while disaster had fallen upon the centre column, the division under colonel evelyn wood had been showing what could be done when care and prudence took the place of a happy-go-lucky recklessness. it had advanced from utrecht on the 7th of january, and had moved up to the frontier at sandspruit. at two in the afternoon of the 10th it moved forward, halted at six, and again advanced by the light of the moon at half-past one in the morning; a mounted advance-guard was thrown out, flanking patrols were organised, and the troops moved in the greatest silence.
the next day colonel buller, with his irregular horse, went out, and after a skirmish with the zulus brought in a thousand cattle, and captain barton, with a party scouting in another direction, captured 550.
on the following morning a reconnaissance in force was made, and a good deal of skirmishing took place; but, as colonel wood never allowed his men to follow the zulus into rough ground, the latter were unable to effect anything against the column. this division advanced forward but slowly, as it was intended that they should keep within reach of the leisurely-moving central column.
after several slight skirmishes the news reached them on the 24th of the disaster of isandula, and with it colonel wood received orders to fall back; and on the 26th he encamped at kambula. raids were made in all directions with great success; the great military kraal of manyamyoba was captured and destroyed by colonel buller and his cavalry. as colonel wood’s was now the most advanced column, colonel rowlands, with a wing of the 80th and a couple of guns and 200 swazis, together with raaff’s horse and wetherby’s borderers, were sent as a reinforcement to him.
the zulus were not idle, and umbelleni and manyamyoba made several successful raids across the border and destroyed the kraals of natives friendly to the english. these two chiefs were not regular zulu chieftains; both were adventurers who had gathered under them numbers of broken men, and had for years carried on raids on their own account from their mountain-stronghold, in much the same way that the scotch borderers of olden times harassed the country on the english side of the frontier.
oham, the king’s brother, with his own following, came into colonel wood’s camp, and gave himself up, saying that he was altogether opposed to the war.
the boys on their arrival at zlobani were brought before umbelleni. that chief briefly gave orders that they should be killed; but two or three of his headmen represented to him that they might be of use; they would be able to carry a message to the british camp, should he desire at any time to send one; by their appearance and dress, they could tell him the nature of any troops they might intend to attack, and could read and explain any letters which might be captured on messengers; finally, they might be an acceptable present to send to cetewayo, who might not be pleased if he heard that prisoners had been killed in cold blood.
umbelleni assented to the reasoning, and ordered the boys to be taken to a hut. the zulu dwellings resemble in form great bee-hives. they are circular and dome-roofed; the entrance is but three feet high, and people can only enter by crawling. a woman was ordered to cook for them. no guard was placed over them, and they were permitted to wander about freely, as escape from such a position was considered impossible.
six weeks passed slowly, and on the 11th of march a messenger arrived, and there was a sudden stir in the camp. in a few minutes the fighting-men assembled. the boys were ordered to take their place in the column, and at a swift march, with which they had the greatest difficulty in keeping up, the column moved away.
“where are they taking us now, i wonder?” tom said.
“i suppose they are going to attack some english party on the march; our men are hardly likely, i should think, again to be caught napping, as they were at isandula.”
crossing two rivers, the bevana and pongola, they at night halted in another mountain-kraal of umbelleni, about three miles from the intombe river. on the bank of the river could be seen twenty waggons. these waggons had come down from derby, on their way to luneberg, a town situated four miles from the intombe. major tucker, who commanded there, sent captain moriarty with a company of the 80th, seventy strong, down to the river to protect the waggons whilst crossing, and that officer had orders to neglect no precaution, and above all to keep an incessant and vigilant look-out.
the river was in flood, and no crossing could be effected, and for four days the waggons remained on the northern bank. captain moriarty placed the waggons in laager on the bank, and took post there with forty of his men, leaving lieutenant harwood with thirty-four on the south bank with directions to cover the sides of the laager with a flanking fire, should it be attacked. the position of the waggons was a dangerous one, as the ground rose immediately behind them, and was covered with bush.
in the middle of the night of the 11th umbelleni’s men arose, and, accompanied by the boys, started from the kraal, and dick and tom were filled with forebodings of what was about to happen. dick had already gathered from the natives that the guard of the waggons was an extremely small one, and, as the body moving to attack them were between 4000 and 5000 strong, the chance of a successful resistance appeared small.
when within a short distance of the waggons two of the zulus motioned to the boys to stop. in ten minutes they heard a sentry challenge; his shout was answered by a loud yell, and the zulus poured down to the attack. unfortunately captain moriarty had not taken sufficient precaution against surprise, and before the men were fairly under arms the zulus were upon them.
