rule, however, that a seal avoids the necessity of consideration is a desirable rule, since it is important to have some means by which those who so intend may make gratuitous promises binding. it would be better then to abolish undesirable[pg 29] incidents of sealed contracts by statute rather than to destroy totally the legal effect of a seal. however, in many states the distinction between sealed and unsealed contracts is totally abolished. in a number of other states the common-law rule has been changed by the enactment of statutory provisions to the effect that sealed contracts shall be presumed to have been made for a sufficient consideration, but this presumption is only prima facie, and lack of consideration may be affirmatively proved, even in the case of a sealed instrument. and under such statutes unsealed contracts remain as at common law, i. e., the burden of proving consideration rests upon the plaintiff who seeks to enforce such a contract.
requisites of simple contracts.—sealed contracts are comparatively easy to understand. simple contracts, which are promises made binding by virtue of their substance rather than their form, though called simple, are more difficult to understand, and more complex. they are also much more common than sealed contracts. a simple contract is a promise, or promises, to which the parties have assented, and for which a price called consideration has been paid. one may promise as much as he wishes, orally or in writing so long as he does not attach a seal to his signature, and then say he does not care to keep his promise, unless he has both been paid for the promise and there has been an assent by the promisor and promisee to the terms of the transaction. mutual assent and consideration are, then, the requisites of simple contracts.[pg 30]
intent to contract.—in the law of contracts, intention, as we ordinarily understand that term, plays little part. in fact, the supreme court of connecticut, in the case of davidson vs. holden, 55 conn. 103, said: "it is of no legal significance that the defendants did not intend to be individually liable, or that they did not know or believe that as a matter of law they would be."
it is our overt acts that count in contracts. or shall we put it this way: in the eyes of the law overt acts manifest legal intention. a says to b: "i will sell you my watch for $25, and you may have until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning to decide." a meets b the next noon and says to him: "i am sorry you did not take the watch. it was a bargain." b replies: "here is the price, i will take it. i intended to call you this morning but have been so busy i did not have an opportunity to do so. i told my wife last night i was going to accept your offer and i can produce five witnesses who were in the room and heard me say so." it is, nevertheless, no contract, for, as has been said, quoting from an old english case, "it is trite learning, that the thought of man is not tryable, for the devil himself knows not the thought of man." occasionally there may be the overt act and still no contract, although the mere formalities of contract may have taken place. the facts in the case of mcclurg v. terry, 21 new jersey equity 225, were as follows: the plaintiff was an infant nineteen years of age, and had returned late in the evening to jersey city, from an excursion, with the defendant and a number of[pg 31] young friends, among whom was a justice of the peace, and all being in good spirits, excited by the excursion, the plaintiff in jest challenged the defendant to be married to her on the spot; he in the same spirit accepted the challenge, and the justice, at their request, performed the ceremony, they making the proper responses. the ceremony was in the usual and proper form, the justice doubting whether it was in earnest or not. the defendant escorted the plaintiff to her home, and left her there as usual on occasions of such excursions; both acted and treated the matter as if no ceremony had taken place. in deciding the case, the court said: "in this case the evidence is clear that no marriage was intended by either party; that it was a mere jest got up in the exuberance of spirits to amuse the company and themselves. if this is so, there was no marriage." the overt act of the parties manifested no legal intention to be married. should we change the facts in the following way, the court undoubtedly would have held a valid marriage: if, after the parties had gone through the marriage ceremony, as recited, they went on a two weeks' honeymoon, and on their return lived together as man and wife for a month and then suddenly decided to call the marriage off, on the ground that it was a joke and they did not intend the ceremony to be binding, regardless of what they said as to the transaction, their overt acts would be taken by the court as showing their real legal intention at the time the ceremony was entered into. one more illustration: when leaving the class tonight, there is a sudden downpour of[pg 32] rain, and the instructor remarks: "i will give ten dollars for an umbrella." a student offers an umbrella and claims the money. here is an overt act, but a reasonable person would not take the words used literally. generally speaking, agreements made jokingly and social agreements confer no contractual rights.
