angus saw that as he could not hope to obtain further information, however long he might stay, and as he had fulfilled the main object of his mission by discovering that dost mahomed would not be content with remaining master of the northern province, but would certainly advance in the spring, he could do no good by remaining any longer.[pg 199] the information that he could give would enable macnaghten and burnes to show the indian government that their intention of withdrawing more troops in the early spring would be disastrous; and it was with this special object in view that he had been sent. he had on the two previous days sold a portion of his goods, but had held out for the prices with which they were marked. he was now more willing to bargain, as he wished to travel in future as lightly as possible. accordingly, before nightfall he had disposed of nearly half the stock with which he had started; but he had at the same time purchased a certain amount of goods from turkestan, as these would be more appropriate as merchandise when he started from balkh for herat. sadut came again in the evening.
"my friend," he said, "i have been thinking over your position. doubtless you might stay here for some time without its being suspected that you were other than you seemed to be, but a chance word from one of your men might betray you, and as you have really learned all that there is to learn, it seems to me that there is no use in your tarrying any longer here. it is true that dost mahomed, for my sake, would protect you, even were you discovered. still, you know the nature of our people, and were it rumoured that you were an infidel, you might be torn to pieces before either the ameer or myself knew aught about it."
"i have come to the same conclusion. if i thought i could gain anything by remaining i should do so, whatever the risk; but as it would be useless to stay, i intend to leave to-morrow. i have a long journey to make via herat; the sooner i am off the better. my men are now packing up my goods and preparing for a start at daylight."
"i felt so sure that this would be your course that i have brought with me an order from the ameer to the governor and headmen of all towns and villages through which you[pg 200] may pass, enjoining them to give you good treatment, as he holds you in high esteem for having rendered most valuable services to me."
"i thank you very heartily," angus replied. "this will greatly facilitate my journey and save me from all small annoyances. i trust that we shall meet again."
"i hope so indeed. never shall i forget the debt of gratitude that i owe you. perhaps some day i may be able to repay that debt to a small extent. remember, that in case of need you may rely upon me to the utmost. at any rate, you must not refuse to accept this; it is a present from dost mahomed, not to an english officer, but to a persian merchant who has saved the life of his sister's son. he talks continually while with me of the nobility of your action, and when i told him that you were going he had his turban brought and took out this gem, which was its chief ornament, and bade me hand it you in remembrance of the deed. i told him you had said that you would receive no present for a simple act of humanity. more i could not tell him without revealing your secret, though i know that it would be safe with him. you cannot refuse to take this. as for myself, i am here an exile far away from my own people, and have but this to give you as a token of my love. it is my signet ring. if you send it to me i will go through fire and water to come to you. my tribesmen will all recognize it, and will do anything in their power for its possessor."
angus saw that, offered as it was, he should greatly hurt the afghan's feelings if he refused the immense ruby surrounded by diamonds that dost mahomed had sent him.
"i will not refuse the gift of the ameer so given to me, and shall cherish it as my most valued possession and the gift of a man whom i for one, and i may say most british officers, consider to be very badly treated by us. i know from sir alexander burnes that dost mahomed was most[pg 201] anxious for our alliance. shah soojah is as unpopular among us as among his own people. of course, as soldiers, it is not our business to concern ourselves with politics; that is a matter for the government only. still we cannot but have our feelings, and i am sure that should the fortune of war ever place dost mahomed in our hands he would receive honourable treatment. your gift i shall prize as highly, as a token of our warm friendship, and trust that the time may never come when i have to put its virtue to the test, though i well know that i could in necessity rely upon any help that you might be able to give me."
after talking for some time of the best route to follow, sadut khan took an affectionate leave, and angus started the next morning with his party. before setting out he bestowed handsome gifts upon hassan and his followers, whom he had learned to like greatly for the devotion they had shown to sadut and the energy and courage with which they had worked during the journey. travelling from twenty to five-and-twenty miles a day, with occasional halts, he reached cabul after two months of travel. his journey had been greatly facilitated by the order that he carried from dost mahomed. he had not entered herat, as it was probable that he would be recognized there. avoiding the city, he travelled by the same route as before to girishk, and then took a road running a few miles north of candahar and falling into the main road at kelat-i-ghilzye.
his first step was to see sir alexander burnes and to report to him that assuredly dost mahomed would come south with a considerable force as soon as the passes were opened. his following would not itself be very formidable, but he relied upon being joined by all the tribesmen south of the hills.
