at six o'clock on the 27th, as soon as the morning haze began to lift, the battle was renewed, and the artillery duel commenced. the enemy's fire was concentrated, as on the day before, principally on prince chkheydsey's and skridloff's batteries, which suffered heavily. the morning was bright and sunny, and the light-green hill-slopes, tinted golden by the rays of the early sun, looked anything but a suitable background for the bloody events to come. our infantry, sitting in their trenches, which, having no head-cover of any sort, were scarcely worthy of the name, awaited the commencement of the assault under a heavy shell-fire. after being directed on to the valley behind us, evidently to search out our reserves, the enemy's gun-fire slackened and rifle-fire commenced; their infantry advanced. but the nearer they came the more they suffered from our two batteries above-mentioned, and they were forced to lie down and entrench. meanwhile, some of our ships had come out to assist us, but no sooner had they commenced to shell the enemy's lines than, as on the day before, a superior force of the enemy, appearing from behind kepp island, compelled them to withdraw to port arthur. one result was that the bayan struck a mine, and was so seriously damaged that she had to be towed into the eastern basin for considerable repairs. at four in the afternoon the enemy's guns again[pg 121] got to work, and at 5 p.m. the fourth attack began. when the sun sank down below the hills, green hills still remained in our possession, high hill and semaphore hill were lost; but the japanese were nearer, and entrenched, ready for further efforts on the following day. so close were they in some places that we could hear their conversation. the day was ours, for we still held green hills; but how about the morrow? it was impossible to hold the seven miles length of the right flank with so few guns and men. our reserves were reduced to one company of sailors and half a company of infantry, and port arthur sent no help.
a little later on the japanese dashed forward and broke through the line—through the very place where kondratenko had stopped the retirement yesterday. the last of the reserve was immediately sent up, and after some desperate fighting drove the enemy back. but now the reserve was used up, and what were we to do? naumenko telephoned to seven-mile station to say that, to enable us to hold our position to-morrow, more troops must be sent to us; but the reply was vague and unsatisfactory. through the night the enemy continued to seize and entrench advantageous points, while our men, utterly exhausted from the two days' battle and weakened by heavy losses, were in a bad way.
it seemed, under the circumstances, as if it would be impossible to hold on next day, and therefore best that the rear-guard action we should have to fight should be planned out at once and the successive positions selected. kondratenko, who with semenoff was moving about all night from one point to another, recognized this; but no definite reply could be got through the telephone, and he did not like to give orders for a retirement on his own account. at last, within a couple of hours of dawn, kondratenko had to decide, and he decided that a withdrawal was the only thing to be done. accordingly, orders[pg 122] were sent to butusoff to retire, and the route to be followed was told him. these he received only just in time. i had gone to the staff to find out how soon the withdrawal would commence, and found naumenko still at the telephone, cursing at the impossibility of getting either orders or anything definite. having other things to see after, he handed me the receiver, saying: 'tell them we have begun to retire.' i rang and rang, and at last, after about ten minutes, got through:
'general kondratenko directs me to ask you to tell general fock that the withdrawal of the right flank has commenced.'
at four o'clock kondratenko looked at his watch, and calculating that by now ordering the general retirement from green hills, butusoff would have been given time to withdraw from high hill and occupy a fresh position in rear, he decided to proceed. just as he was giving the actual order to retire, a note was received from fock: 'i am withdrawing; you can do as you like.' this masterpiece of military co-operation has been carefully preserved, and is now in colonel semenoff's possession.
under cover of the morning haze, the first and the most difficult part of the retirement was carried out in perfect order and with inconsiderable loss, and our troops took up the new line from the village of khodziatun to the seashore, along the heights running down into the lunwantun valley. the sun then came out and dissipated the mist. instead of the panic on our part which the enemy expected, they ran up against our infantry holding new positions, and knew that our guns also would open on them from fresh points. during our abandonment of green hills they had got into difficulties on our left, for they had tumbled on to our mines. one caused immense loss, blowing a whole crowd of them to pieces, and this, with one or two smaller explosions, put such fear into them[pg 123] that we were able to get our machine-guns away at leisure.
