as there were no signs of any french force approaching the position held by the portuguese, terence moved his regiment a short distance forward, to a point which enabled them to obtain a view right down the valley in which the conflict was taking place. he then allowed them to fall out of their ranks; knowing that in less than a minute from the call being sounded they would be under arms again, and in readiness to move in any direction required. then, with herrara and his three english officers, he moved a short distance away and watched the scene.
as soon as regnier's columns had crossed the bottom of the ravine, their guns along the crest opened fire on the british position facing them.
"they are too far off for grape," terence said. "you remember, ryan, at corunna, how those french batteries pounded us from the crest, and how little real damage they did us. a round shot does not do much more harm than a bullet, unless it strikes a column in motion, or troops massed in solid formation.
"those fellows are mounting the hill very fast."
"they are, indeed," ryan agreed. "you can see how the line of smoke of our skirmishers on the hillside gets higher and higher."
"i wish our regiment was there, colonel," bull said. "we might do some good; while here we are of no more use than if we were a hundred miles away."
"no, no, bull, that is not the case. if the french had not seen that this position was strongly held, they might have moved a division by this road and, if they had done so, they would have turned the main position altogether, and forced wellington to fall back, at once. so you see, we are doing good here; though i do not say that i should not like to be over there."
"the french will soon be at the top of the hill," herrara exclaimed. "see how they are pushing upwards."
"they certainly are gaining ground fast," macwitty said. "they are within a hundred yards of the top. our men don't seem to be able to make any stand against them at all.
"colonel, the lower column is turning off more towards their left."
"they had better have kept together, macwitty. it is evident that picton's division is hard pressed, as it is and, if those two columns had united and thrown themselves upon him, they would have broken right through our line. as it is, the second party will have leith's division to deal with. do you see one of his brigades marching swiftly to meet them, and some guns sweeping the french flank? i wish we were nearer."
the scene had become too exciting for further conversation, and they watched almost breathlessly. the line of smoke on the top of the crest showed that the head of the column had made good its footing there; while the quick puffs of smoke, and the rattle of musketry, denoted that the other column was also within a short distance of the summit. but leith's regiments were approaching the spot at the double. presently there was the crash of a tremendous volley, and then the leading regiment disappeared over the brow of the hill, and into brushwood. the roar of musketry was heavy and continuous, and then ryan gave a joyous shout, as it could be seen that the two long smoke wreaths were becoming mixed together, and that the movement was downwards and, ere long, the dark masses of troops could be seen descending the hill even more rapidly than they had climbed it. leith's second brigade was now approaching the scene of the struggle, and was near at hand; hill's division was seen in motion towards the same spot.
"that is all right now," terence said; "but there is another big fight going on, further up the valley."
it was too far off to make out the movements of the troops but, even at that distance, the smoke rolling up from the hillside gave some idea of the course of the fight. here, too, after mounting more than halfway up the slope, it could be seen that the tide of war was rolling down again; though more slowly, and with harder fighting than it had done in the struggle nearer to them. and when at last the firing gradually ceased, they knew that the french had been repulsed, all along the line.
"the men had better open their haversacks and eat a meal," terence said. "we may get an order to move, at any moment."
no orders came, however, and the troops remained in the positions that they occupied until the following morning. then a heavy skirmishing fire broke out and, for some time, it seemed as if the battle was to be renewed. no heavy masses of the french, however, came down from the hill on their side to support the light troops in the valley and, in the afternoon, the firing died away. towards evening a staff officer rode up, at full speed, and handed a note to terence.
"the french have turned our left by the royalva pass. trant has failed to check them, and the whole army must fall back. these are your instructions."
the mishap had not been trant's fault. he had been sent by the portuguese general on a tremendous detour and, when he arrived at the position assigned to him, his troops were utterly exhausted by their long and fatiguing march. a large proportion had deserted or fallen out and, with but 1500 wearied and dispirited men, he could offer but little resistance to the french advance and, being attacked by their cavalry, had been driven away with loss. terence opened the note.
"you will march at once. keep along on this side of the mondego, breaking up your command into small parties, who will visit every village within reach. all of their inhabitants who have not obeyed the proclamations, and retired, are to leave at once. destroy all provisions that you can find. set fire to the mills and, where this is not practicable, smash the machinery and, bearing south as you go, spread out over the country between the zezere and the sea, and continue to carry on the duty assigned to you, compelling the peasants to drive their animals before them, along the roads to lisbon."
