the concept “tree” is conditioned for our knowledge by the percept “tree.” there is only one determinate concept which i can select from the general system of concepts and apply to a given percept. the connection of concept and percept is mediately and objectively determined by thought in conformity with the percept. the connection between a percept and its concept is recognised after the act of perception, but the relevance of the one to the other is determined by the character of each.
very different is the result when we consider knowledge, and, more particularly, the relation of man to the world which occurs in knowledge. in the preceding chapters the attempt has been made to show that an unprejudiced examination of this relation is able to throw light on its nature. a correct understanding of this examination leads to the conclusion that thinking may be intuitively apprehended in its unique, self-contained nature. those who find it necessary, for the explanation of thinking as such, to invoke something else, [147]e.g., physical brain-processes, or unconscious spiritual processes lying behind the conscious thinking which they observe, fail to grasp the facts which an unprejudiced examination yields. when we observe our thinking, we live during the observation immediately within the essence of a spiritual, self-sustaining activity. indeed, we may even affirm that if we want to grasp the essential nature of spirit in the form in which it immediately presents itself to man, we need but look at our own self-sustaining thinking.
for the study of thinking two things coincide which elsewhere must always appear apart, viz., concept and percept. if we fail to see this, we shall be unable to regard the concepts which we have elaborated in response to percepts as anything but shadowy copies of these percepts, and we shall take the percepts as presenting to us reality as it really is. we shall, further, build up for ourselves a metaphysical world after the pattern of the world of percepts. we shall, each according to his habitual ideas, call this world a world of atoms, or of will, or of unconscious spirit, and so on. and we shall fail to notice that all the time we have been doing nothing but erecting hypothetically a metaphysical world modeled on the world we perceive. but if we clearly apprehend what thinking consists in, we shall recognise that percepts present to us only a portion of reality, and that the complementary portion which alone imparts to reality its full character as [148]real, is experienced by us in the organisation of percepts by thought. we shall regard all thought, not as a shadowy copy of reality, but as a self-sustaining spiritual essence. we shall be able to say of it, that it is revealed to us in consciousness through intuition. intuition is the purely spiritual conscious experience of a purely spiritual content. it is only through intuition that we can grasp the essence of thinking.
to win through, by means of unprejudiced observation, to the recognition of this truth of the intuitive essence of thinking requires an effort. but without this effort we shall not succeed in clearing the way for a theory of the psycho-physical organisation of man. we recognise that this organisation can produce no effect whatever on the essential nature of thinking. at first sight this seems to be contradicted by patent and obvious facts. for ordinary experience, human thinking occurs only in connection with, and by means of, such an organisation. this dependence on psycho-physical organisation is so prominent that its true bearing can be appreciated by us only if we recognise, that in the essential nature of thinking this organisation plays no part whatever. once we appreciate this, we can no longer fail to notice how peculiar is the relation of human organisation to thought. for this organisation contributes nothing to the essential nature of thought, but recedes whenever thought becomes active. it suspends [149]its own activity, it yields ground. and the ground thus set free is occupied by thought. the essence which is active in thought has a two-fold function: first it restricts the human organisation in its own activity; next, it steps into the place of that organisation. yes, even the former, the restriction of human organisation, is an effect of the activity of thought, and more particularly of that part of it which prepares the manifestation of thinking. this explains the sense in which thinking has its counterpart in the organisation of the body. once we perceive this, we can no longer misapprehend the significance for thinking of this physical counterpart. when we walk over soft ground our feet leave deep tracks in the soil. we shall not be tempted to say that the forces of the ground, from below, have formed these tracks. we shall not attribute to these forces any share in the production of the tracks. just so, if with open minds we observe the essential nature of thinking, we shall not attribute any share in that nature to the traces in the physical organism which thinking produces in preparing its manifestation through the body.1
an important question, however, confronts us here. if human organisation has no part [150]in the essential nature of thinking, what is its function within the whole nature of man? well, the effects of thinking upon this organisation have no bearing upon the essence of thinking, but they have a bearing upon the origin of the “i,” or ego-consciousness, through thinking. thinking, in its unique character, constitutes the real ego, but it does not constitute, as such, the ego-consciousness. to see this we have but to study thinking with an open mind. the ego is to be found in thinking. the ego-consciousness arises through the traces which, in the sense above explained, the activity of thinking impresses upon our general consciousness. the ego-consciousness thus arises through the physical organisation. this view must not, however, be taken to imply that the ego-consciousness, once it has arisen, remains dependent on the physical organisation. on the contrary, once it exists it is taken up into thought and shares henceforth thought’s spiritual self-subsistence.