the force on the other side of the river were now on the alert, and their rifle-fire opened before that of the defenders of the waggons. for a moment or two there was a sharp rattling fire from the waggons; then there were shouts and screams, the firing ceased, and the boys knew that the laager had been captured. many of the soldiers indeed were assegaied before they could leave their tents, most were slaughtered at once, but a few managed to swim across the river. the zulus swarmed after them. lieutenant harwood jumped upon his horse and rode off to luneberg to fetch assistance. the little detachment was broken by the rush of the zulus, but a serjeant and eight men fell back into a deserted kraal, and succeeded in repelling the attacks of the enemy.
lieutenant harwood was afterwards tried by court-martial for his conduct; he was acquitted, but the general in command refused to confirm the verdict, and the commander-in-chief at home approved of the view he took of the matter, and issued a general order to the effect that “an officer, being the only one present with a party of soldiers actually engaged with the enemy, is not under any pretext whatever justified in deserting them, and thus by so doing abandoning them to their fate.”
apprehensive of the arrival of reinforcements from luneberg, umbelleni did not continue his attack upon the little party in the kraal, but, after hastily plundering the waggons, retreated with his force, and the next day returned to zlobani.
a few days passed and the boys learnt that two regiments from ulundi were expected shortly to reinforce umbelleni’s men. the chief himself, with the majority of his followers, was now at his kraal, four miles distant, but the boys remained in the village on the zlobani plateau. several times they saw parties of british horse riding over the plains and from a distance reconnoitring the position, and they wondered whether there could be any intention on the part of colonel wood to attack it. there was on the plateau a large number of cattle, part the property of umbelleni’s men, but the great majority spoil taken in raids. it seemed to the boys that an attack could scarcely be successful. the sides of the mountains were extremely precipitous, covered with bush, and contained large numbers of caves. there was but one path up which mounted men could ride; this was about hallway along the west side, the hill being a much greater length from north to south than from east to west. up the southern extremity of the plateau was a path by which footmen could descend to the plain, but it was exceedingly steep and altogether impracticable for cavalry; a handful of men should have been able to hold the position against an army.
colonel wood having heard of the large quantity of cattle concealed on the zlobani mountain had determined to attack it, and at three o’clock in the morning of the 27th of march a cavalry party started. it consisted of 150 mounted infantry; the frontier light horse, 125; raaff’s troop, 50; piet-uys’ boer contingent, 50; wetherby’s horse, 80; schermbrucker’s horse, 40;—a total of 495 men. they were commanded by colonel russell, and colonel wood was himself to join them in the evening. the party was a picked one, all being well mounted and good rifle-shots.
the track led across a rough sandy country with deep nullahs, and thickly covered with trees and bush. at five o’clock they halted for half an hour, and then again advanced. after five miles’ travelling across a very rough country they came out into a large cultivated flat, which terminated in a long, dark, winding gorge, black with bush and skirted by precipices of sandstone and granite. they turned into this and followed a rivulet until they came to the end of the gorge, where they discovered a steep path which seemed cut out of the solid rock, and was only wide enough for one horseman to pass. after three quarters of an hour’s climbing they gained the summit. the country was wild in the extreme. the plateau upon which they found themselves extended for seven or eight miles. huge masses of scrub and boulders, peaks, terraces, and ledges of rock appeared everywhere, while caves and immense fissures formed retreats for the cattle. it was now late in the afternoon, and the force bivouacked for the night, having brought with them three days’ provisions. at seven in the evening colonel wood joined them with his staff, eight mounted men of the 50th regiment and six natives under untongo, a son of pongo, a friendly chief. untongo had by some means obtained information that seven strong regiments had marched from ulundi seven days before, and was most anxious that the column should return to kambula.
colonel wood, however, could not carry out this advice, for colonels buller and wetherby and piet-uys, with their commands, who were in front, had moved forward a long distance, and a retreat now would leave them to be surrounded and cut off. the troops lay down and slept, and at half-past three o’clock again prepared to advance. distant shots were heard, showing that colonel buller was attacked, and just as the party was setting off, colonel wetherby with his troopers rode in, having in the night got separated from buller’s men in the wild and broken country. as the troops advanced they came here and there across the bodies of zulus, showing that buller had had to fight his way. captain ronald campbell ascended a rock and scanned the country with his glass. far away, almost in the centre of the gigantic and apparently inaccessible cliff of zlobani, the remains of buller’s column could be seen slowly advancing, driving some dark masses of cattle and zulus before them.