"i understand, sir," terence said, after reading the note, "and will carry out the orders to the best of my ability."
five minutes later the regiment was under arms. terence called the whole of the officers together, and explained the instructions that he had received. the two battalions were broken up into half companies which, as they marched along the mondego, were to be left behind, one by one; each party, when left, turning south, and proceeding to carry out the orders received. in a few cases, only, were companies to keep intact as, although a hundred men would be ample for the duty at the large villages, two hundred would not be too much in a town like leiria.
on reaching foz d'aronce, half a battalion moved to the east, to work down by the river zezere. the rest turned to the right, to follow the course of the mondego down to the sea. for convenience, and in order to keep the troops in hand, bull, macwitty, ryan, and herrara each took the command of half a battalion; with orders to supervise the work of the companies belonging to it, and to keep in touch with the nearest company of the next battalion, so that the two thousand men could advance, to a certain extent, abreast of each other.
foz d'aronce had already been evacuated by its inhabitants, but in all other villages the orders were carried out. by daybreak the last company in the two battalions reached the sea coast and, after two hours' rest, began its march south. the others had long been at work.
it was a painful duty. the frightened villagers had to be roused in the darkness, and told that the french were approaching, and that they must fly at once, taking their animals and what they could carry off in carts away with them. while the terrified people were harnessing horses to their carts, piling their few valuables into them, and packing their children on the top, the troops went from house to house, searching for and destroying provisions, setting fire to barns stored with corn, and burning or disabling any flour mills they met with.
then, as soon as work was done, they forced the villagers to take the southern road. there was no difficulty in doing this for, although they had stolidly opposed all the measures ordered by wellington, trusting that the french would not come; now that they had heard they were near, a wild panic seized them. had an orderly retreat been made before, almost all their belongings might have been saved. now but little could be taken, even by the most fortunate. the children, the sick, the aged had to be carried in carts and, in their haste and terror, they left behind many things that might well have been saved.
the peasantry in the villages suffered less than the townspeople, as their horses and carts afforded means of transport: but even here the scenes were most painful. in the towns, however, they were vastly more so. the means for carriage for such a large number of people being wanting, the greater number of the inhabitants were forced to make their way on foot, along roads so crowded with vehicles of every kind that the british divisions were frequently brought to a standstill, for hours, where the nature of the country prevented their quitting the road and making their way across the fields.
on the 29th, the greater portion of the british troops passed the mondego. hill retired upon thomar, and the rest of the troops were concentrated at milheada. the commissariat stores followed the coast road down to peniche, and were embarked there. the light division and the cavalry remained, after the main body had been drawn across the mondego, north of that river.
soon after starting on his work, terence learned that the british troops had passed through pombal, leiria, and thomar. it was consequently unnecessary for him to endeavour to clear those towns.
the delays caused at every village rendered the work slow, as well as arduous. the french drove the light division through coimbra and, following, pressed so hotly that a number of minor combats took place between their cavalry and the british rear guards. before leiria the rear guards had to fight strongly, to enable the guns to quit the town before the french entered it.
terence presently received orders to collect his regiment again and, crossing the zezere, to endeavour to join trant and the other leaders of irregular bands, and to harass massena's rear. he had already, knowing that great bodies of french cavalry had crossed the mondego, called in the companies that were working leiria and the coast; as they might otherwise have been cut up, in detail, by the french cavalry. with these he marched east, picking up the other companies as he went and, on the same evening, the regiment was collected on the zezere.
having followed the river up, he reached foz d'aronce and then, finding that several bodies of french troops had already passed through that village, he turned to the left and camped close to the mondego; sending ten of his men over the river, in peasants' clothes, to ascertain the movements of the enemy. one of them returned with news that he had come upon a party of trant's men, who told him that their main body were but two miles away, and that there were no french north of coimbra.
the regiment had made a march of upwards of forty miles that day. therefore, leaving them to rest, terence forded the mondego and rode, with ryan, to trant's village.
"i am glad, indeed, to see you, o'connor," the partisan leader said, as terence entered the cottage where he had established himself. "is your regiment with you?"
"yes, it is three miles away, on the other side of the river. we have marched something like eighty miles, in two days. we have been busy burning mills and destroying provisions, but the french cavalry are all over the country, so i was ordered to join you, and aid you to harass the french line of communication, and to do them what damage we could."