the ego-consciousness is built upon human organisation. the latter is the source of all acts of will. following out the direction of the preceding exposition, we can gain insight into the connection of thought, conscious ego, and act of will, only by studying first how an act of will issues from human organisation.2
in a particular act of will we must distinguish two factors: the motive and the spring of [151]action. the motive is a factor of the nature of concept or idea; the spring of action is the factor in will which is directly determined in the human organisation. the conceptual factor, or motive, is the momentary determining cause of an act of will; the spring of action is the permanent determining factor in the individual. the motive of an act of will can be only a pure concept, or else a concept with a definite relation to perception, i.e., an idea. universal and individual concepts (ideas) become motives of will by influencing the human individual and determining him to action in a particular direction. one and the same concept, however, or one and the same idea, influence different individuals differently. they determine different men to different actions. an act of will is, therefore, not merely the outcome of a concept or an idea, but also of the individual make-up of human beings. this individual make-up we will call, following eduard von hartmann, the “characterological disposition.” the manner in which concept and idea act on the characterological disposition of a man gives to his life a definite moral or ethical stamp.
the characterological disposition consists of the more or less permanent content of the individual’s life, that is, of his habitual ideas and feelings. whether an idea which enters my mind at this moment stimulates me to an act of will or not, depends on its relation to my other ideal contents, and also to my [152]peculiar modes of feeling. my ideal content, in turn, is conditioned by the sum total of those concepts which have, in the course of my individual life, come in contact with percepts, that is, have become ideas. this, again, depends on my greater or lesser capacity for intuition, and on the range of my perception, that is, on the subjective and objective factors of my experiences, on the structure of my mind and on my environment. my affective life more especially determines my characterological disposition. whether i shall make a certain idea or concept the motive for action will depend on whether it gives me pleasure or pain.
these are the factors which we have to consider in an act of will. the immediately present idea or concept, which becomes the motive, determines the end or the purpose of my will; my characterological disposition determines me to direct my activity towards this end. the idea of taking a walk in the next half-hour determines the end of my action. but this idea is raised to the level of a motive only if it meets with a suitable characterological disposition, that is, if during my past life i have formed the ideas of the wholesomeness of walking and the value of health; and, further, if the idea of walking is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure.
we must, therefore, distinguish (1) the possible subjective dispositions which are likely to turn given ideas and concepts into motives, [153]and (2) the possible ideas and concepts which are capable of so influencing my characterological disposition that an act of will results. the former are for morality the springs of action, the latter its ends.
the springs of action in the moral life can be discovered by analysing the elements of which individual life is composed.
the first level of individual life is that of perception, more particularly sense-perception. this is the stage of our individual lives in which a percept translates itself into will immediately, without the intervention of either a feeling or a concept. the spring of action here involved may be called simply instinct. our lower, purely animal, needs (hunger, sexual intercourse, etc.) find their satisfaction in this way. the main characteristic of instinctive life is the immediacy with which the percept starts off the act of will. this kind of determination of the will, which belongs originally only to the life of the lower senses, may, however, become extended also to the percepts of the higher senses. we may react to the percept of a certain event in the external world without reflecting on what we do, and without any special feeling connecting itself with the percept. we have examples of this especially in our ordinary conventional intercourse with men. the spring of this kind of action is called tact or moral good taste. the more often such immediate reactions to a percept occur, the more the agent will prove [154]himself able to act purely under the guidance of tact; that is, tact becomes his characterological disposition.