the moment it was light the enemy shelled the positions which yesterday had been occupied by our batteries, but which were now empty. to discover our new gun positions was not so easy; for experience had now taught us how to take advantage of the ground and how to mask our artillery. at 7 a.m. the fresh companies, so urgently asked for during the night, began to arrive from arthur to cover the further retirement. bands were playing, and the enemy could not make out whether we were still retiring or were moving to the attack. with us everything was in perfect order; camp kitchens were smoking, and backwards and forwards along the road carts, rickshaws, and stretchers were moving. this was not what the enemy expected after a two-day battle; they thought kinchou would be repeated.
the further retirement towards arthur began punctually at 11 a.m., when, covered by a heavy gun and rifle fire, the companies gradually withdrew in perfect order. the enemy pressed our rear-guard hard, but could effect nothing, and by noon we were in sight of the forts. some of the troops marched direct towards the fortress; others took up the last advanced position on the right flank on the hills of ta-ku-shan to sia-gu-shan. behind ta-ku-shan commenced the fortress rayon, and the position on it was the last advanced defensive point, and, in connexion with the positions on wolf's hills, was of great importance for the further defence of arthur. thus did the right flank, under kondratenko, fight on the 26th and 27th, and retire on july 28. let us see how general fock's command—the left flank—fared during these days.
it was noticed on the evening of the 25th that the enemy, in considerable force, was moving across out of[pg 124] dalny towards this flank. night passed quietly. early next morning the japanese began to press our outposts, which were forced in from the villages of khumuchino and khukhaia. the hills all round were enveloped in mist, and from the main position nothing was visible. by 5 a.m. it began to clear, and from hill 113 it could be seen that the enemy was massing at the village of sakaiza. tents were struck and the trenches quickly manned, the cold morning air refreshing the men, tired out with continued outpost work. the mist lifted, and above the horizon of the pacific ocean appeared the copper-red segment of the rising sun. the enemy's artillery fire began to develop about 5.30 a.m., and the day's fighting commenced upon hills 94 and 125, the former being seized by the enemy. we allowed them to mass there, and then swept them off again by our fire from hill 125. at seven o'clock fifteen companies could be seen advancing in columns in the valley near the village of khukhaia, close to upilazy. they were moving towards hill 125, and as soon as they came under fire they could be seen to extend in successive lines, one battalion remaining in reserve. having extended, they steadily and quickly advanced to the attack in eleven lines. the distance between their firing-line and hill 125 quickly decreased. our men calmly watched them advancing.
'don't fire without the order,' said the officer in command.
'wait for the word of command,' repeated the section commanders.
'twelve hundred!'
'twelve hundred!' again echoed the section leaders.
the men were dying to fire, but waited quietly, though the shrapnel was screaming over them.
'section, present—fire!'
'section, present—fire!'
[pg 125]
volley followed volley, and the machine-guns vomited bullets. the enemy's firing-line could be seen to falter; then the second line melted into it. on they came. our volleys rang out more frequently, but did not stop the advance; the third line melted into the remnants of the first two. over our heads shots were screaming and on all sides wounded men were groaning; but the others paid no attention: they heard nothing but
'section, present—fire!'
the japanese were now close. as a line began to waver, it was reinforced and carried forward by the next in rear, and so it went on, fresh lines after lines appearing as if there was no end to them. their firing-line now began to crawl up the hill from all sides. volleys gave way to 'independent'—crack, crack, crack all round, and the deafening rat-tat-tat of the machine-gun. now the range was point-blank, the crew of our machine-gun were all down—but—the enemy were repulsed. while they gathered down below for a fresh effort, their guns poured a hail of high-explosive shell on to our trenches, and did their work so well that our trenches were thick with wounded. their infantry rallied, and again came on in swarms. at noon, though we had only 40 men left out of 150, our men gallantly held their ground. the foe crawled up on all sides; they showed up on the ridge, and dashed in with the bayonet. one of them, mad with fanaticism, got on to the top, shouting: 'how are you, russkys?'
