methods of exercising command

i. defence against invasion

in methods of exercising command are included all operations not directly concerned with securing command or with preventing its being secured by the enemy. we engage in exercising command whenever we conduct operations which are directed not against the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea communications for our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use of them. such operations, though logically of secondary importance, have always occupied the larger part of naval warfare. naval warfare does not begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even with breaking his cruiser power. beyond all this there is the actual work of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the passage of our own military expeditions. there is also the obstruction of his trade and the protection of our own. in all such operations we are concerned with the exercise of command. we are using the sea, or interfering with its use by the enemy; we are not endeavouring to secure the use or to prevent the enemy from securing it. the two categories of operation differ radically in conception and purpose, and strategically they are on wholly different planes.

logically, of course, operations for exercising command [pg 234] should follow those for securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment of command is the special object of naval warfare, and since that command can only be obtained permanently by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, it follows that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme end of securing command by destruction. war, however, is not conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice. we have seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow operations for securing command. war being, as it is, a complex sum of naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which strategical problems can be solved by well-turned syllogisms. the naval factor can never ignore the others. from the outset one or more of them will always call for some act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical progression. to a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning.

hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic forms of naval activity. in the hurry and stress of war confusion between them is easy. by keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at least what we are doing. we can judge how far any given operation that may be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve the other. by applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided. the risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and of set purpose. above all, it will enable the staff to settle clearly for each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, [pg 235] and what the object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. it is above all in this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction.

this will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the exercise of control. of all the current assumptions, not one is so confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. of the battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. it is true, that is, of all operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control it is not true. in the case we have now to consider-defence against invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been, the enemy's army. on this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting invasion have always been constructed from the year of the armada to 1805.

in the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established. admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports are the "principal object." the whole disposition of the fleet during hawke's blockade in 1759 was based on keeping a firm hold on the transports in the morbihan, and when he sought to extend his operations against the rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by anson that "the principal object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the interception of the embarkations of the enemy at morbihan," and secondly, "the keeping of the ships of war from coming out of brest." similarly commodore warren [pg 236] in 1796, when he had the permanent frigate guard before brest, issued orders to his captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports under escort they were "to run them down or destroy them in the most expeditious manner possible previous to attacking the ships of war, but to preserve such a situation as to effect that purpose when directed by signal." lord keith's orders when watching napoleon's flotilla were to the same effect. "directing your chief attention," they run, "to the destruction of the ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board (in preference to that of the vessels by which they are protected), and in the strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance to which every other consideration must give way."22

in tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. the army was the primary objective round which all dispositions turned. in the french service the strength and soundness of the british practice was understood at least by the best men. when in 1805 napoleon consulted ganteaume as to the possibility of the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by evasion, the admiral told him it was impossible, since no [pg 237] weather could avail to relax the british hold sufficiently. "in former wars," he said, "the english vigilance was miraculous."

to this rule there was no exception, not even when circumstances rendered it difficult to distinguish between the enemy's fleet and army as objectives. this situation could occur in two ways. firstly, when the invading army was designed to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of napoleon's invasion of egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of defence forced the fleet to come up to the army's line of passage in order to clear it, as happened in the case of the armada and the french attempt of 1744.

in the latter case the invading army, whose objective was unknown, was at dunkirk, and a french fleet was coming up the channel to cover the passage. sir john norris, in command of the home fleet, was in the downs. though his name is now almost forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval tradition, and a strategist of the first order. in informing the government of his plan of operations, he said he intended to proceed with his whole squadron off dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. "but," he says, "if they should unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go northward, i intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them; and with the remainder of my squadron either to fight the french fleet now in the channel, [pg 238] or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or i shall pursue the embarkation with all my strength." in this case there had been no time to organise a special squadron or flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and the battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. this being so, norris was not going to allow the presence of an enemy's battle-fleet to entice him away from his grip on the invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to direct his offensive against them, while he merely contained the enemy's battle-fleet by defensive observation.

in the egyptian case there was no distinction between the two objectives at all. napoleon's expedition sailed in one mass. yet in the handling of his fleet nelson preserved the essential idea. he organised it into three "sub-squadrons," one of six sail and two of four each. "two of these sub-squadrons," says berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to make sure of napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and possibly only eight, of his own battleships against the eleven of the enemy.

[pg 239]

many other examples could be given of british insistence on making the enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet in cases of invasion. no point in the old tradition was more firmly established. its value was of course more strongly marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy endeavoured to act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or preventive line, and where consequently for our own fleet there was no confusion between the two objectives. this was the normal case, and the reason it was so is simple enough. it may be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the general principle upon which our traditional system of defence was based.

an invasion of great britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded sea. it may be that our fleet predominates or it may be that it does not, but the command must always be in dispute. if we have gained complete command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted. if we have lost it completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart from the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best terms we can get. now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are obviously two ways in which an invasion may be attempted. firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it through our naval defence with transports and fleet in one mass. this was the primitive idea on which the spanish invasion of philip the second was originally planned by his famous admiral, santa-cruz. ripening military science, however, was able to convince him of its weakness. a mass of transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable [pg 240] engine of war ever known. the weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. where contact with the enemy's fleet is certain, and particularly in narrow seas, as it was in this case, such a course will give the defender all the chances he could desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, provided always we resolutely determine to make the army in its transports our main objective, and are not to be induced to break our head against its escort.

where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an uncommanded sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's battle-fleet, as it did in the case of napoleon's invasion of egypt. but that operation belongs to an entirely different category from that which we are now considering. none of the factors on which the traditional system of british defence is based were present. it was an operation over an open sea against a distant and undetermined objective that had no naval defence of its own, whereas in our own case the determining factors are permanent naval defence, an approximately determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any force of invasion strength is impossible. napoleon's exploit was in fact nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade which had no naval defence beyond it. the vital importance of these things will appear as we proceed and note the characteristics which marked every attempt to invade england. from such attempts we of course exclude the various descents upon ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into another class, to be dealt with hereafter.

since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength of a powerful battleship escort has always been rejected as an inadmissible operation, the invader has had no choice but to adopt a separate line for his army, and operate with his fleet in such a way as may promise to prevent the enemy controlling that line. that, in short, is the problem of invasion over [pg 241] an uncommanded sea. in spite of an unbroken record of failure scored at times with naval disaster, continental strategists from parma to napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is a solution short of a complete fleet decision. they have tried every conceivable expedient again and again. they have tried it by simple surprise evasion and by evasion through diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. they have tried it by seeking local control through a local naval success prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet away from home waters to a sufficient extent to give them temporarily local superiority. but the end has always been the same. try as they would, they were faced ultimately by one of two alternatives—they must either defeat our covering battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their own battle-fleet on the transports, and so set up the very situation which it was their main design to avoid.

the truth is, that all attempts to invade england without command of the sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which no escape was ever found. no matter how ingenious or complex the enemy's design, a determined hold on their army as the primary naval objective has always set up a process of degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. its stages are distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it were diagrammatically as follows:—

two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading army is gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast to be invaded; that is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, and where the army's passage will be exposed to interference for the shortest time. the covering fleet will operate from a point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the enemy as far as possible from the army's line of passage. the [pg 242] defender replies by blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by establishing a mobile defence of the threatened coasts which transports cannot break unaided, or more probably he will combine both expedients. the first fallacy of the invasion plan is then apparent. the narrower the sea, the easier it is to watch. pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is necessary to give the transports sufficient armed strength by escort or otherwise to protect them against flotilla attack. the defender at once stiffens his flotilla defence with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has to arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. so weak and disturbing a position is then set up that the whole scheme begins to give way, if, that is, the defender has clung stubbornly to the strategy we always used. our battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. it has always held a position between the invader's fleet and the blockaded invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla defence. to enable a battle-squadron to break our hold and to reinforce the army escort, the invader must either force this covering position by battle, or disturb it so effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade it. but since ex hypothesi he is trying to invade without securing the command by battle, he will first try to reinforce his transport escort by evasion. at once he is faced with new difficulty. the reinforcement entails dividing his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and disturbing to morale, that no invader has ever been found to risk it. and for this reason. to make evasion possible for the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest of his force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and thus unless he is in very great superiority, and by hypothesis is not—he runs the hazard of having his two divisions beaten in detail. this method has sometimes been urged by governments, but so loud have been the protests both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been dropped, and the invader finds himself [pg 243] at the end of the vicious circle. unable to reinforce his transport escort sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is forced to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the attempt till command shall have been secured by battle.

thus the traditional british system has never failed to bring about the deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded on making the invading army the primary objective. we keep a hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade and defence stiffened as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and secondly, by battle-fleet cover. it is on the flotilla hold that the whole system is built up. it is the local danger to that hold which determines the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and it is the security of that hold which determines the position and action of the battle-fleet.

a few typical examples will serve to show how the system worked in practice under all kinds of conditions. the first scientific attempt to work on two lines of operation, as distinguished from the crude mass methods of the middle ages, was the spanish enterprise of 1588. though internal support from catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a true invasion, that is, a continuing operation for permanent conquest. parma, the military commander-in-chief, laid it down that the spanish fleet would have not only to protect his passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his communications for the flow of provisions and munition."

