the 4th of july showed the japanese the power and energy of our troops. it illustrated their capabilities not only in defence, but of successfully delivering an attack; for it should be noted that the minimum number of troops on the advanced positions took part in the engagement of that day. having retaken big ridge, green hills, and the foot hills of kuen-san, still holding the defile—the second key to the advanced positions—and having made some progress with the fortifying of all the defensive line, we completely stopped the enemy's forward movement towards the outer forts, on which work was now being pressed on. at this time our mobile shore defences (a division of gunboats) were able to shell the enemy's positions, his rear communications, and his bivouacs, with great success. thanks to the result of the battle of the 4th, the enemy felt that they were liable to attack themselves; the desperate and well-planned attack of our right flank, under the command of general kondratenko, on that day had come as a nasty surprise. after kinchou they had advanced victoriously—as they liked. the battle of june 26, with our abandonment of kuen-san, confirmed them in the belief that russians were incapable of taking advantage of and of holding good positions; but the actions of july 3 and 4 made them more careful, and not quite so ready to believe blindly in their lucky star. they[pg 104] now assumed the defensive, and began to construct field fortifications, to build wire entanglements, and to lay mines all along their defence line and captured heights. they became still more careful when our outpost line moved forward, and, attacking their outposts, occupied with our pickets the hills in front of green hills, from the foot of kuen-san to the sea. if only that hill had been still in our hands, our position would have been splendid: under the energetic kondratenko, we would have very soon turned it into quite a formidable fort, which would have been able to shell the enemy at every point, for all the roads leading from their position to dalny would have been distinctly visible. but what could we now do? fock had, knowingly or unknowingly, spoilt everything, and in the face of common sense given up the hill. i repeat, kuen-san was never properly fortified, and so the japanese had been able to capture it with small loss. had it been fortified, they would have paid a long and heavy price for it.
one day when butusoff, commanding the section on the right flank of green hills, was lying on his face on his favourite little hill, and looking intently at the top of kuen-san through his glasses, i asked him what he thought of it. he had intended for some time to send some scouts there, and so he used to study all the approaches to the top by day.
'oh, i think a lot of it! so long as kuen-san belongs to the japanese, we can do no good here. remember that they can clearly see everything that we do. now, look at the top; look up there,' he said, pointing. 'not there—more to the right; up above that first point.'
'i see!'
'look! you can see those little poles running all the way down? those are for telephone-wires. from the top of that hill they will be able to correct the fire of the[pg 105] whole of their batteries, just as they did on mount samson. do you remember? well, all their batteries are being connected up with telephone to that peak. i stay here by the hour, and i have seen how they have connected up by telephone from one peak to another.'
pic
a bombproof.
thanks to the fairly successful operations under general kondratenko, people in the fortress were now somewhat less nervous, and they began, with their usual optimism, at once to believe that the enemy would be checked for a long time on the advanced works. true, kondratenko had taken the place of fock, but the real state of affairs was not understood. few knew that we might expect a decisive advance any day, and that it was impossible to hold the enemy long on our most absurd line of positions, stretching for seventeen miles, with such forces as were allotted by the district staff. but however much it was hoped that we would succeed in checking the enemy for a longer or shorter time, every one quite understood that if we were not reinforced from the north the japanese must sooner or later close up to the fortress and begin to bombard it.
in view of this, the leading people, especially those with families, began to build for themselves bomb-proofs; but, owing to the lack of the necessary material, labour, and knowledge, most of these were made in a primitive fashion, and would have given absolutely no protection against shells, nor even against splinters; but, ostrich-like, the builders obtained a sense of security from the concealment afforded. st?ssel, with his extraordinary ideas on everything, took a different view; in every unofficial way he showed his disapproval of these buildings and made fun of them. however, this did not prevent him having one built for himself in his own courtyard, and also one for the staff-officers of the district. in this the latter took refuge during the bombardment.[pg 106] they might have built ten bomb-proofs each for themselves if they had liked, but why should they interfere with others, especially with those who had wives and children? it was absurd, barbarous. the building of bomb-proofs should have been encouraged. kinchou had shown what damage could be done by small shells, and what might we not expect from siege-guns? the whole of arthur should have been turned into a catacomb, for besides the healthy, there were all the sick and wounded to be protected; but, when no proper bomb-proofs had been constructed during six years in the batteries, it is not surprising that none had been built for the hospitals.