the second level of human life is feeling. definite feelings accompany the percepts of the external world. these feelings may become springs of action. when i see a hungry man, my pity for him may become the spring of my action. such feelings, for example, are modesty, pride, sense of honour, humility, remorse, pity, revenge, gratitude, piety, loyalty, love, and duty.3
the third and last level of life is to have thoughts and ideas. an idea or a concept may become the motive of an action through mere reflection. ideas become motives because, in the course of my life, i regularly connect certain aims of my will with percepts which recur again and again in a more or less modified form. hence it is that, with men who are not wholly without experience, the occurrence of certain percepts is always accompanied also by the consciousness of ideas of actions, which they have themselves carried out in similar cases or which they have seen others carry out. these ideas float before their minds as determining models in all subsequent decisions; they become parts of their characterological disposition. we may [155]give the name of practical experience to the spring of action just described. practical experience merges gradually into purely tactful behaviour. that happens, when definite typical pictures of actions have become so closely connected in our minds with ideas of certain situations in life, that, in any given instance, we omit all deliberation based on experience and pass immediately from the percept to the action.
the highest level of individual life is that of conceptual thought without reference to any definite perceptual content. we determine the content of a concept through pure intuition on the basis of an ideal system. such a concept contains, at first, no reference to any definite percepts. when an act of will comes about under the influence of a concept which refers to a percept, i.e., under the influence of an idea, then it is the percept which determines our action indirectly by way of the concept. but when we act under the influence of pure intuitions, the spring of our action is pure thought. as it is the custom in philosophy to call pure thought “reason,” we may perhaps be justified in giving the name of practical reason to the spring of action characteristic of this level of life. the clearest account of this spring of action has been given by kreyenbühl (philosophische monatshefte, vol. xviii, no. 3). in my opinion his article on this subject is one of the most important contributions to present-day philosophy, more [156]especially to ethics. kreyenbühl calls the spring of action, of which we are treating, the practical a priori i.e., a spring of action issuing immediately from my intuition.
it is clear that such a spring of action can no longer be counted in the strictest sense as part of the characterological disposition. for what is here effective in me as a spring of action is no longer something purely individual, but the ideal, and hence universal, content of my intuition. as soon as i regard this content as the valid basis and starting-point of an action, i pass over into willing, irrespective of whether the concept was already in my mind beforehand, or whether it only occurs to me immediately before the action, that is, irrespective of whether it was present in the form of a disposition in me or not.
a real act of will results only when a present impulse to action, in the form of a concept or idea, acts on the characterological disposition. such an impulse thereupon becomes the motive of the will.
the motives of moral conduct are ideas and concepts. there are moralists who see in feeling also a motive of morality; they assert, e.g., that the end of moral conduct is to secure the greatest possible quantity of pleasure for the agent. pleasure itself, however, can never be a motive; at best only the idea of pleasure can act as motive. the idea of a future pleasure, but not the feeling itself, can act on my characterological disposition. [157]for the feeling does not yet exist in the moment of action; on the contrary, it has first to be produced by the action.
the idea of one’s own or another’s well-being is, however, rightly regarded as a motive of the will. the principle of producing the greatest quantity of pleasure for oneself through one’s action, that is, to attain individual happiness, is called egoism. the attainment of this individual happiness is sought either by thinking ruthlessly only of one’s own good, and striving to attain it even at the cost of the happiness of other individuals (pure egoism), or by promoting the good of others, either because one anticipates indirectly a favourable influence on one’s own happiness through the happiness of others, or because one fears to endanger one’s own interest by injuring others (morality of prudence). the special content of the egoistical principle of morality will depend on the ideas which we form of what constitutes our own, or others’, good. a man will determine the content of his egoistical striving in accordance with what he regards as one of life’s good things (luxury, hope of happiness, deliverance from different evils, etc.).