[pg 244]

in advising the dual line of operation, parma's original intention was to get his army across by surprise. as always, however, it proved impossible to conceal the design, and long before he was ready he found himself securely blockaded by a dutch flotilla supported by an english squadron. so firm indeed was the english hold on the army, that for a time it was overdone. the bulk of the english fleet was kept on the line of passage under howard, while drake alone was sent to the westward. it was only under the great sailor's importunity that the disposition, which was to become traditional, was perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a covering position to the westward. the normal situation was then set up, and it could only have one result. surprise was out of the question. parma could not move till the blockade was broken, nor in face of the covering fleet could the spanish fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. the vague prospects the spaniards had conceived of keeping the english fleet away from the line of passage by threatening a descent in the west country or blockading it in a western port would no longer do. no such expedient would release parma, and the duke of medina-sidonia was ordered to proceed direct to dunkirk if possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and secure the passage.

there was some idea in the king's mind that he would be able to do this without a battle, but parma and every seasoned spanish sailor knew that the english fleet would have to be totally defeated before the transports could venture out of port. such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the english dispositions secured that the spaniards would have to fight it [pg 245] under every disadvantage which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. the english would secure certain contact at such a distance from the line of passage as would permit prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to the enemy and close to their own sources of support and supply. no battle to the death would be necessary until the spaniards were herded into the confined and narrow waters which the army's passage demanded, and where both sections of the british fleet would be massed for the final struggle. they must arrive there dispirited with indecisive actions and with the terrors of unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. all this was no matter of chance. it was inherent in the strategical and geographical conditions. the english dispositions had taken every advantage of them, and the result was that not only was the spanish army unable even to move, but the english advantages in the final battle were so great, that it was only a lucky shift of wind that saved the armada from being driven to total destruction upon the dutch banks.

in this case, of course, there had been ample time to make the necessary dispositions. it will be well to follow it with an example in which surprise came as near to being complete as it is possible to conceive, and where the arrangements for defence had to be improvised on the spur of the moment.

a case in point was the french attempt of 1744. in that year everything was in favour of the invader. england was undermined with jacobite sedition; scotland was restless and threatening; the navy had sunk to what is universally regarded as its worst for spirit, organisation, and command; and the government was in the hands of the notorious "drunken administration." for three years we had been making unsuccessful war with spain, and had been supporting [pg 246] maria theresa on the continent against france, with the result that our home defence was reduced to its lowest ebb. the navy then numbered 183 sail—about equal to that of france and spain combined—but owing to the strain of the war in the mediterranean and transatlantic stations only forty-three, including eighteen of the line, were available for home waters. even counting all cruising ships "within call," as the phrase then was, the government had barely one-fourth of the fleet at hand to meet the crisis. with the land forces it was little better. considerably more than half the home army was abroad with the king, who was assisting the empress-queen as elector of hanover. between france and england, however, there was no war. in the summer the king won the battle of dettingen; a formal alliance with maria theresa followed in the autumn; france responded with a secret alliance with spain; and to prevent further british action on the continent, she resolved to strike a blow at london in combination with a jacobite insurrection. it was to be a "bolt from the blue" before declaration and in mid-winter, when the best ships of the home fleet were laid up. the operation was planned on dual lines, the army to start from dunkirk, the covering fleet from brest.

the surprise was admirably designed. the port of dunkirk had been destroyed under the treaty of utrecht in 1713, and though the french had been restoring it secretly for some time, it was still unfit to receive a fleet of transports. in spite of the warnings of sir john norris, the senior admiral in the service, the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from the french army in flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter quarters, and that no suspicion might be [pg 247] aroused the necessary transports were secretly taken up in other ports under false charter-parties, and were only to assemble off dunkirk at the last moment. with equal skill the purpose of the naval mobilisation at brest was concealed. by false information cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling for a long voyage, the british government was led to believe that the main fleet was intended to join the spaniards in the mediterranean, while a detachment, which was designed to escort the transports, was ostensibly equipped for a raid in the west indies.

so far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was perfect. yet it contained within it the fatal ingredient. the army was to strike in the thames at tilbury; but complete as was the secrecy, marshal saxe, who was to command, could not face the passage without escort. there were too many privateers and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. the division, therefore, which we supposed to be for the west indies was to be detached from the brest fleet after it entered the channel and was to proceed to join the transports off dunkirk, while the marquis de roquefeuil with the main fleet held what british ships might be ready in portsmouth either by battle or blockade.

nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. the british government seemed quite asleep. the blow was timed for the first week in january, and it was mid-december before they even began to watch brest with cruisers regularly. on these cruisers' reports measures were taken to prepare an equal squadron for sea by the new year. by this time nearly [pg 248] twenty of the line were ready or nearly so at the nore, portsmouth, and plymouth, and a press was ordered to man them. owing to various causes the french had now to postpone their venture. finally it was not till february 6th that roquefeuil was seen to leave brest with nineteen of the line. the news reached london on the 12th, and next day norris was ordered to hoist his flag at spithead. his instructions were "to take the most effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms." it was nothing but news that the young pretender had left rome for france that led to this precaution. the government had still no suspicion of what was brewing at dunkirk. it was not till the 20th that a dover smuggler brought over information which at last opened their eyes.

a day or two later the french transports were seen making for dunkirk, and were mistaken for the brest fleet. orders were consequently sent down to norris to follow them. in vain he protested at the interference. he knew the french were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, and he had to go. tiding it up-channel against easterly winds, he reached the downs and joined the nore division there on the 28th. history usually speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country from invasion. but it was not so. saxe had determined not to face the thames ships without escort. they were ample to destroy him had he done so. in truth the move which the government forced on norris spoilt the campaign and prevented his destroying the brest fleet as well as stopping the invasion.

roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the start. [pg 249] he was instructed by all possible means to bring the main british fleet to action, or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach the special division of four of the line under admiral barraille to dunkirk to escort the transports. it was in fact the inevitable order, caused by our hold on the army, to divide the fleet. both officers as usual began to be upset, and as with medina-sidonia, they decided to keep company till they reached the isle of wight and remain there till they could get touch with saxe and pilots for the dover strait. they were beset with the nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation. roquefeuil explained to his government that it was impossible to tell what ships the enemy had passed to the downs, and that barraille when he arrived off dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority. he ended in the usual way by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage. on arriving off portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led him to believe that the whole of norris's fleet was still there, and he therefore detached barraille, who reached dunkirk in safety.

not knowing that norris was in the downs, saxe began immediately to embark his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction by an attack which norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla of fireships and bomb vessels.

the brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. saxe and his staff having heard rumours of norris's movement to the downs had become seized with the sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the dangers [pg 250] of an uncommanded passage. they too wanted the whole fleet to escort them, and orders had been sent to roquefeuille to do as he had suggested. all unconscious of norris's presence in the downs with a score of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had still with his flag to close on barraille. norris was informed of his approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already quoted, for dealing with the situation.

