the last day but one
the dawn of january 1, 1905, ushered in an anxious day. all the roads near the forts were now so much under rifle and machine-gun fire that movement on them soon ceased. in the staff office of the section it was expected that the enemy would at any moment commence to pound and then storm eagle's nest, which was now the key to the position. sure enough, about nine o'clock the bombardment commenced, shell after shell with clockwork regularity striking the top of the hill. the staff of the section went from their usual observation-place to the dressing station, from which an excellent view of the rearward slope of eagle's nest could be seen, and which had a telephone. at noon captain galitsinsky, who was in command of the work, began sending in alarming messages to the effect that the enemy, by repeated rushes, were successfully concentrating in force in front of the position, evidently with a view to an assault, and asked that he might be reinforced. the assault soon began, but made at first little progress in face of the garrison's steady fire. general gorbatovsky, commanding the section, kept the commandant regularly informed of the progress, and urged that our guns should increase their fire. our fortress guns poured in a fairly heavy fire, but not so heavy as the circumstances warranted, as we had but few howitzers, which alone could have been[pg 323] effective. galitsinsky continued anxiously to report the critical condition of the position. gorbatovsky never left the telephone, talking all the time with either fock, biely, or the commandant: he kept on begging for reserves to be sent up, saying that without reinforcements he could not guarantee the issue. suddenly some infantry were seen running back from tumulus hill, and it was ascertained that the enemy, having climbed a spur in front of eagle's nest, had enfiladed some of our trenches. the men in them wavered and then ran. the presence of mind of captain stepanoff alone restored order and averted a panic. a party of fifty sailors were sent up to galitsinsky, followed by a second party somewhat later, and the fight waged hotly, our men with difficulty holding their own.
at midday, while the issue of the fight was in the balance, rear-admiral loschinsky received the following letter, no. 2,544 of january 1:
'the state of the fortress is becoming so critical that its further resistance cannot be guaranteed. if it becomes necessary to surrender, it is essential that the most important papers and standards be sent away. i am, therefore, directed by general st?ssel to ask you whether it will be possible to send a destroyer at any moment to chifu on board which an officer could be despatched with such papers. if this can be arranged, the destroyer ought to keep under steam ready to depart, as it will be impossible to foresee the precise moment when she will be required. i have the honour to inquire if this can be done?
'reuss.'
loschinsky replied to the effect that a destroyer would be kept always ready, and, to ship articles more con[pg 324]veniently, would lie under electric cliff. the statny, under lieutenant baron kasinsky, was told off for this. while this took place the commandant was occupied issuing orders for the defence of the north-eastern front, and it never entered his head that anyone was then thinking out arrangements in case of a surrender. he was not told of the letter sent to loschinsky, although the latter, in his capacity of commander of the coast defences, was immediately under him.
meanwhile the assault on eagle's nest continued, and about 2.30 p.m. the telephone from it ceased to work. everyone at the dressing station was busy with his glasses watching the top of the hill, which was shrouded in clouds of bursting shrapnel, when, to our intense surprise, galitsinsky, the commander of the place, suddenly arrived.
'how? what's happened? why?'
'i was the last to leave. none of our men are there now.'
he looked exhausted, dishevelled, overcome.
the staff were much perturbed, for the loss of this important tactical point decided the fate of the north-east front. any minute the japanese might force their way along the valley and commence a massacre. our guns concentrated their fire on the position that a few hours before had been ours; but soon lieutenant malchenko could be discerned riding along the road past our position with a large white flag!
when he was seen, someone laughingly said:
'looks as if he were taking our new year greetings to nogi.'
but he was not armed with empty greetings. alas! he was taking to japan an unexpected new year's gift. he was the bearer of the following letter from general[pg 325] st?ssel to general baron nogi, dated december, 1904 (no day of the month):
'being acquainted with the general state of affairs in the theatre of war, i am of opinion that no object is to be gained by further opposition in port arthur, and so, to avoid useless loss of life, i am anxious to enter into negotiations for a capitulation. if your excellency agrees, i would ask you to be so good as to appoint accredited persons to negotiate concerning the terms and arrangements for surrender, and to appoint a spot where they may meet my representatives.'
the despatch of the parlementaire had been decided on directly general fock had brought word of the capture of eagle's nest, and colonel reuss had been immediately summoned to translate the above letter into english. no meeting of the council of war was held. there was no attempt made to persuade st?ssel to alter his decision to surrender. the commandant was not even informed of the intention to despatch a parlementaire.
the decision to give up the fortress had really matured on the day of the last meeting of the council of defence, for general st?ssel had that day despatched a telegram to the tsar, in which he reported that the men had become worn out, and that the fortress could not possibly hold out more than a few days.[42]
in this he was undoubtedly influenced by the desire to save the lives of his close friends. if any of them had opposed the despatch of the parlementaire, and had informed the commandant of it, st?ssel alone would never have dared to do it. but he was supported, and so risked ignoring smirnoff and proposing the surrender.
simultaneously with the despatch of the parlementaire,[pg 326] rear-admiral wiren, commanding the battleship and cruiser division, received the following letter from colonel reuss:
'a letter has just been sent by a parlementaire from general st?ssel to general baron nogi proposing to begin negotiations for a capitulation; there is, therefore, only to-night for you to do what you consider necessary to your ships!'