further, the purely conceptual content of an action is to be regarded as yet another kind of motive. this content has no reference, like the idea of one’s own pleasure, solely to the particular action, but to the deduction of an action from a system of moral principles. [158]these moral principles, in the form of abstract concepts, may guide the individual’s moral life without his worrying himself about the origin of his concepts. in that case, we feel merely the moral necessity of submitting to a moral concept which, in the form of law, controls our actions. the justification of this necessity we leave to those who demand from us moral subjection, that is, to those whose moral authority over us we acknowledge (the head of the family, the state, social custom, the authority of the church, divine revelation). we meet with a special kind of these moral principles when the law is not proclaimed to us by an external authority, but comes from our own selves (moral autonomy). in this case we believe that we hear the voice, to which we have to submit ourselves, in our own souls. the name for this voice is conscience.
it is a great moral advance when a man no longer takes as the motive of his action the commands of an external or internal authority, but tries to understand the reason why a given maxim of action ought to be effective as a motive in him. this is the advance from morality based on authority to action from moral insight. at this level of morality, a man will try to discover the demands of the moral life, and will let his action be determined by this knowledge. such demands are (1) the greatest possible happiness of humanity as a whole purely for its own sake, (2) the progress of [159]civilisation, or the moral development of mankind towards ever greater perfection, (3) the realisation of individual moral ends conceived by an act of pure intuition.
the greatest possible happiness of humanity as a whole will naturally be differently conceived by different people. the above-mentioned maxim does not imply any definite idea of this happiness, but rather means that every one who acknowledges this principle strives to do all that, in his opinion, most promotes the good of the whole of humanity.
the progress of civilisation is seen to be a special application of the moral principle just mentioned, at any rate for those to whom the goods which civilisation produces bring feelings of pleasure. however, they will have to pay the price of progress in the destruction and annihilation of many things which also contribute to the happiness of humanity. it is, however, also possible that some men look upon the progress of civilisation as a moral necessity, quite apart from the feelings of pleasure which it brings. if so, the progress of civilisation will be a new moral principle for them, different from the previous one.
both the principle of the public good, and that of the progress of civilisation, alike depend on the way in which we apply the content of our moral ideas to particular experiences (percepts). the highest principle of morality which we can conceive, however, is that which contains, to start with, no such reference to [160]particular experiences, but which springs from the source of pure intuition and does not seek until later any connection with percepts, i.e., with life. the determination of what ought to be willed issues here from a point of view very different from that of the previous two principles. whoever accepts the principle of the public good will in all his actions ask first what his ideals contribute to this public good. the upholder of the progress of civilisation as the principle of morality will act similarly. there is, however, a still higher mode of conduct which, in a given case, does not start from any single limited moral ideal, but which sees a certain value in all moral principles, always asking whether this or that principle is more important in a particular case. it may happen that a man considers in certain circumstances the promotion of the public good, in others that of the progress of civilisation, and in yet others the furthering of his own private good, to be the right course, and makes that the motive of his action. but when all other grounds of determination take second place, then we rely, in the first place, on conceptual intuition itself. all other motives now drop out of sight, and the ideal content of an action alone becomes its motive.
among the levels of characterological disposition, we have singled out as the highest that which manifests itself as pure thought, or practical reason. among the motives, we [161]have just singled out conceptual intuition as the highest. on nearer consideration, we now perceive that at this level of morality the spring of action and the motive coincide, i.e., that neither a predetermined characterological disposition, nor an external moral principle accepted on authority, influence our conduct. the action, therefore, is neither a merely stereotyped one which follows the rules of a moral code, nor is it automatically performed in response to an external impulse. rather it is determined solely through its ideal content.
for such an action to be possible, we must first be capable of moral intuitions. whoever lacks the capacity to think out for himself the moral principles that apply in each particular case, will never rise to the level of genuine individual willing.
kant’s principle of morality: act so that the principle of your action may be valid for all men—is the exact opposite of ours. his principle would mean death to all individual action. the norm for me can never be what all men would do, but rather what it is right for me to do in each special case.