"as i think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his majesty's service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, i have ... determined to anchor without the sands of dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." that is, he determined to keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as saxe's objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "but if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night and go northward [that is, for scotland], i intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my squadron either fight the french fleet now in the channel, or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or i shall pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my strength." this meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the king.

as to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the rochefort squadron had joined roquefeuille. the doubt was quickly settled. on the morrow he heard that roquefeuille was at dungeness with only fifteen of [pg 251] the line. in a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior position which roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. with admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage. the movement was made immediately. the moment the french were sighted "general chase" was signalled, and roquefeuille was within an ace of being surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. the calm was succeeded by another furious gale, in which the french escaped in a disastrous sauve qui peut, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. the outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war.

the whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation. for all the nicely framed plan and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage.

in the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever plan was devised for turning the difficulty. the first idea of marshal belleisle, like that of napoleon, was to gather the army at ambleteuse and boulogne, and to avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the strait by stealth in flat boats. but this idea was abandoned before it had gone [pg 252] very far for something much more subtle. the fallacious advantage of a short passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated points all in more open waters—a diversionary raid from dunkirk and two more formidable forces from havre and the morbihan in south brittany. to secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the brest fleet from the mediterranean and the west indies.

the new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet—that is, the western squadron off brest—would have two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it. difficult as the situation looked, it was solved on the old lines. the two divisions of the french army at dunkirk and morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at havre, which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well supported. its case was hopeless. it could not move without a squadron to release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from brest. hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the channel. with the morbihan force it was different. any time that hawke was blown off a squadron could reach it from brest and break the cruiser blockade. the french government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to make the attempt. conflans however, who was in command, protested his force was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration. boscawen had caught and beaten the mediterranean squadron off lagos, and though the west indian squadron got in, it proved, as in napoleon's great plan of concentration, unfit for further service. the old situation had arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end [pg 253] there was nothing for it but for conflans to take his whole fleet to the morbihan transports. hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of quiberon was the result. the dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing any harm. its escort, after landing its handful of troops in ireland, was entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the french to invade over an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet.

the project of 1779 marked these principles even more strongly, for it demonstrated them working even when our home fleet was greatly inferior to that of the enemy. in this case the invader's idea was to form two expeditionary forces at cherbourg and havre, and under cover of an overwhelming combination of the spanish and french fleets, to unite them at sea and seize portsmouth and the isle of wight. it was in the early summer we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser squadrons and flotillas were at once formed at the downs and channel islands to watch the french coasts and prevent the concentration of transports. spain had not yet declared war, but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran sir charles hardy, who had been norris's second in command in 1744, was ordered to proceed off brest and prevent any spanish squadron that might appear from entering that port. the french, however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea before hardy could reach his station and forming a junction with the spaniards off finisterre. the combined fleet contained about fifty of the line, [pg 254] nearly double our own. the army of invasion, with dumouriez for its chief of the staff, numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no condition to meet ashore. everything, therefore, was in favour of success, and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of confidence prevailed that no invasion could take place.

the brains of the naval defence were lord barham (then sir charles middleton) at the admiralty and kempenfelt as chief of the staff in the fleet; and it is to their correspondence at this time that we owe some of the most valuable strategical appreciations we possess. the idea of the french was to come into the channel in their overwhelming force, and while they destroyed or held hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to break the cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. kempenfelt was confident that it could not be done. he was sure that the unwieldy combined mass could be rendered powerless by his comparatively homogeneous and mobile fleet, inferior as it was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the westward. the appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which he wrote at this time has already been given.23 when the worst of the position was fully known, and the enemy was reported off the mouth of the channel, he wrote another to middleton. his only doubt was whether his fleet had the necessary cohesion and mobility. "we don't seem," he said, "to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the comparative force of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. the fleet that sails fastest has much the advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so have always in [pg 255] their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack. i think i may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line coppered would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy combined armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, hanging continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation from night, gale or fog, to dart upon the separated, to cut off convoys of provisions coming to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige their whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would be impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet."

here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of the solution—the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy's fleet to escort the transports. hardy, of course, knew it well from his experience of 1744, and acted accordingly. this case is the more striking, since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the problem he had to solve. it was complicated by instructions that he must also prevent a possible descent on ireland, and cover the arrival of the great convoys. in reply, on august 1st, he announced his intention of taking station ten to twenty leagues w.s.w. of scilly, "which i am of opinion," he said, "is the most proper station for the security of the trade expected from the east and west indies, and for the meeting of the fleets of the enemy should they attempt to come into the channel." he underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the westward and undefeated. this at least he did, till a month later he found it [pg 256] necessary to come in for supplies. then, still avoiding the enemy, he ran not to plymouth, but right up to st. helen's. the movement is always regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the fleet at the time. but it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary objective. if hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the invader's line of passage. so long as he was there, invasion could not take place till he was defeated. the allies, it was true, were now free to join their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the spaniards were served in 1588. "i shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive them up the channel." it is the old principle. if the worst comes to the worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation beyond the endurable risks of war.

so it proved. on august 14th count d'orvilliers, the allied commander-in-chief, had made the lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to bring hardy to decisive action. until he had done so he dared neither enter the channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the invasion bases. his ineffectual efforts exhausted his fleet's endurance, which the distant concentration at finisterre had [pg 257] already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to brest before anything had been accomplished. the allies were not able to take the sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so, hardy and kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely, and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a paralysing blow.

there was never any real chance of success, though it is true dumouriez thought otherwise. he believed the enterprise might have gone through if a diversion had been made by the bulk of the fleet against ireland, and under cover of it a coup de main delivered upon the isle of wight, "for which," he said, "six or eight of the line would have been enough." but it is inconceivable that old hands like hardy and kempenfelt would have been so easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage. had such a division been detached up the channel from the allied fleet they would surely, according to tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or their whole squadron.

the well-known projects of the great war followed the same course. under napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of every scheme that ever raised delusive hope before. beginning from the beginning with the idea of stealing his army across in flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla defence. then came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. we replied by strengthening our flotilla. convinced by experiment that his scheme was now impracticable, he set his mind on breaking the blockade by the sudden intrusion of a flying squadron from a distance. to this end various plausible schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in his hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of bringing an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. the experience of two centuries had taught him nothing. by a more distant concentration than [pg 258] had ever been attempted before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his enemy. the only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet that it never could get within reach of the real difficulties of its task, a task which every admiral in his service knew to be beyond the strength of the imperial navy. nor did napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he had set himself—invasion over an uncommanded sea. with our impregnable flotilla hold covered by an automatic concentration of battle-squadrons off ushant, his army could never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command of the sea, and with absolute control of the sea the passage of an army presents no difficulties.

of the working of these principles under modern conditions we have no example. the acquisition of free movement must necessarily modify their application, and since the advent of steam there have been only two invasions over uncommanded seas—that of the crimea in 1854, and that of manchuria in 1904—and neither of these cases is in point, for in neither was there any attempt at naval defence. still there seems no reason to believe that such defence applied in the old manner would be less effective than formerly. the flotilla was its basis, and since the introduction of the torpedo the power of the flotilla has greatly increased. its real and moral effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, and the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more restricted. mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid coup de main against any important port almost an impossibility. in the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical considerations we must turn for light.

theoretically stated, the success of our old system of defence depended on four relations. firstly, there is the relation between the rapidity with which an invasion force could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity with which restlessness [pg 259] in foreign ports and places d'armes could be reported; that is to say, the chance of surprise and evasion are as the speed of preparation to the speed of intelligence.

secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to the speed of cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability to get contact with a convoy after it has put to sea and before the expedition can be disembarked is as the speed of our cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy.

thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power of modern cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or weakly escorted and the corresponding power in sailing days.

fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys and the speed of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where the enemy's transports are likely to be strongly escorted. on this relation depends the facility with which the battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can complete its passage and effect the landing.

all these relations appear to have been modified by modern developments in favour of the defence. in the first ratio, that of speed of mobilisation to speed of intelligence, it is obviously so. although military mobilisation may be still relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet intelligence has outstripped both. this is true both for gaining and for conveying intelligence. preparations for oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they caused. elaborate precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. yet formerly, in the condition of comparative crudeness with which international trade was then organised, concealment was relatively easy, at least for a time. but the ever-growing sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements are reported from hour to [pg 260] hour instead of from week to week, has greatly increased the difficulty. and apart from the rapidity with which information may be gathered through this alert and intimate sympathy between exchanges, there is the still more important fact that with wireless the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a far higher ratio than the speed of sea transit.

as regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on which evasion so much depends, it is the same. in frigate days the ratio appears to have been not more than seven to five. now in the case at any rate of large convoys it would be nearly double.

of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does from year to year, enough has been said already. with the advent of the torpedo and submarine it has probably increased tenfold. in a lesser degree the same is true of cruisers. in former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure a dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her relatively low excess of speed and the restricted range and destructive power of her guns. with higher speed and higher energy and range in gun power the ability of cruisers to cut up a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost certain if once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known before.

the increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large convoys is equally indisputable and no less important, for the facility of finding interior positions which it implies goes to the root of the old system. so long as our battle-fleet is in a position whence it can cover our flotilla blockade or strike the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his battle-fleet in the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of invasion.