while st?ssel harried those building bomb-proofs and created general annoyance by his extraordinary sallies and orders, things were elsewhere progressing. the work on temple and water-supply redoubts, which were destined, after ta-ku-shan, to play so brilliant a part in the defence, and on which the waves of the august storm were to be broken, were pushed on. general smirnoff, anticipating the course of operations, decided to fortify, as i have said, beside the main line of defences, the forts which at this time were almost ready—203 metre hill, the hills lying in front of angle, divisional, long, and orphan hills. it must be remembered that at the time of his arrival in the fortress there was only one advanced work; this was temple redoubt, with capacity for a company.
much was done to improve this work, and after the destruction of siu-shuing village, close by, and the construction of two lunettes, it really had some defensive value.
one interesting point was that st?ssel and fock insisted on the fortification of angle hill, which was of minor importance, in preference to strengthening 203 metre hill, which was of the greatest tactical value. this action was against smirnoff's opinion, and necessitated[pg 107] the occupation of pan-lun-shan and the forward slopes of angle hill. work on these could only be useless, but, to avoid unpleasantness, general smirnoff gave orders that they should be fortified, and he himself, together with kondratenko, made a thorough examination of the ground, though no one realized better than he the waste of time, men, material, and guns, all of which were so urgently wanted in other parts. in the event smirnoff's opinion proved correct. angle hill had to be abandoned, with its guns, on the first day of the august attack; but 203 metre hill held out for long, and it was only after its capture, on december 5, that the japanese were first able to shell the harbour and shipping.
while we worked hard at the fortifications and swept the roads for mines, everything went on quietly on the advanced positions now established along green hills. the enemy showed no activity, and did not disturb us with a single shot, but, like us, worked hard, getting troops into position and bringing up guns and ammunition to the front lines. fock especially insisted on upilazy ridge being fortified, anticipating that the main attack would be against that flank, and, as he was complete master on that side and was supported by st?ssel, he concentrated the greater part of the material, engineers, and sappers there. the right flank, to which he paid no attention, was left to itself. heaven knows what would have happened on july 26 if smirnoff had not discovered this in time, and, as already stated, sent kondratenko there. from july 4 he, with the assistance of some engineer officers, began to get the position on green hills into some order; but general fock was very displeased with his activity, and interfered wherever he could. had smirnoff and kondratenko given way, the results of the fighting on july 26 would have been disastrous, and i am sure that such a rout would have taken place[pg 108] among our men that the enemy would have driven us right into arthur. (the retirement on fock's flank was almost a rout.)
in the middle of july st?ssel inspected the advanced positions we were holding—at least, he visited the left flank, commanded by fock. this was only natural, for the mere fact of smirnoff and kondratenko evincing interest on the right would have been enough to make him ignore it. i assisted at this visit, and was personally assured by st?ssel that the attack would certainly fall on the left, while the enemy would merely demonstrate on the right. this inspection was indeed a farce, for all knew that, had st?ssel given any orders, which he did not, they would not have been carried out.
we went along the shininsky ridge, and at 2 p.m. reached the howitzer battery. it consisted of two howitzers on wooden platforms. on one side was pitched a tent for the men, on the other one for the officer. the heat was unbearable, and not a breath of wind fanned the air. kuen-san stood just above us, and with glasses we could see what was being done by the enemy. after a few words with his chief of the staff, kondratenko came up to st?ssel and, pointing out the desirability of delaying the enemy's work on that side, suggested that a few shells should occasionally be dropped on to them. st?ssel agreed and gave the order accordingly; but no sooner had the men begun to load than the general came up, and rudely telling kondratenko that he was in command there, persuaded st?ssel to cancel the order. the incident was enlightening. we moved on, st?ssel remarking on more than one occasion that bomb-proofs were necessary, and receiving the invariable reply that they were being made. none, however, were visible, nor had the fire trenches any sort of overhead cover.
[pg 109]
gradually we made our way homewards, back to the railway, and then by train to port arthur, to resume again our daily life, and to read the instructive orders in which st?ssel gave us the benefit of his experience at the front!