offer and acceptance.—the usual way that mutual assent is manifested is by an offer and an acceptance of the offer. two persons are not likely to express at the identical minute the same proposition. it is as a practical matter, then, essential that one should make a proposition, and if a contract is to be made, that the other should assent to it. an offer may be made to one or more specified persons, or to anyone whomsoever who will do what the offer requests, as in case of an offer of a reward. an offer is itself a promise, but is a promise conditional on the payment of a consideration or return for it either by some act or some promise from the other party. according as the offer asks for an act or a promise it will fall into one or the other of the two great divisions of simple contracts; one kind is called unilateral (meaning one-sided), that is, a promise only on one side; the other is bilateral, a promise on each side.
illustrations.—let us give illustrations of these contracts. we say to john: "we will promise to give you, john, $100 if you will do a specified piece of work." that is a proposal to make an exchange of the work for the money in a sense, but more exactly it is an offer to exchange an agreement to give the[pg 33] money in return for the work. we are not saying to john: "if you will agree or promise to do that work we will promise to give you the money." we are saying that we will give him the money if he actually does the work. that offer requires the actual doing of the work before it is binding. until then the price requested for the promise has not been paid. it is an offer of a unilateral contract. again, when we say to a man: "if you will spade up our garden we will pay you $2 a day," we are making an offer for a unilateral contract. we are asking him to spade up the garden; not to promise to spade it up, but to do it, and when he does it he can hold us liable on our promise to pay him $2 a day. the promise will have become binding because we have been given the payment that we asked for in our promise. but if we say to a man: "if you will agree to work for us the next month we will pay you $100," and the man says, "all right," then we have a bilateral contract. we are asking him, as the price of our promise, not to work but to agree to work, and he has promised to do so. to say "i accept" is always sufficient acceptance in the case of a bilateral contract where a promise is requested, but if i said to you, "i will give you $5 if you will bring me a book here," it would not make a contract to say "i accept." i said i would give you $5 if you brought the book here, and nothing but bringing it here will form a contract. the offeree must always do what the offerer asks him. if an offerer asks for a promise, any form of words indicating assent would be sufficient, because they would mean, in effect: "i consent[pg 34] to make the promise you specify in your offer." the form of wording in simple contracts is immaterial. any plain language is sufficient for an offer, and as for acceptance, it does not matter whether the acceptor says "all right," or "i accept your offer," or in what form he expresses his assent. the question is, does he express assent? now, the offerer is at liberty to name any consideration in his offer that he sees fit. he can name, in other words, whatever price for his promise he chooses to ask. if the person addressed does not choose to pay that price, all he has to do is to reject the offer, but he can bind the offerer only on the terms proposed. therefore, if the offerer asks for an act in return for his promise, that is, asks for an immediate payment, or work, or the giving of property for his promise, no contract can be made by the person addressed saying, "all right, i will do it;" that is not giving the price the offerer asked. on the other hand, should the offerer ask for a promise and not for an act, the acceptor must give the promise asked for.
option without consideration.—a common business transaction that presents very well the principles governing the formation of simple contracts is what is called an option. suppose the owner of a mine says: "i will sell you this mine for $50,000, and you may have thirty days to decide whether you choose to accept the offer or not." now, it does not matter whether that statement is oral or in writing; it is merely an offer, and not binding as the matter stands as far as we have stated. however,[pg 35] if it were in writing and a seal attached (in a state where seals still have the force which the common law gave them) it would be a binding promise to sell the mine at that price at any time within thirty days. if there is no seal attached, as long as the offer is unaccepted and unpaid for, it is not binding. the man who makes it may say: "i withdraw my offer. it is true that i promised to keep the offer open thirty days, but you did not pay me for that promise and i am going to break the promise. i withdraw my offer." any offer for the formation of a simple contract, while unaccepted, may be withdrawn. but, if before it was withdrawn and within the thirty days' limit, the person to whom the option was given says, "here is the $50,000 which you said you would take for your mine," the offerer would then be bound, and would have to perform his part of the contract.