"there is not much to be done in the way of cutting their communications; at least, there is nothing to be done to the north and east of this place, for massena brought all his baggage and everything else with him; and cut himself loose, altogether, from his base at ciudad. if the people had but carried out wellington's orders, massena would have suffered a fearful disaster. we have learned, from stragglers we have taken, that the fourteen days' provisions with which they marched were altogether exhausted; and that they had been unable to obtain any here. they would have had to retreat, instantly; but i hear that, in coimbra alone, there is enough food for their whole army, for at least two months."
"but could we not have destroyed it, as we retreated?"
"of course, we ought to have done so," trant said; "but from what i hear, the affair was very badly managed. instead of the first division that went through burning all the magazines and stores, it was left to crawford to do so; and he, as usual, stopped so long facing the enemy that, at last, he was regularly chased through coimbra and, the roads being blocked with carts, his brigade would have been destroyed had the french infantry pushed strongly after him.
"things are just as bad, in the way of provisions, on the other side of the river. we have done a great deal in the way of destroying mills and magazines. i am afraid massena will find enough provisions to last his army all the winter."
"that is bad."
"had it only been coimbra, no very great harm would have been done; for the french troops got altogether out of hand when they entered, plundered the place and, as i hear, destroyed enough provisions to have lasted them a month."
"of course, they hold the town?"
"oh yes! it is full of their sick and wounded."
"what force have you?" terence asked.
"i have 1500 men of my own. miller and wilson, with some of the northern militias, will be here shortly; and i expect, in a few days, we shall have eight thousand men."
"the great thing would be to act before the french know that there is so strong a force in the neighbourhood," terence said, "because as soon as they hear that, they are sure to send a strong force back to coimbra."
"how do you mean, to act?" trant asked in some surprise.
"i propose that we should capture coimbra, at once. i have 2000 men and you have 1500. i don't suppose they have left above a couple of thousand in the town, perhaps even less and, if we take them by surprise, i should think we ought to be able to manage that number, without difficulty. i certainly consider my own men to be a match for an equal number of french."
"it is a grand idea," trant said, "and i don't see why we should not carry it out. as you say, the sooner the better. they may know that i am here, but they will never dream of my making such attempt with a force which, i must own, is not always to be relied upon. they are always shifting and changing. after a long march, half of them will desert; then in a few days the ranks swell again. consequently, the men have little discipline and no confidence in each other, and are little better than raw levies; but for rough street fighting i have no doubt they would be all right, especially when backed by good troops like yours.
"how would you proceed? as yours is the real fighting body, you should have the command."
"not at all," terence said warmly. "you are my senior officer, not only in rank but in age and experience. my orders were to assist you as far as i could and, while we are together, i am ready to carry out your orders in any way."
"will your men be able to attack in the morning?"
"certainly. they will have a good night's rest, and will be quite ready for work, say, at four o'clock in the morning. it is not more than two hours' march to coimbra, so that we shall be there by daybreak. have they any troops between us and the town?"
"they have a post at a village, a mile this side, o'connor. do you know how far their army is, on the other side of the river?"
"i know that they had a division close to leiria, the day before yesterday; but whether they have any large body just across the mondego, i cannot say."
"then we will first surprise their post. i will undertake that. will you march your force down the river, close to the town? i have a hundred cavalry and, as soon as i have captured the post, i will send them on at a gallop; with orders to ride straight through to the bridge, and prevent any mounted messengers passing across it. as soon as you hear them come along the road, do you at once enter the town. i will bring my men on at the double, and we shall not be many minutes after you.
"it would be as well for you to enter it by several streets, as that will cause greater confusion than if you were in a solid body. the principal point is the great convent of santa clara, which has been converted into a hospital. no doubt a portion of the garrison are there; the rest will be scattered about in the public buildings, and can be overpowered in detail.
"i think we are certain of success. i hope you will stop for a time and take supper with me and, in the meantime, i will send down orders for my men to be under arms, here, at half-past three."
illustration: 'good news. we are going to take coimbra.'
terence and ryan remained for an hour, and then rode back to the regiment. the men were all sound asleep, but herrara and the two majors were sitting round a campfire.
"what news, colonel?" the former asked, as terence rode up.
"good news. we are going to take coimbra, tomorrow morning. all massena's sick and wounded, and his heavy baggage are there. they have no suspicion that any force is yet assembled in the neighbourhood and, i expect, we shall have easy work of it. they have a post a mile out of the town. trant will surprise and capture that, at five in the morning. just before daybreak we shall enter the town. we must march from here at half-past three."
"that is something like news, colonel," macwitty exclaimed. "it will cut the french off from this line of retreat, altogether, and they must either fall back by the line of the tagus, or through badajoz and merida."
terence laughed.