"your news is most opportune," the agent said, "and can hardly fail to induce the governor-general to alter his deter[pg 202]mination to withdraw the greater part of our force in the spring. already we have not a man too many for contingencies that may arise. now, tell me about your journey. the winter set in so severely directly you left us that i have been seriously uneasy about you. i had only one message from mackenzie after you had left, it was brought by a native; and he told me that you had passed through, but that the weather had changed for the worse the day after you started, and the universal opinion among the natives was that you and your party had perished."
angus gave an account of his journey. he had thought over the question whether it would be wise to mention the episode of the wounded afghan, but he concluded that it would be better to do so, as mackenzie, when he rejoined the force, might casually mention that he had a sick man with him; and he therefore told the whole story as it happened.
"i admire your humanity, mr. campbell, though it seems almost quixotic to burden yourself with a wounded man. but, as you say, it was evident that if you could manage to carry him through he might be of great service to you. undoubtedly he would have been a valuable prisoner to have in our hands, but his gratitude to you may prove valuable to us, for the momunds are a powerful tribe, and your conduct to him cannot but have inspired him with a better feeling towards us than he has hitherto shown."
"he may have less animosity, sir, but i fear that he will still be found fighting against us. on the way he spoke many times of his determination to continue the struggle until afghanistan was free from the infidel; i am convinced that his indignation at the treatment of dost mahomed, and his fanaticism are so strong that no private matter is likely to shake them."
the winter passed quietly, and the attention of burnes[pg 203] and macnaghten was turned rather towards the frontier than to the state of things round cabul. yar mahomed, virtual ruler of herat, although he was receiving large sums of money from us, was known to be intriguing with persia, and trying to form an alliance with the shah to expel the british from afghanistan. russia had sent an expedition against khiva, and the conquest of this little state would bring her more closely to the frontier of afghanistan. dost mahomed, however, had gone on a visit to the ameer of bokhara, and had been detained for the present by that treacherous ruler; thus for a time the prospect of an invasion on his part was greatly diminished.
in the spring macnaghten and shah soojah returned to cabul. the former continued to ignore the warnings of sir a. burnes, as to the ever-growing hostility of the afghans to the british and the man they had forced upon them. his advice and that of burnes had been so far followed that the force at cabul had not been diminished; but, not content with this, macnaghten continued to urge on the indian government the necessity of sending a great force to occupy herat and another to cross the mountains and thwart the projects of the russians by carrying our arms into bokhara. moreover, he was continually applying for money to meet the expenses of shah soojah's government. as if the drain that these demands would entail upon the indian treasury and upon the indian army were not sufficient, he insisted upon the necessity of conquering the punjaub, where, since the death of runjeet sing, the attitude of the population had been increasingly hostile.
it is difficult to understand how any perfectly sane man could have made such propositions. it would have needed the whole army of india to carry them out, to say nothing of an enormous outlay of money. although the governor-general and his council firmly declined to enter upon the[pg 204] wild schemes proposed to them, macnaghten did not cease to send them lengthy communications urging the absolute necessity of his advice being followed.
as the summer came on there were everywhere signs of unrest. in april the ghilzyes cut the communications near candahar, but were defeated by a small body of troops sent from that city. the beloochees, whose country had been annexed, were bitterly hostile, and convoys were cut off. candahar was invested by them, quettah besieged, and khelat captured. with the exception of macnaghten himself, there was scarcely an officer in the army but was conscious of the tempest that was gathering round them. shah soojah was as unpopular among them as among the native population. macnaghten was almost as unpopular as the shah. everyone knew that it was his influence that had first induced lord auckland to enter upon this war, and the levity with which he replied to every warning, and the manner in which he deferred to shah soojah in every respect, and allowed him to drive the tribesmen to despair by the greed of the tax-gatherers, incensed the officers of the army to the utmost.