option with consideration.—let us change the character of the option a little. suppose in consideration of $1000 paid down the owner of a mine promises to sell the mine for $50,000 at any time within thirty days. here the offer, or the contract—for it is now more than an offer—has been paid for, and it is therefore binding. the person to whom the offer was made paid $1000 for the promise, therefore the promisor is bound to keep it. it was not an absolute promise to give the mine to the buyer, but it was a promise to sell it to him for $50,000 if he chose to take it within thirty days; that is a conditional promise. a conditional promise may be binding and paid for just as well as an absolute promise.[pg 36]
insurance policy.—take the case of a fire insurance policy. that is a conditional promise, a promise to pay indemnity for the destruction of a house by fire. therefore, the performance of the insurance company's promise is conditional on the suffering by the insured of loss by fire. an insurance policy is ordinarily a unilateral contract; the premium is the consideration or price paid for the promise, and the promise is binding on the insurance company from the time when the premium is thus paid. of course, the promise is only binding according to its terms. the insured has bought a conditional promise, a promise to pay if the house burns down. he gets that promise, but he will not become entitled to any money or any damages unless the house burns down nor unless he complies with the other conditions of his policy.
guarantee.—another kind of a promise worth referring to is a guarantee. a question arises whether a business house will sell something to a buyer on credit, and it decides it will not without a guarantee. accordingly, john agrees, in writing, that if the business house in question will sell james a bill of goods, john will guarantee the payment of the price. that means, if james does not pay for the goods, john will. that is a unilateral contract in which the promise is conditional, and the consideration for that promise is the selling of goods to james.
preliminary negotiations—advertisements.—an offer is sometimes difficult to distinguish from other things. suppose the case of[pg 37] an advertisement. a business house advertises that it will sell goods for a certain price. take the case of a bond list issued by a banking house. the list states that the banking house will sell specified kinds of bonds at quoted prices. john receives one of those lists, looks it over, sees something that looks good to him, and goes into the banking house and says: "i will take five of those bonds at the price named here." the banking house says: "we have sold all the bonds of that kind that we had;" or it says, "the market has changed on those bonds and there has been some advance in the price." has john a cause of action against the banking house? he has if that bond list amounts to an offer—that is, if the list means that the banking house offers to enter into a contract with anyone receiving the list. but it has been held that that sort of advertisement does not prima facie amount to an offer, although it might be put in such clear words of agreement to sell on the part of the banking house that it would amount to an offer. generally an advertisement of this sort, or anything that can fairly be called an advertisement of goods for sale, is held to mean simply that the advertiser has these goods for sale and names a price he is putting upon them; he invites customers to come in and deal with him in regard to them. it is an invitation to come and make a trade rather than a direct offer of a trade.
illustration.—again to illustrate: you are looking at a new model of an automobile in a show-room window. you like it, enter the salesroom,[pg 38] and say you will take the car, tendering the price. the manager tells you that it is simply their demonstration car, that he will be glad to book your order for a car of the same model, and can make delivery in a month. you are not satisfied, and wish to sue, claiming that your tender of the price constituted an acceptance of the dealer's offer. your position would be unsound and there would be no recovery in such a case. the placing of the demonstration car in the window is simply an invitation to the public to come in and deal with the seller. on the other hand, suppose you go into a second-hand automobile salesroom. there are fifty cars of various makes and models on the floor and each one is labeled with a different price. you pick out a 1918 packard which is marked $1500. you tender the price to the salesman and say you will take the car. he refuses to sell. in this case your tender is an acceptance of his offer to sell. in the former instance, placing a price on the demonstration car was not a statement to the public generally that that particular car was for sale at that price, but in this case, where the cars are all second-hand cars, the reasonable interpretation of placing the price on the 1918 packard is that that particular car is for sale. quite likely, the dealer did not have any other packard car in stock and would have no way of securing any of that model at that price.