a superficial criticism might urge against these arguments: how can an action be individually adapted to the special case and the special situation, and yet at the same time be ideally determined by pure intuition? this objection rests on a confusion of the moral motive with the perceptual content of an [162]action. the latter, indeed, may be a motive, and is actually a motive when we act for the progress of culture, or from pure egoism, etc., but in action based on pure moral intuition it never is a motive. of course, my self takes notice of these perceptual contents, but it does not allow itself to be determined by them. the content is used only to construct a theoretical concept, but the corresponding moral concept is not derived from the object. the theoretical concept of a given situation which faces me, is a moral concept also only if i adopt the standpoint of a particular moral principle. if i base all my conduct on the principle of the progress of civilisation, then my way through life is tied down to a fixed route. from every occurrence which comes to my notice and attracts my interest there springs a moral duty, viz., to do my tiny share towards using this occurrence in the service of the progress of civilisation. in addition to the concept which reveals to me the connections of events or objects according to the laws of nature, there is also a moral label attached to them which contains for me, as a moral agent, ethical directions as to how i have to conduct myself. at a higher level these moral labels disappear, and my action is determined in each particular instance by my idea; and more particularly by the idea which is suggested to me by the concrete instance.
men vary greatly in their capacity for [163]intuition. in some, ideas bubble up like a spring, others acquire them with much labour. the situations in which men live, and which are the scenes of their actions, are no less widely different. the conduct of a man will depend, therefore, on the manner in which his faculty of intuition reacts to a given situation. the aggregate of the ideas which are effective in us, the concrete content of our intuitions, constitute that which is individual in each of us, notwithstanding the universal character of our ideas. in so far as this intuitive content has reference to action, it constitutes the moral substance of the individual. to let this substance express itself in his life is the moral principle of the man who regards all other moral principles as subordinate. we may call this point of view ethical individualism.
the determining factor of an action, in any concrete instance, is the discovery of the corresponding purely individual intuition. at this level of morality, there can be no question of general moral concepts (norms, laws). general norms always presuppose concrete facts from which they can be deduced. but facts have first to be created by human action.
when we look for the regulating principles (the conceptual principles guiding the actions of individuals, peoples, epochs), we obtain a system of ethics which is not a science of moral norms, but rather a science of morality as a natural fact. only the laws discovered in this way are related to human action as the laws [164]of nature are related to particular phenomena. these laws, however, are very far from being identical with the impulses on which we base our actions. if we want to understand how man’s moral will gives rise to an action, we must first study the relation of this will to the action. for this purpose we must single out for study those actions in which this relation is the determining factor. when i, or another, subsequently review my action we may discover what moral principles come into play in it. but so long as i am acting, i am influenced, not by these moral principles, but by my love for the object which i want to realise through my action. i ask no man and no moral code, whether i shall perform this action or not. on the contrary, i carry it out as soon as i have formed the idea of it. this alone makes it my action. if a man acts because he accepts certain moral norms, his action is the outcome of the principles which compose his moral code. he merely carries out orders. he is a superior kind of automaton. inject some stimulus to action into his mind, and at once the clock-work of his moral principles will begin to work and run its prescribed course, so as to issue in an action which is christian, or humane, or unselfish, or calculated to promote the progress of culture. it is only when i follow solely my love for the object, that it is i, myself, who act. at this level of morality, i acknowledge no lord over me, neither an external authority, nor the so-called [165]voice of my conscience. i acknowledge no external principle of my action, because i have found in myself the ground for my action, viz., my love of the action. i do not ask whether my action is good or bad; i perform it, because i am in love with it. my action is “good” when, with loving intuition, i insert myself in the right way into the world-nexus as i experience it intuitively; it is “bad” when this is not the case. neither do i ask myself how another man would act in my position. on the contrary, i act as i, this unique individuality, will to act. no general usage, no common custom, no general maxim current among men, no moral norm guides me, but my love for the action. i feel no compulsion, neither the compulsion of nature which dominates me through my instincts, nor the compulsion of the moral commandments. my will is simply to realise what in me lies.
