bismarck’s policy.—its gradual growth and political character.—contrast with lucchesini.—bismarck’s open honesty.—vassal and liege.—liberalism a danger.—democracy a danger.—the relative positions of prussia and austria in the federation.—gerlach’s ideal conservatism.
ismarck has now to be politically tested, and amidst all the strange eventualities in the remarkable history of prussia, we perceive, first as a counsellor, then as an actor, and finally as a guide, that the one man emerges, a man ever the same, yet ever appearing to change. otto von bismarck is best to be compared to a tree, which continues the same, although gaining in height and strength by growth; whose lofty top, with its wide-spreading leaves, alters its appearance at each new spring, to a greater or lesser degree; it remains the same, even if the wind bends the trunk, despite its toughest power of resistance, slightly[158] aside; an imperfect twig may be broken off by the storm, or a heavy rain-fall may bare one of the deep roots, and abandon the growing power a prize to the effects of the breeze and the sun.
the altered appearance which bismarck at different times has presented, has blinded many eyes; many thought he had grown into another man, as he presented himself ever stronger, mightier, and of greater stature! of course, he has long since become too great, too strong, and too mighty for his opponents, and some have found, in a manner not so entirely agreeable, the influence of the wide-spreading tree with its potent shadow.
there have certainly been alterations in the man, but none of them inconsistent with the growth of the tree. the simile may not be accurate, but it indicates the truth. bismarck has himself pointed out the changes which he has undergone very much better by the modest sentence, “i have learnt something!” perhaps he did not always learn the best, but he has learnt more than many who now turn maliciously from him, because they could not keep step with him; some others, also, because they would not.
we owe to guizot the expression of the same thought, so moderately phrased by bismarck, in the pointed french remark, “l’homme absurde seul ne change pas!” the word, however, is somewhat suspicious in the mouth of the french statesman, for its utterance is pro domo, as an excuse for various political apostasies.
now, in bismarck there is no trace of apostasy throughout his political life, and perhaps in no statesman can an enduring political principle be more easily discovered, and followed into detail—if we only adhere to facts, and do not allow ourselves to be diverted by absurd misinterpretations of his words, the diatribes of political opposition, or the hollow declamation of foolish party babblers.
this is the more easy, as bismarck is precisely the opposite of one of his predecessors in the foreign office of prussia. the cunning of the marquis of lucchesini,[34] a predecessor of bismarck,[159] had become so well known, so proverbial, that none of his negotiations ever led to any thing, because whoever was representing the other side always commenced with the conviction that lucchesini would, in the end, outwit him. a certain degree of confidence, however inconsiderable, is necessary on both sides, if political arrangements are to end in results. bismarck, on the other hand, is a thoroughly honest politician—honest to such a degree that his political adversary is sometimes puzzled, and suspects some snare in his very openness. bismarck is a thoroughly honest man, who scorns every intentional deception on the part of his opponents.
we are well aware that this assertion will be met in many circles with scornful contradiction; but it is nevertheless true, and we will demonstrate the proposition. but they also err, who may perhaps believe that we are of opinion that we have, in this, said something flattering to the minister-president; we merely acknowledge that this honesty has been implanted in the nature of bismarck by the almighty, that it could not but develop itself and become a sustaining principle; but such acknowledgment does not constitute flattery.
bismarck rode into the political lists in 1847 as a courageous, sensible, and honorable man, and has held his place in the arena for more than twenty years as a loyal champion of the king, both in single combat and general battle. he has made mistakes in his innumerable contests, but he has learnt from them, has gallantly paid in person, and never concealed or denied his colors or insignia.
even the most furious opponents of these colors and insignia can not deny this.
we have not used the simile of the knightly tournament unadvisedly,[160] for the whole political faith of bismarck is founded on a chivalric idea, in the deep immovable conviction of his personal position towards the prussian sovereignty. the ultimate foundation of bismarck’s political action consists in his personal position as an alt mark vassal and nobleman to his liege lord, the margrave of brandenburg, the king of prussia. it will be understood that this position is the ultimate, but not precisely the only one; it is only the least, but also the inmost circle, whence the other principles around him have evolved themselves, according to his consciousness. as the liegeman stood in personal relation to his lord, so the deputy stood to the king, and the relation to the regent was analogous to the relation of the minister-president and chancellor of the diet to the king and chief of the north german federation. from this strong consciousness of the moral connection of his own person with that of the sovereign, his liege, bismarck’s whole political acts arise and may be discerned.
king william is, however, aware of the construction which bismarck places upon their inter-relations, and in this, on the one hand, lies the strength, on the other the weakness, of the position held by bismarck, as chief counsellor of the king. this hint may here suffice.
and if we now contemplate, from this point of view, the whole political life of bismarck—his speeches, his letters, his dispatches and ordinances, the result of his exertions everywhere, from the beginning until now—what do we find? the same loyal brandenburg statesman, who, in chivalrous and liege faith, has grown greater in courage and self-sacrifice; learning more how to perform his functions as year by year has passed away; with greater self-possession and good-humor before the throne of his monarch; before that throne, in his conception, the bulwark of prussia and germany, and defended by him with equal zeal against inward detractors and outward foes.
at the first united diet, in the year 1847, he was impressed with the idea that liberalism might endanger the throne of his liege; it was not a perfect conviction, but the daring phrase roused him; he supposed he saw danger, and he instantly showed a firm front to it.
at that time he was but little acquainted with the use of parliamentary[161] weapons; his opponents were far more experienced in eloquence than himself, and he stood, as it were, almost alone before a multitude; for those of his own opinions, with the exception of the two manteuffels, perhaps, were still less experienced speakers than he; but the bravery with which he encountered the word “liberal” deserved all praise. the bold attitude with which he entered the arena revealed to his opponents that the unknown dyke captain from the banks of the elbe was not a man to be undervalued by them; this they did not do; and the fierce irony with which they, with more or less talent, overwhelmed him, betrayed the fact that in this junker the crown had found a mighty defender.