oral agreement preliminary to written contract.—another case of the same nature that comes up not infrequently is this: parties talk over a business arrangement and then[pg 39] they say, "as this is an important matter let us put it down in writing; let us have a written contract containing what has been agreed upon." when it comes to drawing up the contract, however, they cannot agree. one party then says, "well, we made a definite oral agreement any way; let us carry that out." the other replies, "why, no, all that was dependent on our making a written agreement." the settlement of their dispute depends on how definite and absolute the oral agreement was. it is possible to make an oral agreement binding, although the parties do agree and do contemplate that it shall subsequently be reduced to writing, but generally the inference is that the oral agreement was merely a preliminary chaffering to fix the terms of the writing, and that everything is tentative until the writing is made and signed.
auction sales.—another state of affairs involving preliminary invitations is presented by auction sales. the auctioneer puts goods up for sale, a bid is made, the auctioneer gets no other bid, and then says, "i will withdraw this from sale." is the auctioneer liable? has he made a contract to sell that article to the highest bidder? when the transaction is analyzed, is this what the auctioneer says in effect: "i offer to sell these goods to the highest bidder?" if this is the correct interpretation, then when the highest bidder says, in effect, "i agree to buy them," there would be a contract. on the other hand, if what the auctioneer says is in effect like what the advertiser says: "here are some goods for sale, what[pg 40] do you bid, gentlemen," then the auctioneer is not making an offer himself. he is inviting offers from the people before him, and until he accepts one of those offers from the bidders before him there would be no contract; and until then the auctioneer could withdraw the goods. and that is the construction put upon the auction sale—that the auctioneer is not making an offer, but is simply inviting offers. even if the auctioneer promises that he will accept the highest offer, that is, that he will sell to the highest bidder, his promise to accept the highest bid, not being paid for, would not be binding upon him were it not for a statute in some states which, in the sale of goods, would make an auctioneer bound to keep a promise to sell without reserve, that is, to the highest bidder, if he made such a promise.
bids or tenders.—somewhat similar to the case of the auctioneer is the case of tenders or bids for the construction of buildings, or for the sale of goods to a city or to a corporation. there, too, the corporation or the city is simply inviting offers. they do not say, "we offer to enter into a contract with anyone who makes the lowest bid," but rather, "we are thinking of entering into a contract, and we want to receive offers in regard to it." when the offers are made by the bids or tenders, any or none of them may be accepted, according as the receiver thinks best. it is sometimes required by law that public corporations, like cities or counties, shall accept the bid of the lowest responsible bidder, but, aside from such statutes, any or none of the bids may be accepted.[pg 41]
implied contracts.—an offer and acceptance are ordinarily made by words either spoken or written; but any method of communication which would convey to a reasonable man a clear meaning will serve as well as words. if a goes to his grocer and says "send me a barrel of flour," he has in terms made no promise to pay for the flour, but the natural meaning of his words is that he agrees to pay. in this case a used words, though not words of promise; but the same result might follow where no words at all were used. suppose a went into a shop where he was known, picked up an article from the counter, held it up so the proprietor could see what he was taking, and went out; this would be in legal effect a promise by a to pay for the article. a contract, where the promises of the parties are to be inferred not from express words of promise but from conduct or from language not in terms promissory, is called an implied promise or contract, as distinct from an express promise or contract, which is one where the undertaking is in express language. this difference between express and implied contracts relates merely to the mode of proving them. there is the same element of mutual assent in both cases, and the legal effect of the two kinds of obligations is identical. there is, however, another kind of obligation which is frequently called an implied contract, but sometimes called a quasi-contract, because it is not really a contract at all, though the obligation imposed is similar. if a husband fails to support his wife, for instance, she may bind him by purchases of goods necessary[pg 42] for her support. she may do this even though he directly forbids the sales to her. there is obviously no mutual assent in this case; the husband emphatically dissents and expresses his dissent, but he is bound just as if he had contracted.