those who hold to general moral norms will reply to these arguments that, if every one has the right to live himself out and to do what he pleases, there can be no distinction between a good and a bad action; every fraudulent impulse in me has the same right to issue in action as the intention to serve the general good. it is not the mere fact of my having conceived the idea of an action which ought to determine me as a moral agent, but the further examination of whether it is a good or an evil action. only if it is good ought i to carry it out. [166]
this objection is easily intelligible, and yet it had its root in what is but a misapprehension of my meaning. my reply to it is this: if we want to get at the essence of human volition, we must distinguish between the path along which volition attains to a certain degree of development, and the unique character which it assumes as it approaches its goal. it is on the path towards the goal that the norms play a legitimate part. the goal consists in the realisation of moral aims which are apprehended by pure intuition. man attains such aims in proportion as he is able to rise at all to the level at which intuition grasps the ideal content of the world. in any particular volition, other elements will, as a rule, be mixed up, as motives or springs of action, with such moral aims. but, for all that, intuition may be, wholly or in part, the determining factor in human volition. what we ought to do, that we do. we supply the stage upon which duty becomes deed. it is our own action which, as such, issues from us. the impulse, then, can only be wholly individual. and, in fact, only a volition which issues out of intuition can be individual. it is only in an age in which immature men regard the blind instincts as part of a man’s individuality, that the act of a criminal can be described as living out one’s individuality in the same sense, in which the embodiment in action of a pure intuition can be so described.
the animal instinct which drives a man to [167]a criminal act does not spring from intuition, and does not belong to what is individual in him, but rather to that which is most general in him, to that which is equally present in all individuals. the individual element in me is not my organism with its instincts and feelings, but rather the unified world of ideas which reveals itself through this organism. my instincts, cravings, passions, justify no further assertion about me than that i belong to the general species man. the fact that something ideal expresses itself in its own unique way through these instincts, passions, and feelings, constitutes my individuality. my instincts and cravings make me the sort of man of whom there are twelve to the dozen. the unique character of the idea, by means of which i distinguish myself within the dozen as “i,” makes of me an individual. only a being other than myself could distinguish me from others by the difference in my animal nature. by thought, i.e., by the active grasping of the ideal element working itself out through my organism, i distinguish myself from others. hence it is impossible to say of the action of a criminal that it issues from the idea within him. indeed, the characteristic feature of criminal actions is precisely that they spring from the non-ideal elements in man.
an act the grounds for which lie in the ideal part of my individual nature is free. every other act, whether done under the [168]compulsion of nature or under the obligation imposed by a moral norm, is unfree.
that man alone is free who in every moment of his life is able to obey only himself. a moral act is my act only when it can be called free in this sense. so far we are concerned here with the presuppositions under which an act of will is felt to be free; the sequel will show how this purely ethical concept of freedom is realised in the essential nature of man.
action on the basis of freedom does not exclude, but include, the moral laws. it only shows that it stands on a higher level than actions which are dictated by these laws. why should my act serve the general good less well when i do it from pure love of it, than when i perform it because it is a duty to serve the general good? the concept of duty excludes freedom, because it will not acknowledge the right of individuality, but demands the subjection of individuality to a general norm. freedom of action is conceivable only from the standpoint of ethical individualism.
but how about the possibility of social life for men, if each aims only at asserting his own individuality? this question expresses yet another objection on the part of moralism wrongly understood. the moralist believes that a social community is possible only if all men are held together by a common moral order. this shows that the moralist does not [169]understand the community of the world of ideas. he does not realise that the world of ideas which inspires me is no other than that which inspires my fellow-men. this identity is, indeed, but a conclusion from our experience of the world. however, it cannot be anything else. for if we could recognise it in any other way than by observation, it would follow that universal norms, not individual experience, were dominant in its sphere. individuality is possible only if every individual knows others only through individual observation. i differ from my neighbour, not at all because we are living in two entirely different mental worlds, but because from our common world of ideas we receive different intuitions. he desires to live out his intuitions, i mine. if we both draw our intuitions really from the world of ideas, and do not obey mere external impulses (physical or moral), then we cannot but meet one another in striving for the same aims, in having the same intentions. a moral misunderstanding, a clash of aims, is impossible between men who are free. only the morally unfree who blindly follow their natural instincts or the commands of duty, turn their backs on their neighbours, if these do not obey the same instincts and the same laws as themselves. to live in love of action and to let live in understanding of the other’s volition, this is the fundamental maxim of the free man. he knows no other “ought” than that with which his will intuitively puts itself [170]in harmony. how he shall will in any given case, that will be determined for him by the range of his ideas.