colonel wetherby obtained permission to lead his men on at once to buller’s assistance, while colonel wood followed with the remainder of the force. wetherby moved by a terribly difficult path to the right, while wood kept to what seemed the main track. about half a mile further the latter came on a party of 200 zulus, armed with rifles; these crossed in front of him, taking an occasional shot at the leading files of the party, who on account of the difficulties of the road were compelled to dismount and lead their horses. their object was evidently to cut off wetherby’s troop from the main column. lieutenant lysons, leaving the column, reconnoitred the ground, and found that wetherby’s party was already divided from them by a deep and impassable ravine, at the bottom of which was the pathway by which buller had made his way to the summit of the cliff. a strong party of zulus were seen faraway in front, working as if to cut off buller’s horse. it was clear that there was nothing to do but to press forward in hopes that the line taken by wetherby and that which the main column was following would come together.
at this moment a heavy fire was opened by a party of the enemy from a narrow ledge of rock a hundred yards above them. untongo and two of his men guided a party of eight marksmen to a still higher point, and their fire speedily drove off the zulus. half an hour’s march brought wood upon wetherby’s track, and high above them to the right the rear of buller’s column could be seen. no more unsuitable ground for the operation of mounted men could be found; perpendicular rocks rose in all directions, while steep precipices fell away at their feet. killed and wounded horses were seen at every turn of the road, showing how stoutly the enemy had held their ground, and how difficult an operation buller had performed. sending fifty men to work upon the right flank and endeavour to take the zulus in the rear, colonel wood kept his men for a few moments under cover of a friendly ledge of rocks, to take breath and look to their rifles, girths, and ammunition, and then pressed rapidly forward and joined the border horse.
the scene was now most exciting. the firing was almost continuous, and the yells of the savages rose from every rock and bush, mingled with the loud cheers of buller’s men far up in front, as they saw the column approaching to their aid. the ground was now more level and practicable for riding, and colonel wood mounted his horse and, accompanied by his own little escort of a dozen men and the border horse under colonel wetherby himself, with his gallant boy, aged fifteen, who was fighting by his side, galloped forward for the front, leaving colonel russell in command of the column. when within a hundred paces of the summit of the cliff a rain of fire opened upon their front and flank from a mass of zulus firing from caves, crevices, and behind enormous boulders. from one cave to the right front an excessively heavy fire was kept up, and colonel wetherby dashed at this with his men just as colonel wood’s horse staggered from a deep assegai wound in the chest. at the same moment a native from behind a boulder fired at that officer at ten paces’ distance; the bullet missed him and lieutenant lloyd rode at the man, but fell, shot through the head. colonel wood and captain ronald campbell rode forward to cover his body. two more zulus fired at the same instant and the colonel’s horse fell dead. colonel wetherby’s men were hotly engaged at close quarters with the zulus, and were unable to join the colonel. captain campbell, lieutenant lysons, and the eight 90th men of the escort rushed at the opening. captain campbell fell, shot through the head, but the rest dashed forward.
there was a movement in the cave and a sudden shout in english of “come on!” and as the little band dashed in and fell upon the zulus they saw, to their astonishment, two english boys, armed with assegais, attacking these in the rear. in another minute the zulus were all cut down, and the party returned to colonel wood.
on the previous afternoon zulu scouts had arrived at zlobani with the news that an english column was on its way towards it. messengers were despatched to umbelleni’s kraal, and at night his force there came to the assistance of those at zlobani. early in the morning the boys proceeded with a number of zulus to the edge of the plateau, and were placed with eight of their guards in a cave. from its mouth they watched anxiously the events of the day.
colonel buller’s party had struck upon the right road, and after hard fighting gained the summit of the cliff. here a great quantity of cattle were collected, and these were sent off in charge of a body of friendly natives, which accompanied the force. this column in the advance had not passed near the cave in which the boys were placed. their hearts beat high as they saw colonel wood’s column suddenly turn off from the line which buller had followed, and make straight for it. their excitement grew higher and higher as the conflict increased in vigour.
soon the zulus in the cave were at work. when captain campbell charged forward with his handful of men, dick and tom exchanged a glance. they stood quiet until it was evident that the english attack would be pushed home; then, as the men of the 90th, led by lysons, dashed at the entrance of the cavern, the boys seized two assegais and each pinned one of the crouching zulus to the ground. before the others could turn round upon them lysons and his men were among them.