in the spring the little garrison of bamian were on the point of being reinforced by a sepoy battalion when dr. lord, who had been sent as political officer, received information that led him to believe that jubbar khan, one of dost mahomed's brothers, who was in charge of dost's family at khooloom, was ready to come in. one of his sons had already done so, and lord thought that by sending forward a force to the fortress of badjah he would quicken jubbar khan's movements. it had the desired effect, and jubbar khan came into bamian bringing with him dost mahomed's family and a large party of retainers. this, however, in no way improved the position of the little party at badjah, for the natives in the vicinity exhibited the greatest hostility. the[pg 205] officer in command sent a detachment under sergeant douglas to escort another officer to badjah. the party was, however, attacked, and although they made a gallant resistance, they would have been destroyed had not two companies of ghoorkas arrived on the spot and beat off the enemy.
in august the startling news arrived that dost mahomed had escaped from bokhara. he was received with open arms by the governor of khooloom and a large force speedily gathered round him. early in september he advanced upon bamian with eight thousand men. badjah was attacked, and although the ghoorka regiment kept back the assailants, it was evident that so advanced a post could not be held, and the force retreated, leaving all their baggage behind them. a regiment of afghan infantry had been raised and were stationed at bamian, but on hearing of dost mahomed's approach they deserted to a man, most of them joining the enemy. even macnaghten could no longer shut his eyes to the serious nature of the position. cabul was full of sikh emissaries, who were stirring up the population to revolt, promising them that the sikh nation would join in driving out the infidel. reinforcements under colonel dennie reached bamian on the 14th of september, and on the 17th dost mahomed with his army approached the place. ignorant that the whole force was upon him, dennie sent mackenzie with two guns and four companies of native infantry and some four hundred afghan horse, and himself followed with four more companies in support.
on joining the advanced party, he found that the whole of dost mahomed's force was in front of him. in spite of the enormous disparity of numbers, he determined to attack; a wise resolution, for although in our indian wars the natives often fought bravely when they attacked us, they seldom offered a vigorous opposition when we took the offensive. mackenzie's two guns opened fire with shrapnel, which had[pg 206] a terrible effect upon the dense masses of the enemy. these were unable to withstand the fire, and soon began to fall back. mackenzie followed them, and again opened fire. before long, dost mahomed's levies broke and fled; and dennie launched the afghan horsemen in pursuit. these cut down great numbers of the enemy, and dispersed them in all directions. the effect of this signal defeat was at once apparent. the governor of khooloom entered into negotiations without delay, and pledged himself not to harbour or assist dost mahomed; the country south of khooloom was divided, he taking half, while the southern portion came under the authority of shah soojah.
the victory caused great satisfaction in cabul, but this feeling was short-lived. dost mahomed after his defeat went to kohistan, where there was great discontent among the chiefs, some of whom were already in revolt. general sale sent a force from jellalabad, which attacked a fortified position held by them, but the assault was repulsed with heavy loss. it was about to be renewed, when the kohistanees evacuated the fort and fled. the fact, however, that our troops had met with a repulse had a great effect upon the minds of the natives. for the first time the afghans had successfully withstood an attack by british soldiers.
throughout the month of october dost mahomed was busy, and at one time approached within forty miles of cabul, when guns were hastily mounted on the citadel to overawe the town, and orders sent to the force at bamian to return at once. dost, however, moved no nearer. sir robert sale was pursuing him, and it was not until the 27th that he moved down again towards cabul, and on the 29th the greater part of the force there marched out to give him battle.
on the 2nd of november the two armies came face to face in the valley of purwandurrah. the ameer at once[pg 207] moved from the village to the neighbouring heights, and the british cavalry galloped to outflank the afghan horse. these were comparatively few in number, but headed by dost mahomed himself, they advanced steadily to meet the indian cavalry. gallantly as indian troops have fought on numberless fields, on this occasion they disgraced themselves utterly. turning rein as the afghans approached, they galloped away in headlong flight, pursued by the afghans until within range of the british guns. their officers in vain attempted to arrest their flight, charging alone into the midst of the enemy. two of them were killed when surrounded by enemies, dr. lord was shot, and the other two cut their way through their assailants and reached the british line covered with wounds. no more disgraceful affair has taken place in the story of our wars in india than this rout of indian cavalry by a third of their number of wild horsemen.