if sociability were not deeply rooted in human nature, no external laws would be able to inoculate us with it. it is only because human individuals are akin in spirit that they can live out their lives side by side. the free man lives out his life in the full confidence that all other free men belong to one spiritual world with himself, and that their intentions will coincide with his. the free man does not demand agreement from his fellow-men, but he expects it none the less, believing that it is inherent in human nature. i am not referring here to the necessity for this or that external institution. i refer to the disposition, to the state of mind, through which a man, aware of himself as one of a group of fellow-men for whom he cares, comes nearest to living up to the ideal of human dignity.
there are many who will say that the concept of the free man which i have here developed, is a chimera nowhere to be found realised, and that we have got to deal with actual human beings, from whom we can expect morality only if they obey some moral law, i.e., if they regard their moral task as a duty and do not simply follow their inclinations and loves. i do not deny this. only a blind man could do that. but, if so, away with all this hypocrisy of morality! let us say simply that human nature must be compelled [171]to act as long as it is not free. whether the compulsion of man’s unfree nature is effected by physical force or through moral laws, whether man is unfree because he indulges his unmeasured sexual desire, or because he is bound tight in the bonds of conventional morality, is quite immaterial. only let us not assert that such a man can rightly call his actions his own, seeing that he is driven to them by an external force. but in the midst of all this network of compulsion, there arise free spirits who, in all the welter of customs, legal codes, religious observances, etc., learn to be true to themselves. they are free in so far as they obey only themselves; unfree in so far as they submit to control. which of us can say that he is really free in all his actions? yet in each of us there dwells something deeper in which the free man finds expression.
our life is made up of free and unfree actions. we cannot, however, form a final and adequate concept of human nature without coming upon the free spirit as its purest expression. after all, we are men in the fullest sense only in so far as we are free.
this is an ideal, many will say. doubtless; but it is an ideal which is a real element in us working up to the surface of our nature. it is no ideal born of mere imagination or dream, but one which has life, and which manifests itself clearly even in the least developed form of its existence. if men were nothing but natural objects, the search for ideals, that is, [172]for ideas which as yet are not actual but the realisation of which we demand, would be an impossibility. in dealing with external objects the idea is determined by the percept. we have done our share when we have recognised the connection between idea and percept. but with a human being the case is different. the content of his existence is not determined without him. his concept of his true self as a moral being (free spirit) is not a priori united objectively with the perceptual content “man,” so that knowledge need only register the fact subsequently. man must by his own act unite his concept with the percept “man.” concept and percept coincide with one another in this instance, only in so far as the individual himself makes them coincide. this he can do only if he has found the concept of the free spirit, that is, if he has found the concept of his own self. in the objective world, a boundary-line is drawn by our organisation between percept and concept. knowledge breaks down this barrier. in our subjective nature this barrier is no less present. the individual overcomes it in the course of his development, by embodying his concept of himself in his outward existence. hence man’s moral life and his intellectual life lead him both alike to his two-fold nature, perception (immediate experience) and thought. the intellectual life overcomes his two-fold nature by means of knowledge, the moral life succeeds through the actual realisation of the [173]free spirit. every being has its inborn concept (the laws of its being and action), but in external objects this concept is indissolubly bound up with the percept, and separated from it only in the organisation of human minds. in human beings concept and percept are, at first, actually separated, to be just as actually reunited by them. someone might object that to our percept of a man there corresponds at every moment of his life a definite concept, just as with external objects. i can construct for myself the concept of an average man, and i may also have given to me a percept to fit this pattern. suppose now i add to this the concept of a free spirit, then i have two concepts for the same object.
such an objection is one-sided. as object of perception i am subject to perpetual change. as a child i was one thing, another as a youth, yet another as a man. moreover, at every moment i am different, as percept, from what i was the moment before. these changes may take place in such a way that either it is always only the same (average) man who exhibits himself in them, or that they represent the expression of a free spirit. such are the changes which my actions, as objects of perception, undergo.