"you are counting your chickens before they are hatched, macwitty. at the present moment, it seems more likely that wellington will have to embark his troops than that massena will have to retreat. he must have nearly a hundred thousand men, counting those who fought with him at busaco and the two divisions that marched down through foz d'aronce; while wellington, all told, cannot have above 40,000. certainly some of the peasants told me they had heard that a great many men were employed in fortifying the heights of torres vedras, and wellington may be able to make a stand there; but as we have never heard anything about them before, i am afraid that they cannot be anything very formidable.
"however, just at present we have nothing to do with that. if we can take coimbra it will certainly hamper massena and, if the worst comes to the worst, we can fall back across the douro.
"don't let the bugles sound in the morning. it is not likely, but it is possible that the french may send out cavalry patrols at night. if a bugle were heard they might ride back and report that a force was in the neighbourhood, and we should find the garrison prepared for us. now we had better do no more talking. it is past eleven, and we have but four and a half hours to sleep."
at half-past three the troops were roused. they were surprised at the early call, for they had expected two or three days' rest, after the heavy work of the last eight days; but the company officers soon learned the news from their majors and, as it quickly spread through the ranks, the men were at once alert and ready. fording the river, they marched at a rapid pace by the road to coimbra and, soon after five o'clock, arrived within a few hundred yards of the town. then they were halted and broken up into four columns, which were to enter the town at different points. the signal for moving was to be the sound of a body of cavalry, galloping along the road. terence listened attentively for the rattle of musketry in the distance, but all was quiet; and he had little doubt that the french had been surprised, and captured, without a shot being fired.
soon after half-past five he heard a dull sound which, before long, grew louder and, in five minutes, a body of horsemen swept past at a gallop. the troops at once got into motion, and entered the town. there was no longer any motive for concealment. the bugles sounded and, with loud shouts, the portuguese ran forward. french officers ran out of private houses, and were at once seized and captured. several bodies of troops were taken, in public buildings, before they were fairly awake. some of the inhabitants--of whom many, unable to make their escape, had remained behind; or who had returned from the villages to which they had at first fled--came out and acted as guides to the various buildings where the french troops were quartered and, in little over a quarter of an hour, the whole town, with the exception of the convent of santa clara, was in their hands.
by this time trant had come up, with his command. the troops rapidly formed up again and, issuing from several streets, advanced against the convent. the astonished enemy fired a few shots; then, on being formally summoned to surrender, laid down their arms. thus, on the third day after massena quitted the mondego his hospitals, depots, and nearly 6000 prisoners, wounded and unwounded, among them a company of the imperial guard, fell into the hands of the portuguese.
the next day miller and wilson came up; and their men, crossing the bridge and spreading over the country, gathered in 300 more prisoners; while trant marched, with those he had captured, to oporto.
illustration: plan of the lines of torres vedras.
on the 10th of october the whole of wellington's army was safely posted on the tremendously strong position that he had, unknown to the army, carefully prepared and fortified for the protection of lisbon. it consisted of three lines of batteries and intrenchments. the second was the most formidable; but the first was so strong, also, that wellington determined to defend this, instead of falling back to the stronger line. at the foot of the line of mountains on which the army was posted, stretching from the tagus to the sea, ran two streams; the zandre, a deep river, which extended nearly halfway along the twenty-nine miles of lines, covered the left of the position; while a stream running into the tagus protected the right. the centre, therefore, was almost the only part at which the line could be attacked with any chance of success; and this was defended by such tremendous fortifications as to be almost impregnable.
massena, who had only heard vague rumours of the existence of these fortifications, four days before, was astounded at the unexpected obstacle which barred his way. the british troops, as soon as they arrived, were set to work to strengthen the intrenchments. trees were felled, and every accessible point was covered by formidable abattis. the faces of the rocks were scarped, so that an enemy who won his way partly up the hill would find his farther progress arrested by a perpendicular wall of rock. soon the eminences on the crest bristled with guns; and massena, after carefully reconnoitring the whole position, came to the conclusion that it could not be attacked; and disposed his troops in permanent positions, facing the british centre and right, from sobral to villafranca on the tagus; and sent his cavalry out over the country, to bring in provisions.