when the second united diet took place, the enemy of the kingdom was no longer liberalism, but democracy, and bismarck met this foe with the most unhesitating conviction. but the nobleman who honors in the king of prussia his liege lord, is by no means the aga, or pasha, of an oriental sultan, blindly obedient and adoring. the manly words of bismarck were a rebuke, not only to the low, but the high.
in 1849-’51 bismarck occupied a position in the diet, as one of the chief leaders of the conservative party against democracy. he entered into the strife with ardor, both at berlin and erfurt; wherever he saw the sovereignty of prussia assailed, he sprang to the breach with decision. he seemed to have a fine intuition for every thing hostile to his beloved sovereignty.
when ambassador at frankfurt to the federation, he at once recognized the impending ruin of prussia to consist in the false position she there occupied, and he arrived at the conviction that the jealousy of austria would strive to retain prussia in this position, and not only that, but would employ itself in active measures, by which it should end in the final destruction of germany. he therefore resolved upon opposition to austria. this was not a very easy task; the compact between prussia and austria had descended to him from his fathers as a sacred tradition. he would readily have held out his hand, he would have desired earnestly to remain true to tradition; nor did he remit in attempts and offers, until he knew that there was a change coming over the policy of austria not tending to the good of prussia and germany. he then changed with military precision. the[162] vassal approached with full front before the throne of his liege, even against austria. he did not do it secretly, but openly and honestly; every one might be able to tell how it fared with him everywhere. he defined his position in writing from frankfurt, from st. petersburg, from paris, both by his own hand and by that of others.
and when, in 1862, he entered upon the conflict inherited by him from the new era, the result of the thorny fight, at the head of the government, it was the mightiness of the kingdom, the position of his liege lord, for which he fought for years with body and soul against the pretensions of the parliamentary spirit, with glorious devotion and tough brandenburg tenacity.
the interior defense of the prussian monarchy, in its inherent integrity, the rehabilitation of the liberty of germany, so important for its own safety, and a dignified attitude towards foreign nations, constitute the unity of the policy of bismarck.
liberalism, democracy, the inimical jealousy of austria, the envy of foreign nations, with its train of parliamentary spirit and specialisms—such are the enemies of the prussian sovereignty; and bismarck has, with equal courage and firmness, with as[163] much insight as success, fought openly and honestly against these. and if all outward symptoms do not deceive us, he is now powerfully preparing against another great foe of real sovereignty—that is, bureaucracy, still lying armed to the teeth behind the table of green cloth as its stronghold.
in these different contests it is quite possible that bismarck may often have erred; he may not immediately have found the right weapons, and he may also not have employed them in the proper localities. it is certain there is much to blame, much to deplore; but accept him in all that is great and real, then most persons will voluntarily bow before the man, who, for twenty years, has fought so great a battle, with visor down, without false deceit or any kind of malice. nor has the man earned his hard victories without having had to pay for them.
bismarck has not destroyed the enemies of the prussian monarchy; this is in the power of no man—nor perhaps was it within the sphere of his intentions; but he has subdued them, and in greater or lesser proportion made them serviceable to the interests of the crown.
one of the chief difficulties in his political action is, on the one hand to discipline these elements which so very unwillingly serve the prussian monarchy, and on the other to spare the perfectly intelligible sensitiveness of ancient fidelity, and to conquer the readily understood want of confidence of his own old coadjutors in the gay ranks of his new allies. he is thus met with the idealistic conservatism of gerlach, whose organ was the “neue preussische zeitung” for so many years. gerlach’s principal service consisted in the actual formation of a political conservative party in prussia—an idealism long revered by bismarck, but certainly not to be contained within its own bounds when opposed to those demands which are made on a guiding statesman by the hard necessities of daily life. the old conservative party of prussia has made great sacrifices, and is making them daily; but she makes them to the glorious kingdom of prussia, and it is a high honor to be the regnant party when a bismarck is the king’s first councillor. and, indeed, is it possible for the conservative party to be otherwise than the reigning party in prussia?
the tried prussian patriotism of the conservatives will not allow[164] itself to be disconnected by details from the great statesman who has emerged from their ranks; they know that bismarck not only is frequently compelled to pour his new wine into old bottles, but also to pour his old wine into new bottles. the good is not always the enemy of the better, but sometimes the bridge to the best and highest. the lightning does not pursue the course where it finds the best conductor, but that in which the sum of conduction is the most powerful. bismarck’s real policy consists in forcing parties unwilling to do so, to work and strive for the monarchy. in royal prussia no party can any longer exist with the object of weakening the royal power. there will always continue to be a number of those whose efforts are more or less openly directed to such an end; but no party dare, as such, to acknowledge such an aim.
if we, then, see the unity of bismarck’s policy to consist in the defense of the sovereignty, it might almost seem as if this policy were of a negative character; but this is only apparent, for such a defense leads to positive creations, although at first sight they may appear as mighty beginnings—such as the north german confederation—and are not all so evident to the eye, as may be seen on the map of the kingdom of prussia since 1866.
we shall now accompany bismarck to the assembly of the three estates of the first united diet, then from battle-field to battle-field at berlin, at erfurt, and at frankfurt, until those of k?niggr?tz and nicolsburg, and still farther, for the great contest is not yet fought out—the last victory is not won. the statesman whom god will yet awaken to enter upon the inheritance of bismarck, and continue his work, will find new and mighty armor, the creation of king william and bismarck, in which to encounter the enemy with the ancient prussian war-cry, “mit gott für k?nig und vaterland!”—“with god for king and country!”