'good-bye, japanese,' was the answer given, as a bayonet was driven through his body, and he was hurled—a flabby mass—over the edge. but now the hill was surrounded on all sides, and it was impossible to hold out much longer. burnevitch sent for reinforcements, and the men, expecting that they would come every moment, held out for another hour. notwithstanding their numbers, the enemy could not gain the hill. at last an order[pg 126] was received from colonel savitsky 'to retire' on to height 113. the withdrawal was effected, and then the men worked right through the night to make cover, having during the day learnt the value of good bomb-proofs—if they would not give protection from high-explosive shells, they would at least save them from the splinters.
as soon as it began to get light the outpost line, which had been thrown out the evening before round hill 113, was called in, and, in expectation of a repetition of the previous day's artillery slaughter, the men were told to take cover in the bomb-proofs. those destroyed by yesterday's fire had been repaired during the night, for it was recognised that this hill 113 was the key to the suantsegan position. at 5 a.m. on the 27th the first shot was fired by a japanese battery in action behind inchenzy station, and the second day's battle had begun. thinking that we had abandoned the hill, the enemy's infantry advanced to take it, but being hurled back by volleys at close range, they retired to a distance and their guns got to work, and so the bombardment continued till 1 p.m., their gunboats assisting.
the battle for possession of these hills was severe, and the coolness of our men was remarkable. if any of them ran away or if any panic set in, it was the fault of the officers, for any officer whom the men respect and love in peace-time can rely on their steadiness in war. how many russian officers know and care for their men? for some reason or other they rarely mix among them and know nothing of them or their habits, and bitter are the fruits they reap in war.
in two hours not a vestige of trench remained. the bomb-proofs had kept out the field-gun shells, but were useless against the high explosive. at last an order was received that the little force on hill 113 was to retire,[pg 127] and taking their dead and wounded, they made their way back under a heavy shrapnel fire. so it went on—the enemy pressing—gradual retirements by us from hill to hill. at night, when the fighting ceased, we were holding the line of hills 139, 127 and upilazy. star after star came out and twinkled in the darkening sky, looking down on the awful shambles, while general st?ssel, intoxicated with the 'success' of the two-day battle, congratulated everyone, ordered the bands to play and the troops to cheer, and himself left seven-mile station for arthur to rest.
at a council of war in the evening it was decided to accept battle on the third day. but not a single unit was sent up to the front, the condition of the line on the right on which the real weight of the fighting had fallen was not ascertained. there was no co-ordination as regards command. each acted independently—fock on his own account, kondratenko on his. the only cohesion was expressed in st?ssel's categorical order 'to hold on.' that all the 'big wigs' expected us to hold on next day is clear from the fact that when st?ssel left after supper that night for arthur, he made his favourite savitsky promise to come into arthur next day to celebrate his 'name's day.' with the departure of the officer commanding the district, the staff rested on its laurels and did not worry about arranging for a retirement. the officers commanding independent units and sections of the line had no idea what to do in the event of the unexpected happening, and as our line was spread out for twelve miles in hill country, the unexpected was, to be paradoxical, to be expected. the troops themselves never dreamed that the morning would see a retirement: they were full of confidence and, forgiving him his mistake at kinchou, still believed in fock.
[pg 128]
their confidence was entirely misplaced, however, for though the general had agreed at the council of war to continue fighting on the third day, he did not do so. he suddenly retired.
kondratenko had been ordered to hold on to the right flank, which, had he been reinforced, he would have done. this sudden retreat of the left therefore might have left him entirely unsupported, and have resulted in the annihilation of his force which would have been taken in flank.
daybreak came; the telephone rang, and orderlies rode up with the order to retire! this order and the suddenness with which it was delivered stunned the force on the left flank, who so little expected it. confidence turned to fear, fear to disorder—so much so that the withdrawal turned into a panic-stricken rush to the rear, similar to the retreat to nangalin.
how different from kondratenko's orderly retirement!
all round for many miles was now a scene of complete disorder. units, not having received any orders, retreated as each of their commanding officers thought best. it was a case of every one for himself; and to do full justice to the younger commanders and to the men, i should say that the fact that this retirement did not in all cases turn into a shameful and panic-stricken flight was largely due to them: that things were not worse was also greatly due to the indecision shown by the enemy. had they energetically pursued, as they did on the right flank, individual commanding officers could not in the surrounding chaos have prevented a panic, and the troops, with fock at their head, would have passed by wolf's hills and have appeared in arthur that evening. despite his extreme dislike for the wolf's hills position, the enemy's indecision compelled fock to occupy it, but only temporarily.