but even yet the affair might have been retrieved had an officer like dennie been in command; had the guns opened and the infantry advanced it might still have been a repetition of the victory of bamian. but sir a. burnes was in authority, and, easily discouraged, as was his nature, he gave no orders, but sent off word to macnaghten that there was nothing for it but to fall back to cabul. suddenly, however, the position was changed by dost mahomed himself. as he rode back after the victorious charge he thought over his position. his imprisonment at bokhara had not broken his spirit, but it had affected him by showing him that the mohammedans of central asia could not be trusted to work together or to unite to beat back the ever-advancing wave of infidel aggression by the british on the south, and the russians on the west. but more than this, the defection of his brother at khooloom, and the surrender by him of his family, had convinced him that it would be[pg 208] vain for him to continue to struggle to regain the throne that he had lost. the kohistanees had risen before he joined them, and he had the satisfaction of showing that his bravery was in no way shaken by his misfortune, and of gaining a success of a most striking description. now at least he could lay down his sword with honour. accordingly, without telling anyone of his intention, he rode off the field with a single attendant, and on the following day reached cabul and rode to the british embassy.
as he approached it he saw macnaghten returning from his evening ride. his attendant galloped forward and asked if the gentleman was the british envoy, and on macnaghten saying that he was so, he then returned to his master; and dost mahomed riding forward, dismounted, saluted the envoy, and handed him his sword, saying that he had come to surrender and to place himself under his protection. macnaghten returned it to him, and told him to remount, and they rode together into the residency, dost mahomed asking eagerly for news of his family, of whom he had not heard since their surrender. being assured that they were well and were honourably treated, he was greatly relieved. a tent was pitched for him, and he wrote at once to his son, begging him to follow his example. he conversed freely with macnaghten, gave him the history of his wanderings and adventures, and assured him that there was no occasion to place a guard over him, as his mind had quite been made up before he came in, and nothing short of force would compel him to leave. his only anxiety was that he should not be sent to england, and on macnaghten assuring him that this would not be the case, and that an ample maintenance would be assigned to him in india, he became perfectly contented and calm.
as a result of his letter, three days later his eldest son, mahomed afzul, came into camp and surrendered. dost[pg 209] remained two days at cabul, where he was visited by many of the british officers, all of whom were impressed most strongly by him, comparing him very favourably with the man for whom we had dethroned him. macnaghten wrote most warmly in his favour to the governor-general, urging that he should be received with honour and a handsome pension assigned to him. he was sent down to india with a strong escort, where he was kindly received by the viceroy, who settled upon him a pension of two lacs of rupees, equivalent to ￡20,000.
unfortunately, just at the time that the ex-ameer returned to cabul a european regiment, a battery of horse artillery, and a regiment of native infantry were recalled to india, and with them went sir willoughby cotton, and the command for the time being remained in the hands of sir robert sale.
angus campbell had not accompanied sir a. burnes when he left cabul with the force which marched out to encounter dost mahomed, but had been left in charge of the office at cabul. he was now his chief's first civil assistant, his temporary appointment to the civil service having been approved and confirmed by the court of directors at home in consequence of the very warm report in his favour sent by eldred pottinger and mr. m'neill. sir a. burnes, too, had in his letters spoken several times of his energy and usefulness, and on his return from his expedition through the passes, both burnes and macnaghten had reported most highly both of his volunteering to undertake so dangerous a mission, and of the manner in which he had carried it out. in return the directors had sent out an order for his promotion to a higher grade, and had ordered that a present of ￡1000 should be given him in token of their recognition of his conduct.