to lessen the district available for this operation, wellington sent orders for the northern militia to advance and, crossing the mondego, to drive in the foraging parties. trant, wilson and the other partisan corps were also employed in the work. a strong force took up its position between castello branco and abrantes, while the militia and partisans occupied the whole country north of leiria; and the french were thus completely surrounded. nevertheless, the store of provisions left behind in the towns and villages was so large that the french cavalry were able to bring in sufficient supplies for the army.
during the week that followed, the minho regiment was engaged in watching the defiles by which massena might communicate with ciudad rodrigo, or through which reinforcements might reach him. wilson and trant were both engaged on similar service, the one farther to the north; while the other, who was on the south bank of the tagus with a number of portuguese militia and irregulars, endeavoured to prevent the french from crossing the river and carrying off the flocks, herds, and corn which, in spite of wellington's entreaties and orders, the portuguese government had permitted to remain, as if in handiness for the french foraging parties.
owing to the exhausted state of both the british and portuguese treasuries, it was impossible to supply the corps acting in rear of the french with money for the purchase of food. but terence had received authority to take what provisions were absolutely necessary for the troops, and to give orders that would, at some time or other, be honoured by the military chest. a comparatively small proportion of his men were needed to guard the defiles, against such bodies of troops as would be likely to traverse them, in order to keep up massena's communications. leaving, therefore, a hundred men in each of the principal defiles; and ordering them to entrench themselves in places where they commanded the road, and could only be attacked with the greatest difficulty; while the road was barred by trees felled across it, so as to form an impassable abattis, behind which twenty men were stationed; terence marched, with 1500 men, towards the frontier.
five hundred of these were placed along the coa, guarding the roads and, with the remainder, he forded the river and placed himself in the woods, in the plain between almeida and ciudad rodrigo. here he captured several convoys of waggons, proceeding with provisions for the garrison of the former place. a portion of these he despatched, under guard, for the use of the troops on the coa, and for those in the passes; thus rendering it unnecessary to harass the people, who had returned to their villages after massena had advanced against lisbon.
growing bolder with success, he crossed the aqueda and, marching round to the rear of ciudad rodrigo, cut off and destroyed convoys intended for that town, causing great alarm to the garrison. these were absolutely ignorant of the operations of massena, for so active were the partisans, in the french rear, that no single messenger succeeded in getting through and, even when accompanied by strong escorts, the opposition encountered was so determined that the french were obliged to fall back, without having accomplished their purpose. thus, then, the garrison at ciudad rodrigo were ignorant both of massena's whereabouts, and of the nature of the force that had thrown itself in his rear. several times, strong parties of troops were sent out. when these were composed of cavalry only, they were boldly met and driven in. when it was a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, they searched in vain for the foe.
so seriously alarmed and annoyed was the governor that 3000 troops were withdrawn, from salamanca, to strengthen the garrison. in december massena, having exhausted the country round, fell back to a very strong position at santarem; and terence withdrew his whole force, save those guarding the defiles, to the neighbourhood of abrantes; so that he could either assist the force stationed there, should massena retire up the tagus; and prevent his messengers passing through the country between the river and the range of mountains, south of the alva, by castello branco or velha; posting strong parties to guard the fords of the zezere.
so thoroughly was the service of watching the frontier line carried out, that it was not until general foy, himself, was sent off by massena, that napoleon was informed of the state of things. he was accompanied by a strong cavalry force and 4000 french infantry across the zezere, and ravaged the country for a considerable distance.
before such strength, terence was obliged to fall back. foy was accompanied by his cavalry, until he had passed through castello branco; and was then able to ride, without further opposition, to ciudad rodrigo.
beresford was guarding the line of the tagus, between the mouth of the zezere and the point occupied on the opposite bank by wellington, sending a portion of his force up the zezere; and these harassed the french marauding parties, extending their devastations along the line of the mondego.
although the minho regiment had suffered some loss, during these operations, their ranks were kept up to the full strength without difficulty. great numbers of the portuguese army deserted during the winter, owing to the hardships they endured, from want of food and the irregularity of their pay. many of these made for the minho regiment, which they had learned was well fed, and received their pay with some degree of regularity, the latter circumstance being due to the fact that terence had the good luck to capture, with one of the convoys behind ciudad rodrigo, a considerable sum of money intended for the pay of the garrison. from this he had, without hesitation, paid his men the arrears due to them; and had still 30,000 dollars, with which he was able to continue to feed and pay them, after moving to the line of the zezere.
he only enrolled sufficient recruits to fill the gaps made by war and disease; refusing to raise the number above 2000, as this was as many as could be readily handled; for he had found that the larger number had but increased the difficulties of rationing and paying them.