admiral wiren, distinguished and gallant officer that he was, was thunderstruck at such tidings, and immediately went off to admiral grigorovitch, to whom it was also news. thence he went to general biely, and even to the commandant, who were both equally thunderstruck at what he told them. from them he went to st?ssel, where the information of what had been done was confirmed.
the troops, who very soon heard of it, no longer remained troops. it was absurd to count on their obedience. and is it to be wondered at? they had fought long, obstinately, doggedly, dying and suffering awful agonies. they had been accustomed to expect death, and now—now—what did they not hear? their hopes rose. they longed for life. they did not wish to die, and no power on earth would have again made them exchange these hopes for death. after the news of the despatch of the parlementaire, it would have been impossible to inspire 30,000 worn-out men, whose minds had already been poisoned by the fatal doctrine of some of their leaders, with the idea that the fortress should be held to the last, and the senior commanders recognized this. when the commandant went to the admirals, and a council was held, with him in the chair, to consider what had best be done to avert a shameful surrender, they all came to the inevitable conclusion that there was not the slightest hope of counting on the obedience of the troops already demoralized and knowing all about the nego[pg 327]tiations. the arrest of st?ssel, fock, reuss and others would have caused dissension in the garrison, perhaps a mutiny, and the last state of the fortress would have been worse than the first. the commandant and admirals accordingly wisely refrained from taking any active steps, in order to avoid the awful scandal, which would only have increased the shame surrounding the surrender, and would have availed nothing.
admiral wiren issued orders for the ships under his command to be disabled by charges being exploded in their most vital parts (engines, boilers, etc.), but though every precaution was taken, the last demolitions were only brought off by the morning of january 2. the sevastopol on that morning was tugged out by the silacha to a depth of 30 fathoms, and her kingston valves[43] were opened, with the result that she heeled over to starboard and quietly foundered. it was impossible to blow up the large number of guns in the fortress as well as its munitions of war, as, according to the terms of the capitulation, all the forts, guns, ammunition, etc., were to be handed over intact. during the afternoon and night several guns were destroyed and much ammunition was buried; but general biely, by st?ssel's direct orders, strictly forbade this, as the enemy had said they would make reprisals if the guns, etc., were found destroyed. some obeyed, others did not. certainly most of the artillery spent the night destroying their weapons and equipment.
from the raschevsky-schwartz diary, january 1, 1905.
'the firing gradually slackened, and about 6 p.m. ceased. deathly silence took the place of the constant noise of firing and roars of explosions, even the whistling of bullets overhead ceased. tired and anxious, we went to the dressing station, where we bolted some food, and[pg 328] then went to the new chinese town to the staff quarters of the section. we had scarcely lain down to snatch a little rest, when a mounted scout arrived with a letter from general fock, in which he ordered gorbatovsky immediately to carry out his orders, and abandon the third defensive section, for which he gave no reasons. he added that the section up to fortification no. 2 was also to be evacuated. [on december 22, fock, realizing the importance of this section, had ordered me to draw up a scheme for strengthening its defence. i had done this on the 23rd, and had carried the work out in two days.] nothing was left for us but to obey the orders, and orders to this effect were accordingly issued by eight that evening. and so the whole of the north-eastern front and almost half of the eastern front was in the enemy's hands. the fortress could no longer hold out, as all roads to the town were in the hands of the japanese, and from zaliterny battery they could demolish the town at leisure. it is inexplicable how anyone understanding the great importance of this section and of b battery could have ordered their abandonment without a fight.
'at the same time a second message was received, in which it was said that the japanese had agreed to the negotiations, and had ceased firing, requesting that we also should cease. the horrible day gave place to a warm, quiet night, and the unusual silence seemed uncanny. suddenly explosion after explosion rang out from the harbour—our battleships being blown up. it was the last straw....'
the letter referred to above, in which general gorbatovsky was ordered immediately to carry out instructions with regard to the abandonment of the third defensive position and the portion up to fortification no. 2, is now in his possession. the abandon[pg 329]ment of these positions was in no way warranted by circumstances, and to carry out such a retreat without fighting was most demoralizing to the troops. the negotiations for a capitulation were still before us, and had we retained something 'up our sleeve,' we could have bargained obstinately and have threatened to hold out longer, in order to obtain better terms. this threat would not have been an empty one.
at dark two huge conflagrations burst out from eagle's nest, lighting up the whole north-east front. port arthur lay silent—more silent than it had been for five long months—while the tongues of flame seemed to lick the low clouds which brooded over the fortress and its triumphant foe. the silence was short-lived, however, for soon several muffled explosions from the direction of the harbour and the forts showed what wiren was doing to his ships and the artillery to their guns. another fire broke out near the harbour, and the town lay bathed in its blood-red glow. from the summit of quail hill the picture of port arthur on its last night—last night as a portion of the russian empire—was tragic enough. the place seemed to shudder at each dull explosion, as if it knew that it was near its end. its former owners, having once more bought it at the cost of thousands of lives, were standing on the threshold of their great holiday and of the long-coveted prize.