from whatever point of view, then, we regard the future chances of successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it [pg 261] would seem that not only does the old system hold good, but that all modern developments which touch the question bid fair to intensify the results which our sea service at least used so confidently to expect, and which it never failed to secure.

ii. attack and defence of trade

the base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be summed up in the old adage, "where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together." the most fertile areas always attracted the strongest attack, and therefore required the strongest defence; and between the fertile and the infertile areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical purposes was definite and constant. the fertile areas were the terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge. the infertile areas were the great routes which passed through the focal points and connected the terminal areas. consequently attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. it may be terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more profitable, but demanding the greater force and risk, and pelagic attack being the more uncertain, but involving less force and risk.

these considerations lead us directly to the paradox which underlies the unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise decisive pressure upon us by operations against our trade. it is that where attack is most to be feared, there defence is easiest. a plan of war which has the destruction of trade for its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority at sea. had he superiority, his object would be to convert that superiority to a working command by battle or blockade. except, therefore, in the rare cases where the opposed forces are equal, we must assume that the belligerent who makes commerce destruction his primary object will have to deal [pg 262] with a superior fleet. now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies mainly in the extent of sea it covers. but, on the other hand, the areas in which it tends to congregate, and in which alone it is seriously vulnerable, are few and narrow, and can be easily occupied if we are in superior force. beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but so also is effective attack. hence the controlling fact of war on commerce, that facility of attack means facility of defence.

beside this fundamental principle we must place another that is scarcely less important. owing to the general common nature of sea communications, attack and defence of trade are so intimately connected that the one operation is almost indistinguishable from the other. both ideas are satisfied by occupying the common communications. the strongest form of attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the establishment of a commercial blockade of the ports they contain. but as this operation usually requires the blockade of an adjacent naval port, it also constitutes, as a rule, a defensive disposition for our own trade, even when the enemy's terminal area does not overlap one of our own. in the occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since most, if not all, such areas are on lines of communication that are common. it will suffice, therefore, to deal with the general aspect of the subject from the point of view of defence.

it was in conformity with the distinction between fertile and infertile areas that our old system of trade defence was developed. broadly speaking, that system was to hold the terminals in strength, and in important cases the focal points as well. by means of a battle-squadron with a full complement of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" as the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them. the intervening trade-routes were left as a rule undefended. thus our home terminals were held [pg 263] by two battle-squadrons, the western squadron at the mouth of the channel, and the north sea or eastern squadron with its headquarters usually in the downs. to these was added a cruiser squadron on the irish station based at cork, which was sometimes subordinate to the western squadron and sometimes an independent organisation. the area of the western squadron in the french wars extended, as we have seen, over the whole bay of biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from the enemy's ports, and acting offensively against his atlantic trade. that of the north sea squadron extended to the mouth of the baltic and the north-about passage. its main function during the great naval coalitions against us was to check the operations of dutch squadrons or to prevent the intrusion of french ones north-about against our baltic trade. like the western squadron, it threw out divisions usually located at yarmouth and leith for the protection of our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers acting from ports within the defended area. similarly, between the downs and the western squadron was usually one or more smaller squadrons, mainly cruisers, and generally located about havre and the channel islands, which served the same purpose for the norman and north breton ports. to complete the system there were flotilla patrols acting under the port admirals and doing their best to police the routes of the coastwise and local traffic, which then had an importance long since lost. the home system of course differed at different times, but it was always on these general lines. the naval defence was supplemented by defended ports of refuge, the principal ones being on the coast of ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others in great numbers were provided within the defended areas against the operations of privateers, and the ruins of batteries all round the british shores testify how complete was the organisation.

a similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there [pg 264] the naval defence consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one or two ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying the flag. they were only occupied by battle-squadrons when the enemy threatened operations with a similar force. the minor or interior defence against local privateers was to a large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla was furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being best adapted for the service.

focal points were not then so numerous as they have become since the development of the far eastern trade. the most important of them, the straits of gibraltar, was treated as a defended area. from the point of view of commerce-protection it was held by the mediterranean squadron. by keeping watch on toulon that squadron covered not only the straits, but also the focal points within the sea. it too had its extended divisions, sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to leghorn, one in the adriatic, a third at malta, and the fourth at gibraltar. in cases of war with spain the latter was very strong, so as to secure the focal area against cartagena and cadiz. on one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have seen, it was constituted for a short time an independent area with a special squadron. but in any case the gibraltar area had its own internal flotilla guard under the direction of the port admiral as a defence against local privateers and pirates.

the general theory of these defended terminal and focal areas, it will be seen, was to hold in force those waters which converging trade made most fertile, and which therefore furnished an adequate field for the operations of raiding squadrons. in spite of the elaborate defensive system, such squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or stealth, and were then able to set at defiance both convoy escorts and the cruiser outposts. but, as experience proved, the system of terminal defence by battle-squadrons made it impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain long enough on the ground [pg 265] to cause any serious interruption or to do serious harm. it was only by a regular fleet of superior strength that the system could be broken down. in other words, the defence could only fall when our means of local control was destroyed by battle.

so much for the defended areas. with regard to the great routes that connected them, it has been said they were left undefended. by this is meant that the security of ships passing along them was provided for, not by patrols but by escort. the convoy system was adopted, and the theory of that system is that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently collected into fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient to repel sporadic attack. in theory, cruiser escort is sufficient, but in practice it was found convenient and economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or returning from it for a refit or some other reason; in other words, the system of foreign reliefs was made to work in with the supplementary escort system. where no such ships were available and the convoys were of great value, or enemy's ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this use of battle units was exceptional.

such a method of dealing with the great routes is the corollary of the idea of defended areas. as those areas were fertile and likely to attract raiding squadrons, so the great routes were infertile, and no enemy could afford to spend squadrons upon them. it is obvious, however, that the system had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a great route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative immunity of those routes was lost. the danger was provided for to a great extent by the fact that the enemy's ports from which a squadron could issue were all within defended areas and watched by our own squadrons. still, the guard could [pg 266] not be made impenetrable. there was always the chance of a squadron escaping, and if it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be followed. hence there were times when the convoy system seriously disturbed our dispositions, as, for instance, in the crisis of the trafalgar campaign, when for a short time our chain of defended areas was broken down by the escape of the toulon squadron. that escape eventually forced a close concentration on the western squadron, but all other considerations apart, it was felt to be impossible to retain the mass for more than two days owing to the fact that the great east and west indies convoys were approaching, and villeneuve's return to ferrol from martinique exposed them to squadronal attack. it was, in fact, impossible to tell whether the mass had not been forced upon us with this special end in view.

in the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most serious strategical objection to the convoy system. it was sought to minimise it by giving the convoys a secret route when there was apprehension of squadronal interference. it was done in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed in no way to lessen the anxiety. it may have been because in those days of slow communication there could be no such certainty that the secret route had been received as there would be now.

modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more liable to error. to avoid such error as far as possible, it is essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. the more important of them are three in number. firstly, the abolition of privateering; secondly, the reduced range of action for all warships; and thirdly, the development of wireless telegraphy. there are others which must be dealt with in their place, but these three go to the root of the whole problem.

difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce [pg 267] destruction in the old wars, one thing seems certain—that the bulk of captures, which were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even in thousands, were due to the action of privateers. further, it seems certain that, reckoning at least by numbers, the greater part of the damage was done by small privateers operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, against coastwise and local traffic. the complaints of merchants, so far as they are known, relate mainly to this kind of work in the west indies and home waters, while accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high seas are comparatively rare. the actual damage done by the swarm of small vessels may not have been great, but its moral effects were very serious. it was impossible for the strongest governments to ignore them, and the consequence was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical dispositions. while these dispositions were adequate to check the operations of large privateers acting in the same way as regular cruisers, the smaller ones found very free play amidst the ribwork of the protective system, and they could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the larger arrangements. even so, the proximity of the enemy's ports made escape so easy, that the work of repression was very ineffective. the state of the case was indeed almost identical with a people's war. the ordinary devices of strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as napoleon's broadly planned methods failed to deal with the guerilleros in spain, or as our own failed for so long in south africa.