termination of offer by revocation or rejection.—since offers do not become binding until accepted according to their terms, up to that time they may be terminated without liability. this may happen in several ways. in the first place an offer may be revoked by the offerer. to effect a revocation he must actually notify the other party of his change of mind, before the latter has accepted. we have already stated that offers may be rejected by the person to whom they are made. for instance, we say, "we offer you one hundred shares of stock at a certain price, and you may have a week to think it over." you say, "i do not care for that offer, i reject it." you come around the next day and say, "on reflection i have concluded to accept that offer." the acceptance is within the seven days which we originally said might be used for reflection, but the offer has been terminated by the rejection. there is no longer any offer open, and consequently the acceptance amounts to nothing. a troublesome question in regard to the revocation of an offer for a unilateral contract is this: suppose a offers b $5 for a book and b starts to get it but when he reaches the door, then a refuses to take the book. the general disposition is to try to hold that promise binding, and yet the difficulty is that the offeree has not fully done[pg 43] what he was asked to do, and if he chose to turn back and take the book away he could do so without liability. he could say, "i did not promise to bring the book. i brought it part way, the walk was long and i am going to take it back." if he is thus free to withdraw it seems impossible to deny that the other party is equally free. bilateral contracts are more desirable than unilateral because in bilateral contracts the mutual promises bind the parties before they begin to perform and both parties are therefore protected while they are performing. in unilateral contracts, the contract is not completed until the act requested is fully done. until then, therefore, either party may withdraw.
a counter offer is a rejection.—another way in which offers may be terminated is by a counter offer on the part of the person to whom the offer was made. we say, "we will sell you stock for $100 a share, and you may have a week to think it over." you say, "i will give you $99 a share." we say, "no, we will not take it." you say, "well, i will give you $100." you are too late; you rejected our offer of sale at $100 by saying you would give us $99. the minute you say you will give us $99, our offer is rejected. of course, when you make the counter offer of $99, if we say we will accept your offer to buy, that would make a contract. offers are constantly rejected by counter offers by people who really intend to enter into a contract. suppose a says, "i will lease you my house a year for $800." you say, "all right, i will take it if you paper the dining-room." that rejects[pg 44] the offer. a new offer has been made by the person addressed, who offers, if the dining-room is papered, to take the house at $800.
termination of offer by death or insanity.—an offer is also terminated by the death or insanity of either party before acceptance. after a contract has once been formed neither subsequent death nor insanity terminates liability upon it unless the contract is of such a personal character that only performance by the contractor in person will fulfil it.
illustration.—in beach v. first methodist episcopal church, 96 ill. 177, a fund was being raised to build a new church, and a subscription paper, as follows, was signed by lorenzo beach:
"fairbury, feb. 14, 1874.
"we, the undersigned, agree to pay the sum set opposite our respective names, for the purpose of erecting a new m. e. church in this place, said sums to be paid as follows: one-third to be paid when contract is let, one-third when building is enclosed, one-third when building is completed. probable cost of said church from ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to twelve thousand dollars ($12,000)."
mr. beach attached and subscribed to that paper the following:
"fairbury, 1874.
"dr. beach gives this subscription on the condition that the remainder of eight thousand dollars is subscribed.
"lorenzo beach, $2000."
[pg 45]
in april, 1875, dr. beach was adjudged insane by the county court. the court held that the "subscription made by dr. beach was, in its nature, a mere offer to pay that amount of money to the church upon the condition therein expressed. there is nothing in the record tending to show that the church, in this case, took any action upon the faith of this subscription, until after dr. beach was adjudged insane, or that the church paid money or incurred any liability. his insanity, by operation of law, was a revocation of the offer." suppose a letter for a winter's supply of coal is sent to your coal dealer and is acknowledged by him, delivery to be made before october 1. on september 15, the coal dealer dies, and his estate refuses to fulfill the contract. in such a case, if you were compelled to buy coal at a higher price from another dealer, you would have a cause of action against the estate for the damage you suffer. the coal dealer's executor or administrator could very easily carry out a contract of this character. on the other hand, suppose you are running a series of lectures during the winter, and you have engaged a noted lecturer to deliver six lectures. after he has delivered three, he dies. in this case, death would terminate the contract, as this is clearly a contract for personal services and the executor or administrator of the deceased lecturer could not perform the contract for him, as could be done in the case of the coal dealer.