"your foot is well on the ladder now," sir a. burnes[pg 210] had said on acquainting him with the decision of the board. "you will now have your name on their books as one of the most promising of the younger officers of the company, and you may be sure that they will keep their eye upon you. macnaghten will shortly return to england, and i have long been promised the succession to his post. i shall certainly request, and no doubt my wishes will be acceded to in such a matter, that you should hold the position of my chief assistant. as such you will have many opportunities of doing good service, as you will naturally proceed on missions to the chiefs of neighbouring peoples, and will so qualify yourself for some important post in the future."
macnaghten, indeed, was extremely anxious to leave. bodily and mentally he had suffered from the strain and anxiety. he had been promised a high post in india, probably the succession to the governorship of bombay, but it was considered advisable that he should remain at his present post till the country was more settled. the winter passed quietly. with the submission of dost mahomed and his sons there was now no rival to shah soojah, no head round whom those discontented with the ameer's rule could rally. he was the less unwilling to remain, as he thought that an era of peace had now begun, and that his anxieties were at an end. he was soon, however, undeceived. on shah soojah's first arrival in india he had naturally looked to the dooranees for aid against the barukzyes, who had so long oppressed them, and had made many promises of remission of taxation as an incentive to their zeal. these promises had so far been kept, that no taxes whatever had been exacted from the dooranees; but in view of the absolute necessity of raising an income for the expenses of the government, and for the personal expenditure of the ameer and his favourites, it became necessary that all should contribute to some extent to the revenue.
[pg 211]
although this tax was but a tithe of that which they had paid under barukzye rule, the dooranees of the district of the north-west of candahar rose in rebellion, and general nott marched out from that city and defeated them in a pitched battle. for a time the movement was crushed, but the discontent remained. this was rendered more formidable by the fact that the heratees had taken up so offensive an attitude that our mission there had been withdrawn, and proofs were obtained that its ruler was fomenting the discontent in the western province, and was encouraging the disaffected by promising them assistance.
in may more serious trouble arose, this time with the ghilzyes. it had been determined to restore the dismantled fort of kelat-i-ghilzye. the tribesmen viewed the work with hostility, and assembled in larger numbers, and nott sent a force against them under colonel winder, with four hundred british troops, a sepoy battalion, a battery of horse artillery, and a small body of cavalry. the ghilzyes advanced to the attack in great force. the battle was long and desperate, but the volleys of grape from the guns, and the steady fire from the infantry, at last turned the scale, and after five hours' fighting the ghilzyes retired. the dooranees were again in arms, and three thousand men were assembled under their chief at girishk. a small force, under colonel woodburn, marched out against them and defeated them, but having no cavalry on which he could rely, he could not prevent the rebels from retiring in fair order. major rawlinson, the political officer at candahar, again warned macnaghten that the situation in western afghanistan was extremely threatening, but was answered that this was an unwarrantable view of our position, and that there were "enough difficulties, and enough of croakers, without adding to the number needlessly."
but rawlinson was perfectly right, and macnaghten was[pg 212] living in a fool's paradise. the defeated chief of the dooranees was joined by another, and in august a force of eight hundred cavalry, of whom some were regulars, three hundred and fifty infantry, and four guns, under captain griffin, met the insurgents. they were strongly posted in a succession of walled gardens and small forts, but the fire of the guns and infantry drove them from the enclosure, and the cavalry then charged them with great effect and scattered them in all directions. another defeat was inflicted upon the ghilzyes in the same month. for the moment all was quiet again; the only drawback to macnaghten's satisfaction was that akbar khan, dost mahomed's favourite son, was still in the north, and was reported to be gathering troops somewhere near khooloom. in september macnaghten received news of his appointment to the governorship of bombay, and began his preparations for leaving cabul, and burnes looked forward to receiving at last the appointment for which he had so long waited. his position had been in every respect irksome. his views differed from those of macnaghten; he saw the dangers of the position which macnaghten refused to recognize. the reports he addressed to the envoy were generally returned with a few lines in pencil of contemptuous dissent; but he believed that with power to act in his hands he should be able to remedy the blunders that had been made, and to restore peace and contentment in afghanistan.
the troops were now commanded by general elphinstone, who had succeeded cotton. he was a brave old officer, but almost incapacitated by infirmities. he obtained the post simply as senior officer, and was wholly unfitted for command in such a critical time and in such a position. probably had it not been for the assurances of macnaghten that all was going on well, and that the trifling risings had been crushed without difficulty, lord auckland would have[pg 213] yielded to the opinion of his military advisers and appointed general nott. had he done so the greatest disaster that ever fell upon the british army might have been avoided.