by the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that the most disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. it is, of course, uncertain how far the declaration of paris [pg 268] will hold good in practice. it is still open even to the parties to it to evade its restrictions to a greater or less extent by taking up and commissioning merchantmen as regular ships of war. but it is unlikely that such methods will extend beyond the larger privately owned vessels. any attempt to revive in this way the old picaresque methods could only amount to a virtual repudiation of statutory international law, which would bring its own retribution. moreover, for home waters at least, the conditions which favoured this picaresque warfare no longer exist. in the old wars the bulk of our trade came into the thames, and thence the greater part of it was distributed in small coasting vessels. it was against this coastwise traffic that the small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and their richest harvest. but, now that so many other great centres of distribution have established themselves, and that the bulk of the distribution is done by internal lines of communication, the channel is no longer the sole artery, and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a vital dislocation of our commercial system.

the probability, then, is that in the future the whole problem will be found to be simplified, and that the work of commerce protection will lie much more within the scope of large strategical treatment than it ever did before, with the result that the change should be found to tell substantially in favour of defence and against attack.

the reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. in the old days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, and so long as she could occasionally renew her fuel and water, she was free to range the sea outside the defended areas for the whole of the period with unimpaired vitality. for such pelagic operations her movement was practically unrestricted. she could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait indefinitely at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger or hope of plunder dictated. so long as she had men left to man her prizes, her power of mischief was [pg 269] almost unlimited. all this is now changed. the capacity of each cruise of a ship to-day is very small. she is confined to short dashes within a strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find undefended waters that her coal will scarcely permit of more than a few days' actual cruising. a couple of chases at high speed during that period may force her to return at once, subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her coal from a prize. she has, further, to face the fact that manning prizes must necessarily reduce her capacity for speed, which depends so much on a fully manned engine-room. this will tend to jeopardise her chances of return through or near defended areas. the only escape from this difficulty is to sink the captured ship. but this course has objections scarcely less weighty than the other. no power will incur the odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor's ship takes time, especially in bad weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser in any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting power. in the case of large ships, moreover, the work of destruction is no easy matter. in the most favourable circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus not only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her chances of evasion.

from these and similar considerations it is obvious that the possibilities of operations on the great trade-routes are much less extensive than they were formerly, while to speak of cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer hyperbole. under modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it would be to keep up a permanent blockade of the british islands. it would require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but our own can contemplate possessing, and such as could not be maintained without having first secured a very decided preponderance at sea. the loss of radius of action therefore, though it does not increase the power of defence, sensibly lessens that of attack by pelagic operations.

for the great increase in the powers of defence we must [pg 270] turn to the extraordinary development in the means of distant communication. under former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to remain for days upon a fertile spot and make a number of captures before her presence was known. but since most large merchantmen have been fitted with wireless installations, she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of calling down upon her an adversary. moreover, when she is once located, every ship within wireless reach can be warned of her presence and avoid her. she must widely and constantly shift her position, thereby still further reducing her staying power. on the whole, then, it would appear that in so far as modern developments affect the problem, they certainly render pelagic operations far more difficult and uncertain than they used to be. upon the great routes the power of attack has been reduced and the means of evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal areas. the whole basis of the old system would seem to be involved. that basis was the convoy system, and it now becomes doubtful whether the additional security which convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical drawbacks and their liability to cause strategical disturbance.

over and above the considerations already noticed, there are three others, all of which favour the security of our trade by permitting a much more extended choice of route. the first is, that steam vessels are not forced by prevailing winds to keep to particular courses. the second is, that the improvements in the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to make well-known landfalls during transit. the third is, that the multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided the old main flow of trade to the channel into a number of minor streams that cover a much wider area and demand a greater distribution of force for effective attack. it will be obvious that the combined effect of these considerations is to increase still further the chances of individual [pg 271] vessels evading the enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with escort.

nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic operations on the great routes the only arguments that minimise the value of convoys. we have also to remember that while the number of vessels trading across the ocean has enormously increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of cruisers available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even equal, the number employed in sailing days. this consideration, then, must also be thrown into the scale against convoys; for it is certain that the amount of serious operative damage which an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic operation is mainly determined by the ratio which his available cruiser strength bears to the volume of that trade. this aspect of the question is, however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the relation which the volume of our trade bears to the difficulty of its defence, and this must be considered later.

it remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old system of defence. the statement that the great routes were left undefended will seem to be in opposition to a prevailing impression derived from the fact that frigates are constantly mentioned as being "on a cruise." the assumption is that they in effect patrolled the great routes. but this was not so, nor did they rove the sea at will. they constituted a definite and necessary part of the system. though that system was founded on a distinction between defended terminals and undefended routes, which was a real strategical distinction, it was impossible to draw an actual line where the one sphere began and the other ended. outside the regularly defended areas lay a region which, as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. in this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found the mean between risk and profit. here too convoys, as they entered the zone, were in their greatest danger for fear of their escorts being overpowered [pg 272] by raiding squadrons. consequently it was the practice, when the approach of convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and reinforce their escorts. outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. the system was in regular use both for home and colonial areas. in no sense did it constitute a patrol of the routes. it was in practice and conception a system of outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. focal points of lesser importance, such as capes finisterre and st. vincent, were similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a squadron.

as has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always liable to bring him rich reward. his mission of defence carried with it the best opportunities for attack.

in the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for the great routes. they were established to link up adjacent defended areas and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. in 1805 the gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which stretched from cape st. vincent through the finisterre focal area to cape clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off ushant. the new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the french and spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. special provision was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued. the new lines were in fact [pg 273] intelligence patrols primarily, though they were also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern trade-route where it was flanked by french and spanish ports.24

the whole system, it will be observed, though not conflicting with the main object of bringing the enemy's fleets to action, did entail an expenditure of force and deflecting preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. large numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the eyes of the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of convoys produced periodical oscillations in the general distribution.

embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old wars, an impression appears to prevail that in the future it must be much more serious. it is argued plausibly enough not only that our trade is far larger and richer than it was, but also that, owing to certain well-known economic changes, it is far more a matter of life and death to the nation than in the days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of our imports. in view of the new conditions it is held that we are more vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and that, consequently, we must devote relatively more attention and force to its defence.

if this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong naval combination would present difficulties of the most formidable kind, greater indeed than we have ever experienced; for since with modern developments the demand for fleet cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less.

[pg 274]

it cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks irreproachable. but on analysis it will be found to involve two assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. the first is, that the vulnerability of a sea power through its maritime trade is as the volume of that trade. the second is, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade is also as its volume—that is to say, the larger the amount of the trade, the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. this idea indeed is carried so far, that we are frequently invited to fix the standard of our naval strength by comparing it with the proportion which the naval strength of other powers bears to their sea-borne trade.

it is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional system of trade defence will avail to raise a doubt whether either assumption can be accepted without very careful consideration. in the history of that system there is no indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it was designed to protect. nor has any one succeeded in showing that the pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through our commerce increased in effect with the volume of our seaborne trade. the broad indications indeed are the other way—that the greater the volume of our trade, the less was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, even when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. it is not too much to say that in every case where he took this course his own trade dwindled to nothing, while ours continually increased.

it may be objected that this was because the only periods in which he devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were when we had dominated his navy, and being no longer able to dispute the command, he could do no more than interfere with its exercise. but this must always be so whether we have positively dominated his navy or not. if he tries to ignore our battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, he cannot dispute the command. whatever his strength, he [pg 275] must leave the command to us. he cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks our trade systematically by sustained strategical operation, he cannot hope to make any real impression.

if, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the application of elementary principles, both will appear theoretically unsound. let us take first the relation of vulnerability to volume. since the object of war is to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the struggle. the pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely annoying. it must seriously cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his national life and activities. if his total trade be a hundred millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no more than he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is accustomed in time of peace. if, however, we can destroy fifty millions, his trade equilibrium will be overthrown, and the issue of the war will be powerfully affected. in other words, to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a percentage or relative impression. the measure of a nation's vulnerability through its trade is the percentage of destruction that an enemy can effect.

now, it is true that the amount of damage which a belligerent can inflict with a given force on an enemy's commerce will vary to some extent with its volume; for the greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be the undefended cruising grounds. but no matter how fertile such areas might be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always limited, and it must be still more limited in the future. it was limited by the fact that it was physically impossible to deal with more than a certain number of prizes in a certain time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has suffered a very marked restriction. when this limit of capacity in a given [pg 276] force is passed, the volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and seeing how low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is the volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at least as against ourselves, provided we have a reasonably well-organised system of defence, must be relatively low. it must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure well within what we have easily supported in the past. there is reason, therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in question being true, the effective vulnerability of sea-borne trade is not in direct but in inverse proportion to its volume. in other words, the greater the volume, the more difficult it is to make an effective percentage impression.

similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade defence was proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but to the number and exposure of its terminals and focal points. whatever the volume of the trade these remained the same in number, and the amount of force required for their defence varied only with the strength that could readily be brought to bear against them. it varied, that is, with the distribution of the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. thus in the war of 1812 with the united states, the west indian and north american areas were much more exposed than they had been when we were at war with france alone and when american ports were not open to her as bases. they became vulnerable not only to the united states fleet, but also in a much higher degree to that of france, and consequently the force we found necessary to devote to trade defence in the north atlantic was out of all proportion to the naval strength of the new belligerent. our protective force had to be increased enormously, while the volume of our trade remained precisely the same.

this relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas is of great importance, for it is in the increase of such areas in the far east that lies the only radical change in the problem. [pg 277] the east indian seas were always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, but the problem was simplified by the partial survival in those regions of the old method of defence. till about the end of the seventeenth century long-range trade was expected to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the retention of their armament by east indiamen was the last survival of the practice. beyond the important focal area of st. helena they relied mainly on their own power of resistance or to such escort as could be provided by the relief ships of the east indian station. as a rule, their escort proper went no farther outward-bound than st. helena, whence it returned with the homeward-bound vessels that gathered there from india, china, and the south sea whaling grounds. the idea of the system was to provide escort for that part of the great route which was exposed to attack from french or spanish colonial bases on the african coasts and in the adjacent islands.

for obvious reasons this system would have to be reconsidered in the future. the expansion of the great european powers have changed the conditions for which it sufficed, and in a war with any one of them the system of defended terminal and focal areas would require a great extension eastward, absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. here, then, we must mark a point where trade defence has increased in difficulty, and there is one other.

although minor hostile bases within a defended area have lost most of their menace to trade, they have acquired as torpedo bases a power of disturbing the defence itself. so long as such bases exist with a potent flotilla within them, it is obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be so simple a matter as it was formerly. other and more complex arrangements may have to be made. still, the principle of [pg 278] defended areas seems to remain unshaken, and if it is to work with its old effectiveness, the means and the disposition for securing those areas will have to be adapted to the new tactical possibilities. the old strategical conditions, so far as can be seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of modern material make them tell in favour of defence rather than of attack.

if we desire to formulate the principles on which this conclusion rests we shall find them in the two broad rules, firstly, that the vulnerability of trade is in inverse ratio to its volume, and secondly, that facility of attack means facility of defence. the latter, which was always true, receives special emphasis from modern developments. facility of attack means the power of exercising control. for exercise of control we require not only numbers, but also speed and endurance, qualities which can only be obtained in two ways: it must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at the cost of increased size. by increasing size we at once lose numbers. if by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers and so facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate defence. vessels of low fighting power indeed cannot hope to operate in fertile areas without support to overpower the defence. every powerful unit detached for such support sets free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once begun, there is no halting-place. supporting units to be effective must multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the inferior power seeking to substitute commerce destruction for the clash of squadrons will have squadronal warfare thrust upon him, provided again the superior power adopts a reasonably sound system of defence. it was always so, and, so far as it is possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would seem that with higher mobility and better means of communication the squadronal stage must be reached long before any adequate percentage impression can have been [pg 279] made by the sporadic action of commerce destroyers. ineffectual as such warfare has always been in the past, until a general command has been established, its prospects in the future, judged by the old established principles, are less promising than ever.

finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. by no conceivable means is it possible to give trade absolute protection. we cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. we cannot make war without losing ships. to aim at a standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. it is to cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set every man's hand against us. all these evils would be upon us, and our goal would still be in the far distance. in 1870 the second naval power in the world was at war with an enemy that could not be considered a naval power at all, and yet she lost ships by capture. never in the days of our most complete domination upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never can be. to seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short, something that it never has been and never can be. such peace-bred dreams must be rigorously abjured. our standard must be the mean of economic strength—the line which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade.

[pg 280]

iii. attack, defence, and support of

military expeditions

the attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed in a large measure by the principles of attack and defence of trade. in both cases it is a question of control of communications, and in a general way it may be said, if we control them for the one purpose, we control them for the other. but with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not the only consideration. the duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of the troops during transit, as in the case of convoys, unless indeed, as with convoys, the destination is a friendly country. in the normal case of a hostile destination, where resistance is to be expected from the commencement of the operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of a most exacting kind. they may be described generally as duties of support, and it is the intrusion of these duties which distinguish the naval arrangements for combined operations most sharply from those for the protection of trade. except for this consideration there need be no difference in the method of defence. in each case the strength required would be measured by the dangers of interference in transit. but as it is, that standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however small those risks, the protective arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to include arrangements for support.

before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the question, it will be well to dismiss attack. from the strategical point of view its principles differ not at all from those already laid down for active resistance of invasion. whether the expedition that threatens us be small or of invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of the fleet. the escort, according to the old practice, must be turned or contained, but never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing prove to be impracticable. it is [pg 281] needless to repeat the words of the old masters in which this principle lies embalmed. it is seldom that we find a rule of naval strategy laid down in precise technical terms, but this one is an exception. in the old squadronal instructions, "the transports of the enemy are to be your principal object," became something like a common form.

nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports were protected by a mere escort. it held good even in the exceptional cases where the military force was accompanied or guarded by the whole available battle strength of the enemy. we have seen how in 1744 norris was prepared to follow the french transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in 1798 nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather than destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might provide for an overwhelming attack upon the transports.

exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be conceived. conditions might exist in which, if the enemy's battle-fleet accompanied his transports, it would be worth our while, for ulterior objects of our own, to risk the escape of the transports in order to seize the opportunity of destroying the fleet. but even in such a case the distinction would be little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a decisive tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would usually be to compel it to conform to our movements by threatening an attack on the transports. it is well known that it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge of them.

there is, however, one condition which radically differentiates comparatively small expeditions from great invasions and that is the power of evasion. our experience has proved beyond dispute that the navy alone cannot guarantee defence against such expeditions. it cannot be sure of preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and this is especially [pg 282] the case where an open sea gives them a free choice of route, as in the case of the french expeditions against ireland. it is for this reason that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient to prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it must be supplemented by a home army. to perfect our defence, or, in other words, our power of attack, such an army must be adequate to ensure that all expeditions small enough to evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when they land. if in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it is adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect the issue of the war except by raising his expeditions to invasion strength, and so finding himself involved in a problem that no one has ever yet solved for an uncommanded sea.

still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy will only regard the army as a second line, and its strategy must provide in the event of evasion for co-operation with that line. by means of a just distribution of its coastal flotilla it will provide for getting contact with the expedition at the earliest moment after its destination is declared. it will press the principle of making the army its objective to the utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser pursuit, and with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser speed, such pursuit is far more formidable than it ever was. no expedition nowadays, however successful its evasion, can be guaranteed against naval interruption in the process of landing. still less can it be guaranteed against naval interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its front against the home army. it may seek by using large transports to reduce their number and secure higher speed, but while that will raise its chance of evasion, it will prolong the critical period of landing. if it seek by using smaller transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its chances of evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea area it will occupy in transit. all the modern developments in fact which make for [pg 283] defence in case of invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate timely contact with an expedition seeking to operate by evasion. nor must it be forgotten, since the problem is a combined one, that the corresponding developments ashore tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. such appear to be the broad principles which govern an enemy's attempts to act with combined expeditions in our own waters, where by hypothesis we are in sufficient naval strength to deny him permanent local command. we may now turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct of such expeditions where the naval conditions are reversed.

by the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their defence but also their support, and for this reason the starting-point of our inquiry is to be found, as above indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with convoys. a convoy consists of two elements—a fleet of merchantmen and an escort. but a combined expedition does not consist simply of an army and a squadron. it is an organism at once more complex and more homogeneous. its constitution is fourfold. there is, firstly, the army; secondly, the transports and landing flotilla—that is, the flotilla of flat-boats and steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in the transports or accompany them; thirdly, the "squadron in charge of transports," as it came to be called, which includes the escort proper and the supporting flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly, the "covering squadron."