the fire of buller’s men from above drove the zulus from their hiding-places. but colonel wood, finding it impossible to make his way up at this point, moved round at the foot of the rocks, to try and find the point at which buller had ascended the cliff. before doing so, however, the bodies of captain campbell and lieutenant lloyd were carried down the hill, and buried in a hastily-made grave. as, carrying their wounded men, the little party made their way to the foot of the cliff, untongo, who had been reconnoitring the rocks on both sides, ran down to him and began to talk rapidly, pointing over towards the plain.
colonel wood did not understand kaffir, but dick, who was standing by, said—
“he says, sir, that there is a great zulu army marching below.”
colonel wood mounted a fresh horse, and making his way with great difficulty across some broken ground reached a point where he could see the plain. there, in five continuous columns, the zulu army from ulundi, 20,000 strong, was sweeping along at its usual rapid pace. it was evident at once that only by a speedy retreat could any of the force hope to escape. colonel wood despatched a message at once to colonel russell, who had with his force by this time commenced the ascent at the extreme westerly point, to retrace his steps instantly, and to cover as far as possible the retreat of the native allies with the cattle.
colonel buller above had also seen the coming danger. so far he had accomplished his work admirably. the zulu position had been triumphantly stormed, and a large number of cattle taken and driven off.
had colonel wood’s force and wetherby’s troop arrived on the scene of action immediately after buller had ascended to the plateau, the retreat could have been made in time, and the expedition would have been successful at all points. the unfortunate incident of their losing the track, the delay caused thereby, and their inability to rejoin him had given time for the ulundi army to come up.
colonel buller found that it was impossible now to descend to the plain by the path by which he had ascended. not only would he have to fight his way back through the whole force of umbelleni, but his retreat by that route would be cut off by the ulundi men. consequently, pursued by a great body of exulting zulus, he made his way along the plateau to the steep path at its extremity.
the scene here was terrible. the zulus blocked the way in front and lined both sides. buller himself, with piet-uys, defended the rear, assisting the wounded, and often charging desperately into the ranks of the zulus pressing upon him. the path was slippery with blood and strewn with dead. as the last of his troop made their way down it, piet-uys, a most gallant dutchman, fell dead across the body of his horse, with six zulus, whom he had shot with his revolver, around him.
wetherby’s troop was surrounded, and forty-five out of his eighty men killed. the colonel himself and his boy both fell, the latter refusing to leave his father, although the latter urged him to gallop off and join the column, which appeared to be making its way through the zulus. colonel russell’s command got through without so much opposition; but buller’s horse, piet-uys’ troop, and wetherby’s command suffered terribly.
fortunately the ulundi army did not follow the retreat; first, because the tremendous three days’ march which they had made had in a great measure exhausted the men, who had started in such haste that they had brought no provisions with them, and secondly, on account of the steady attitude and resolute bearing of russell’s command.
buller’s force reached kambula camp at half-past seven at night. it had set in stormy, and torrents of rain were falling. although he had been in the saddle for forty-eight hours, colonel buller, on hearing that a small party of the survivors had taken refuge in hiding ten miles away, collected a party of volunteers, and, taking led horses, set out to rescue them. this was effected; the fugitives were found to be seven in number, and returned with their rescuers safely to camp.
the boys had both escaped, two of wetherby’s men, who accompanied colonel wood, taking them on their saddles behind them. the total loss was ten officers and seventy-eight men.
for the night the boys were handed over to the charge of one of the officers of the staff, but in the morning colonel wood sent for them, and they then told him the story of their adventures since the battle of isandula, with which he was greatly interested. he said that he would at once have sent them to utrecht, but that the camp would probably be attacked during the day.
the troops had been on the alert all night, expecting an attack. before daylight captain raaff was sent out with twenty-five men to reconnoitre, and returned with one of oham’s natives. this man had joined the zulu army as it advanced, and was, fortunately for himself, not recognised by them as being one of oham’s people. in the night he had slipped away. he reported the zulus 20,000 strong, a great portion of them being armed with rifles.
fortunately little preparation was necessary at kambula. nothing had been left to chance here, and there was therefore no fear of a repetition of the isandula disaster. each corps, each subdivision, each section, and each man had his place allotted to him, and had been told to be in that place at the sound of the bugle.
the little fort was in a strong position, laid out upon an elevated narrow reach of table-land. a precipice, inaccessible to a white man, guarded the right flank; on the left a succession of steep terraces had been utilised and carefully intrenched, each successive line commanding that below it. at one end there was a narrow slip of land swept by two 7-pounders. immediately in the rear, upon an eminence 120 feet higher than the fort, was a small work, armed with two guns. the camp consisted of an outer defence of 100 waggons, and an inner one of fifty—the whole protected by earthworks and ditches.