nothing could be worse than the position in which the british camp and mission were established. they were on low ground, commanded on every side by hills, and surrounded by forts and villages. they were nearly a mile in extent, defended only by so contemptible a ditch and rampart, that an english officer for a bet rode a pony across them. the commissariat compound was near the cantonment, and occupied an extensive space with the buildings and huts for the officers. it, too, had a rampart, but this was even less formidable than that which surrounded the camp.
things had now settled down. many of the officers had sent for their wives and children, and lady macnaghten, lady sale, and others were established in comfortable houses. the climate was exhilarating, the officers amused themselves with cricket, horse-racing, fishing, and shooting, and lived as if they had been at a hill station in india, instead of in a mountainous country surrounded by bitter foes. october came in quietly, though pottinger, who was now in kohistan, sent unfavourable reports of things there. but these were as usual pooh-poohed by macnaghten. the latter's troubles with the indian government, however, continued unabated. the expenses of the occupation of afghanistan, amounting to a million and a quarter a year, were a terrible drain upon the revenues of india, and it had become necessary to raise a loan to meet the outlay, and the question of a withdrawal from afghanistan was being seriously discussed.
none of the good results that had been looked for had been achieved, nor did it appear likely that the situation would improve; for it was evident to all unbiassed observers[pg 214] that the ameer was upheld solely by british bayonets, and that when these were withdrawn the whole fabric we had built up at so enormous an expense would collapse. the uneasiness of the indian government was increased by the fact that a change of ministry was imminent at home, and that the conservatives, who had always opposed the invasion of afghanistan, would at once take steps for the withdrawal of the troops from the country; and the investigation which would be made into the whole affair would create intense dissatisfaction in england, and lead to the recall of the indian politicians responsible for it. the news stirred macnaghten to fury; but he saw that it was necessary to make retrenchments, and accordingly he largely cut down the subsidies paid to the chiefs. the consequence was, that the leaders of the whole of the powerful tribes, including those round cabul, the kohistanees, ghilzyes, and momunds, at once entered into a hostile federation against the british.
sale's brigade, that was about to start on its way to india, was ordered to attack the ghilzyes at jellalabad, and on the 9th colonel monteith was sent with a sepoy regiment, a squadron of cavalry, and a party of sappers and miners, to keep the passes clear. the force was, however, attacked at the first halting-place, and sir robert sale marched with the 13th regiment to clear the pass from his end. joined by monteith's force, he succeeded in driving the natives from their heights, the sepoys and the british soldiers vying with each other in climbing the almost inaccessible crags. the 13th retired down the valley, and monteith encamped in the khoord cabul pass. he was attacked at night, the enemy being aided by the treachery of the afghan horsemen, who admitted them within their lines. they were, however, beaten off, and monteith was joined by sale on the following day. negotiations were then opened with[pg 215] the ghilzyes; terms were made, but broken by the treacherous tribesmen a few hours after they had been signed.
on his way back to jellalabad sale was attacked more than once in great force, and with difficulty cut his way down. macnaghten, who had determined to leave on the 1st of october, but had postponed his departure for a short time, wrote on that day that he hoped the business just reported was the expiring effort of the rebels.
angus had remained with burnes at cabul. the latter was much depressed by the occurrences that had taken place. he had greatly disapproved of macnaghten's wholesale cutting down of the subsidies of the chiefs.
"how unfortunate am i!" he said many times to angus. "had macnaghten gone but two months earlier, this would never have happened. it has been money alone that has kept the tribesmen quiet, and the very worst form of retrenchment has been chosen. had he gone i should have acted in a very different way. in the first place, i should have told the ameer frankly that the troubles were solely caused by the rapacity of the men he had appointed to receive the taxes. these must be dismissed, and honest and faithful ones appointed in their place. it is the abominable tyranny with which the taxes—of which i believe but a small portion ever get into the treasury—are collected that has brought about the trouble. with proper administration the revenue could be doubled, and the taxation would press much more lightly upon the people than it does at present. now the evil is done, and i shall have to take over the administration when everything points to a terrible catastrophe, with which my name will ever be associated."