termination of offer by lapse of time.—an offer may be terminated by delay on the[pg 46] part of the person addressed. an answer to an offer must be sent in time, whether mail or telegraph is used, or whether the parties are dealing face to face. an offer lapses if it is not accepted within the time the offer specifies if any time is specified. if no time is specified, then within a reasonable time. one may specify any length of time in his offer, and it will remain open for that time provided it is not rejected or revoked, and neither party dies or becomes insane, in the meantime. but frequently offers contain no express limit of time; then it is a question of what is a reasonable time, and reasonableness depends upon business customs, the character of the transaction, the way the offer is communicated, and similar circumstances. an offer on the floor of a stock exchange will not last very long. a reasonable time for acceptance of such an offer is immediately, and an offer sent by telegraph will not remain in force long. the use of the telegraph indicates that the offerer deems haste of importance. an offer sent by mail will last longer. an offer relating to things which change in value rapidly will not remain open for so long a time as an offer which relates to land, or something that does not change in value rapidly.
illustration.—in the case of loring v. the city of boston, 7 met. (mass.) 409, the facts were that on may 26, 1837, this advertisement was published in the daily papers of boston: "$500 reward. the above reward is offered for the apprehension and conviction of any person who shall set fire to any building within the limits of the city. may 26th, 1837.[pg 47] samuel a. eliot, mayor." in january, 1841, there was an extensive fire on washington street, and loring, after considerable effort, was able to secure the apprehension and conviction of the criminal. he then sued to recover the reward, which the city of boston refused to pay. the ground of defense was that the advertisement "offering the reward of $500 for the apprehension and conviction of persons setting fire to buildings in the city, was issued almost four years before the time at which the plaintiff arrested marriott and prosecuted him to conviction." the opinion of the court reads: "three years and eight months is not a reasonable time within which, or rather to the extent of which, the offer in question can be considered as a continuing offer on the part of the city. in that length of time, the exigency under which it was made having passed, it must be presumed to have been forgotten by most of the officers and citizens of the community, and cannot be presumed to have been before the public as an actuating motive to vigilance and exertion on this subject; nor could it justly and reasonably have been so understood by the plaintiff. we are, therefore, of the opinion that the offer of the city had ceased before the plaintiff accepted and acted upon it as such, and that consequently no contract existed upon which this action, founded on an alleged express promise, can be maintained."
both parties must be bound or neither.—both parties to a simple contract must in effect be bound, and until they are, there is no[pg 48] contract. in a unilateral contract, before the promise becomes binding, the promisee must have actually performed what he was requested to do, that is, he must bind himself by actual performance before the offerer's promise is binding on him. in a bilateral contract, where each party makes a promise, neither promise can be binding unless and until the other one is. so that in the case of the proposed agreement to lease, as the proposed tenant might refuse to take the house if the dining-room was not papered, the proposed landlord has a similar right; that is, since one is not bound, the other is not.
contracts by correspondence.—contracts are often made by correspondence, simple contracts especially. that raises rather an important question as to how and when the contract is formed. suppose a letter containing an offer is addressed from boston to a man in new york. a reply is sent by him from new york accepting the offer. that reply goes astray. is there a contract? yes. it creates a contract by correspondence for a letter to be mailed by the acceptor provided the offerer imposes no conditions to the contrary, and impliedly authorizes the use of the mails, as he does by himself making an offer by mail. but suppose the offerer in his letter says, "if i hear from you by next wednesday i shall consider this a contract." then, unless the offerer receives an answer by the next wednesday, there will be no contract. it will make no difference that an answer has been mailed, it must have been received; that is a condition of the offer. suppose[pg 49] an offer is made by word of mouth, and it is accepted by sending a letter. does the contract then become binding, irrespective of receipt of the letter? no, unless in some way the offerer has authorized the use of the mails in sending such an answer, and if the circumstances were such that the use of the mails would be customary, that would amount to an implied authorization. the use of the telegraph depends upon similar principles. if an offer is sent by telegraph, an answer may be sent by telegraph, and an acceptance started on its way will become binding although it is never received. similarly, one may authorize a telegraphic answer to a letter containing an offer sent by mail, and if the use of the telegraph is authorized, a contract will arise at the moment that the telegram is sent.