in the perceptual object “man” there is given the possibility of transformation, just as in the plant-seed there lies the possibility of growth into a fully developed plant. the plant transforms itself in growth, because of [174]the objective law of nature which is inherent in it. the human being remains in his undeveloped state, unless he takes hold of the material for transformation within him and develops himself through his own energy. nature makes of man merely a natural being; society makes of him a being who acts in obedience to law; only he himself can make a free man of himself. at a definite stage in his development nature releases man from her fetters; society carries his development a step further; he alone can give himself the final polish.
the theory of free morality, then, does not assert that the free spirit is the only form in which man can exist. it looks upon the freedom of the spirit only as the last stage in man’s evolution. this is not to deny that conduct in obedience to norms has its legitimate place as a stage in development. the point is that we cannot acknowledge it to be the absolute standpoint in morality. for the free spirit transcends norms, in the sense that he is insensible to them as commands, but regulates his conduct in accordance with his impulses (intuitions).
when kant apostrophises duty: “duty! thou sublime and mighty name, that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission,” thou that “holdest forth a law … before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counterwork it,”4 then the free spirit replies: “freedom! [175]thou kindly and humane name, which dost embrace within thyself all that is morally most charming, all that insinuates itself most into my humanity, and which makest me the servant of nobody, which holdest forth no law, but waitest what my inclination itself will proclaim as law, because it resists every law that is forced upon it.”
this is the contrast of morality according to law and according to freedom.
the philistine who looks upon the state as embodied morality is sure to look upon the free spirit as a danger to the state. but that is only because his view is narrowly focused on a limited period of time. if he were able to look beyond, he would soon find that it is but on rare occasions that the free spirit needs to go beyond the laws of his state, and that it never needs to confront them with any real contradiction. for the laws of the state, one and all, have had their origin in the intuitions of free spirits, just like all other objective laws of morality. there is no traditional law enforced by the authority of a family, which was not, once upon a time, intuitively conceived and laid down by an ancestor. similarly the conventional laws of morality are first of all established by particular men, and the laws of the state are always born in the brain of a statesman. these free spirits have set up laws over the rest of mankind, and only he is unfree who forgets this origin and makes them either divine commands, or [176]objective moral duties, or—falsely mystical—the authoritative voice of his own conscience.
he, on the other hand, who does not forget the origin of laws, but looks for it in man, will respect them as belonging to the same world of ideas which is the source also of his own moral intuitions. if he thinks his intuitions better than the existing laws, he will try to put them into the place of the latter. if he thinks the laws justified, he will act in accordance with them as if they were his own intuitions.
man does not exist in order to found a moral order of the world. anyone who maintains that he does, stands in his theory of man still at that same point, at which natural science stood when it believed that a bull has horns in order that it may butt. scientists, happily, have cast the concept of objective purposes in nature into the limbo of dead theories. for ethics, it is more difficult to achieve the same emancipation. but just as horns do not exist for the sake of butting, but butting because of horns, so man does not exist for the sake of morality, but morality exists through man. the free man acts morally because he has a moral idea, he does not act in order to be moral. human individuals are the presupposition of a moral world order.
the human individual is the fountain of all morality and the centre of all life. state and society exist only because they have necessarily grown out of the life of individuals. that [177]state and society, in turn, should react upon the lives of individuals, is no more difficult to comprehend, than that the butting which is the result of the existence of horns, reacts in turn upon the further development of the horns, which would become atrophied by prolonged disuse. similarly, the individual must degenerate if he leads an isolated existence beyond the pale of human society. that is just the reason why the social order arises, viz., that it may react favourably upon the individual. [178]
1 the way in which the above view has influenced psychology, physiology, etc., in various directions has been set forth by the author in works published after this book. here he is concerned only with characterising the results of an open-minded study of thinking itself. ↑
2 the passage from page 146 down to this point has been added, or rewritten, for the present revised edition. (1918). ↑
3 a complete catalogue of the principles of morality (from the point of view of metaphysical realism) may be found in eduard von hartmann’s ph?nomenologie des sittlichen bewusstseins. ↑
4 translation by abbott, kant’s theory of ethics, p. 180; critique of pure practical reason, chap. iii.