such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. but so essentially is it a single organism, that in practice these various elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. they may be interwoven in the most intricate manner. indeed to a greater or less extent each will always have to discharge some of the functions of the others. thus the covering squadron may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, but it will often provide the greater part of the landing [pg 284] flotilla and even a portion of the landing force. similarly, the escort may also serve as transport, and provide in part not only the supporting force, but also the landing flotilla. the fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure theoretical. still its use is not merely that it serves to define the varied functions which the fleet will have to discharge. as we proceed it will be seen to have a practical strategical value.

from a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet.

in our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place. the battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys. the convoys had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that met them as they approached the terminal areas. but where a convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an enemy's country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided. in the case of distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection escort only. but once the operations began from the point of concentration, a covering squadron was always in touch.

it was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether. thus our various expeditions for the assistance of portugal were treated exactly like commercial [pg 285] convoys, but in such cases as wolfe's expedition to quebec or amherst's to louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually launched against the west indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as an integral part in the theatre of operations. our arrangements in the crimean war illustrate the point exactly. our troops were sent out at first to land at gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that territory as an army of observation. it was not a true combined expedition, and the transports were given no covering squadron. their passage was sufficiently covered by our channel and mediterranean fleets occupying the exits of the baltic and the black sea. but so soon as the original war plan proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against sebastopol were decided on, the mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron in touch with the troops.

seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term "covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe it. but it is adopted for two reasons. in the first place, it was the one employed officially in our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great combined expedition. in preparing the descent on the crimea, sir edmund lyons, who was acting as chief of the staff to sir [pg 286] james dundas, and had charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into a "covering squadron" and a "squadron in charge of transports." in the second place, the designation serves to emphasise what is its main and primary function. for important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they must not be permitted to overshadow the fact that its paramount function is to prevent interference with the actual combined operations—that is, the landing, support, and supply of the army. thus in 1705, when shovel and peterborough were operating against barcelona, shovel was covering the amphibious siege from the french squadron in toulon. peterborough required the assistance of the marines ashore to execute a coup de main, and shovel only consented to land them on the express understanding that the moment his cruisers passed the signal that the toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would have to be recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land operations. and to this peterborough agreed. the principle involved, it will be seen, is precisely that which lyons's term "covering squadron" embodies.

to quote anything that happened in the crimean war as a precedent without such traditional support will scarcely appear convincing. in our british way we have fostered a legend that so far as organisation and staff work were concerned that war was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. but in truth as a combined operation its opening movement [pg 287] both in conception and organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and successful thing of the kind we ever did. designed as the expedition was to assist an ally in his own country, it was suddenly called upon without any previous preparation to undertake a combined operation of the most difficult kind against the territory of a well-warned enemy. it involved a landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within striking distance of a naval fortress which contained an army of unknown strength, and a fleet not much inferior in battle power and undefeated. it was an operation comparable to the capture of louisburg and the landing of the japanese in the liaotung peninsula, but the conditions were far more difficult. both those operations had been rehearsed a few years previously, and they had been long prepared on the fullest knowledge. in the crimea everything was in the dark; even steam was an unproved element, and everything had to be improvised. the french had practically to demobilise their fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the enterprise appear, that they resisted its being undertaken with every military argument. we had in fact, besides all the other difficulties, to carry an unwilling ally upon our backs. yet it was accomplished, and so far at least as the naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success mark the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries of rich experience.

the first of the lessons was that for operations in uncommanded or imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a covering squadron differentiated from the squadron in charge of transports. its main function was to secure the necessary local command, whether for transit or for the actual operations. but as a rule transit was secured by our regular blockading squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled in the theatre of operations. when therefore the theatre was within a defended terminal area, as in our descents upon the northern and atlantic coasts of [pg 288] france, then the terminal defence squadron was usually also sufficient to protect the actual operations. it thus formed automatically the covering squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the case of our attack on st. malo in 1758, took up a position between the enemy's squadron and the expedition's line of operation. if, however, the theatre of operation was not within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that was weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering squadron, in which the local squadron was more or less completely merged. whatever, in fact, was necessary to secure the local control was done, though, as we have seen, and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was not always the standard by which the strength of the covering squadron was measured.

the strength of the covering squadron being determined, the next question is the position or "tract" which it should occupy. like most other strategical problems, it is "an option of difficulties." in so far as the squadron is designed for support—that is, support from its men, boats, and guns—it will be desirable to station it as near as possible to the objective; but as a covering squadron, with the duty of preventing the intrusion of an enemy's force, it should be as far away as possible, so as to engage such a force at the earliest possible moment of its attempt to interfere. there is also the paramount necessity that its position must be such that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries to interrupt. usually such certainty is only to be found either in touch with the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own landing force. where the objective is the local naval base of the enemy these two points, of course, tend to be identical strategically, and the position of the covering squadron becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. but the vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no matter how great the necessity of support, the covering squadron should never be so deeply engaged with the landing force as [pg 289] to be unable to disentangle itself for action as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function. in other words, it must always be able to act in the same way as a free field army covering a siege.

where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval base, the choice of a position for the covering squadron will turn mainly on the amount of support which the army is likely to require. if it cannot act by surprise, and serious military resistance is consequently to be expected, or where the coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron to overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to the army, though the extent to which, under modern conditions, ships at sea can usefully perform the delicate operation of supporting an infantry attack with gun fire, except by enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be proved. a similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men and boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and steam towage cannot be provided by the transports and their attendant squadron; or again where the locality is such that amphibious operations beyond the actual landing are likely to be called for, and the assistance of a large number of boats and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. such cases occurred at quebec in 1759, where saunders took his covering battle-squadron right up the st. lawrence, although its covering functions could have been discharged even better by a position several hundreds of miles away from the objective; and again in 1800 at alexandria, where lord keith ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions [pg 290] in order to undertake the supply of general abercromby's army by inland waters and give him the mobility he required.

if, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to furnish all the support necessary, the covering squadron will take station as close as possible to the enemy's naval base, and there it will operate according to the ordinary laws of blockade. if nothing is desired but to prevent interference, its guard will take the form of a close blockade. but if there be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of forcing the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, for instance, in anson's case above cited, when he covered the st. malo expedition not by closely blockading brest, but by taking a position to the eastward at the isle de batz.

in the japanese operations against manchuria and the kuantung peninsula these old principles displayed themselves in undiminished vitality. in the surprise descents against seoul and at takusan the work of support was left entirely with the transport squadron, while admiral togo took up a covering position far away at port arthur. the two elements of the fleet were kept separate all through. but in the operations for the isolation and subsequent siege of port arthur they were so closely united as to appear frequently indistinguishable. still, so far as the closeness of the landing place to the objective permitted, the two acted independently. for the actual landing of the second army the boats of the covering squadron were used, but it remained a live naval unit all through, and was never organically mingled with the transport squadron. its operations throughout were, so far as modern conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. [pg 291] to prevent interference was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as we are able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the enemy to decisive action.

all through the operations, however, there was a new influence which tended to confuse the precision of the old methods. needless to say it was the torpedo and the mine. their deflective pressure was curious and interesting. in our own operations against sebastopol, to which the port arthur case is most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. on the traditional principle, dating from drake's attack on san domingo in 1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean between facility for a coup de main and freedom from opposition; that is, it was chosen at the nearest practicable point to the objective which was undefended by batteries and out of reach of the enemy's main army.

in the handling of the covering squadron admiral dundas, the commander-in-chief, gave it its dual function. after explaining the constitution of the transport squadron he says, "the remainder of my force ... will act as a covering squadron, and where practicable assist in the general disembarkation." with these two objects in mind he took a station near enough to the landing place to support the army with his guns if it were opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before sebastopol, and at such a distance that at the first sign of the russians moving he would have time to get before the port and engage them before they could get well to sea; that is, he took a position as near to the army as was compatible with preventing interference, or, it may be said, [pg 292] his position was as near to the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the landing. from either aspect in fact the position was the same, and its choice presented no complexity owing mainly to the fact that for the first time steam simplified the factors of time and distance.

in the japanese case the application of these principles was not so easy. in selecting the nearest undefended point for a landing, it was not only batteries, or even the army in port arthur, or the troops dispersed in the liaotung peninsula that had to be considered, but rather, as must always be the case in the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. the point they chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. it was not strictly out of mobile defence range, but it so happened that it lay behind islands which lent themselves to the creation of fixed defences, and thus it fulfilled all the recognised conditions. but in so far as the defences could be turned by the russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, and the difficulty of choosing a position for it was complicated by the fact that the objective of the combined operations was not merely port arthur itself, but also the squadron it contained. it was necessary, therefore, not only to hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. this indicated a close blockade. but for close blockade a position out of night torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point where such a position could be secured was behind the defences that covered the disembarkation. consequently, in spite of what the strategical conditions dictated, the covering squadron was more or less continuously forced back upon the army and its supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron was no longer required.