illustrations.—in the case of an option, if the acceptance was made by mail and lost in the mails, a binding contract would be formed if the use of the mail was expressly or impliedly authorized, and similarly if the option called for payment and a letter was mailed containing a draft or cash. there is a right to send a check or draft by mail if the parties had been dealing by mail. that authority would be implied. when parties are dealing by mail and there is a bargain that a check shall be sent, the check becomes the property of the person to whom it is sent as soon as it is mailed, and, therefore, when the letter with the check is put in the mail it operates as a payment on the option, and the loss of the draft is not the sender's loss, but the other man's. a lost[pg 50] draft, however, can be replaced and must be replaced. authority to send actual cash by mail would not be so easily implied, especially if the amount were large, because it is contrary to good business custom; but if authority were given, the result would be the same as in the case of a check. it would, however, be a proper business precaution to register the letter if it contained cash. if the offerer, not having received the letter of acceptance and thinking none had been sent, sells the property to another person, though not morally blamable, he would get into trouble. the second purchaser would get title to the property, supposing that the property was actually transferred to him. the lost letter created a contract, but it did not actually transfer title to the property, and, therefore, when the purchaser actually got possession of the property he would become the owner of it and could not be deprived of his title if he took it innocently. if, however, the person to whom the property was transferred had notice of the prior completion of a contract, he could not keep the property. in any event the seller would be liable in damages for breach of the contract completed by mailing the lost letter. suppose an option is given by telephone to one who, just before the option expires, tries to get a connection by phone to accept and is unable to do so, and ten minutes after the time has expired a connection is secured? there is no contract and he has no action. it is no fault of the offerer that the acceptor was unable to accept in time, and, generally speaking, one who wishes to accept an offer must at his peril[pg 51] keep the means of acceptance open. it may be asked why does not the same principle apply in regard to mail as to the telephone; that is, why does not starting the acceptance by telephone complete the contract? because there is no authority to send communication by telephone to the offerer when the acceptor has no telephone connection. when one sends an offer by mail the reason that he is bound by an acceptance sent by mail is because he, in effect, asks that an acceptance properly addressed to him be started on its course. he takes his chance as to the rest, but an offerer by telephone does not authorize a reply by talking into the telephone when there is no connection.
mistakes in the use of language in offer and acceptance.—another question which has to do with the express mutual assent of parties relates to the meaning of language used. suppose an offerer says, "i will sell you a cargo of goods from the ship 'peerless,' due to arrive from india, at a certain price." the buyer assents. there are two ships named "peerless," and the buyer thinks one is meant, but the seller thinks the other is meant. is there a contract for the sale of the cargo of "peerless" no. 1, or a contract for the sale of the cargo of no. 2, or no contract at all? the answer is, that language bears the meaning which a reasonable person in the position of the person to whom the offer is made is justified in attaching to it. if a reasonable person in his position would think "peerless" no. 1 was meant, then there is a contract for the cargo of[pg 52] no. 1. if he was not justified in thinking that, and ought to have thought no. 2 was meant, although in fact he did not think so, there was a contract for the cargo of "peerless" no. 2. if either meaning were as reasonable as the other, then each party has a right to insist on his own meaning, and there would be no contract. this principle often comes up in contracts made by telegraph, where the words of the telegram are, by the mistake of the telegraph company, changed. for instance, a telegram purports to be an offer to sell a large quantity of laths at $1 a bundle. the terms as actually despatched by the seller in making his offer fixed the price at $1.20. the telegraph company dropped off the words "and twenty cents." a telegram is sent back by the buyer, "i accept your telegraphic offer." then trouble arises when buyer and seller compare notes. well, the offerer is bound. he selected the telegraph as the means of communication, and he must take the consequences of a misunderstanding, which arose from a mistake of the agency which the offerer himself selected. the question may be asked: would there be any right of action against the telegraph company by the offerer, the sender of the telegram? the answer is yes. the company has broken the contract it impliedly made with the sender to use reasonable diligence in despatching and delivering the message. but the trouble with that action is that on telegraph blanks there is always this in substance: that on unrepeated telegrams this company is liable for mistakes only to an amount not exceeding twice the[pg 53] cost of the telegram; and it has been held in many states that that limit on unrepeated telegrams is not unreasonable. the sender of the telegram has agreed to the contract on the reverse side of the telegraph blank, and he ought to have his message repeated if he desires to hold the company liable in full damages if his message does not reach the party addressed in absolutely correct form. in other states, however, this limitation of liability is held to be against public policy and the company is liable for the full damage suffered.
