as the sea blockade was at this time very slack, communication with chifu was easy, and chinamen could always be found to make the trip. in addition, steamers with provisions often ran into pigeon bay. st?ssel received inquiries from head-quarters, through shanghai, as to what he wanted, and was informed that what he required would be sent. but he refused all proffers of assistance, saying we required nothing, and this in the face of smirnoff's protests that big gun ammunition, preserved meat, vegetables, hospital appliances, etc., were urgently needed. we could at that time have obtained anything we wanted, for merchants and others were offering to run the blockade—at a price. one day a steamer owned by a private frenchman ran into pigeon bay with supplies, among which was a large stock of tinned milk. it was with the greatest difficulty st?ssel could be got to take this, yet milk was one of the first things to run out, and he warned the captain not to come again. it was almost impossible to send private letters out of arthur, for all of them were censored by st?ssel's staff, those hinting of the true state of things being destroyed and the writers punished. i myself had experience of this.
with the occupation of green hills, smirnoff set to work to fortify the ground in front of angle hill, wolf's[pg 92] hills, ta-ku-shan and sia-gu-shan hills. the latter were of immense importance, as they were quite inaccessible, and protected the whole of the western front of the fortress, but only so long as wolf's hills were in our possession. as far as intelligence was concerned everything went on in the old sweet way. the scouting was bad, the information gained was nil, and we remained ignorant of the enemy's position or movements. one good step taken at this time, however, was the formation of a town guard from all the citizens capable of bearing arms.
on june 23 the enemy, having concentrated, began to advance from siabintao on the extreme right flank along the hills on the seashore. to oppose them two companies of frontier guards from waitselazui, and three companies from khuankhe-chjuan were sent. a short engagement ensued; our men held their ground, and the enemy retired. this movement of the japs was merely a demonstration with the object of finding out the weakness of our right flank. they had excellent information regarding the left from their spies and patrols, and knew well that considerable bodies of infantry and artillery were collected on that side, and that fairly strong fortifications were in course of construction. the weakness of our right was continually pointed out to fock, but he did not send a single company there, even after this fight on the 23rd. at 5 a.m. on the 26th they opened a heavy gun fire, chiefly on the right, and made a general advance all along the line. at midday they pressed the attack on the centre and right more vigorously, and continued massing against those points till evening. next day, at daybreak, they hurled all their might against the right. the fighting was obstinate, and the enemy, though considerably stronger than we, were obliged to fall back; we, however, owing to reinforcements not being received in time, were obliged to abandon kuen-san.
[pg 93]
this peak, which was really the key to our positions, for it commanded the whole line, was held by only one company of the 14th regiment, commanded by captain lopatin. realizing its great tactical importance, and naturally thinking that we did the same and would doggedly hold on to it, the japanese attacked, after artillery preparation, with almost an entire regiment. but the general did not appreciate its value. even when the japs began to press its little garrison, he sent no reinforcements. the company only began to withdraw when it had lost three-fourths of its strength, and when, in spite of the several messages despatched asking for help, no support was given. at the subsequent inquiry upon this affair, fock so represented the matter to st?ssel that he had lopatin tried by court-martial for abandoning the position prematurely, and without orders. fock himself escaped blame. before the sentence could be confirmed by the tsar, poor lopatin died of heart failure; but he had been sentenced to the loss of all his rights, and to serve with the prison companies for two years.
by the evening of the 27th the fighting ceased with the capture of kuen-san and green hills. the troops holding the right fell back into the valley of lunwantun, and occupied the heights in rear; but the loss of the two former made our position critical, as from kuen-san the japs could renew the attack, and force us back. there was nothing for it but to attack and at all costs regain possession of those hills. the district staff accordingly issued, with the greatest precaution, secret orders to that effect. on july 1 i met a young officer in the street.
'would you care to come with me to green hills?' he said casually. 'a night attack has been fixed for to-night on kuen-san; but it is a great secret.'
as i also heard the move discussed by chinese shop-assistants, i went at once to the district staff and told[pg 94] the senior aide-de-camp, for, as the whole town seemed to know this 'secret,' it must, of course, be known now to the enemy.
'yes, the general let it out, so we have telephoned to cancel the move. in any case it wouldn't have succeeded, as the general was dead against it. the attack will take place another day, and kondratenko is going to command the right flank. fock will now only nominally be the senior.'
this reply was only too true, for the general was jealous of kondratenko, and would not co-operate in any way.
early in the morning of july 3 our destroyer and gunboat division steamed towards shaopingtao and opened fire on green hills; at the same time our troops advanced from the right flank against them, kondratenko being in command. the ships did little actual harm, owing to lack of facilities for fire observation and correction. the fight raged all day, our main objective being kuen-san. on the 4th it was renewed, but though we again got possession of green hills, we were unable to capture kuen-san. the 13th regiment took two-thirds of it, but could not advance further, as the japanese threw in heavy reinforcements, and brought up a number of machine-guns. on the night of the 5th we had to withdraw, and abandoned further attempts to retake the position, as one attack alone had cost us 500 men. green hills were again ours, but the key to the position, from which all our roads, dispositions, and actions could be seen, and an enemy's artillery fire and infantry advance directed, remained in the hands of the japanese. on the 7th everything was quiet, and from then onwards for three weeks the enemy did not fire a shot in reply to our occasional bombardments, for they were establishing themselves and fortifying the ground actually won. smirnoff insisted on the positions recaptured by us[pg 95] being strongly fortified, and sent his best engineer officer, raschevsky, to supervise, so good progress was made. at midnight of the 8th, in torrents of rain, they made a sudden attack on our centre, but were noticed in time and repulsed. on the 13th our howitzers bombarded the enemy's works for some hours, but drew no reply. on the 14th we made a reconnaissance of the japanese position under smirnoff, with like result. twice only from the 8th to the 26th july did the enemy attack, and then only in small numbers.