[pg 129]
when the force reached these hills and saw the trenches, they found a fresh surprise in store for them. they had been previously dug without any care, not on the slopes of the hills which it was necessary to hold, but at their foot: there was no communication between them, and the flat ground in front was densely covered with kiaoling the height of a man. as none of the crop had been cut, large numbers would be able to creep through it unseen, right up to our trenches, and hurling themselves upon us, might drive us out of them. any retirement, also, would have to be made up the slopes and would be quite exposed. however, there was no time to dig elsewhere when the enemy's attack was expected at any moment. the men were more tired from the disorganization than from fighting or from privations, and on this particular evening the general's depressing influence on his division was more than ever noticeable. officers and men looked with confidence only towards the fortress and its forts; they felt that this chaos would end there. the division knew that it was commanded by a man who was not equal to the task, and who would spoil everything.
by evening all the positions were occupied, and if the divisional staff had happened to mix amongst the bivouacs, and to hear what was being said in the trenches, they would have learned much to their advantage. the orders of the officer commanding the district for the night of july 28 were interesting, as showing his absolute ignorance of the situation.
our troops, now occupying these trenches, such as they were, expected every moment to be attacked, and passed an anxious night. from the japanese lines we heard nothing, for, true to their usual tactics, the enemy, having thrown out outposts, were resting in calmness and confidence. their victory on our left flank had been[pg 130] quickly and easily obtained: their leaders were competent and trusted. indeed, from the time of their landing in the peninsula things had gone without a hitch. at dawn on the 29th they commenced a forward movement. in front of us, taller than a man's height, grew the dense kiaoling: it was so high that it was only by the wavy movement of its surface that it was possible to tell if the enemy were there. all we could do was to fire volleys into it; but whenever we thought we must have done much damage—there was the movement again. in one place they got up so close that it was only by the great gallantry of our infantry that our guns escaped capture.
on july 29 we had the following order:
'colonel grigorenko and the officers under him will be good enough to arrange for the immediate construction of durable bomb-proofs on wolf's hills. even though they work twenty-four hours in the day, this must be done, as it is vitally important.
'(signed by order).
'reuss, colonel,
'chief of the staff.'
no head cover had been provided along the line of improvised trenches, and but few paths had been made on the slopes. the enemy were concentrating steadily, at any minute the artillery preparation might commence, and then the assault would follow. everything pointed to an immediate attack, and yet here was our staff, in their usual short-sighted manner, writing of bomb-proofs—bomb-proofs whose construction required much labour and time. this order made many think that the authorities had decided to hold the positions for good [especially as a long line of two-wheeled carts left arthur with wood, rails, and iron-sheeting], and the men set to work to carry it out, but they had no time. at 2 a.m. on the 30th the[pg 131] japanese, taking advantage of the natural cover afforded by the crops, attacked in force, and before it was properly light the assault was in full swing. the assaulting columns hid in the kiaoling, and our men in the trenches at the foot of the hills could see nothing but the sea of grain in front of them until the waving stalks parted and the enemy suddenly dashed out.
blinded and shut in as they were, subject to heavy shrapnel and high-explosive shell-fire, and with an unseen enemy at close quarters, would it have been surprising if our men had fled in panic? talking afterwards to prisoners, the japanese officers said openly that if they themselves had been entrusted with the organization of the defence of these hills, and told to make it as easy as possible for the attackers, they could not have done it better than we russians had done it for them. as soon as the assault began colonel laperoff poured a hot fire into the assaulting columns from his guns above, which caused the japanese heavy losses, in spite of their invisibility. but they came on irresistibly, and by midday our retirement had begun. they forced in particular that portion of the line held by the 13th east siberian rifle regiment. in the afternoon, when the assault was pressed with greater fury, our troops began to quit the position so hurriedly that the guns were left without infantry escort, and nearly fell into the enemy's hands. this all happened in sight of the permanent forts of port arthur. as wolf's hills were so close to the rayon of the fortress, we might have been protected by its heavy guns, which could have shelled the enemy in front of this position and more or less have paralysed his advance by enfilade fire from the north-east front. but, thanks to the plan of retirement not having been communicated to smirnoff, the batteries and forts of port arthur did not co-operate in the action.
[pg 132]
having seized wolf's hills, the enemy did not pursue further. this caution was quite comprehensible, as directly in rear of these were a number of exposed depressions, where they would have come under the fire of the fortress guns.
with the loss of this position began the close investment of port arthur.