condition in offer requiring receipt of acceptance.—an offerer, as has been said, may insert in his offer any condition he sees fit. he may therefore insert a condition that an acceptance shall reach him, not merely be despatched. the condition may specify the time within which the acceptance must arrive in order to be effectual. it is a wise precaution in all business offers of importance to insert such a condition in the offer. it will not be sufficient to add to the offer such words as "subject to prompt acceptance," for prompt acceptance would be given, within the meaning of the law, by despatching the acceptance, not by the receipt of it. the condition should be in such words as "subject to prompt receipt of your acceptance," or "subject to receipt of your acceptance," by a stated day or hour.
when silence gives consent.—there is one way of manifesting mutual assent, namely, by silence, of which a word should be said. there is a proverb that "silence gives consent." is[pg 54] it so in law? suppose a man goes into an insurance broker's and tosses some policies down and says, "renew those policies, please." nobody says anything and he leaves the policies there and goes out. the next night his buildings burn down. are they insured? they are, in effect, if the insurance broker has contracted to renew the policies; otherwise the buildings are not insured. now on the bare facts, as we have stated them, they are not insured; some other facts must always exist to make silence amount to assent. if, for instance, on previous occasions, the broker kept silence when such statements were made to him, and nevertheless carried out the proposal, it is a fair inference that he means by his silence this time what he meant the preceding time. furthermore, silence, when the offer is unknown, can never amount to assent. in the case as we have put it, we did not say that the insurance broker even heard the offer; if he did, then the question would depend on whether he had ever done anything to justify the other person in believing that silence would mean assent in such a dealing, or whether business customs justified the assumption. the offerer cannot by his own act make the silence of the other person amount to an acceptance. suppose an offer of this sort: "we offer to sell you 100 shares of stock at $50 a share, and unless we hear from you to the contrary by next wednesday we shall conclude that you have accepted our offer." the offerer does not get any word before next wednesday. nevertheless, there is no contract. the person addressed has a right to say, "confound[pg 55] his impudence, i am not going to waste a postage stamp on him, but i don't accept his offer. he has no business to suppose that if he doesn't hear from me to the contrary i assent." this sort of case is not infrequently referred to: a magazine is sent through the mails on a subscription for a year, the subscription runs out, the magazine is, nevertheless, still sent. is the person who receives it bound to pay another year's subscription? here you have a little more than silence; you have the receiver of the magazine continuing to receive it. if he refused to receive it, undoubtedly there would be no contract, but where a man takes property which is offered to him, he is bound by the proposal which was made to him in regard to the property. he ought to let the magazine alone if he doesn't want to pay for it. you may say that the receiver does not know that the subscription has run out, and if he did he would not take the magazine. but then he ought to know. he made the subscription originally. the difficulty is merely in his own forgetfulness, and he cannot rely on that.
illustration.—the leading case of hobbs v. massasoit whip co., 158 mass. 194, is a good illustration. the plaintiff in this case had been in the habit of sending eel skins to the defendant and had received pay from him in due course. the skins in the shipment for payment of which suit was brought, were alleged by the defendant to be short of the required length, and in a condition unfit for use. they were kept by the defendant some months, and were then destroyed, without notification to the plaintiff.[pg 56] the latter sued for the price of the skins and the court held that the silence of the defendant and failure to notify the plaintiff that it did not wish to have this particular lot of skins, amounted to an acceptance. the court said: "in such a condition of things, the plaintiff was warranted in sending the defendant skins conforming to the requirements, and even if the offer was not such that the contract was made as soon as the skins corresponding to its terms were sent, sending them would impose on the defendant a duty to act at that time; and silence on its part, coupled with a retention of the skins for an unreasonable time, might be found by the jury to warrant the plaintiff in assuming that they were accepted, and thus to amount to an acceptance."