in the conditions that existed nothing was lost. for the lines of the japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy's base, that by mining the entrance of the port admiral togo ensured that the enemy's exit would be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended anchorage [pg 293] before the russians could get far to sea. what would happen in a case when no such position could be secured is another matter. the landing place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack, and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with a defended anchorage elsewhere. thus it would appear that unless the geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the transport squadron. hence the increased importance of keeping clear the difference in function between the two squadrons.

to emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be contrasted with the lissa episode at the end of the austro-italian war of 1866. in that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results. the austrian admiral, tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in pola waiting for a chance of a counter-stroke. persano with the superior italian fleet was at ancona, where he practically dominated the adriatic. in july the italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. to improve the position persano was ordered to take possession of the austrian island of lissa. without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox british principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force. practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as persano was thus committed, tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to [pg 294] meet the attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. according to british practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told off either to hold tegethoff in pola or to bring him to timely action, according to whether the island or the austrian fleet was the primary objective. the reason it was not done may be that persano was not given a proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the objective. if so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval action.

the length to which the supporting functions of the fleet may be carried will always be a delicate question. the suggestion that its strength must be affected by the need of the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, which imply its men as well, will appear heretical. a battle-squadron, we say, is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its men to fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the strength of a squadron being fixed by any other standard. theoretically nothing can seem more true, but it is an idea of peace and the study. the atmosphere of war engendered a wider and more practical view. the men of the old wars knew that when a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something different from a purely naval unit. they knew, moreover, that an army acting oversea against hostile territory is an incomplete organism incapable of striking its blow in the most effective manner without the assistance of the men of the fleet. it was the office, then, of the naval portion of the force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, but to complete its deficiencies and lend it the [pg 295] power to strike. alone and unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it cannot supply itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can it avail itself of the highest advantages of an amphibious force, the sudden shift of base or line of operation. these things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them with its men.25

the authority for this view is abundant. in 1800, for instance, when general maitland was charged with an expedition against belleisle, he was invited to state what naval force he would require. he found it difficult to fix with precision. "speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or four sail of the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be properly adequate to the proposed service. the frigates to blockade." (meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and prevent reinforcements reaching it from the mainland, always one of the supporting functions of the squadron attached to the transports.) "the line-of-battle ships," he adds, "to furnish us with the number of men necessary for land operations." in this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the cover, and what maitland meant was that the battleships he asked for were to be added to the transport [pg 296] squadron not as being required for escort, but for support. st. vincent, who was then first lord, not only endorsed his request, but gave him for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line than he had asked for. at this time our general command of the sea had been very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval force to spare for its exercise. it will be well to compare it with a case in which the circumstances were different.

when in 1795 the expedition under admiral christian and general abercromby was being prepared for the west indies, the admiral in concert with jervis drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.26 the force he asked for was considerable. both he and jervis considered that the escort and local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on closing either brest or toulon effectually by blockade. but this was not the only reason. the plan of operations involved three distinct landings, and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, "not only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned, cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed." christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is, the landing flotillas doing inshore work]." the main attack would require at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in proportion. in all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being "otherwise employed"] would have to provide landing parties to the number of 2000 men "for the flat-boats, [pg 297] landing and moving guns, water, and provisions," and this would be their daily task. the military force these landing parties were to serve amounted to about 18,000 men.

lord barham, it must be said, who as sir charles middleton was then first sea lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading squadrons. the need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. his opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition. he regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it. his opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were characteristic of his strategy. he believed that in view of the threatening attitude of spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring it up to a two-power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it concentrated for decisive naval action the moment spain showed her hand. in short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea had been secured. it was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition which forced him to resign [pg 298] before the preparations were complete. but it is to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of our whole position at sea.27

it is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the strategical reactions already noted, will have another of the first importance, in that they must influence the choice of a landing place. the interest of the army will always be to fix it as near to the objective as is compatible with an unopposed landing. the ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which could be landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the dark. in larger expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing far enough from the objective to prevent the garrison of the place or the enemy's local forces offering opposition before a footing was secured. the tendency of the navy will usually be in the opposite direction; for normally the further they can land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are they of being able to protect it against naval interference. their ideal will be a place far enough away to be out of torpedo range, and to enable them to work the covering and the transport squadron in sound strategical independence.

to reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some kind of joint staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth working it is no less desirable to ascertain, so far as possible, the principles and method on which it should proceed. in the best recent precedents the process has been for the army staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the landing [pg 299] must take place for the operation to have the desired effect, and to indicate the known practicable landing points in the order they would prefer them. it will then be for the naval staff to say how nearly in accordance with the views of the army they are prepared to act. their decision will turn on the difficulties of protection and the essentials of a landing place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and the like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to which the conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and feints. if the naval staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, which the higher joint staff must adjust. it will be the duty of the naval staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on the army. balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the superior staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. whether the superior staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on land.

where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can be fixed in this way with much precision. but if, as usually happens, the probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the admiral. the practice has been to give him instructions which define in order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within reasonable risk of war. similarly, if the danger of naval interference be small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice will be with [pg 300] the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of the landing place he would choose.

during the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in making things work smoothly on these lines. after the first inglorious failure at rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the spot.

it was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always arranged thenceforth. since the elder pitt's time it has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military exigencies. the danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service to which he does not belong.

the system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were essentially questions for a joint superior staff. the exceptions indeed are very few. a fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the spirit is willing, occurred in the crimea. the naval difficulties, as we have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of rendering the whole attempt madness. when it came to the point of execution a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied staffs of both services. so great were the differences of opinion between the french and british generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could [pg 301] not indicate a landing place with any precision. all the admirals knew was that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which, until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior. all these objections they laid before the council general. lord raglan then said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take it. whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that should be chosen.

there remains a form of support which has not yet been considered, and that is diversionary movements or feints by the fleet to draw the enemy's attention away from the landing place. this will naturally be a function of the covering battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. the device appears in drake's attack on san domingo in 1585, an attack which may be regarded as our earliest precedent in modern times and as the pattern to which all subsequent operations of the kind conformed so far as circumstances allowed. in that case, while drake landed the troops a night's march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, kept it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration with the boats of forcing a direct landing under cover of its guns. the result was the garrison moved out to meet the threat and were surprised in flank by the real landing force. passing from this simple case to the most elaborate in our annals, we find saunders doing the same thing at quebec. in preparation for wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements [pg 302] for a bombardment of montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the boats of the fleet began a demonstration of landing his marines. by this device he held montcalm away from wolfe's landing place till a secure footing had been obtained. similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the combined result was that wolfe was able to penetrate the centre of the french position unopposed.

such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather than of strategy, but the device has been used with equal effect strategically. so great is the secrecy as well as the mobility of an amphibious force, that it is extremely difficult for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a feint. even at the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it is impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are being landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on elsewhere. at quebec it was not till montcalm was face to face with wolfe that he knew he had to deal with the whole british force. still less from a strategical point of view can we be certain whether a particular landing represents an advance guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing elsewhere. this is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the landing army arrives in echelon like the second japanese army. in that instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with conspicuous effect. the russians were always apprehensive that the japanese would strike for newchuang at the head of the gulf of pe-chi-li, and for this reason general stakelberg, who had command of the troops in the peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate [pg 303] for effective action in its southern part, where the japanese had fixed their landing place. admiral togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in the gulf. the precise effect of this feint upon the russian staff cannot be measured with certainty. all we know is that stakelberg was held back from his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the japanese army before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering counter-stroke.

this power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course inherent in the peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in the facility with which their line of operation can be concealed or changed, and there seems no reason why in the future it should be less than in the past. good railway connections in the theatre of the descent will of course diminish the effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the means of making them have increased. in mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, there is a new instrument which in the russo-japanese war proved capable of creating a very strong impression at small cost to the fleet. should a flotilla of such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the demonstration.

on the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be hitherto. the rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places that power higher than ever. it would at any rate be difficult to find in the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on seoul with which the japanese opened the war in 1904. it is true the russians at the last moment decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place without opposition, but this was unknown to the japanese, and [pg 304] their arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. the risk was accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles identical with those of the british tradition. but, on the other hand, there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the past. until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.